Non-belligerent Britain in WW1 and the world two decades after CP victory in WW1

But the key difference will be rather dramatic. As an aftermatch of the Russian Revolution, left-wing political movements from Social Democrats to more radical Marxists will all appear somewhat revolutionary despite their actual rhetoric and methods - after all, their Russian comrades banded together to support Soviet power and overthrew provisionary government.

Hrm. There's a strong argument that in Southwest Germany, prior to WW1 the SPD was becoming a Volkspartei as opposed to a Klasspartei. Instead of the stab in the back myth, they were here loyal members of the governing coalition that won the war, right?


In OTL these old elites tolerated limited forms of parliamentarism as long as it stopped short of actual democracy, and I doubt they'd be willing to sacrifice their own prestitigous position by bandwagoning one revolutionary group against another. And ironically this will drive many classical liberals away from cooperation with Social Democrats, who in turn will most likely cooperate with more hardline Communist units.

I'm not sure I follow here. Because of an increasing autocratic, reactionary "old regime", the liberals will turn away from ties to the socialists?

Rosa Luxembourg will still be around, right? Hrm.
 
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Hrm. There's a strong argument that in Southwest Germany, prior to WW1 the SPD was becoming a Volkspartei as opposed to a Klasspartei. Instead of the stab in the back myth, they were here loyal members of the governing coalition that won the war, right?

It is true that reactionary aversion towards Social Democrats might be less severe than in OTL because of what you said - Burgfrieden was upheld through the war, after all. And yet the old Junkers nobility remains the same while and SPD still opposes them on ideological basis, and this animosity is unlikely to disappear anywhere.

Still, having SPD-led coalitions to rise to power by democratic means is very likely possibility for early postwar period. But in the long run: could they really transform the basic nature of German Empire or split into radical minority and moderate majority while trying to do so, as Conservatives and reactionaries would seek to oppose, stop or at least slow down the very reforms attempts the common supporters of SPD so vividly wait for?

I'm not sure I follow here. Because of an increasing autocratic, reactionary "old regime", the liberals will turn away from ties to the socialists?

Rosa Luxembourg will still be around, right? Hrm.

The latter part of that post of mine is too easy to misunderstand, so let me clarify.

As Socialists of different shades of red are more free to cooperate without Moscow telling them how to vote and whom to play with, the image of revived left-wing internationalism and cooperation will somewhat blur the OTL strong distinction between Social Democrats and other left-wing groups. "Deep down they're just same damn Commies, all of them, no matter what they say"-sort of stereotyping is much easier without bitter rivalries between Moscow loyalists and "Social Fascists" of OTL.

This will make conservatives and reactionaries more suspicious towards SPD. And this weariness, most likely present in some level due ideology and regardless of the actual policies of SPD, might make some (but definitively not all) liberal politicians think twice before entering closer collaboration with SPD, no matter how many mutual goals these political groups actually have. Associating themselves with Social Democrats might alienate the moderate Conservatives.

While Burgfrieden was upheld through the war, postwar suspicion towards Left-wing politics is unlikely to disappear from German right-wing politics. After all, the flipside of lack of Dolchstoßlegende is the fact that SPD leadership and majority are never forced to show their true and solid commitment to non-revolutionary approach in the German revolutions of 1918-19.

Edit: And yes, Rosa and her comrades will be around. But in which party and with what goals?
 
It is true that reactionary aversion towards Social Democrats might be less severe than in OTL because of what you said - Burgfrieden was upheld through the war, after all. And yet the old Junkers nobility remains the same while and SPD still opposes them on ideological basis, and this animosity is unlikely to disappear anywhere.

Still, having SPD-led coalitions to rise to power by democratic means is very likely possibility for early postwar period. But in the long run: could they really transform the basic nature of German Empire or split into radical minority and moderate majority while trying to do so, as Conservatives and reactionaries would seek to oppose, stop or at least slow down the very reforms attempts the common supporters of SPD so vividly wait for?
Wait, how would we be getting coalition government anyway? The Kaiserreich's chancellors were appointed to manage the Reichstag, not represent it; even an SPD majority would only be able to obstruct the government's proposals, work with the government, or split. Or am I missing something here?
 
To discuss my area of semi-expertise:

An interesting thing about Scotland and the war is that we started the most subduedly conservative bit of Britain and finished the most revolutionary. In 1911, for instance, the Scots working-class were a good third less unionised than the Anglo-Welsh in spite of the fact that costs of living were higher (as the playwright observes: it's cold) and wages lower and in spite of the fact that a substantially larger portion of Scots worked in the most unionised industries: coal, steel, ships, and engineering. The elites of the heavily interdependent heavy-industry complex, the kirk, and the political machine kept everything blue: we went far less Labour representatives to parliament that we 'ought' to have done in terms of their usual electoral base. The Clydebank strikes are famous, but they're famous for being an exception: Clydebank, with its huge factory employment of unskilled, mostly female labour, was unusual.

During the war, the pressures of full employment altered employer-employee relations drastically everywhere, but in Scotland, where there was no existing framework for involving unions in decision-making, the strain was greatest. Hence, the red year 1919, after which Scottish politics became more 'normal' in the British context.

So Scotland will stay blue - it stayed a rather chilly shade of violet into the 1950s, of course - for a while, but one feels that if there are any dramatic developments in British politics it is due a crisis.
There is something I should correct here - Labour was so weak in Scotland before the War because the Liberals were so strong. There was never a Lib-Lab pact north of the border because the Liberals just didn't need it. The Conservatives/Unionists had pockets of strength but by 1910 they only had about a dozen seats out of 72 or so, whereas the Liberals had the vast majority of the rest. The Unionists did gain a majority of Scottish votes and seats in 1896 and 1900 but these were essentially blips. An election fought on Home Rule or patriotism would have a positive impact for the Unionists in Scotland, but otherwise the default position was Liberal (although that's not necessarily to say that Scotland wasn't conservative with a small c in many ways).

It was only after the First World War that Scotland became Unionist, as the Liberal vote collapsed and the middle classes and rural vote moved wholesale to the blue side.
 
You're quite right, of course; that was, I confess, a rather inaccurate and figurative usage of 'blue' for the sake of symmetry with red. What I meant to allude to was the slow growth of working class politics per se.
 
Wait, how would we be getting coalition government anyway? The Kaiserreich's chancellors were appointed to manage the Reichstag, not represent it; even an SPD majority would only be able to obstruct the government's proposals, work with the government, or split. Or am I missing something here?

Good point. And continuing the business as usual by appointing minority governments and apolitical Chancellors is a good way to piss off democratic-minded reformers and radicalize them.
 
Okay, since the mod itself is coming along rather nicely, it's time for some pictures.

http://img842.imageshack.us/img842/2171/eurooppa.jpg
WIP map of Europe.

http://img821.imageshack.us/img821/8493/saksan.jpg
Cabinet of German Empire

http://img195.imageshack.us/img195/4048/ubdb.jpg
United Baltic Duchy, German client state in areas of OTL Estonia and Latvia

http://img684.imageshack.us/img684/5764/ranska.jpg
Unstable coalition government of France

http://img811.imageshack.us/img811/3808/italiaj.jpg
Still-democratic Kingdom of Italy

http://img3.imageshack.us/img3/6707/tasavalta.jpg
Left-wing KMT

http://img528.imageshack.us/img528/6235/zhili.jpg
Zhili Clique, the internationally recognized government of China.

http://img155.imageshack.us/img155/2862/kuomingjun.jpg
Warlord clique of Feng Yuxiang

http://img810.imageshack.us/img810/9871/fengtien.jpg
Fengtien Clique, the Japanese-supported northern warlord state.

http://img577.imageshack.us/img577/4374/turkestan.jpg
Ottoman-supported Pan-Turkic state in Central Asia is a thorn on the side of the Russian Republic, and a source of instability in Central Asia.

http://img141.imageshack.us/img141/3576/mongolia.jpg
Bogd Khan and the rest of the Mongolian government.

Once again, all comments and improvement suggestions are appreciated.
 
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