(Non T-191) Cliches to avoid in a CSA timeline?

[History Learner]

Key points are:
* Sherman had cut off Savannah from being supplied.
* Sherman had sufficient food supplies and controlled several areas where they could forage for more.
* Sherman also wanted the supplies on board the Union ships.

Questions then become:
1) How did Hardee's men escape then
2) If they were sufficient on supplies, why did they need the contents of the ships?
3) As far as the foraging areas go, is it enough to sustain them for a long time? Saphroneth did point out the area Sherman was referring to is much smaller than what his army had used during the campaign.

 

[DaHound22]

To be honest somethings are cliche, but they're also kind of unavoidable. As an example a second war is a near certainty between the two as the CSA probably cant do much more than force a ceasefire or drag the war out til it bogs down into proto-trench warfare. And the European Great War or an equivelent to it is also very nearly impossible to get rid of in this kind of TL (thats why a serbian shooting an austrian somehow got the brits to invade Turkey.) The Confederacy expanding or Lee becoming President after Davis aren't impossible to avoid, but they're just incredibly likely to occur.

Now, that said, plent ACW cliches you could get rid of just based on the fact that they are very unlikely. For example, Lee's not taking Washington, the slavery is literally protected by the CS Constitution so abolishing it would be very, VERY difficult. Also, I find the whole "South goes Nazi" routine to be a bit tiresome and not very realistic. So i would avoid those.

 

[drewmc2001]

... What are some lesser known cliches I should avoid using in a Confederate timeline?
Thank you for your help!

I'm not sure this qualifies as an answer about cliches, but if you write a TL, try to make sure your actions flow smoothly from one to another. Even assuming an early/late CS victory, there is nothing inherently wrong, or cliched in opting for a early emancipation, but the problem that many timelines suffer from is a weak chain of events that seem implausible to your readers. Its very important your main story arcs (your point of emancipation would definitely be a main arc) be firmly grounded in the story leading up to that point. An early or late emancipation simply needs to be well built into your story and be internally consistent within your story.

To that end, most of the advice you have received you should take with a grain of salt (including this post, too). The worst cliche you can put into your story is an illogical or poorly thought out set of events. If you want Britain to ride to the rescue, go for it. But make certain sure the reasons for the intrusion is logical and consistent. That's where so many TLs fail.

Good luck.

 

[galveston bay]

Questions then become:
1) How did Hardee's men escape then
2) If they were sufficient on supplies, why did they need the contents of the ships?
3) As far as the foraging areas go, is it enough to sustain them for a long time? Saphroneth did point out the area Sherman was referring to is much smaller than what his army had used during the campaign.

regarding 3), Saph failed to answer what the Confederacy could do to prevent Sherman from marching anywhere he wanted to, including but not limited to the Confederate powder works at Sibley Mill (125 miles right up the Savannah River), Jacksonville FL, or as he did historically, right through South Carolina.

To face him, the Confederates had to pull what was left of the Army of Tennessee east, and only managed to assemble around 30,000 men to face Sherman, and even then they were not united at all. The entirety of the two eastern departments that Johnson surrendered had around 89,000 including everyone in FL, SC, GA, NC, and what was left in VA after Lee surrendered. The biggest concentration of Confederate troops was 20,000 men.

Sherman had 60,000 as of January 1865, getting reinforcements later

The contents of those ships were useful, things like coffee, small arms ammo, new clothing, a ration reserve (although at no point did Sherman's troops ever really need it), and clothing, tents, new wagons and food for the horde of refugees following him about. But if necessary, Sherman could have done without those while he marched to friendly railroads or even west to the Mississippi River if he wanted.

There was nothing left to stop him that could stop him.

 

[History Learner]

regarding 3), Saph failed to answer what the Confederacy could do to prevent Sherman from marching anywhere he wanted to, including but not limited to the Confederate powder works at Sibley Mill (125 miles right up the Savannah River), Jacksonville FL, or as he did historically, right through South Carolina.

To face him, the Confederates had to pull what was left of the Army of Tennessee east, and only managed to assemble around 30,000 men to face Sherman, and even then they were not united at all. The entirety of the two eastern departments that Johnson surrendered had around 89,000 including everyone in FL, SC, GA, NC, and what was left in VA after Lee surrendered. The biggest concentration of Confederate troops was 20,000 men.

Sherman had 60,000 as of January 1865, getting reinforcements later

The contents of those ships were useful, things like coffee, small arms ammo, new clothing, a ration reserve (although at no point did Sherman's troops ever really need it), and clothing, tents, new wagons and food for the horde of refugees following him about. But if necessary, Sherman could have done without those while he marched to friendly railroads or even west to the Mississippi River if he wanted.

There was nothing left to stop him that could stop him.

Saphroneth's point was, if I am understanding it correctly, in terms of late war intervention by the Anglo-French; the Royal Navy would scatter the supply ships waiting off the coast.

 

[galveston bay]

Saphroneth's point was, if I am understanding it correctly, in terms of late war intervention by the Anglo-French; the Royal Navy would scatter the supply ships waiting off the coast.

Sure, but he also posted that Sherman would be screwed. My point is that Sherman is merely briefly annoyed. Saph also posted that Grant would be doomed, when the very same factors apply. Lee could not stop Grant from marching back into supply whenever Grant chose. Especially by the end of 1864 as Grant is at Petersburg, Sherman is at Savannah and the armies facing them can barely defend themselves.

 

[History Learner]

Sure, but he also posted that Sherman would be screwed. My point is that Sherman is merely briefly annoyed.

In a hypothetical situation where the St. Albans Raid erupts into war and Sherman in December finds himself outside Savannah with the Royal Navy off the coast, then yeah, I think he's screwed. He can't double back at that point because he's already stripped his rear areas clean and the locations around Savannah will rapidly be depleted if he has to resort to siege operations to force Hardee out. I've also got the suspicion that the supplies he wanted off the Union ships most particularly was ammunition, given you can't exactly replace cartridges while living off the land.

Saph also posted that Grant would be doomed, when the very same factors apply. Lee could not stop Grant from marching back into supply whenever Grant chose. Especially by the end of 1864 as Grant is at Petersburg, Sherman is at Savannah and the armies facing them can barely defend themselves.

Lee cannot stop Grant, but geography does. Even the most direct route (Which would involve marching through Richmond in a straight line) back to Union supply lines is 75 miles, during which time Grant would have no access to ammunition and most critically, food. Furthermore, with no access to rail lines, he'd have to destroy most of his artillery train among other supplies.

 

[Fiver]

Questions then become:
1) How did Hardee's men escape then
2) If they were sufficient on supplies, why did they need the contents of the ships?
3) As far as the foraging areas go, is it enough to sustain them for a long time? Saphroneth did point out the area Sherman was referring to is much smaller than what his army had used during the campaign.

1) Escaping troops can move faster and less noticeably than supply wagons. Forrest at Ft Donelson is an example.
2 & 3) If Sherman stayed to besiege Savannah, he had a chance of running out of available forage before the city surrendered. Failure to link up with the Union fleet probably would have left Savannah in Confederate hands, but Sherman was in no danger of of starving or being forced to surrender. Instead, Sherman would have had to continue moving through Confederate territory.

 

[galveston bay]

In a hypothetical situation where the St. Albans Raid erupts into war and Sherman in December finds himself outside Savannah with the Royal Navy off the coast, then yeah, I think he's screwed. He can't double back at that point because he's already stripped his rear areas clean and the locations around Savannah will rapidly be depleted if he has to resort to siege operations to force Hardee out. I've also got the suspicion that the supplies he wanted off the Union ships most particularly was ammunition, given you can't exactly replace cartridges while living off the land.



Lee cannot stop Grant, but geography does. Even the most direct route (Which would involve marching through Richmond in a straight line) back to Union supply lines is 75 miles, during which time Grant would have no access to ammunition and most critically, food. Furthermore, with no access to rail lines, he'd have to destroy most of his artillery train among other supplies.

You are ignoring the point that there is nothing to stop Sherman from marching north in South Carolina, south into Florida,, west into southern Georgia and Alabama, or west north west into the piedmont area of Georgia/South Carolina. His march was only 50 miles across (stripped). There is plenty of land to loot should it be desired.

He doesn't need Savannah at all. About 4 weeks he is 250 miles from Savannah (distance Atlanta to Savannah, length of time March to the Sea) and there is nothing the Confederates can do about it. Savannah isn't even politically necessary, as the election has already happened.

Grant has an immense supply stockpile as of December 1864 at City Point. He has already crossed the James once with a massive pontoon bridge, something he can do again, as the British cannot get their heavy ships up the James to threaten it, leaving it a RN gunboat vs USN gunboat/monitor encounter. Moving up to Fredericksburg is very much within his capabilities. The only problem Grant might have is fodder, and if it comes down to it, he abandons vehicles and guns as he needs to. There is no danger that those can't be replaced. Grant has proven at Vicksburg his ability to move decisively and quickly and to made do with limited access to supplies. No reason to assume he couldn't here.

Basically the window of opportunity to save the Confederacy by British intervention is over after the fall of Atlanta and the summer battles around Petersburg. The Confederate armies are too weak to do much more than defend the ground they are on. As Hood would prove most decidedly when he foolishly attacks at Franklin and Nashville.

 

[Ace Venom]

This is an excellent point, but one of the biggest cliches of Confederate victory timelines is that Union peace negotiators are inept idiots. How often does the Union give back every bit of territory they have captured from the Confederates, plus Missouri or Kentucky as a special bonus prize in return for getting absolutely nothing from the Confederates.

I'll bite on this one. Simply calling for a plebiscite for the sake of one would be a bit ludicrous. Certainly there are timelines where the Confederacy does get Kentucky, but it's usually because either A) Kentucky seceded outright or B) the Confederate invasion in 1862 put the rival Kentucky government in power some way due to some 1862 POD. I once saw a timeline where the CSA managed to get Missouri, but not Kentucky. Much of it does depend on the particular conditions of the time. Outright demanding a plebiscite in the border states is a bit ludicrous on its face, but one could also understand why the CSA might want them in Kentucky and Missouri.

1) Control of Kentucky gives the CSA a more secure border at the Ohio River.
2) Control of Missouri gives the CSA more security for the Mississippi River.

Of course, the USA recognizes these same benefits to the CSA, so this isn't exactly something that could happen easily. Much of this depends on when the CSA wins the war. Once the rival Confederate governments of Kentucky and Missouri exist, the CSA has grounds to ask for a plebiscite. There is one situation where the demand might have success. The CSA already has troops occupying Missouri and Kentucky. At this point, the CSA might have triggered the secession of these states anyway. This is entirely possible in a Trent War timeline. The USA wouldn't exactly be negotiating from a position of strength here. Of course, this outlines all sorts of possible worst case scenarios depending on the success of various Confederate campaigns. General ineptness would likely create far too many difficulties in the Trans-Mississippi for the CSA, but higher rates of success in the West (Tennessee and Kentucky) and the East (Virginia and Maryland) don't seem completely implausible in a Trent War timeline.

As to post war borders, the Union wouldn't give up anything more than the original seceding states, and might (I stress might) allow a plebiscite in Kentucky if the Confederacy relinquished its claims to Maryland, West Virginia, and Missouri, and that would only happen if Confederate troops were sitting on the soil of Kentucky when negotiations started. The only other territory they might give up is Confederate Arizona, and the Indian Territory, but again, the Confederates need to be sitting on it for that to actually happen.

I'd say it all depends on various factors. How long did the war last? How successful were Confederate campaigns in Maryland, Kentucky, or Missouri? Or West Virginia, for that matter? What is the overall effect of British intervention on the Confederate war effort if that intervention actually does occur? Does France jump on the bandwagon if Britain intervenes and send direct military assistance to try to get the CSA agree to allow a French puppet on their border? At that point, I'd say all bets are off so long as they aren't completely in the realm of ASB. If there is no foreign intervention and simply just foreign recognition, the USA can still negotiate from a higher position of strength than if Britain and France actually get involved militarily.

So how do I feel about worst case scenario in the event of British and French intervention?
1) Confederate Arizona would get support from France simply because it would further reduce the Union border with Mexico, but Britain wouldn't exactly want the Confederates to take the entire American Southwest. The CSA wouldn't have any real claim to the remaining part of New Mexico Territory, so the division likely would stand.
2) Indian Territory without much question would go to the CSA. It would give the Union a more favorable border if they kept Indian Territory, but they might not war to keep it.
3) If Kentucky, Maryland, and Missouri secede during this particular war, it would be hard to argue against them. However, a lack of secession by any of these states might still be grounds for the CSA to demand a plebiscite of some sort if Confederate troops are actually present in significant numbers in those states. Britain might be far more supportive of this demand simply because it would potentially put the Confederate border closer to the Great Lakes, which would give some more security in that region. However, Britain might not support the plebiscites on anti-slavery grounds. I'd say a plebiscite for Kentucky or Missouri would be a toss up for British support. French support could also go either way, but I see the French giving much stronger backing towards Confederate claims on Arizona Territory. All of that is a big if, but we're also discussing the worst case scenario.
4) West Virginia could still remain Confederate. This is admittedly incredibly difficult to pull off and it would depend on how long the war actually drags on. Even in a worst case scenario, I'd see this having a small chance of actually happening. The CSA has a strong claim, but unless it can reverse its fortunes in West Virginia, the CSA probably won't get its way there.

Beyond that, I'd say this is the best the CSA could actually get in the worst case scenario outlined above. The CSA (with some assistance from Britain and France) actually needs to be negotiating from a better position of strength to get these sort of benefits. And even then, we're speaking of a worst case scenario for the Union. If the Union avoids the worst case scenario, but still loses the war, then it will have more strength at the negotiating table. But in no way would I ever expect "plebiscite just because."

In this same worst case scenario, Britain might be a bit vindictive and clarify ownership of the San Juan Islands, which hadn't been decided yet anyway. If Britain decides to revise the Webster-Ashburton Treaty in its favor, then a future war between the Union and Britain becomes highly likely. Everything said here would require specific conditions to give an outcome with these particular results. This also avoids completely implausible outcomes. I find it far more likely for the USA to simply bow out in 1863 and seek peace, which would avoid the worst case scenario entirely. In other words, what happens next is entirely timeline dependent.

 

[History Learner]

You are ignoring the point that there is nothing to stop Sherman from marching north in South Carolina, south into Florida,, west into southern Georgia and Alabama, or west north west into the piedmont area of Georgia/South Carolina. His march was only 50 miles across (stripped). There is plenty of land to loot should it be desired. He doesn't need Savannah at all. About 4 weeks he is 250 miles from Savannah (distance Atlanta to Savannah, length of time March to the Sea) and there is nothing the Confederates can do about it. Savannah isn't even politically necessary, as the election has already happened.

Starving the South: How the North Won the Civil War by Andrew F. Smith on Pg 177 states that Sherman had stripped an area 30 to 60 miles wide and 265 miles long, so I'm not sure what you mean by only 50 miles stripped. Georgia was also the breadbasket of the Confederacy, so anywhere else he marches he's going to find much reduced pickings (Especially in the case of Florida), while still lacking in ammunition and reinforcements.

Grant has an immense supply stockpile as of December 1864 at City Point. He has already crossed the James once with a massive pontoon bridge, something he can do again, as the British cannot get their heavy ships up the James to threaten it, leaving it a RN gunboat vs USN gunboat/monitor encounter. Moving up to Fredericksburg is very much within his capabilities. MostThe only problem Grant might have is fodder, and if it comes down to it, he abandons vehicles and guns as he needs to. There is no danger that those can't be replaced. Grant has proven at Vicksburg his ability to move decisively and quickly and to made do with limited access to supplies. No reason to assume he couldn't here.

It's around 80 miles between Fredericksburg to Petersburg, so again I must point out Grant would have to do such a march without food or ammunition.

 

[Fiver]

Saphroneth's point was, if I am understanding it correctly, in terms of late war intervention by the Anglo-French; the Royal Navy would scatter the supply ships waiting off the coast.

Saphroneth did more than assume that late war intervention by the French or the British would scatter Union supply ships; he assumed that it would force the surrender of Grant's and Sherman's armies.

The first is debatable. By 1864, the Union had a lot more ironclads and they had made significant improvements. French or British naval dominance is not clearcut like it would be in a Trent War.

It is far from certain that loss of supply ships would force Grant to surrender. Grant was clearly capable of rapid march on short notice over a sustained period of time while out of supply - he did it in the Overland Campaign. Lee could try to intercept, but that would mean coming out from behind the entrenchments to face Union forces that would outnumber Lee by about 2-to-1. That's more likely to result in Lee's army being destroyed than Grant's.

The loss of supply ships has no real chance of destroying Sherman's army. He would just march north through the Carolinas like he did in OTL. The Confederates had nothing that could stop him.

 

[galveston bay]

Starving the South: How the North Won the Civil War by Andrew F. Smith on Pg 177 states that Sherman had stripped an area 30 to 60 miles wide and 265 miles long, so I'm not sure what you mean by only 50 miles stripped. Georgia was also the breadbasket of the Confederacy, so anywhere else he marches he's going to find much reduced pickings (Especially in the case of Florida), while still lacking in ammunition and reinforcements.



It's around 80 miles between Fredericksburg to Petersburg, so again I must point out Grant would have to do such a march without food or ammunition.

exactly, he stripped an area roughly 50 miles wide from Atlanta to Savannah. However this does not even include plenty of other paths he can take

Florida has Union troops in it, and ports under Union control (Jacksonville since February 1864 for starters)

As to ammunition, all the powder he needs is a mere 125 miles away (see previous post) and he used very little marching to Savannah

Again, who is going to fight him?

80 miles is a mere 4-8 days march. He has food stocks on hand, as well as fodder at City Point, vast amounts of it, its been accumulating all through the Fall. He has more than enough to get to Fredericksburg. Lee has an army that has been malnourished for months, and indeed its animals are at their nadir of strength because of his supply problems and because grazing in winter is poor. He can't catch Grant or even get ahead of him without serious losses just from marching. The Retreat after Five Forks makes that point very plain. Again there is nothing to keep Grant from marching to Fredericksburg should he so desire.

Worst case, Grant is back where he started in June 1864 and Sherman is back in Eastern Tennessee by sometime in January 1865. The South is still in dire straits because of accumulated battle casualties and after the Americans and British settle their differences, Lincoln has the time he needs to finish the job.

Any time after the summer of 1864 is too late to save the Confederacy, particularly after Atlanta falls.

 

[Fiver]

In a hypothetical situation where the St. Albans Raid erupts into war and Sherman in December finds himself outside Savannah with the Royal Navy off the coast, then yeah, I think he's screwed. He can't double back at that point because he's already stripped his rear areas clean and the locations around Savannah will rapidly be depleted if he has to resort to siege operations to force Hardee out. I've also got the suspicion that the supplies he wanted off the Union ships most particularly was ammunition, given you can't exactly replace cartridges while living off the land.

Sherman is only screwed if he maintains the siege of Savannah and then chooses to retreat by a route where he has already used up the forage. Unless the ASB's hand the idiot ball to Sherman, that's not going to happen and Sherman will march north through the Carolinas, just like he did in OTL.

Lee cannot stop Grant, but geography does. Even the most direct route (Which would involve marching through Richmond in a straight line) back to Union supply lines is 75 miles, during which time Grant would have no access to ammunition and most critically, food. Furthermore, with no access to rail lines, he'd have to destroy most of his artillery train among other supplies.

In OTL, Grant marched over 90 miles from Richmond to Appomattox running well ahead of his supply lines. Having to withdraw from Richmond would cost Grant's heavy artillery, but most of his army should be able to escape.

 

[Fiver]

Of course, the USA recognizes these same benefits to the CSA, so this isn't exactly something that could happen easily. Much of this depends on when the CSA wins the war. Once the rival Confederate governments of Kentucky and Missouri exist, the CSA has grounds to ask for a plebiscite. There is one situation where the demand might have success. The CSA already has troops occupying Missouri and Kentucky. At this point, the CSA might have triggered the secession of these states anyway. This is entirely possible in a Trent War timeline. The USA wouldn't exactly be negotiating from a position of strength here. Of course, this outlines all sorts of possible worst case scenarios depending on the success of various Confederate campaigns. General ineptness would likely create far too many difficulties in the Trans-Mississippi for the CSA, but higher rates of success in the West (Tennessee and Kentucky) and the East (Virginia and Maryland) don't seem completely implausible in a Trent War timeline.

In OTL, Confederate attempts to seize Union territory always ended in failure. British intervention will not remove the Confederacy's logistical flaws nor Confederate generals' weakness on the offense. Gaining West Virginia or any of Kentucky or Tennessee requires the Confederacy who can do better on offense on Robert E Lee and probably do it with less resources than Lee had. That's not ASB, but it's very unlikely. Regardless, neither side would accept a plebescites in states they fully control. If a state is divided between Union and Confederate control, I still doubt either side would want a plebiscite; it would have too much chance of becoming a re-enactment of Bleeding Kansas and restarting the war.

4) West Virginia could still remain Confederate. This is admittedly incredibly difficult to pull off and it would depend on how long the war actually drags on. Even in a worst case scenario, I'd see this having a small chance of actually happening. The CSA has a strong claim, but unless it can reverse its fortunes in West Virginia, the CSA probably won't get its way there.

In OTL, the Confederacy couldn't take West Virginia even though they had Lee against Rosecrans.

In other words, what happens next is entirely timeline dependent.

That is the key to any Confederate independence timeline.

 

[Ace Venom]

In OTL, Confederate attempts to seize Union territory always ended in failure. British intervention will not remove the Confederacy's logistical flaws nor Confederate generals' weakness on the offense. Gaining West Virginia or any of Kentucky or Tennessee requires the Confederacy who can do better on offense on Robert E Lee and probably do it with less resources than Lee had. That's not ASB, but it's very unlikely. Regardless, neither side would accept a plebescites in states they fully control. If a state is divided between Union and Confederate control, I still doubt either side would want a plebiscite; it would have too much chance of becoming a re-enactment of Bleeding Kansas and restarting the war.

In OTL, the Confederacy couldn't take West Virginia even though they had Lee against Rosecrans.

Which is precisely when I considered this the worst case scenario involving both British and French intervention. In other words, French troops on the ground in the South and well, you know where British troops would be. Not quite ASB, but not easily accomplished either. Even I acknowledged that.

 

[Darth_Kiryan]

Is it a Cliche to say that the Confederate government is always unified in the post-war world. As in it is significantly unified similarly to the US - I mean for a Country that prided themselves on States Rights so thoroughly I do not know if it is really looked at as much

For example, I have only ever seen one TL where the Confederate Government vs States Rights backfires so much, and that was in @The Kiat excellent dystopia where during this ATL World War 1 (between the US and CS of course)the Confederate units assigned to fight on the front lines stop fighting on account of their state telling them too rather than listen to their Federal Government to continue fighting.....

https://www.alternatehistory.com/fo...he-confederate-states-of-america-1916.324745/

https://www.alternatehistory.com/forum/threads/reconstruction-the-roaring-20s.339919/

 

[History Learner]

Is it a Cliche to say that the Confederate government is always unified in the post-war world. As in it is significantly unified similarly to the US - I mean for a Country that prided themselves on States Rights so thoroughly I do not know if it is really looked at as much

For example, I have only ever seen one TL where the Confederate Government vs States Rights backfires so much, and that was in @The Kiat excellent dystopia where during this ATL World War 1 (between the US and CS of course)the Confederate units assigned to fight on the front lines stop fighting on account of their state telling them too rather than listen to their Federal Government to continue fighting.....

https://www.alternatehistory.com/fo...he-confederate-states-of-america-1916.324745/

https://www.alternatehistory.com/forum/threads/reconstruction-the-roaring-20s.339919/

Confederate Constitution retained the Supremacy Clause.

 

[EnglishCanuck]

In OTL, Confederate attempts to seize Union territory always ended in failure. British intervention will not remove the Confederacy's logistical flaws nor Confederate generals' weakness on the offense. Gaining West Virginia or any of Kentucky or Tennessee requires the Confederacy who can do better on offense on Robert E Lee and probably do it with less resources than Lee had. That's not ASB, but it's very unlikely. Regardless, neither side would accept a plebescites in states they fully control. If a state is divided between Union and Confederate control, I still doubt either side would want a plebiscite; it would have too much chance of becoming a re-enactment of Bleeding Kansas and restarting the war.

All true, however I would quibble on the plebiscite issue. The Confederates would, by dint of their historic claims and most likely the arrogance of their representatives, demand the states of Maryland, Missouri, and Kentucky. The Union of course would laugh off Maryland and Missouri (seriously, Stirling Price's campaigns are almost laughable in their repeated failures), but there are scenarios where they might hold bits of Kentucky and cling tenuously to it and demand a plebiscite there. I can see them giving up the counties bordering the District of Columbia, all claims to West Virginia, and all claims to Missouri and Maryland in order to get it. The Union would probably win such a plebiscite so I see no huge obstacle in them granting one in exchange for diplomatic renunciation of other Union territory.

The only other one up in the air is the Indian Territory, the Confederates signed various treaties with the tribes there, and it was such a backwater campaign wise that they could see a see-saw there which might allow for favorable conditions for the Confederacy to request it as a territory. The Union might give it up in such a case.

 

[CalBear]

regarding 3), Saph failed to answer what the Confederacy could do to prevent Sherman from marching anywhere he wanted to, including but not limited to the Confederate powder works at Sibley Mill (125 miles right up the Savannah River), Jacksonville FL, or as he did historically, right through South Carolina.

To face him, the Confederates had to pull what was left of the Army of Tennessee east, and only managed to assemble around 30,000 men to face Sherman, and even then they were not united at all. The entirety of the two eastern departments that Johnson surrendered had around 89,000 including everyone in FL, SC, GA, NC, and what was left in VA after Lee surrendered. The biggest concentration of Confederate troops was 20,000 men.

Sherman had 60,000 as of January 1865, getting reinforcements later

The contents of those ships were useful, things like coffee, small arms ammo, new clothing, a ration reserve (although at no point did Sherman's troops ever really need it), and clothing, tents, new wagons and food for the horde of refugees following him about. But if necessary, Sherman could have done without those while he marched to friendly railroads or even west to the Mississippi River if he wanted.

There was nothing left to stop him that could stop him.

Saphroneth's point was, if I am understanding it correctly, in terms of late war intervention by the Anglo-French; the Royal Navy would scatter the supply ships waiting off the coast.

Be terrific if y'all could debate facts without either invoking or arguing against a Banned member.