Suppose, sometime during the Xinghai Revolution, Yuan Shikai is killed somehow (maybe by an assassin?). What are the effects on China after the Revolution?
F#cking Ponies.
(I'm just glad my sister's not in to history, she runs a stud ...)
Why, Pray tell, does this come up in a thread about the Chinese Revolution?Fucking Ponies.
(I'm just glad my sister's not in to history, she runs a stud ...)
Well the Mongolians do love their ponies.Why, Pray tell, does this come up in a thread about the Chinese Revolution?
Hendryk was generally regarded as the forum's China expert. He's been banned twice both due to his own habit of turning personal disagreements into a Jihad on his opponents' arses. First time it was gun control, second time it was MLP (a bit of Ponyspam in 'his' comic thread got him started, but even when the Ponyspam was properly confined to the Pony Thread he wasn't happy...).Why, Pray tell, does this come up in a thread about the Chinese Revolution?
However, I do not know if it would be any more decisive than Yuan's regime in moving fast to retake Qingdao from the vulnerable Germans in 1914. Our default presumption should be that Japan still moves faster in the ATL.
Originally Posted by raharris1973
However, I do not know if it would be any more decisive than Yuan's regime in moving fast to retake Qingdao from the vulnerable Germans in 1914.
Our default presumption should be that Japan still moves faster in the ATL.
This is true, but China in 1918 will not be a state cascading into warlordism.
I am not as pessimistic about Japan as the rest of the board, who thinks that they are fated to move into all of Asia.
A successful Chinese republic would have influences on anticolonialism in Southeast Asia, India, and Japanese culture and political thought. Perhaps in the OTL they lobby for a racial equality clause with Japan at Versailles.
Moreover, the 1920s were the high mark of Japanese liberalism, when despite the weakness of China the Japanese moved lightly. As the OTL Korean War showed, a reformed China could be a thoroughly capable foe; if there is, say, 15 years of stable government between 1911 and 1925, then I think Japanese militarism may not get off the ground as we know it.
I was simply saying the most reasonable presumption would be the Japanese, as a militarily-efficient member of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, would be likely to attack and defeat the Germans at Qingdao before the Chinese could decide on and execute a plan to do the same.
Japan would have a lead in most material aspects of modernization, and would be quite a proud nation, but the gulf between a stable China and Japan as of 1925 would likely not be so great as between the Japan and China of OTL 1931.
I actually wonder what Chinese diplomats did say about racial equality at OTL's Versailles. While I think they could be quite supportive of the idea, if Qingdao is a bone of contention that the Japanese are trying to either hold on to permanently or for purposes of heavy-handed bargaining, it will harm the coherence of any Sino-Japanese anti-racist front.