No Yelnya bridgehead during battle of Smolensk 1941

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Deleted member 1487

Edit: ninja-ed

Alright having breezed through the relevant chapters in Barbarossa Derailed, I didn't see a list of escapees from the pocket, so that much is still unknown, but I am willing to state that probably most of the Soviet 16th, 19th, and 20th armies had their combat elements reduced to around 10% of strength if they survived at all, so were effectively ground down to nubs in the fighting. Later surviving units were used as cadres to rebuilt fighting forces around, but they were largely shattered and lost most of their equipment even if they got out. So in terms of POWs closing the pocket isn't really going to add that many more to the OTL hauls plus KIA/WIA for the Soviets, perhaps maybe 50k or so. However closing the pocket at the right time they could have cut off and wiped out those forces sooner within the pocket, probably ending the pocket by early August or 4-5 days early with lower losses and wiping out Soviet cadres for division/army rebuilding. Though I'm making this number up the Germans might well save 30k casualties during the pocket battle and end it sooner, with the Soviets then leaving with fewer commands to send reinforcements to. Then without the Germans cramming valuable units into a bridgehead that would end up a fire sack and source for at least another 30k unnecessary casualties the Germans could have done a lot more right after Smolensk and Mogliev ended, with Guderian pushing south sooner with greater strength and better defensive positions on this flank, while operations by Kampfgruppe Stumme against the Soviet 22nd army could have started perhaps a week or more sooner and given more time to recover before Typhoon or at least having time/extra forces to follow up against Soviet forces before Typhoon to wear them down and make the pocket battles of October (which might happen sooner ITTL) easier than IOTL. The Soviets would probably even more desperate to attack and more reckless in their operational conduct with a swifter collapse of the Smolensk pocket, which would have all sorts of knock on consequences going forward.
 

Deleted member 1487

About 100k was encircled at Mogilev, but half escaped that pocket.
Add in the 100k partially encircled troops of 22nd and 27th armies, 80% of which escaped, and you get the sense that the Germans got too greedy and attempted too much - ending up with a lot of missed opportunities instead.

With regards to the question at hand, I'm certain the Germans could have closed the pocket if they had made it their priority.
Besides PzGr2, Glantz asserts that PzGr3 moved too far to the north of Smolensk, and could have contributed more if not.

The resulting benefit for the Germans would be threefold.
(1) probably another 50-100k pow's.
(2) a faster resolution of the battle. The Mogilev siege ended after 10 days. If we assume a similar timespan for the Smolensk encirclement, the pocket collapses about 7-10 days ahead of schedule (as the Soviets run out of suppl)y.
(3) Those 7-10 days were pretty hard on the Germans troops (especially the motorized troops) which had to endure attacks from both inside and outside the pocket. Eliminate the inside threat, and you get fewer German casualties as a result

Thanks for the kind remark. Apart from a lot of books, I'm looking at original documents when I've got the time.
The pow data can be found here (add 2 to the counter to get the next document in the series): http://wwii.germandocsinrussia.org/pages/85664/zooms/8
I assume you read German at least? Thanks for the resource.
I do wonder if 7-10 days early is a bit optimistic given that I think there was a supply depot in the Smolensk area, so they had enough to coast on even without rail supply for the duration of the fight IOTL as rail supply was cut during the fight pretty early and roads were interdicted from the air for the duration. Perhaps 4-5 days early assuming the pocket is closed by the 20th and held shut (historically the pocket lasted to August 5th).
Yes the fight for the last 10-15 days were pretty tough on German troops, so collapsing the Soviets sooner would be a major help, as would forcing their attention against multiple units, rather than allowing them to concentrate against 7th and 20th Panzer division, while later asking 17th Panzer to close the pocket in late July, while 10th Panzer and 2nd SS were relatively idle in Yelnya. Without a doubt the Germans missed huge chances all throughout July by trying to be way too ambitious. BTW starting on July 21st the Germans started their bombing campaign against Moscow to no effect and high losses, so avoiding that would have meant hundreds more bomber sorties for the Luftwaffe against Smolensk and lower casualties.

What do you think would happen then if the pocket battle is over by August 1st and the Germans did have not Yelnya to worry about, plus have inflicted another 50-100k Soviet losses while taking perhaps 30k less in July?
 
I can understand a fair bit of German, but wouldn't consider myself fluent in it.

Anyway, I found the Glantz' comment I was referring to on p.359, where he estimates the number of troops in the pocket by mid-July at over 220k, by 1.Aug at 100k and the number of escapees at 50k. I'm not entirely convinced by his math, but lets work with that.

If the pocket is sealed on the 16th and collapses on 1.Aug, it will hold out for 16 days.
How many Soviet pockets (fully cut off) lasted that long during Barbarossa? Off the top of my head, I can't recall any.

Yet again from Glantz, he cites a 20th Army report from 27.July which states that the units have between 0.5 - 1 loads of ammunition with 0.3 loads in forward warehouses.
On 30th July, the same Army reported being down to 10-15 rounds per gun and 0.1 to 1 refill of fuel.
How much lower would those numbers be if they had been fully cut off from supply for 12 and 15 days respectively?

At some point, the supply situation would be so low, that they would be forced to attempt a breakout.
I wouldn't be suprised if that happened around the 27th. I would be a bit suprised if they lasted into August.


Regardless if it is late July or early August, I don't believe this scenario would change the German decision to reinforce the flanks.
For the Soviets, the (~65k strong) newly formed 34th Army was originally subordinated to the Western Front before being transfered north to take part in the Staraya Russa attack in mid-August. I can see that army remaining in the WF, leaving the balance of forces between the Germans/Soviets about the same around Smolensk. Glantz does estimate the Staraya Russa attack delayed AG North's advance to Leningrad by about 10 days, so thats one possible consequence.

In the central sector, the course of the battle would probably tip slightly in the German favor due to a shorter frontline at El'nia and more time to rest/refit before the Soviets strike if the above happens. If 34th Army still head north, I can forsee a bit more trouble for the Soviets. Maybe you can move the starting line for Typhoon 50km to the east. Maybe you have weaker Soviet attacks, leading to bigger German supply stockpiles by the end of September.
 

Deleted member 1487

I can understand a fair bit of German, but wouldn't consider myself fluent in it.

Anyway, I found the Glantz' comment I was referring to on p.359, where he estimates the number of troops in the pocket by mid-July at over 220k, by 1.Aug at 100k and the number of escapees at 50k. I'm not entirely convinced by his math, but lets work with that.

If the pocket is sealed on the 16th and collapses on 1.Aug, it will hold out for 16 days.
How many Soviet pockets (fully cut off) lasted that long during Barbarossa? Off the top of my head, I can't recall any.

Yet again from Glantz, he cites a 20th Army report from 27.July which states that the units have between 0.5 - 1 loads of ammunition with 0.3 loads in forward warehouses.
On 30th July, the same Army reported being down to 10-15 rounds per gun and 0.1 to 1 refill of fuel.
How much lower would those numbers be if they had been fully cut off from supply for 12 and 15 days respectively?

At some point, the supply situation would be so low, that they would be forced to attempt a breakout.
I wouldn't be suprised if that happened around the 27th. I would be a bit suprised if they lasted into August.


Regardless if it is late July or early August, I don't believe this scenario would change the German decision to reinforce the flanks.
For the Soviets, the (~65k strong) newly formed 34th Army was originally subordinated to the Western Front before being transfered north to take part in the Staraya Russa attack in mid-August. I can see that army remaining in the WF, leaving the balance of forces between the Germans/Soviets about the same around Smolensk. Glantz does estimate the Staraya Russa attack delayed AG North's advance to Leningrad by about 10 days, so thats one possible consequence.

In the central sector, the course of the battle would probably tip slightly in the German favor due to a shorter frontline at El'nia and more time to rest/refit before the Soviets strike if the above happens. If 34th Army still head north, I can forsee a bit more trouble for the Soviets. Maybe you can move the starting line for Typhoon 50km to the east. Maybe you have weaker Soviet attacks, leading to bigger German supply stockpiles by the end of September.
How can it be sealed on the 16th? 10th Panzer division per the maps I shared, was still well away from 7th Panzer. It took until about the 19th to just get to Yelnya. Since the POD is that Yelnya is not the objective they had north instead. So the 19th-20th is about as early as 10th Panzer could close the pocket instead of taking Yelnya with 2nd SS following in it's wake, probably having to send a part of the division to hold the Desna river flank just in case. Realistically we are seeing the 20th as the start of the first full day of the closed pocket, which would be the point at which 10th Panzer plows into the rear of Rokossovsky's Operational group fighting 7th and 20th Panzer to the North. That could well wreck Rokossovsky's forces sufficiently to slam shut the pocket from the north and south before the Soviets can pull units out to hold it open or push units in from the east to help. Once closed and with 2nd SS coming into to help the Soviets are in trouble even if attacking from both ends.
BTW thanks for the page numbers for all this info, I missed that in my skimming.

I'm thinking if the pocket is closed on the 20th it can hold out for about 10 days given the depleted nature of Soviet forces by that point and the move of 17th Panzer East to help keep the pocket shut. So by July 31st the pocket should be crushed. August 1st then should be the 1st day after it is over for the start of follow up operations. I'm not sure how much got into the Smolensk salient IOTL between July 16th-August 5th, but being shut the pocket should be fully mopped up within 10 days of it being closed, even with the elements of the German pincers still falling into place and the infantry still catching up. It was quite a bit different from the Vyazma pocket situation or even Minsk due to the Smolensk pocket happening after a wild advance, which left infantry divisions far behind the mobile ones. Infantry are necessary to liquidate the pocket, so finishing it off will depend on how quickly they can get there to squeeze and how well the Panzer and motorized infantry divisions can keep the deep end of the pocket closed.

AFAIK the decision to operate on the flanks was pretty much already made by the 19th and was a combination of needing to clear the flanks of Soviet armies in the seams of the army groups and logistical reasons, as bringing up the rail heads was badly lagging at that point. The nearest rail head to Yelnya according to Glantz was over 450 miles away by August 1st.

Not having 34th army to deal with would be a huge help to the German 16th army and may well mean 4th Panzer Group isn't broken up to defeat the Staraya Russia attack, which may well mean Leningrad falls in September. 34th army then gets destroyed at some point along the Moscow axis instead of mangled by AG-North in September. If Leningrad falls in September than the full 4th Panzer Group comes south for Typhoon, which is a big deal and may mean operations in September to soften up Soviet Western Front forces.

Sounds like there are a ton of potential butterflies with major potential consequences.
 

Deleted member 1487

Looking at the potential for 34th army not to be sent to Staraya Russa, that would mean the advance against Leningrad wouldn't be halted on August 12th to send part of 4th Panzer army south. By the end of August the breaches in the Luga Line would mean the city falls before September...which has enormous impact on the rest of Barbarossa if 4th Panzer army could then spend most of September refitting, plus the entire group being available for Typhoon.

Supposedly during the greatest danger in September of Leningrad falling, the commander of the area ordered the fleet scuttled and the city destroyed, but Zhukov arrived in time to countermand the order. Not sure if the story is true, but if true then if the city is about to fall then it could actually happen in August.
 
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I agree with the 16th not being possible in this ATL. I started thinking about a more focused PzGr3 as well, and had a small mental lapse :)
And if the pocket closes a few days later, I also don't object to the pocket lasting until the start of August - as that would be the about 10 days I was thinking about earlier.
 

Deleted member 1487

I agree with the 16th not being possible in this ATL. I started thinking about a more focused PzGr3 as well, and had a small mental lapse :)
And if the pocket closes a few days later, I also don't object to the pocket lasting until the start of August - as that would be the about 10 days I was thinking about earlier.
If we get into earlier PODs with 3rd Panzer then the Soviet 22nd Army would be in trouble with a more focused attack in the lead up to Smolensk. Can you think of a POD to get a more focused 3rd AND 2nd Panzer army? Looking at the 34th army it was assigned to the Reserve Front after the POD here (July 25th IOTL).
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/34th_Army_(Soviet_Union)
Perhaps it would get tossed into a frantic effort to save Smolensk, but I'm not sure if it was finished forming in time though as it was not transferred to a front line army until August 6th. If it does do it's OTL operation it is effectively smashed in August, though perhaps with the situation being settled at Smolensk sooner 3rd Panzer army units are sent instead to help the German 16th army at Staraya Russa? As it was they did smash up the Soviet 22nd army about this time, not sure where all their divisions were in mid-August.
 
Interesting posts. The pod could be to gave Hitler order his generals to operate after his instructions: Donetsk first, Leningrad second, moscow third,thus closing the pocket and transfer ressources South and north is top priority. In this scenario Leningrad falls and typhoon starts earlier. Hmmm.

Alternatively, its a compromise between Hitler and the generals. Donetsk first, moscow second, Leningrad third.
In this case 4th panzer is transferred earlier and the luftwaffe assets remain. Can we in this scenario see a an extra encirclement simultaneously with Kiev and an more forward jump off position towards Moscow when Kiev ends?
 

Deleted member 1487

Interesting posts. The pod could be to gave Hitler order his generals to operate after his instructions: Donetsk first, Leningrad second, moscow third,thus closing the pocket and transfer ressources South and north is top priority. In this scenario Leningrad falls and typhoon starts earlier. Hmmm.

Alternatively, its a compromise between Hitler and the generals. Donetsk first, moscow second, Leningrad third.
In this case 4th panzer is transferred earlier and the luftwaffe assets remain. Can we in this scenario see a an extra encirclement simultaneously with Kiev and an more forward jump off position towards Moscow when Kiev ends?
Well historically the encirclements against the Soviet 22nd and 34th armies happened in late August IOTL which was followed up by attacks on other Soviet armies in the areas between AGs-North and Center, plus the attack against Leningrad happened around the same time. That came though with the move of 3rd Panzer army north, so all the Panzer armies were committed to operations in August-September IOTL.

It is clear that even with a success like totally pocketing Soviet forces at Smolensk and crushing them much more easily that anything along the central Axis was impossible for supply reasons, the strength of the 3rd mobilization of Soviet forces in the way, and the threats to the flanks, so 2nd and 3rd Panzer army, as per OTL, are going to operate on the flanks first. As I said 3rd Panzer was tasked with securing the immediate flank, as was the German 16th army, while both armies ended up sending corps north to 18th army and 4th Panzer army to help storm Leningrad in August-September. A lot hinges on what the Soviets do with 34th army, as historically the Staraya Russa attacks by 4 Soviet armies were stopped except for the fresh 34th army. If STAVKA keeps 34th army in front of Moscow instead of north to help Leningrad, then it is likely Leningrad falls or is at least in a much worse situation, as the full 4th Panzer army plus VIII air corps are used from early August on to push on the city, while they'd still get OTL reinforcements from 3rd Panzer army. Soviet 34th army would still get burned up in front of Smolensk in August-September anyway, so that shouldn't make much of a difference there, as it will just act as a replacement for the forces extracted IOTL from Smolensk.

It is unlikely that any major encirclements on the road to Moscow happen before Typhoon and after Smolensk though due to the diversions north and south, just really brutal WW1 style positional warfare as per OTL.
 
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Deleted member 1487

I got some new information about escapes from the Smolensk pocket, according to p.72 of the 2015 revised edition of "When Titans Clashed" up to 20,000 Soviet soldiers managed to make it out of the pocket with some of their heavy equipment.
 
This report lists the strength of the divisons of 16th and 20th Army on August 6th (number of men is the first numeric column).

https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=111761447

Note that the 161st Rifle Division (which drags up the total) had just ended a period of rest and refit in the rear area (and was thus not part of the pocket escapees).

If we exclude that division, we get numbers that come close to matching Glantz's numbers.
But the amount of heavy equipement in the divisons are not very great.
 

Deleted member 1487

This report lists the strength of the divisons of 16th and 20th Army on August 6th (number of men is the first numeric column).

https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=111761447

Note that the 161st Rifle Division (which drags up the total) had just ended a period of rest and refit in the rear area (and was thus not part of the pocket escapees).

If we exclude that division, we get numbers that come close to matching Glantz's numbers.
But the amount of heavy equipement in the divisons are not very great.
Can you read Russian? So given that the numbers of men was relatively low that got out, as was the heavy equipment, it seems the biggest change would more likely be the ending of the pocket more quickly and more damage done to the Soviet forces trying to hold it on as the extra and early German divisions smash into them. What then about the Soviet forces not engaging them at Yelnya, do they they try and push out over the river and attack or move north to help with the pocket? Does an early end to the pocket with less overall German losses then mean the Germans are free to start Kiev early or would they get bogged down with greater Soviet offensives to tie they down?
 
Here is another report (comparing strength on 1.7 with strength on 6.8) that perhaps more clearly show the poor state of the divisions when exiting the encirclement.
https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=111761448

If the Germans close the pocket earlier, I would expect Soviet losses to be about the same as OTL, but with a higher share of pow as opposed to kia/wia.
German casualties would probably be a bit lower as well - and the battle would end earlier.

This again might cause some trouble for the Soviets further north.
If PzGr3 can send one PzKorps to AGNorth sooner, while at the same time be able to launch the Velikiye Luki attack earlier (perhaps around the time of the OTL Staraya Russa attack), I can envision a scenario in which Leningrad Front comes under even more pressure than what historically occured.
 

Deleted member 1487

Here is another report (comparing strength on 1.7 with strength on 6.8) that perhaps more clearly show the poor state of the divisions when exiting the encirclement.
https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=111761448
Where are you finding these? I can't read Russia.

If the Germans close the pocket earlier, I would expect Soviet losses to be about the same as OTL, but with a higher share of pow as opposed to kia/wia.
German casualties would probably be a bit lower as well - and the battle would end earlier.
If 20k Soviets got out IOTL, why would closing the pocket earlier result in the same losses as OTL?

This again might cause some trouble for the Soviets further north.
If PzGr3 can send one PzKorps to AGNorth sooner, while at the same time be able to launch the Velikiye Luki attack earlier (perhaps around the time of the OTL Staraya Russa attack), I can envision a scenario in which Leningrad Front comes under even more pressure than what historically occured.
What about an earlier move to Kiev, Soviet forces not locked down around Yelyna, and the Timoshenko offensive, plus follow up Soviet attacks?
 
Where are you finding these? I can't read Russia.
If 20k Soviets got out IOTL, why would closing the pocket earlier result in the same losses as OTL?

In my assumption, I'm going with the theory that the battle would end a bit earlier.
With fewer days of fighting, there would be less casualties among the forces on the outside trying to break in.

So, while the number of casualties inside the pocket would probably go up - outside the pocket it would go down.

With fewer days of fighting, German casualties would also go down.

And as mentioned, the ratio of pow vs kia/wia might change a bit inside the pocket.

What about an earlier move to Kiev, Soviet forces not locked down around Yelyna, and the Timoshenko offensive, plus follow up Soviet attacks?

2nd Army's attack on Gomel could probably be launched a bit earlier as well. I seem to recall that attack got delayed a bit due to lack of ammunition (because of the fighting around Smolensk).

With regard to the Timoshenko offensives, I don't really see that much difference - although I haven't pondered too much on it. It will still be a bloody affair - even if the locations and timing of the battle are slightly different.
 

Deleted member 1487

In my assumption, I'm going with the theory that the battle would end a bit earlier.
With fewer days of fighting, there would be less casualties among the forces on the outside trying to break in.

So, while the number of casualties inside the pocket would probably go up - outside the pocket it would go down.

With fewer days of fighting, German casualties would also go down.

And as mentioned, the ratio of pow vs kia/wia might change a bit inside the pocket.
Ok, that makes a lot of sense.

2nd Army's attack on Gomel could probably be launched a bit earlier as well. I seem to recall that attack got delayed a bit due to lack of ammunition (because of the fighting around Smolensk).
They were also using a lot fighting for control of the Yelnya bridgehead.

With regard to the Timoshenko offensives, I don't really see that much difference - although I haven't pondered too much on it. It will still be a bloody affair - even if the locations and timing of the battle are slightly different.
Glantz says that the fighting east of Smolensk starting in July and into August and September, especially for Yelnya, cost the Germans very dearly and tied them down for a while.
 
I am skeptical how many tanks were actually lost at Smolensk on the German side rather than needing repairs (as incredible as that sounds). I also suspect German tanks in Typhoon were likewise being repaired rather than having been destroyed outright (panzer divisions were approaching single digits working tank numbers all the same). As well, Soviet tank losses during typhoon were permanent and nearly as prolific before the whole winter offensive as at Smolensk.
 

Deleted member 1487

I am skeptical how many tanks were actually lost at Smolensk on the German side rather than needing repairs (as incredible as that sounds). I also suspect German tanks in Typhoon were likewise being repaired rather than having been destroyed outright (panzer divisions were approaching single digits working tank numbers all the same). As well, Soviet tank losses during typhoon were permanent and nearly as prolific before the whole winter offensive as at Smolensk.
Sure, I don't think anyone was arguing otherwise. The issue is how many could actually be repaired and how many repairable units were left behind in retreats? Think Klin Bulge.
 
Sure, I don't think anyone was arguing otherwise. The issue is how many could actually be repaired and how many repairable units were left behind in retreats? Think Klin Bulge.

If they couldn't be repaired then they would count as actual losses, and it was not abnormal for the German army to have obscene amounts of tanks being repaired. From June to the beginning of September, 10th Panzer division permanently lost around 60 tanks, but still had about 200 tanks at that time. Tank numbers really seem to drop dramatically in November and December, as you say. 2nd panzer division dropped from 96 in late October to 27 in late November. 6th panzer division had only 5 tanks in December. German tanks being repaired in January 1942 was about 1000 and virtually none were in the inventory. What the Red Army was doing militarily in November and December seems to have been incredibly effective.

Edit. For September 1941, there were 1697 working tanks, 927 being repaired and 970 gone for good on the German Soviet front.
 
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