Thats been addressed in earlier posts, but it bears examining again. OTL the Brits started running convoys past Axis occupied Sicily in June 1943 & warships in May. That is they were using the Mediterranean route before Op HUSKY & before the Axis were driven out of Sicily.
Normandy 1943
- Thread starter Julian
- Start date
Thats been addressed in earlier posts, but it bears examining again. OTL the Brits started running convoys past Axis occupied Sicily in June 1943 & warships in May. That is they were using the Mediterranean route before Op HUSKY & before the Axis were driven out of Sicily.
Probablly half those in my list should be dropped. They were either training or home guard formations. The HQ existed but when you pick through the regimental histories they are missing. ie: the regiments that formed the rifle brigade of the 4th Canadian Armored Div did not arrive in the UK until mid 1943. Guard duty in Jamaica or Newfoundland had been their role until summer 43. Unit histories show both the 4 Cdn AD & the 1 Pol AD went through a long training exercise in the winter of 43-44. In another itteration of this discussion subject one of the participants went through the condition of the Commonwealth units in the UK & thought that between 12 & 15 divisions could be made ready for the summer of 43.
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B-24s and PB4Ys had their P&W R-1830 replaced with Wright R-2600s from B-25s postwar when converted to Borate Bombers for firefighting
Boeing did test a single prototype with Allisons, so going larger Radial shouldn't be a problem, esp. if they just graft B-25 firewalls to the existing nacelles
The item I posted Friday Post #71 is a rough list for the Commonwealth. You can use that to crosscheck with unit histories available on the web, or in the books. Below is a similar rough list for the US. It is drawn from Stauntons US Army OB for WWII with some crosschecking with unit histories. It still needs much refinement. If you have questions please ask. &* I reiterate, cross check with unit histories.
1943 At Start
5 Infantry Div Iceland 3/42
29 Infantry Div UK 11/42
1 Infantry Div Tunisia Torch US to UK 8/42
3 Infantry Div Morroco Torch, Husky, Dragoon
9 Infantry Div Morroco Torch To UK 11/43
34 Infantry Div Tunisia Torch US to UK 1/42
1 Armored Div Tunisia Torch US to UK 5/42
2 Armored Div Morroco Torch Husky to UK Autum 43
45th Infantry Div US to Africa/Sicily 6/43
88th Infantry Div US to Africa 12/43, to Italy Feb 44
1944 Movement
4th Infantry Div US to UK 1/44
501 Abn Reg US to UK 1/44
113 Cav Gp US to UK 1/44
5th Armored Div US to UK 2/44
6th Armored Div US to UK 2/44
30 Infantry Div US to UK 2/44
15 Cav Gp US to UK 3/44
106 Cav Gp US to UK 3/44
2 Cav Div US to Africa 3/44
85 Infantry Div US to Italy 4/44
79 Infantry Div US to UK 4/44
90 Infantry Div US to UK 4/44
2 Cav Gp US to UK 4/44
91 Infantry Div US to Italy 4/44 ?
35 Infantry Div US to UK 5/44
83 Infantry Div US to UK 5/44
517 Abn Reg US to Italy 5/44
3 Cav Gp US to UK 6/44
That is very interesting. Perhaps you might toss in some detailed informations about the conversion?
Going from R-1820 to R-2600 adds perhaps a ton, if not more to the empty weight of the B-17. Need a bigger turbo, intercoolers, oil system, cowling, engine bearers, props - another 1000 lbs? Fuel consumption will go up considerably, too.
The V-1710 on B-17 was not much of a hassle, though.
A few points on the OP relating directly to a 1943 (or 1942) invasion operation.
Its worth repeating just how sucessfull the Allied, Soviet & Brit/US, deception operations were from 1942. This was in part by the insights the Allies had onto the highest German command levels via ULTRA and spies. They could gain some judgement on how effective their efforts were & adjust them. that is they had a feed back loop working with the deception ops.
This went far beyond Rundsteadt & had its roots at the end on 1940 when it was clear the Bits were not going to seek peace and would remain a threat. At that point the requirements for the planned attack on the USSR & then the emerging need for mobile corps in the Balkans and Africa meant no mobile field armies could remain in the west. Even retaining horse draught levels of mobility was questionable. The only good option was to occupy and improve the existing French fortifications defending each port. If the British did invade somehow the port garrisons would have to hold out until a mobile field army could be organized and deployed to France.
This strategy remained in place into 1943. While eventually mobile corps were stood up in the west, some horse draught some motorized, There were though 1942 & most of 1943 completely insufficient forces to effectively defend the beaches. The port garrisons were grown and expanded their entrenched territory a few more kilometers, but the bulk of the rural beaches were 'defended' platoon size outposts distributed every few kilometers. Of the two infantry divisions defending the Cotientin peninsular in October 1942 one was largely static & centered on Cherbourg. The other had a regimental battlegroup out posting each coast, and a third regiment in reserve inland. The nearest armored corps was dispersed at training sites in the interior & 48 to 72 hours away.
Rommels ideas for halting an invasion on the beach were wholly impractical before mid 1943, & even then of only limited applicability through the winter of early 44. The addition of new units to the western front OB during 1943 reached a tipping point late in the year, making a continual beach defense possible. That led to the decision to invest massive resources in continuing the fortification of the coast and redeploy the bulk of the arriving infantry units to beach defense. Note that the port fortification centers were retained & also reinforced with men & artillery. This was a second example of the German defense trying to have it both ways, making the ports invulnerable, and creating a strong defense on the beaches.
Its worth repeating just how sucessfull the Allied, Soviet & Brit/US, deception operations were from 1942. This was in part by the insights the Allies had onto the highest German command levels via ULTRA and spies. They could gain some judgement on how effective their efforts were & adjust them. that is they had a feed back loop working with the deception ops.
This went far beyond Rundsteadt & had its roots at the end on 1940 when it was clear the Bits were not going to seek peace and would remain a threat. At that point the requirements for the planned attack on the USSR & then the emerging need for mobile corps in the Balkans and Africa meant no mobile field armies could remain in the west. Even retaining horse draught levels of mobility was questionable. The only good option was to occupy and improve the existing French fortifications defending each port. If the British did invade somehow the port garrisons would have to hold out until a mobile field army could be organized and deployed to France.
This strategy remained in place into 1943. While eventually mobile corps were stood up in the west, some horse draught some motorized, There were though 1942 & most of 1943 completely insufficient forces to effectively defend the beaches. The port garrisons were grown and expanded their entrenched territory a few more kilometers, but the bulk of the rural beaches were 'defended' platoon size outposts distributed every few kilometers. Of the two infantry divisions defending the Cotientin peninsular in October 1942 one was largely static & centered on Cherbourg. The other had a regimental battlegroup out posting each coast, and a third regiment in reserve inland. The nearest armored corps was dispersed at training sites in the interior & 48 to 72 hours away.
Rommels ideas for halting an invasion on the beach were wholly impractical before mid 1943, & even then of only limited applicability through the winter of early 44. The addition of new units to the western front OB during 1943 reached a tipping point late in the year, making a continual beach defense possible. That led to the decision to invest massive resources in continuing the fortification of the coast and redeploy the bulk of the arriving infantry units to beach defense. Note that the port fortification centers were retained & also reinforced with men & artillery. This was a second example of the German defense trying to have it both ways, making the ports invulnerable, and creating a strong defense on the beaches.
Cryhavoc101
Donor
Regarding when a 1943 landing should be made - how much did the Allies know about Op Citadel / Battle of Kursk (5th July - 23rd Aug)?
Assuming that the allies new of the plans and assuming that the Germans and their allies had moved their principle units and main assets etc into position in the months / weeks prior to the operation then the Wallies can either wait until they start the op or in the last weeks of June - just before the Germans launch their attacks.
Ideally the Wallies could wait until they have started but I think it more likely that the Wallies pick a date and go regardless of weather or not Op Citadel has started.
Assuming that its before how ready was the Red army to conduct a major offensive in mid/late 43 in the face of German formations moving to the new Western Front?
Assuming that the allies new of the plans and assuming that the Germans and their allies had moved their principle units and main assets etc into position in the months / weeks prior to the operation then the Wallies can either wait until they start the op or in the last weeks of June - just before the Germans launch their attacks.
Ideally the Wallies could wait until they have started but I think it more likely that the Wallies pick a date and go regardless of weather or not Op Citadel has started.
Assuming that its before how ready was the Red army to conduct a major offensive in mid/late 43 in the face of German formations moving to the new Western Front?
I don't believe Stalin would or did share much information with the Wallies, he at most might have told them something big was in the works but that's about as much as he would've shared.
IOTL Stalin was upset about the Wallies not opening up a second front in Europe in 43, I wonder how much the Wallies would have told him about they're plans, I'm assuming they would have at least told him they were going to invade in 43 since IOTL they told him they weren't.
Obviously Stalin knew a lot about it from both battlefield intel, & his spys within Germany. Britain had some information from Enigma decrypts. I've never dug into that aspect much. The half dozen books on my shelf concerning Enigma & the ULTRA system drop a few hints & devote the other 99% of the text to the Battle of the Atlantic, how it supported deception ops, ect...
Its a great idea. Trade off is they might have to settle for a smaller landing operation. If as per the OP a extended Mediterranean campaign is avoided, and Op BOLERO is kept up at full throttle rather than being reduced to only the air and infrastructure portions as in OTL, then a invasion early in the summer may not be much reduced vs a August landing. & a early sumer landing has the advantage of a longer campaign season following.
Given the frequent delays for Op CITADEL you are probablly right. Given all the other scheduling factors for a amphibious operation trying to match a moving target like the CITADEL execution would be impractical.
Take a look at the assorted attacks they did have planned, and the execution dates for sumer & autum.
Both sides were informing the other about the basics of their operations. There were concerns all around about security, but the essentials were shared.
Little bit about techincal aspects, predominatly the aircraft that Allies can deploy, and what LW can do against in 1943.
The Spitfire VIII was a long-range variant of the Spitfire, that, while not as long ranged as future Mustang variants, it sported increase of fuel from 84 gals (in the early marks and IX) to 120 gals, plus of course a drop tank could be fitted. In OTL most of them went to the Med, obvoiusly with a decision to have Normandy landing in 1943 the RAF/Allied units in the Med will not get them. 1658 produced.
Less emphasis to the Med means fewer P-38s will come there, so more is left for the UK. Has good range/radius, firepower, turn, speed and rate of climb; problems are low rate of roll, big size, not that good in dive above 20000 ft, cabin heating. Main problem looks to be there is not enough of them.
Typhoon, Spitfire IX and P-47 have performance and firepower, but lack in range in early/mid 1943. So the Allies can deploy the Spit VIII and P-38 for long-range job, that includes escorting day bombers as far as possible, but with intent to draw Luftwaffe to play. In the meantime, toss in the shorter ranged fighters, together with medium bombers, to chase picked operational/tactical targets.
Leave P-40, Spitfire V and A-36 for Med, that combind with bombers/fighter-bombers keep Axis guessing where the next landing may be.
LW can either join the party, or leave the airspace between bay of Biscay and Ruhr to the Allies AFs. Both choices are bad. Coince #1 means they are out-numbered by a large margin, even if they recall what can be spared from the Med. Neither Fw 190 nor Bf 109 have much options against most of the Allied fighters that will be located in the UK, bar Spit V. Recalling the fighters from East means giving the Soviets the free hand.
Surrendering the airspace obviously means Allies can do what they please.
The Spitfire VIII was a long-range variant of the Spitfire, that, while not as long ranged as future Mustang variants, it sported increase of fuel from 84 gals (in the early marks and IX) to 120 gals, plus of course a drop tank could be fitted. In OTL most of them went to the Med, obvoiusly with a decision to have Normandy landing in 1943 the RAF/Allied units in the Med will not get them. 1658 produced.
Less emphasis to the Med means fewer P-38s will come there, so more is left for the UK. Has good range/radius, firepower, turn, speed and rate of climb; problems are low rate of roll, big size, not that good in dive above 20000 ft, cabin heating. Main problem looks to be there is not enough of them.
Typhoon, Spitfire IX and P-47 have performance and firepower, but lack in range in early/mid 1943. So the Allies can deploy the Spit VIII and P-38 for long-range job, that includes escorting day bombers as far as possible, but with intent to draw Luftwaffe to play. In the meantime, toss in the shorter ranged fighters, together with medium bombers, to chase picked operational/tactical targets.
Leave P-40, Spitfire V and A-36 for Med, that combind with bombers/fighter-bombers keep Axis guessing where the next landing may be.
LW can either join the party, or leave the airspace between bay of Biscay and Ruhr to the Allies AFs. Both choices are bad. Coince #1 means they are out-numbered by a large margin, even if they recall what can be spared from the Med. Neither Fw 190 nor Bf 109 have much options against most of the Allied fighters that will be located in the UK, bar Spit V. Recalling the fighters from East means giving the Soviets the free hand.
Surrendering the airspace obviously means Allies can do what they please.
nbcman
Donor
According to Janusz Piekalkewicz in his book Operation Citadel: Kursk and Orel: The Greatest Tank Battle of the Second World War, the British Secret Service shared information with Stalin based off of Ultra system intercepts. So the WAllies knew of the German plans at Kursk and they could theoretically base their 1943 invasion plans accordingly-although the WAllies might invade too early due to the delays in the start of Op Citadel.
From the linked book review:
I've read that Hitler had some serious misgivings about Operation Citadel and that Manstein was trying to talk him into cancelling Citadel and go on the defensive instead. Considering that Hitler did put a halt to Citadel after the Allies landed in Sicily, what if the Allies invade France before Citadel is launched and Hitler cancels Citadel and goes on the defensive at Kursk?
The Soviet suffered heavy losses at Kursk on the defensive but if Hitler cancels they most likely go on the offense, how bad could this go for the Soviets?
If the Germans lose in the West but win a defensive victory in the East, how much could this change the post war map of Europe?
The Soviet suffered heavy losses at Kursk on the defensive but if Hitler cancels they most likely go on the offense, how bad could this go for the Soviets?
If the Germans lose in the West but win a defensive victory in the East, how much could this change the post war map of Europe?
This is early enough agreements between Churchill and Stalin won't hold up as well. If the West allis are crossing the Rhine in late 44 while the Red Army is stll east of Warsaw the occupation zones will be very different.
For air reconissance its fairly good. It was difficult for the Brits to keep photo recon flights completely away. January thru May 1944 the Germans managed aproxx 125 reconissance flights over south England. Also: There still were running a couple agents in the US, both sending info on ships departing east coast ports. And, during much of 1942 & early their naval radio intel service had gotten inside the Brit convoy code. They also had some info from evesdropping on low grade radio traffic in the UK. They never penetrated the TYPEX encrypted traffic, by some low grade stuff was of use. Finally and most important, the AT3 telephone encryption of the link between the US Embassy in London and Washington DC was open to the Abwehr into early 1943. While sensitive information was prohibited on this link the Germans got a large amount of useful general information off it.
From all that & agents, photo recon, & radio intel in the Mediterranean the Germans OTL managed a partial picture of the Allied build up in the UK. Its not realistic to hand waive all that away in this thread. We have to consider that the Germans will understand there is a build up for some purpose in the UK.
From all that & agents, photo recon, & radio intel in the Mediterranean the Germans OTL managed a partial picture of the Allied build up in the UK. Its not realistic to hand waive all that away in this thread. We have to consider that the Germans will understand there is a build up for some purpose in the UK.
Cryhavoc101
Donor
A credible threat to Crete, Sicily and the South of France and perhaps Norway will need to be maintained during the Spring and Summer of 43 - with fake and not so fake army groups stood up accordingly.
Whats amazing about the British Convoy code is that for far less the cost of a single ship a far more robust system could have been deployed across the entire merchant fleet and escort groups etc and it was long suspected that the code had been broken but bugger all was done about it!
What you have described is what occurred in the Med in 1943. Three times; in March/April over Tunisia, June/July over Sicily, & September over south italy the German air force tried to contest the Allies & in each case was forced to break off the battle as it accumulated unsustainable losses. Since the Allies were building a similar air force in the UK from late 1942 it is possible to create the same conditions over western France as were created over Tunis through Naples.
It looks like there are three directions this landing in NW Europe can go. A. Germans react in strength and strip as much as possible from the east & Mediterranean to defend in France. B. The defense of France remains relatively weak as in OTL, with Op CITADEL & a strong reinforcement of Italy/Balkans going ahead. C. Strength split between all three fronts. Even after years of reading these discussions I'm still unsure which of those favors the Allies more. I still think some variation of C is the more likely course. Hilter was notoriously bad at truing to have it all, & while he frequently seized on the current shiny thing with both hands he also changed his mind moment to moment & ended up splitting the difference. He also had a propensity for 'Collosall Cracks, delaying a major attack repeatedly to build strength. Op CITADEL is the most famous example. The counter attack on the Anzio beach head is another. The Ardennes offensive was set back many weeks to add more Pz Brigades and Volks divisions of questionable value.
Point here is just because the German armies in France are reinforced it does not mean a truly decisive attack will be made on them at any point.
Point here is just because the German armies in France are reinforced it does not mean a truly decisive attack will be made on them at any point.