No Yugoslav coup in 1941?

  • Thread starter Deleted member 1487
  • Start date
...but 17-year old King supported this coup, new government even ended regency and allowed him to assume normal duties, despite his age.
 
still think there are so many cross currents the country flies apart at some point (sooner rather than later) during WWII.

(and that's leaving aside territorial ambitions of Axis members Italy and Bulgaria for Dalmatia and Vardar Macedonia respectively)

think the question would realistically be what is most orderly division of the country?
 
Somewhat covered in another thread

I made a thread about a similar situation here, detailing best possible AGS performance.

Von Rudenstedt had to cram the mass of his army group between the Rokitno Marshes and the Carpathian Mountains. He wanted to create a German-Hungarian force based on the Seventeenth Army, but Hitler distrusted Hungary and forbade any formal contact between the two militaries. Barbarossa underwent numerous revisions including "Deployment Directive Barbarossa" on 31 January 1941. This added Rumania to Von Rudenstedt area of responsibility...

Army Group South's initial plan envisioned a double envelopment during Phase 1, employing First Panzer Group in the North and 12th Army coming out of Rumania. Hitler soon decided against this course of action, and besides in April he ordered 12th army to Yugoslavia and Greece. Eleventh Army took over duties in Rumania but these combined forces would not be ready for 22 June 1941, giving Barbarossa its staggered start in the south. Therefore von Rudenstedt would fight mainly a frontal war, punctuated by occasional penetrations and except for Kiev relatively small encirclements.
http://books.google.com/books?id=kjW...ntains&f=false

Without a Yugoslav coup, which is by no means a given, the Germans might be able to start Barbarossa early and, if they are struck with a sudden case of the smarts, go for a double envelopment of Soviet forces in Ukraine which would have pre-empted the whole Kiev debacle.

However, your POD is simply no coup...that does not change the following:

-Greeks still allow Brits in Crete in Nov 1940. Greece will have to be invaded.
-Hitler will still not involved Hungary in wartime planning, which increases the probability he will approve of a frontal assault against Russian forces in Ukraine instead of the double envelopment.
-Greece still needs to be invaded, and this will tax German forces and Fallschirmjaeger.

The net result? Germany is up 5 divisions in the short term, has less of an occupation problem in the long term as they did OTL, and less wear and tear on the 12th army. Perhaps Barbarossa starts at the same time, but this time with AGS starting on time.

In retrospect, the biggest game changer in the whole theater would be a different POD. If the Axis goes for broke against Malta before November 1940, instead of maneuvering with Franco to get him into the Axis in order to attack Gibraltar and Greece at the same time as they did OTL, it is possible that the British lose enough forces and ships in the process that they do not support Greece. Without the Brits in Greece, Greece remains an Italian, and not a German, affair...perhaps a peace is struck between the two powers with Germany mediating, giving Malta to Italy in exchange.

Then, the Yugoslav coup does not happen, because the Germans clearly have the upper hand in the Meditteranean by March when Rommel was on the attack in North Africa and Malta was in Axis hands.

The result is Barbarossa starts ahead of schedule (June 10th), likely with the same limitations in aircraft due to the effects of an attack on Malta and the Blitz, but with the actual possibility of a double envelopment which will lead to a collapse in resistance among the first echelon of Soviet forces in Ukraine. This means that Guderian is never diverted to Kiev and the fighting for Moscow will be much closer, which then makes the whole thing a toss up. Russia either capitulates or the Germans over-extend and all of AGC is annihilated.
 
According to his later memoirs, Peter II sympathized with the coup to some extent (not sure how much).

In any case, the sympathies of both the Regent's government and the King lay with the Allies. I assume Yugoslavia would muck about in the Axis for a year or two, contributing as little as diplomatically possible, then switch sides and join the Allies if and when Germany's fortunes reverse.

It's worth noting that many of Hitler's allies contemplated changing sides around 1943 even in OTL - Romania, Hungary, Slovakia, Italy...(and some of them eventually did). With the Balkans far less tightly controlled by Germany, Yugoslavia's switch could be accompanied by any combination of those countries. I suspect the USSR's sphere of influence would be somewhat smaller by the end of the war, but who knows.
 

Deleted member 1487

According to his later memoirs, Peter II sympathized with the coup to some extent (not sure how much).

In any case, the sympathies of both the Regent's government and the King lay with the Allies. I assume Yugoslavia would muck about in the Axis for a year or two, contributing as little as diplomatically possible, then switch sides and join the Allies if and when Germany's fortunes reverse.

It's worth noting that many of Hitler's allies contemplated changing sides around 1943 even in OTL - Romania, Hungary, Slovakia, Italy...(and some of them eventually did). With the Balkans far less tightly controlled by Germany, Yugoslavia's switch could be accompanied by any combination of those countries. I suspect the USSR's sphere of influence would be somewhat smaller by the end of the war, but who knows.

Apparently Peter II is actually buried near where I live, the only European monarch interned in America. That said how much can we trust he later memoirs after the fact?

A neutral Yugoslavia is actually a pretty big deal and probably won't have a chance at switching sides until 1944 when the Allies get close enough to move men via the Adriatic from Italy. From 1941-early 1944 then the neutrality of the Yugoslavs is actually quite helpful if they are supplying the Axis with war materials and the Axis don't have to use hundreds of thousands of men to occupy it. Germany and Italy alone had something like over 600k men there in 1943 when they would have been highly useful in Sicily or the East. Hundreds of aircraft were used in a number of offensives against partisans in Yugoslavia too. It seems also that the Axis supplied the Croats with nearly 300 aircraft as well (not exactly frontline aircraft, but useful nonetheless).
 
Without a Yugoslav coup, which is by no means a given, the Germans might be able to start Barbarossa early.

Two arguments against this:

(1) The late spring thaw, making the Russian roads a muddy mess;

(2) To quote an old soc.history.what-if post of mine:

***

Actually, even apart from the Balkans operations *and* the late spring
thaw, equipment shortages would have made it difficult to start Barbarossa
earlier than in OTL. To quote Martin L. Van Creveld, *Hitler's Strategy
1940-1941: The Balkan Clue* (Cambridge University Press 1973), pp. 173-4:

"Halder's diary bristles with references to various units, none of which
had anything to do with the Balkans, and whose equipment and training
were not yet complete as late as the end of May 1941. Long before the
Yugoslav campaign was in sight an entry reads 'the conversion of tanks
into underwater tanks will require 12 weeks.' Allow another few days for
transportation and 'Barbarossa', for which these machines were vital,
could not start before the first days of June...

"Throughout May Halder was recording the difficulties encountered in
supplying such diverse units as 100th armoured brigade, 13th, 17th and
18th armoured divisions and 14th and 18th motorized divisions, units
which may have had nothing in common except for the fact that they had
not been connected in any way with the Balkan campaign.

"Indeed, it is hardly possible to open a history of any 'fast' unit that
took part in the war against Russia without being struck by the
belatedness with which it was supplied with its full motor vehicle park.
Thus, the so-called Panzerzüge [freight trains adapted to carrying and
rapidly unloading armor and materials for use in occupying bridges,
strongholds, etc.]; before the Yugoslav coup it had been decided five of
these should be constructed but they were not ready for transportation to
the east until mid-June, after finallly receiving French supplies. The
10th motorized division did not receive its equipment until after
marching east on 10 June, and even then the vehicles had to be collected
piecemeal from...Germany, Belgium, Holand and France!...Indeed, the
problems created by the general shortage of equipment, particularly motor
vehicles, were not limited to only the 'fast'units. At the time of the
German offensive against Russia, no less than 92--or 40 percent--of the
army divisions had to be supplied, wholly or in part, with French
material. Since the losses in material resulting from the Balkan
campaign were extremely limited, it is quite clear that lack of equipment
of all kinds would have prevented 'Barbarossa' from starting before the
end of June even if neither 'Marita' nor '25' [the Greek and Yugoslav
operations] had come into the world."
 
Two arguments against this:

(1) The late spring thaw, making the Russian roads a muddy mess;

(2) To quote an old soc.history.what-if post of mine:

***

Actually, even apart from the Balkans operations *and* the late spring
thaw, equipment shortages would have made it difficult to start Barbarossa
earlier than in OTL. To quote Martin L. Van Creveld, *Hitler's Strategy
1940-1941: The Balkan Clue* (Cambridge University Press 1973), pp. 173-4:

"Halder's diary bristles with references to various units, none of which
had anything to do with the Balkans, and whose equipment and training
were not yet complete as late as the end of May 1941. Long before the
Yugoslav campaign was in sight an entry reads 'the conversion of tanks
into underwater tanks will require 12 weeks.' Allow another few days for
transportation and 'Barbarossa', for which these machines were vital,
could not start before the first days of June...

"Throughout May Halder was recording the difficulties encountered in
supplying such diverse units as 100th armoured brigade, 13th, 17th and
18th armoured divisions and 14th and 18th motorized divisions, units
which may have had nothing in common except for the fact that they had
not been connected in any way with the Balkan campaign.

"Indeed, it is hardly possible to open a history of any 'fast' unit that
took part in the war against Russia without being struck by the
belatedness with which it was supplied with its full motor vehicle park.
Thus, the so-called Panzerzüge [freight trains adapted to carrying and
rapidly unloading armor and materials for use in occupying bridges,
strongholds, etc.]; before the Yugoslav coup it had been decided five of
these should be constructed but they were not ready for transportation to
the east until mid-June, after finallly receiving French supplies. The
10th motorized division did not receive its equipment until after
marching east on 10 June, and even then the vehicles had to be collected
piecemeal from...Germany, Belgium, Holand and France!...Indeed, the
problems created by the general shortage of equipment, particularly motor
vehicles, were not limited to only the 'fast'units. At the time of the
German offensive against Russia, no less than 92--or 40 percent--of the
army divisions had to be supplied, wholly or in part, with French
material. Since the losses in material resulting from the Balkan
campaign were extremely limited, it is quite clear that lack of equipment
of all kinds would have prevented 'Barbarossa' from starting before the
end of June even if neither 'Marita' nor '25' [the Greek and Yugoslav
operations] had come into the world."

That book is a real eye opener, for all the talk of spring thaw and Greece none of that really mattered when units who were in no way connected to Greece couldn't get their trucks.
 
Apparently Peter II is actually buried near where I live, the only European monarch interned in America.

Libertyville, Illinois? Interesting. Though his remains were moved to Serbia a few years ago with a lot of pomp and official ceremony.
That said how much can we trust he later memoirs after the fact?
That's a good question. Some of Peter II's criticism of the Regent's government is legitimate, but other parts sound weird. I wouldn't be surprised if he exaggerated his support of the coup and his overall awareness of the situation. Latching on to an event of 'national pride' to boost personal popularity is an old and useful method.
 
Two arguments against this:

(1) The late spring thaw, making the Russian roads a muddy mess...

Let's put this myth to rest. The weather abated by the end of the first week of June. Everything is a go by June 10th.

equipment shortages would have made it difficult to start Barbarossa
earlier than in OTL.

No Greece and Yugoslavia offensive, all of the sudden equipment is in a better state of repair! Voila. Fixed!


I never understand why people think that June 22nd has to be written in stone. It is almost like Napoleon's ghost is whispering in their ears.

Allow another few days for
transportation and 'Barbarossa', for which these machines were vital,
could not start before the first days of June...

This is consisten with my claim that a June 10th start date is possible without Yugo and Greece happening.

Thus, the so-called Panzerzüge [freight trains adapted to carrying and
rapidly unloading armor and materials for use in occupying bridges,
strongholds, etc.]; before the Yugoslav coup it had been decided five of
these should be constructed but they were not ready for transportation to
the east until mid-June, after finallly receiving French supplies.

This is interesting. Do we have an actual date? Is it a big deal if they come a few days late? AGS started their whole offensive a few days late IOTL. I do not imagine the Germans being that inflexible if a portion of their total armored trains were 5 days late.

The 10th motorized division did not receive its equipment until after
marching east on 10 June, and even then the vehicles had to be collected
piecemeal from...Germany, Belgium, Holand and France!

Again, consistent with a June 10th start date and why were they late...was it because the operation was already delayed? This is a chicken-egg scenerio. If the Germans knew June 10th was the start date, they would just steal their French trucks a few days sooner.

Since the losses in material resulting from the Balkan
campaign were extremely limited, it is quite clear that lack of equipment
of all kinds would have prevented 'Barbarossa' from starting before the
end of June even if neither 'Marita' nor '25' [the Greek and Yugoslav
operations] had come into the world."

They still lost 4,000 men and obviously used a ton of trucks...all of which wouldn't be use ITTL, being husbanded for Russia.
 

Deleted member 1487

Two arguments against this:

(1) The late spring thaw, making the Russian roads a muddy mess;
The problem is a 1957 US army study of the Balkans campaign concluded that the campaign in the Balkans delayed the start of Barbarossa by two weeks. The muds were over by the 9th of June, so assuming there was an abbreviated or no Balkan campaign the invasion could have started on the 10th of June. Not quite two weeks, but 12 days early could actually make quite a difference if the time table of OTL Barbarossa was moved up, as the muds for Autumn began on October 8th during the start of Operation Taifun. Had they had an addition 12th days of mud free movement then the roads would have allowed for the digestion of Vyazma and Bryansk and move on Moscow before the muds began (OTL they had about 7 days of operations before mud started being an issue, ITTL they'd have almost 3 weeks, i.e. about 20 days; Vyazma was liquidated and the move east happened in about 14 days IOTL, so 6 days of mud free movement toward Moscow would be a HUGE deal, as IOTL there were NO days of mud free movement toward Moscow after Vyazma, as the muds began during the encirclement).
 
Apparently Peter II is actually buried near where I live, the only European monarch interned in America. That said how much can we trust he later memoirs after the fact?

A neutral Yugoslavia is actually a pretty big deal and probably won't have a chance at switching sides until 1944 when the Allies get close enough to move men via the Adriatic from Italy. From 1941-early 1944 then the neutrality of the Yugoslavs is actually quite helpful if they are supplying the Axis with war materials and the Axis don't have to use hundreds of thousands of men to occupy it. Germany and Italy alone had something like over 600k men there in 1943 when they would have been highly useful in Sicily or the East. Hundreds of aircraft were used in a number of offensives against partisans in Yugoslavia too. It seems also that the Axis supplied the Croats with nearly 300 aircraft as well (not exactly frontline aircraft, but useful nonetheless).

That number looks WAY too high. Can we have sources on that and composition of those units?

Presuming the POD helps Germany in Barbarossa but does not win the war, knowing exactly how many Italians, Germans, and Waffen SS were actually there would help a lot.

I presume no Yugo means more German reinforcements in 1943. Waffen SS would probably displace German units in southern France even more so, and maybe, just maybe, Kesselrine gets his 2 additional divisions for the Gustav Line. He boasted that if he had two more, it would have been impregnable.
 

Deleted member 1487

That number looks WAY too high. Can we have sources on that and composition of those units?
Consider that a major part of that was the offensive sweeps against partisans, which concentrated hundreds of thousands of men for the operations:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_War_II_in_Yugoslavia

7th SS Mountain Division Prinz Eugen was 22k men and was later part of the 5th SS mountain corps doing combat ops in Yugoslavia.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_War_II_in_Yugoslavia#Critical_Axis_offensives
The Fifth Enemy Offensive, also known as the Battle of the Sutjeska or Fall Schwarz (Case Black) was an operation that immediately followed the Fourth Offensive and included a complete encirclement of Partisan forces in southeastern Bosnia and northern Montenegro in May and June 1943.
In that August of my arrival [1943] there were over 30 enemy divisions on the territory of Jugoslavia, as well as a large number of satellite and police formations of Ustashe and Domobrani (military formations of the puppet Croat State), German Sicherheitsdienst, chetniks, Neditch militia, Ljotitch militia, and others. The partisan movement may have counted up to 150,000 fighting men and women (perhaps five per cent women) in close and inextricable co-operation with several million peasants, the people of the country. Partisan numbers were liable to increase rapidly.[48]
The Croatian Home Guard reached its maximum size at the end of 1943, when it had 130,000 men. It also included an air force, the Air Force of the Independent State of Croatia (Zrakoplovstvo Nezavisne Države Hrvatske, or ZNDH), the backbone of which was provided by 500 former Royal Yugoslav Air Force officers and 1,600 NCOs with 125 aircraft.[49] By 1943 the ZNDH was 9,775 strong and equipped with 295 aircraft.[39]
Presuming the POD helps Germany in Barbarossa but does not win the war, knowing exactly how many Italians, Germans, and Waffen SS were actually there would help a lot.

I presume no Yugo means more German reinforcements in 1943. Waffen SS would probably displace German units in southern France even more so, and maybe, just maybe, Kesselrine gets his 2 additional divisions for the Gustav Line. He boasted that if he had two more, it would have been impregnable.
He'd have the 7th SS mountain division then, which was oversized. Of course by the time of Winter 1943-44 Yugoslavia might join in then or at least the fear of that problem might keep units held in reserve by the Germans just in case they needed to invade, so Kesselring might be denied them. Of course having more men in 1942-43 might mean the Allies are delayed in Sicily or their invasion of Italy.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Case_White
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Case_Black
Date May 15–June 16, 1943
Axis order of battle

23px-Flag_of_German_Reich_%281935%E2%80%931945%29.svg.png
Germany

23px-Flag_of_Italy_%281861-1946%29_crowned.svg.png
Italy

 
That looks like 250,000 men there. Nothing to sneeze at, but certainly not 600K.

So, that being said, I can see men ITTL that were in Yugoslavia OTL being used East, probably blown at Kursk to be honest, with other elements held in reserve.

Being that the Waffen SS divisions of Eastern conscripts were usually not high quality, ITTL they would be in Greece and France, and not in Yugoslavia.

1943 can turn out different for Germany then, they might be able to hold the Dnieper with 200K more men in the east.
 
It is worth noting that whenever Italy falls, the calculus changes dramatically. Once Italy sues for peace with the Allies, you might see Romania and Yugoslavia try to broker a deal ASAP. Germany would be too stretched to do much about it, they would literally have to invade Yugoslavia and Romania in late 43 at the cost of pretty much losing all of Italy.

But, butterflies change a lot of things. It makes Hitler more weary in the Med theater, which means he might have played defense all the long in Africa, denied Rommel and take Malta in 42, and avoid Tunisgrad, simply so he can keep enough men in reserve to prevent a Balkan collapse.
 

Deleted member 1487

That looks like 250,000 men there. Nothing to sneeze at, but certainly not 600K.
That's just what was used in the offensive, not all occupation troops. Most of the occupation troops were not combat units like these.
 
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