Normandy 1943

[Crowbar Six]

If the U-boats are tamed 12 months earlier and the Battle of the Atlantic is effectively won in Mid 42 like it should have been with the release of sufficient VLR Liberator Bombers (a mere 50 released from Bomber command in May 43 helped turn the tide) then there will be enough of everything!

It will be necessary to focus everything on the Atlantic so with the exception of Supplying Malta - no arctic convoys to russia or any other major naval op.

Of course this would require the Pod to be in late 41 and the eventual OTL 'Effective' victory in May 43 was the cumulation of several areas of technology and assets ie 10 cm air and Escort mounted Radar, sufficient escorts and escort carriers, effective deployment of Huff Duff and the 'maturing' of the Canadian Navy to name but a few - but had the British and Americans flooded the Atlantic with Hundreds instead of a few dozen ASW Aircraft then hundreds of Merchant ships otherwise sunk are surviving and very likely U-boat losses are significantly higher with U-boats sortieing the Bay of Biscay effectively going to their deaths as per May 43+ and megatons more supplies are reaching the UK.

Do this, focus on getting equipment to the UK, Admiral Pound taking early retirement and Admiral AB Cunningham taking over early and therefore able to bully Portal for a Change (as well as being able to brow beat Churchill) should get us our planes.

After that.....you can have troops storming ashore in Normandy in the Summer of 43 and in Berlin by Christmas.......hmmm?....what?

Harris was going to let those Liberators go only after they were pried from his cold dead hands.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

... and in Berlin by Christmas.......hmmm?....what?

Lets not go overboard. OTL the planning for the post OVERLORD conquest of France & Germany extended to 1946. Antwerp was not expected to be captured until D+180 (actually D+88). Communications centers like Liege, Nancy, Belfort came into US Army hands three to five months ahead of expectations. the Allies crossed the Rhine River six to twelve months ahead of the expected moment.

Given Allied resources in 1943 I'm thinking the winter of 43/44 would be used for building up for a robust attack months later. Under winter conditions in 1944 Cherbourg was ramped up to a capacity of 15,000+ tons daily, a average of 20,000 tons daily under average conditions. Thats sufficient to keep a army of 17 to 23 divisions & support units attacking. Or if the attacking is restrained & the priority for build up then 30+ divisions & army overhead can be sustained while the balance of the port intake is cached.

Note that the Allies dont have to drop the idea of prefabricated ports after this invasion. OTL there was a third prepared to instal in Quiberon Bay in July 44. re: Op CHASITY. As the weather improves in 1944 a new auxillary cross beach facility can be opened and additional forces waiting in the UK can cross over to join the battle. Even if the invasion is confined to Normandy or whatever in 1944 the Allies are still in a much better position in 1944. The landing & the lodgement battle are behind them, as is the build up. They can start the battle for France months earlier & already ashore.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

Harris was going to let those Liberators go only after they were pried from his cold dead hands.

The US leaders share some blame in this. Harris could have been rapidly bypassed had King, Arnold, Marshal... seen the light and given the necessary orders. Coastal Command was not the only team that could have played this game.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

Good weather really starts in May; OTL storms in early and mid June were unusual.

Ironic that both storms of June blew in exactly on the dates of the necessary tides for executing the NEPTUNE landing plan. Had Eisenhower passed on the 5.6,7 June window he'd had to have canceled again for the 19th, 20th, 21st. That sets the invasion back to July 4-6. 8, 9, 10 and 22, 23, 24 May were the previous tide conditions that fit the landing plan. Anyone have a weather report for those dates?

 

[cortz#9]

Ironic that both storms of June blew in exactly on the dates of the necessary tides for executing the NEPTUNE landing plan. Has Eisenhower passed on the 5.6,7 June window he'd had to have canceled again for the 19th, 20th, 21st. That sets the invasion back to July 4-6. 8, 9, 10 and 22, 23, 24 May were the previous tide conditions that fit the landing plan. Anyone have a weather report for those dates?

I was wondering the same thing earlier.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

I started, but didn't finish Atkinson's first book - very good, need to go back to that. Imagine he's got some interesting things to say bout the the whole proposition of going into Italy too.

That would be 'Day of Battle' where Atkinson picks over the Italian campaign to June 1944. I recommend finding a copy of Jacksons 'The Battle for Italy'. Its very old, but I've found it holds up well. Partly because Jackson researched well and partly because he wrote a strictly chronological or event history & stayed out of debating flashy issues. Dry, but if you want a relatively through account of the Italian campaign Jackson is good.

 

[Cryhavoc101]

The US leaders share some blame in this. Harris could have been rapidly bypassed had King, Arnold, Marshal... seen the light and given the necessary orders. Coastal Command was not the only team that could have played this game.

King had his Liberators everywhere but the Atlantic ie everywhere there were no U-boats - he too should have been taken to task over this

Lets not go overboard. OTL the planning for the post OVERLORD conquest of France & Germany extended to 1946. Antwerp was not expected to be captured until D+180 (actually D+88). Communications centers like Liege, Nancy, Belfort came into US Army hands three to five months ahead of expectations. the Allies crossed the Rhine River six to twelve months ahead of the expected moment.

Yeah I forgot the again sorry

Given Allied resources in 1943 I'm thinking the winter of 43/44 would be used for building up for a robust attack months later. Under winter conditions in 1944 Cherbourg was ramped up to a capacity of 15,000+ tons daily, a average of 20,000 tons daily under average conditions. Thats sufficient to keep a army of 17 to 23 divisions & support units attacking. Or if the attacking is restrained & the priority for build up then 30+ divisions & army overhead can be sustained while the balance of the port intake is cached.

Note that the Allies dont have to drop the idea of prefabricated ports after this invasion. OTL there was a third prepared to instal in Quiberon Bay in July 44. re: Op CHASITY. As the weather improves in 1944 a new auxillary cross beach facility can be opened and additional forces waiting in the UK can cross over to join the battle. Even if the invasion is confined to Normandy or whatever in 1944 the Allies are still in a much better position in 1944. The landing & the lodgement battle are behind them, as is the build up. They can start the battle for France months earlier & already ashore.

Yep I agree - I would expect the Allies to have 4 Army groups pushed up to the Rhine possibly as early as Christmas 43 in this scenario and crossing it in force by March 44 (would possibly require a Dragoon in the South in late 43) possibly by forces having performed a maskirovka threatening locations in the Med Before and during the 43 Overlord ops.

 

[galveston bay]

GB:
Politically I completely understand the need to expel Japanese from Aleutians, but practically and supporting your comment, are the Aleutians another case of wasted time and effort better used elsewhere in your view?

Applying your Japanese scheme of maneuver from the Philippines for using, then pulling off and landing else where works regarding Sicily, land there and then immediately send the landing assets and as soon as you can transport and assault troop assets to England.

The Aleutians literally were the worst place in all of World War II for air operations, Kiska and Attu were not significant anchorages to support naval forces and so the threat of Japanese forces from them was minimal. They could have been ignored for the most part and no harm done in my opinion.

That frees up enough assets to land a division sized formation (as that is what was landed at Kiska, 2 US and 1 Canadian brigade sized unit plus the 1st Special Service Force), plus it frees up some old battleships for gunnery support. It also frees up the 6th and 7th US Divisions (both later sent to Macarthur), the single mountain regiment (cadre for the 10th Mountain later) and of course the 1st Special Service Force early.

 

[Oldbill]

I wouldn't have ignored the Japanese forces in the Aleutians. I'd have done everything I could to get them to put more troops there, then seal them off with air and naval forces, mainly subs. The winds up there are quite something (williwaws) and the seas, well they are everything you may have heard about them. Let the IJA sit on those islands, and starve.

 

[galveston bay]

I kind of like North Africa followed by Sardinia and Corsica in July / August, and the French Riveria (going for Marseilles, a very large port) in September, while building up for a landing on the Atlantic Coast. Its a long way from Germany, transportation routes are limited (through the Rhone Valley or through the Alpine and coastal passes between Italy and France) which are relatively easy to harass by air, while still leaving open the option (from the point of view of the defender) of a possible landing in northern Italy and of course the French Atlantic and Channel coasts which require defense.

Of course taking Corsica / Sardinia would funnel German troops into the Riveria and northern Italy, probably at the expense of Sicily and southern Italy (which could be a followup landing in late 1943).

But it definitely complicates things for the Germans. This isn't the decisive push that the OP seems to call for, but it does get you the Allies in France in 1943 and probable success in remaining there.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

Some folks question the US Armys ability in 1943. Here is a rough outline of the British ground combat divisions in the UK and Africa. Fifteen look like they would be of use in a summer 1943 invasion of France. Theres also four Canadian divisions on hand in the UK.

Divisions

1 Inf Formed in UK prewar. To Africa March 1943. To 5th Army for Op shingle

3 Inf Formed in UK prewar. To France June 1944.

4 Inf Formed in UK prewar. To Africa March 1943

5 Inf Formed in UK prewar. To india May 1942. ME Aug 1942.
To Sicily July 1943. To NW Europe 1945

6 Inf Formed in Egypt 1939. Palestine & India March 1940.
To Egypt Oct 1941. to India March 1942. Disolved 1943.

15 Inf Formed in UK Sept 1939. To France June 1944

38 Inf Formed Sept 1939. Sept 1944 redesignated 38 Reserve

43 Inf Formed from Territorial Div 1939. To France June 1944

44 Inf Formed from Territorial Div 1939. To Egypt July 1942.
Disbanded Dec 1943

46 Inf Formed in UK Oct 1939. To Africa Jan1943. To Italy Sept 1943

47 Inf Formed Nov 1940 from 2 London div. Dispersed Aug 1944

48 Inf Territorial Div to Dec 1942. Designated Reserve to end of war.

49 Inf Reformed in UK June 1940. to France 12 June 1944.

50 Inf From Territorial Div. To Egypt June 1941. To Lybia/Tunisia
Feb 1942. To Sicily Uly 1943. To UK Oct 1943. To France June 1944.

51 Inf To Egypt Aug 1942. To UK July 1943. To France June 1944

52 Inf In UK from 1939. To France Oct 1944.

53 Inf In UK from 1939. To France June 1944

54 Inf In UK from 1939. Disbanded Dec 1943

55 Inf Remained in UK entire war

56 Inf To Iraq Nov 1942. To Egypt March 1943. to Italy Sept 1943 To 5th Army for Op shingle

59 Inf Formed in UK. 1939 to France June 1944

78 Inf Formed in UK May 1942. to Africa Nov 1942.
To Italy Sept 1943

Guards Armored Formed June 1941

1 Arm Fomed prewar. To Egypt November 1941. to Italy May 1944

2 Arm Formed Dec 1939. Used to rebuild 7th Arm Jan 1941.
Disolved 1941

6 Arm Formed Sept 1940 in UK. To Egypt Jan 1941. to Italy March 1944

7th Arm Formed Egypt 1939. To Italy Sept 1943. to UK Dec 1943

8th Arm Formed UK Nov 1940. to Egypt July 42. Disolved Jan 1943.

9th Arm Formed UK Dec 1940. remained there & was disbanded July 1944

10th Arm Formed in Palestine Aug 1941. to Egypt April 1942.
To Palestine Jan 1943

11 Arm Formed in UK March 1941. remained there until to France in June 1944

42 Arm Formed in UK Nov 1941. Disolved Oct 1943

79 Arm Formed Aug 1942 as admin HQ for units of specialist vehicles.

1 Para Formed 1941. Move to Africa March/April 1943.
Two brigades returned to UK Dec 1943.

6th Para Formed May 1943. Remained in UK

1 Cdn To UK 1940. To Sicily July 1943

2 Cdn To UK 1940

3 Cdn To UK 1941

5 Cdn Arm To UK 1941

 

[Zheng He]

The Aleutians literally were the worst place in all of World War II for air operations, Kiska and Attu were not significant anchorages to support naval forces and so the threat of Japanese forces from them was minimal. They could have been ignored for the most part and no harm done in my opinion.

That frees up enough assets to land a division sized formation (as that is what was landed at Kiska, 2 US and 1 Canadian brigade sized unit plus the 1st Special Service Force), plus it frees up some old battleships for gunnery support. It also frees up the 6th and 7th US Divisions (both later sent to Macarthur), the single mountain regiment (cadre for the 10th Mountain later) and of course the 1st Special Service Force early.

It frees up some an escort carrier and a bunch of cruisers too.

 

[galveston bay]

It frees up some an escort carrier and a bunch of cruisers too.

they probably stay in the Pacific though... there is always work for an escort carrier, while the old Omaha class cruisers probably remain in Alaska while the other cruisers head south

 

[marathag]

might make the B-17 gunship more viable to help kill more German planes too.

The big problem was they didn't have the speed to maintain formation after the rest had dropped their bombs.

So they ended up straggling.

The YB-40 would have needed R-2600 or V-1710s to get the HP to keep up with formations.

 

[Errolwi]

Some folks question the US Armys ability in 1943. Here is a rough outline of the British ground combat divisions in the UK and Africa. Fifteen look like they would be of use in a summer 1943 invasion of France. Theres also four Canadian divisions on hand in the UK.

Divisions
...

And 2nd (New Zealand) Formed up in Africa, April 1941 (a third of it having detoured via England) To Italy late 1943 after refit. If it doesn't go in via the Med, there will be a delay while the base organisation is moved from Egypt to the UK.

 

[longtimelurkerinMD]

The big problem was they didn't have the speed to maintain formation after the rest had dropped their bombs.

So they ended up straggling.

The YB-40 would have needed R-2600 or V-1710s to get the HP to keep up with formations.

I read that too, but was thinking for the niche short range close support mission was thinking that could be worked with. Especially if they are inside of escort range.

But to your point, don't know enough to comment on whether R-2600 can be mounted to B17s - not I'd guess?

 

[Aber]

Some folks question the US Armys ability in 1943. Here is a rough outline of the British ground combat divisions in the UK and Africa. Fifteen look like they would be of use in a summer 1943 invasion of France. Theres also four Canadian divisions on hand in the UK.

I think it would be slightly more in the UK; Royal Marine division, 4th Canadian Armoured, and 1st Polish Armoured are missing.

Dunn's count for July 1943 has 29 Allied divisions in the UK (including 8 home service only) and 30 in the Mediterranean (Morocco to Persia, so some will be on occupation duty only).

 

[Zheng He]

And 2nd (New Zealand) Formed up in Africa, April 1941 (a third of it having detoured via England) To Italy late 1943 after refit. If it doesn't go in via the Med, there will be a delay while the base organisation is moved from Egypt to the UK.

Maybe they go to the Pacific instead. Still plenty of places for useful employment.

 

[Errolwi]

Isn't shipping going to be a bit short, with no (or maybe less) transiting the Med than OTL?

 

[torten]

Isn't shipping going to be a bit short, with no (or maybe less) transiting the Med than OTL?

Taking Pantelleria and Lampedusa makes the passage a lot safer, and I expect the RAF and USAF could easily gain aerial superiority over the Strait of Scilly. Escort wise, all you really want is something that can scare away Submarines. And in case of a major surface sortie, I'm sure Torpedo bombers, and a battleship and some cruisers in Algiers would make ensure it never happens again.