No Yelnya bridgehead during battle of Smolensk 1941

[Deleted member 1487]

What if instead of Guderian pushing out to grab a bridgehead at Yelnya as a jump off point toward Moscow that ultimately was abandoned in September after heavy Soviet attacks, Gudernian instead used his forces to close the Smolensk pocket in July and held a river line as a defensive position, as he was forced to do anyway months later? Having 10th Panzer division to close the Smolensk pocket and trap probably 100k more Soviet troops in the pocket would have been very helpful and helped beat off Soviet attempted to rescue forces in the pocket, while without the Yelnya bridgehead the Germans would have been spared something like 50k casualties from July-September trying to hold it, while avoid having several divisions trapped in a fire sack that the Soviet artillery had a field day bombarding. It potentially accounted for over 40% of the 100k German casualties taken from August-September defending against Soviet offensives in front of Smolensk before Typhoon started. Holding the river line east of Yelnya would have been FAR less costly than trying to hold the bridgehead. Plus with pocketing more forces successfully at Smolensk the Soviets would have less forces to attack the Germans will from August-September. It is called Elnya on the map below.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Smolensk_(1941)
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yelnya_Offensive

 

[Deleted member 1487]

Alright, to explain why this is an important POD, had 10th Panzer and the 2nd SS divisions been fully available to shut the Smolensk pocket and 100k Soviets or more not escape as per OTL, the short of it is that it would make the pocket collapse more quickly due to lack of supply and weaken Soviet forces outside the pocket in the battles in August-September. Not only that, but 7th Panzer wouldn't be as worn down in the fighting as the one division nearest to closing the pocket and therefore getting the brunt of Soviet counterattacks. So less worn down German divisions, higher Soviet losses, and less need to keep divisions locked down defending Yelnya in August-September would mean Guderian would be able to do more offensively earlier and could therefore actually launch the Kiev operation early with stronger forces. During the August-September battles a weaker series of Soviet attacks against German forces in better defensive positions along the Desna river (west of Yelnya) would be easier to deal with and wear down. In the end the Moscow offensive might be able to be launched 1-2 weeks early against potentially weaker Soviet forces by strong German forces not as badly worn down by defensive fighting. Thoughts?

The below map is from August 25th and you can see how many forces have been locked down for over a month holding the Yelnya bridgehead, while you can also see 16th division that had been within the pocket escaped and participated in the series of August-September offensives against AG-Center toward Smolensk, so it having been destroyed in the pocket battle due to 10th Panzer and 2nd SS helping close the pocket early on from the South would mean several Soviet divisions and an armored division would not be available to the Soviets post-battle. With a shorter line anchored on a river line without the Yelna bridgehead few forces would be needed to hold the line, so Guderian has a bunch of extra divisions earlier, not worn down in the the fire sack of Yelnya, to attack south and prepare for an early Kiev operation.

Below is a map from September 6th that shows the start of the Yelnya bridgehead evacuation and again how much effort by mobile divisions to commit to the operation to prevent the whole thing from falling apart. This was during the start of move south for the Kiev Operation, which happened between September 1st-10th.

 

[Catspoke]

1) The Germans are just in a better supply situation without the Yelyna counterattacks come Typhoon time without serious fighting here.
2) The Soviets won't be attacking the bridgehead so perhaps its close to a wash for them (more losses in pocket, less counter attack losses)
3) Kiev wraps up a bit earlier so Guderian is in a bit of a better situation come Typhoon.
4) Perhaps Guderian tries a bigger encirclement at Kiev, moving torwards Byransk a bit, with unknowable results

Best case, Typhoon succeeds due to better supply, less Soviet forces, more German reserves, Kiev wraps up earlier, the Germans are able to get a couple of Panzer divisions next to Moscow in October, city is encircled in November.
Worst case, Guderian hoping for the big encirclement still, messes up Kiev with a deep encirclement and many Soviet armies escape,

 

[Deleted member 1487]

1) The Germans are just in a better supply situation without the Yelyna counterattacks come Typhoon time without serious fighting here.
2) The Soviets won't be attacking the bridgehead so perhaps its close to a wash for them (more losses in pocket, less counter attack losses)
3) Kiev wraps up a bit earlier so Guderian is in a bit of a better situation come Typhoon.
4) Perhaps Guderian tries a bigger encirclement at Kiev, moving torwards Byransk a bit, with unknowable results

Best case, Typhoon succeeds due to better supply, less Soviet forces, more German reserves, Kiev wraps up earlier, the Germans are able to get a couple of Panzer divisions next to Moscow in October, city is encircled in November.
Worst case, Guderian hoping for the big encirclement still, messes up Kiev with a deep encirclement and many Soviet armies escape,

First of all thanks for responding, I was worried this wouldn't go anywhere. 2nd Soviet losses to a tight seal of the Smolensk pocket would have cost the Soviets 2-3x as many men as were lost during the Yelnya offensives and the Soviets are likely to try and attack from Yelnya over the Desna river, so would be fighting the Germans on even worse terms than IOTL; likely they end up with many more losses of men and equipment for their efforts in this scenario. Otherwise agree about the supply situation and Guderian after Kiev. If Guderian is stronger and less worried about his flank then perhaps he might pull off a bigger encirclement, but IOTL the Kiev operation was ambitious as it was, so IMHO probably not going to loop out further East. AFAIK Guderian followed orders on the Kiev operation and was interested in finishing the Kiev situation ASAP to get ready for Moscow, so he'd be unlikely to complicate things any more and delay the Moscow move.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

4) Perhaps Guderian tries a bigger encirclement at Kiev, moving torwards Byransk a bit, with unknowable results
Worst case, Guderian hoping for the big encirclement still, messes up Kiev with a deep encirclement and many Soviet armies escape,

I looked at the Kiev battle again, there was no reason for him to try to move East or do anything different than OTL in terms of the encirclement. Heading East would be too much of a detour and completely miss the point of the Kiev move.

Best case, Typhoon succeeds due to better supply, less Soviet forces, more German reserves, Kiev wraps up earlier, the Germans are able to get a couple of Panzer divisions next to Moscow in October, city is encircled in November.

The question is whether the move against Moscow could happen sooner, would the Soviets stop their attacks against Smolensk in August-September sooner and actually prepare defenses, and would and easier Vyazma-Bryansk pocket battle allow for a quicker turn against Moscow that would have made a difference? Perhaps all things considered it ends up not mattering in terms of taking Moscow, but leaves the Germans with more soldiers for winter and the Soviets with less. How the butterflies from that play out are anyone's guess.

 

[thaddeus]

hard to see the POD for this? in fact their setback(s) here COULD be a POD for no diversion to Kalinin and/or Tikvin, as per recent threads you have posted?

 

[Deleted member 1487]

hard to see the POD for this? in fact their setback(s) here COULD be a POD for no diversion to Kalinin and/or Tikvin, as per recent threads you have posted?

A POD might be hard, but have von Bock make it clear to Guderian that closing the pocket is more important than taking jump off points for a Moscow move, because there will have to be an operational pause for a while after the pocket battle for logistical reasons, so no immediate move east would be happening. I don't see how this Kalinin or Tikvin options would link up to his. I mean if there is ASB intervention that gives Hitler access to campaign histories of Barbarossa then maybe all of the above could be linked, but that would require hindsight and appreciation for how much logistics impacted German force capabilities by this point in the campaign relative to what the Soviets still have in tank.

 

[thaddeus]

hard to see the POD for this? in fact their setback(s) here COULD be a POD for no diversion to Kalinin and/or Tikvin, as per recent threads you have posted?

A POD might be hard, but have von Bock make it clear to Guderian that closing the pocket is more important than taking jump off points for a Moscow move, because there will have to be an operational pause for a while after the pocket battle for logistical reasons, so no immediate move east would be happening. I don't see how this Kalinin or Tikvin options would link up to his. I mean if there is ASB intervention that gives Hitler access to campaign histories of Barbarossa then maybe all of the above could be linked, but that would require hindsight and appreciation for how much logistics impacted German force capabilities by this point in the campaign relative to what the Soviets still have in tank.

meant this operation might give a hint to Soviet capability and could serve as POD as to why no diversion to Kalinin (or at least it appears a diversion to me) and the crossing over to capture Tikvin? (which seems even more of one especially as Leningrad was even closer in their grasp.)

 

[Deleted member 1487]

meant this operation might give a hint to Soviet capability and could serve as POD as to why no diversion to Kalinin (or at least it appears a diversion to me) and the crossing over to capture Tikvin? (which seems even more of one especially as Leningrad was even closer in their grasp.)

Probably not, because closing the pocket tightly and destroying the Soviet 16th and 20th armies completely, rather than letting them get away somewhat intact, while defeating Soviet external forces from breaking into the pocket, probably with heavy losses, would mean reducing their capabilities in August-September, which might given the Germans a feeling of even greater superiority, especially if it makes the Vyazma-Bryansk pockets easier.

 

[Gudestein]

Actually Hitler demanding the Kiev diversion sooner could be the POD. Eg. Close this pocket NOW. We lose the forces in a few weeks.

I like it as a medium size pod, bit please bear with me trying it out as a bigger pod. With stronger German units and an earlier start of the Kiev encirclement, could they have done Kiev with half the panzer units and another (smaller) encirclement towards Moscow with the other half?
With Hitler being the POD, lack of collaboration could be the other half. Guess some generals necks are on the Line, but doing two encirclements and have a more advanced typhoon jump-off point could be a war winner (or not, byt a Big change)? Linked with a simple acceleration of an OTL request from Hitler.
Anyways, my knowledge of the details are insufficient to judge feasibility, but the potential is to bag the major parts of forces facing both AGC and AGS.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

Actually Hitler demanding the Kiev diversion sooner could be the POD. Eg. Close this pocket NOW. We lose the forces in a few weeks.

I like it as a medium size pod, bit please bear with me trying it out as a bigger pod. With stronger German units and an earlier start of the Kiev encirclement, could they have done Kiev with half the panzer units and another (smaller) encirclement towards Moscow with the other half?
With Hitler being the POD, lack of collaboration could be the other half. Guess some generals necks are on the Line, but doing two encirclements and have a more advanced typhoon jump-off point could be a war winner (or not, byt a Big change)? Linked with a simple acceleration of an OTL request from Hitler.
Anyways, my knowledge of the details are insufficient to judge feasibility, but the potential is to bag the major parts of forces facing both AGC and AGS.

IIRC the order to get ready to turn to Kiev as issued on the 19th of July, so if it is before Yelnya is taken and Hitler orders no move toward Moscow is to be made, then perhaps Guderian actually listens to those firm, early orders.
As to the bigger POD you talk about...no they needed all hands on deck to deal with Kiev. They'd have some extra infantry divisions to hold the line without holding Yelnya, but would have to beat off Soviet attempts to cross the river Desna, especially as Guderian moves south. ITTL 3rd Panzer army still will need to commit forces to destroying the 22nd army at the seam between AG-Center/North so will lack the forces for say an early small pocket to the East. Perhaps the 22nd army mission around Veliyki Luki is done sooner with weaker Soviet forces to the East? VIII Air Corps is still going to AG-North for the Leningrad offensive, which will be no more successful with this POD than IOTL. I imagine the Soviets will still launch their August-September offensives, but without 16th and 20th army they won't be as strong, while without Yelnya it won't be in the same place exactly. Since 20th army was in the Vyazma pocket historically, they'd probably either build up one of the remaining armies to fill it's historical role or reform it further East. 16th army though historically sat on the highway to Moscow, so that being destroyed would have an impact...but again it would probably be reformed with forces different than what it had IOTL.

The real question here I suppose is how early Typhoon could be moved up. Without as heavy of attacks in August-September and an accelerated TL for Kiev and potentially the Veliyki Luki operation, AG-Center can build up supplies for the Moscow operation more quickly and have forces in place sooner. Maybe it will be just a few days in advance, but given the historical weather patterns a few days of decent weather in late September may make a huge difference. With weaker Soviet forces to contend with east of Smolensk when Typhoon does start, they might be able to finish things off sooner, which means a quicker advance east before the weather really gets rough. Not sure if that is enough, but the build up of enough small changes could make a big difference, especially given weather and the timing of Soviet reserves arrival. If the 2nd SS division Reich is able to make it to Borodino before the Soviet 32nd Rifle Division, which got there barely before the Germans, then the highway to Moscow may well be breached and 4th Panzer could scatter Soviet defenses before they reach OTL levels. If the Germans get through to Moscow frontally before Soviet reserves arrive during the Moscow Panic of mid-October...things could get ugly.

 

[per70]

Do you by any chance have hard data on the number of Soviet troops partially trapped by say 16.July? I've seen a lot of data of varying quality wrt that - but I'm still struggling with getting a firm grasp of those.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

Do you by any chance have hard data on the number of Soviet troops partially trapped by say 16.July? I've seen a lot of data of varying quality wrt that - but I'm still struggling with getting a firm grasp of those.

As far as I understand it assuming that 10th Panzer and most of SS division Reich are used to connect with 7th Panzer coming in from the north they would pocket 19th, 20th, and 16th armies completely and Operational Group Rokossovsky would be not be strengthened by the flood of manpower pushing out of the pocket. The Soviet armies in the pocket already had been worn down by their offensives west to try and help with the Minsk pocket, so I don't know what their strength was as of July 16th. I do know historically some 300k men were captured in the pocket, while the remaining 459k Soviets killed or wounded I have no idea of whether they were part of the pocketed armies or not. Some where, some were not and I don't know how many men got out. I'm guessing that around 500k men would have been pocketed had 2nd Panzer Army snapped the pocket shut from the South ASAP. Wikipedia quotes a Soviet source of 581k men for the Battle of Smolensk at the start, not sure if that is just the 3 armies that were in the pocket or not. I'm guessing not, so the pocketed armies might have 'only' been 400k or so men. Russian wikipedia for the battle says initially it was for 5 armies. Assuming equal strength for each army that would mean the 3 pocketed would have somewhat over 100k men each, but we know that since 300k were captured they probably included a lot of civilians pressganged into Soviet military service without being formally inducted into the military from Smolensk and the surrounding areas, so their numbers were inflated beyond the official ones. If 300k were captured and a lot of 16th and 20th army managed to get out, plus then 19th army was reconstituted East of Smolensk in August, then I'm guessing at least 100k men, probably many more, got out and fought on, while the majority of POWs taken IOTL were likely militia. There was a ton of equipment left behind, probably the officially mobilized soldiers having left it behind along with the militia while they fled the pocket.

https://translate.google.com/transl...B6%D0%B5%D0%BD%D0%B8%D0%B5_(1941)&prev=search
Soviet OOB in the pocket:

• 19th Army (Lieutenant General Konev )
  • 25th Rifle Corps (Major General SM Chestohvalov )
    • 127th Infantry Division (Major-General T. Korneev )
    • 134 th Infantry Division (Brigade Commander VK Bazarov )
    • 162 th Infantry Division (Colonel NF Kolkunov )
  • 34th Rifle Corps (Lt. Gen. RP Khmelnitsky )
    • 129th Infantry Division (Major-General AM Gorodnyansky )
    • 158th Infantry Division (Colonel V. Novozhilov )
  • 23rd Mechanized Corps (Major General MA Myasnikov )
    • 220th Motorized Rifle Division (Major-General NG Khoruzhenko )
  • In submission of Army Staff
    • The 38th Infantry Division (Colonel M. G. Kirillov )
• 20th Army (Lieutenant General PA Kurochkin )
  • 69th Rifle Corps (Major General EA Mogilevchik )
    • 153rd Infantry Division [14] Colonel N. A. Hagen )
    • 229 th Infantry Division (Major-General MI Kozlov )
    • 233rd Infantry Division (Colonel GF Kotov )
  • 2nd Rifle Corps (Major General AN Ermakov )
    • 100th Infantry Division (Major-General JH Russiyanov )
    • 161 th Infantry Division (Colonel AI Mikhailov )
  • 5th Mechanized Corps (Major General IP Alekseenko )
    • 13th Panzer Division (Colonel FW Grachev )
    • 17th Panzer Division (Colonel IP Korchagin )
  • 7th Mechanized Corps (Major General V. Vinogradov )
    • 14th Panzer Division (Colonel I. D. Vasiliev )
    • 18th Panzer Division (Major-General FT Remizov )
  • The headquarters of the 20th Rifle Corps (Major General S. Eremin )
  • In submission of Army Staff
    • 73th Infantry Division (Colonel AI Akimov )
    • The 18th Infantry Division (Colonel K. B. Sviridov )
    • 57th Panzer Division (Colonel VA Mishulin )
    • 1st Motorized Infantry Division (Colonel JG Kreizer )
    • 144th Infantry Division (Major-General MA Pronin )
    • 128th Infantry Division (Colonel F. Komarov )
  
  

n the second tier

• 16th Army (Lieutenant General MF Lukin )
  • 32nd Rifle Corps (Major General TK Kolomiets )
    • 46th Infantry Division (Major-General AA Filatov )
    • 152 th Infantry Division (Colonel PN Chernyshev )
  • The headquarters of the 44th Rifle Corps (Divisional VA Yushkevich )

On July 16, the 29th Motorized Division from the group Guderian broke in Smolensk , where began a stubborn battle with the defenders of the city (see. Smolensk Defense (1941) ). On July 19, the 10th Panzer Division of the enemy advanced to the south-east of Smolensk and took Yelnya . Under the threat of the environment in the vicinity of Smolensk were 20 infantry divisions of the Red Army, were part of the three armies (16th, 19 th and 20 th) [17]
Thus, less than a week, German forces managed to get to Smolensk, which was the goal of all offensive operations [URL='https://translate.googleusercontent.com/translate_c?depth=1&hl=en&prev=search&rurl=translate.google.com&sl=ru&u=https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/%25D0%25A1%25D0%25BC%25D0%25BE%25D0%25BB%25D0%25B5%25D0%25BD%25D1%2581%25D0%25BA%25D0%25BE%25D0%25B5_%25D1%2581%25D1%2580%25D0%25B0%25D0%25B6%25D0%25B5%25D0%25BD%25D0%25B8%25D0%25B5_%281941%29&usg=ALkJrhjL_rMgcxxJKQTtBytWhncd1AP5yA#cite_note-Got-18'][18] . In the vast area west, north and east of Smolensk were the operational environment of the Western Front, a large force (the second strategic echelon): 16 Army ( MF Lukin ), 19 Army ( Konev ) and 20 th army ( PA Kurochkin ). Communication with these armies was supported by only a pontoon crossing the Dnieper River in the area of the village Solovyov (15 km south of Yartsevo ), which defended the consolidated group under the command of Colonel A. I. Lizyukova . This crossing sweep the enemy artillery fire, and subjected to constant blows his aircraft.

The Soviet 13th Army ( FN Remezov ) was divided into two enemy: one part was surrounded near Mogilev (see. Mogilev Defense ), and the other - was surrounded on Krychau direction, with heavy fighting broke for the river Sozh , where entrenched.
[/URL]
t is a different way events developed on the southern flank of the central portion of the Soviet-German front. Here the Soviet 21th Army , Colonel-General F. Kuznetsova July 13 launched an offensive with the task of mastering Bykhov and Bobruisk , exit to the rear of the enemy in the direction of Mogilev, Smolensk.

63rd Rifle Corps (Corps Commander LG Petrovsky ) successfully crossed the Dnieper , took Rogachev and Zhlobin and continued attack on Bobruisk .

South of 232 th Infantry Division of the 66th Corps advanced 80 kilometers, took the ferry across the River Berezina and Ptich .

67th Rifle Corps launched an offensive in the direction of the German bridgehead in the area of the Old Bykhov .

The German command urgently dispatched against the 21st Army 43 minutes and 53 minutes, and then the 12th army corps of the 2nd Field Army and the 52nd Infantry Division from the reserve of the High Command, who managed to stop the Soviet advance (see . Bobruisk battle ).

20 Soviet divisions should have theoretically had at least 240k men assuming 12k men per division. That wouldn't be counting militia or non-formally inducted civilian reinforcements/volunteers.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

Looking through Barbarossa Derailed vol.1 Glantz also had a number of Front level units not included in the above armies for fortified regions, plus reserve units, so I'm willing to be there was a mess of non-army units at Smolensk during the pocket battles. I'm guessing hard numbers are going to be impossible, especially given that many losses were taken by Soviet armies in the Smolensk pocket from July 1st-16th already, while having an unknown number of non-army units there as well, plus not recording quick inductions of men in and around Smolensk into the fight. I'm guessing somewhere between 400-500k men in the end at a high end estimate would have been in the pocket on the 16th including everyone that might have been fighting.

Actually Hitler demanding the Kiev diversion sooner could be the POD. Eg. Close this pocket NOW. We lose the forces in a few weeks.

Based on some reading I'm doing to try and find out the numbers in Smolensk on the 16th, it looks like von Bock ordered Yelnya captured on the 14th. I suppose had he issued different orders, say by Hitler's insistence that the pocket be closed by Guderian and a Moscow advance held off by this date rather than the 19th then that would be the POD that would avoid the Yelnya bridgehead. Though it sounds like there was the assumption Yelnya was to be the 'outer' ring of the Smolensk pocket to defend it against Soviet relief attempts. Not sure why they thought such a bridgehead that far south would matter, even with the heights at the town. Glantz in Barbarossa Derailed calls the move 'operationally sound' as I suppose such a picket line would be far enough from the pocket so as not to be caught up in the fight, would have strong defensive terrain, and would block moves across the river from the south. Seems a bit too much and an overestimate of German power and Soviet ability from the south to intervene.

 

[per70]

Based on some reading I'm doing to try and find out the numbers in Smolensk on the 16th, it looks like von Bock ordered Yelnya captured on the 14th. I suppose had he issued different orders, say by Hitler's insistence that the pocket be closed by Guderian and a Moscow advance held off by this date rather than the 19th then that would be the POD that would avoid the Yelnya bridgehead.

I'll come back to your other post in a short while.
But as a starter, I'll insert a quote from von Bock's diary on July 19th in which he refers to a phone conversation with Blumentritt:

"Please ask Guderian for me whether or not he is in a position to carry out the order of three days ago to link up with Panzer Group 3 near Yarzevo. If not, I have to commit other forces to do so. I asked: "Is everything alright with the command there? <snip> at this point Kluge jumped in and...had to defend the armored group against my accusation of poor command"

So it seems as if von Bock was a bit unhappy with Guderians decision to go for El'nia instead of a link up with PzGr3.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

I'll come back to your other post in a short while.
But as a starter, I'll insert a quote from von Bock's diary on July 19th in which he refers to a phone conversation with Blumentritt:

"Please ask Guderian for me whether or not he is in a position to carry out the order of three days ago to link up with Panzer Group 3 near Yarzevo. If not, I have to commit other forces to do so. I asked: "Is everything alright with the command there? <snip> at this point Kluge jumped in and...had to defend the armored group against my accusation of poor command"

So it seems as if von Bock was a bit unhappy with Guderians decision to go for El'nia instead of a link up with PzGr3.

Yeah I did see von Bock having had a different view of things on the 19th and apparently changed his mind by then, but the orders for the 14th are clear in stating that El'nia is supposed to be taken as part of the outer ring of the pocket. I'm gathering that the situation that he thought was going on on the 14th was changed by the 'Timoshenko' offensive and the reality of the difficulty of closing the pocket and how Guderian couldn't close the pocket and take Yelnya, which he incorrectly chose to hang on to instead (I guess later via Hitler's intervention?). Osprey's Barbarossa campaign book for AG-Center does mention that Guderian realized he had to pick between helping close the Smolensk pocket or holding El'nia (a different spelling of Yelnya) and chose the latter because he expected to attack East after Smolensk and thought he needed the bridgehead. I think that was around the 19th. I'm still going through Barbarossa Derailed and the Smolensk pocket section. I guess the forces anticipated to be able to close the Smolensk pocket by Guderian, the 18th Panzer and 29th Motorized, proved unequal to the task, so the order on the 14th by von Bock proved to be ultimately unworkable, which then altered his plans between the 14th-19th. I'm still getting through the section, so will come back and edit as necessary...or if you post again I will just post a new post with the new info.

I also got an August 1st OOB for the Soviet 16th, 19th, and 20th armies, which I think include forces extracted from the pocket, but not only those units. Plus of course units that got out were pretty worn down:

Table 10. ␣e Organization and Senior Command Cadre of the Western Front as of 1 August 1941 and the Central Front as of 23 July 1941
WESTERN FRONT – Marshal of the Soviet Union Semen Konstantinovich Timoshenko
␣␣ 16thArmy–LieutenantGeneralMikhailFedorovichLukinandLieutenantGeneral Konstantin Konstantinovich Rokossovsky on 8 August.
32nd Ri␣e Corps
␣
␣
␣
␣␣ 19th Army – Lieutenant General Ivan Stepanovich Konev.
46th Ri␣e Division 129th Ri␣e Division 152nd Ri␣e Division
␣ ␣ ␣ 34th Ri␣e Corps 158th Ri␣e Division
2nd Ri␣e Corps ␣ 50th Ri␣e Division ␣ 161st Ri␣e Division 25th Ri␣e Corps
␣
␣
␣
␣␣ 20th Army – Lieutenant General Pavel Aleksandrovich Kurochkin and Lieutenant General Mikhail Fedorovich Lukin on 6 August. ␣ 69th Ri␣e Corps
89th Ri␣e Division 91st Ri␣e Division 162nd Ri␣e Division
␣ ␣ ␣ 166th Ri␣e Division
␣ ␣ ␣
73rd Ri␣e Division 144th Ri␣e Division 233rd Ri␣e Division
␣ 153rd Ri␣e Division ␣ 229th Ri␣e Division ␣ 5th Mechanized Corps – Major General of Tank Forces Il’ia Prokof’evich
Alekseenko, died of wounds on 2 August after escaping from encirclement.
␣ ␣
␣
13th Tank Division – Colonel Fedor Ustinovich Grachev (disbanded 8 August) 17th Tank Division – Colonel Ivan Petrovich Korchagin (converted into 126th Tank Brigade on 28 August) 1st Motorized Ri␣e Division – Colonel (Major General on 7 August) Iakov Grigor’evich Kreizer (converted into 1st Tank Division on 18 August).
␣ 57th Tank Division – Colonel (Major General of Tank Forces on 24 July) Vasilii Aleksandrovich Mishulin (converted into 128th Tank Brigade on 1 September).

 

[Deleted member 1487]

Here is a relevant map for the 16th of July:

Per Glatnz on the page right after:

After mid-month, however, Hitler, Bock, Kluge, and Hoth were most preoccupied with the task of sealing o and destroying the almost encircled forces of 16th, 19th, and 20th Armies, which still clung resolutely to their defenses around the Smolensk
“pocket.” Bock at Army Group Center, Kluge at Fourth “Panzer” Army, and Hitler’s own sta wanted to destroy as many of the newly located Soviet units as possible. Hoth, whose panzer group was split between the front northward from Dukhovshchina and Iartsevo and the northern and eastern ␣anks of the pocket, wanted link-up and destruction so as to release forces to man his increasingly threatened “eastern” front. By contrast, Guderian, who was still hoping to continue his advance on Moscow without delay, had already dispatched Schaal’s 10th Panzer Division of Vietingho’s XXXXVI Motorized Corps eastward to secure a bridgehead over the Desna River at El’nia. ␣is bridgehead he thought would form an ideal jumping-o position for a subsequent advance on Viaz’ma and the grand prize of Moscow. Schaal’s panzers and panzer grenadiers did so on 19 July. As it turned out, however, the violent Soviet attacks that continued against the two panzer groups’ ␣anks ␣nally convinced Guderian that he had enough force available to either hold on to El’nia or bottle up Soviet 16th Army east of Smolensk, but not both.

So it looks like the pocket couldn't have been closed by 10th Panzer and 2nd SS division on the 16th, but by the 19th it was possible to get it done and sweep in the last elements of the Soviet 16th army. On July 16th though von Bock would have had to change his orders and make it clear to Guderian he was expected to send addition forces to close the pocket further East and forget about El'nia. This is where 'Auftragstaktik' becomes a problem, as Guderian was acting on initial orders and what he thought was best, but against the desires of higher command for the operational/strategic plan.

Situation map from late July 16th 1941:

Late July 17th:

 

[per70]

I think your estimate is on the very high end of the scale.


Firstly, it seems to be a common misconception that the Germans got 300k+ POW's in the Smolensk pocket.
But if we look at the relevant AG Center documents, we get a different picture.

AG Center reported collecting 309 110 POW's in what they defined as the battle of Dnjepr, Dvina and Smolensk (including the Roslavl operation) lasting until 5.Aug.
Which is the basis of the 300k claim above.

If we dig a bit deeper, we get the following distribution between the armies/PzGr's:

AOK 2 got the largest haul, collecting 110 352 POW (probably picking up a lot of prisoners west of the rivers + from the Mogilev encirclement).
AOK 9 got 36 400 POW's in the Smolensk kessel and 36 570 POW's elsewhere.
Pz Gr 2 got 38 561 POW in the Roslavl operation, 10 500 in the Smolensk kessel and 47 979 elsewhere.
Which leaves about 28k POW for PzGr3 and other units subordinated to the army group.

Now, the Smolensk kessel data goes from 20.July to 5. August and comes out at a total of 46 900.


Looking at the Soviet side, Lopukhovsky quotes a Western Front report placing their casualties from 21.July to 31.July at 105 723, of which 46 827 was MIA.
Which seem to fit pretty good with the German data - although the timespan is slightly different and WF consisted of other units as well.

Now, I seem to recall Glantz providing an estimate of roughly 50k troops escaping from the pocket in first few days of August in his derailed book.
He also quotes a 20th Army report placing that armies losses up until 20.July at 24k.

All in all, I would probably put the number of troops in the pocket at around 250k (and I dont have all my data at hand, so its not as accurate as it should be).

 

[Deleted member 1487]

Situation late July 19th:

Situation late July 20th:

Situation July 22nd:

Routing North instead and leaving the SS Reich division to hold the southern/outer flank along the Desna river rather than over it would let 10th Panzer take the Soviet 16th army and Rokossovsky's Operational Group fighting 7th and 20th Panzer from the north by surprise, without strong forces in place to stop them.

However by the 23rd so many forces had been committed to holding Yelnya that they were effectively leaving the pocket wide open to ensure they could maintain that bridgehead, which removed two powerful and useful mobile divisions from cutting off 3 Soviet armies, as well as their supply lines:

For reference of how much the Yelnya bridgehead sucked in German attention during the Smolensk pocket struggle, here is a situation map from July 31st well into the semi-failed pocket operation:

I think your estimate is on the very high end of the scale.


Firstly, it seems to be a common misconception that the Germans got 300k+ POW's in the Smolensk pocket.
But if we look at the relevant AG Center documents, we get a different picture.

AG Center reported collecting 309 110 POW's in what they defined as the battle of Dnjepr, Dvina and Smolensk (including the Roslavl operation) lasting until 5.Aug.
Which is the basis of the 300k claim above.

If we dig a bit deeper, we get the following distribution between the armies/PzGr's:

AOK 2 got the largest haul, collecting 110 352 POW (probably picking up a lot of prisoners west of the rivers + from the Mogilev encirclement).
AOK 9 got 36 400 POW's in the Smolensk kessel and 36 570 POW's elsewhere.
Pz Gr 2 got 38 561 POW in the Roslavl operation, 10 500 in the Smolensk kessel and 47 979 elsewhere.
Which leaves about 28k POW for PzGr3 and other units subordinated to the army group.

Now, the Smolensk kessel data goes from 20.July to 5. August and comes out at a total of 46 900.


Looking at the Soviet side, Lopukhovsky quotes a Western Front report placing their casualties from 21.July to 31.July at 105 723, of which 46 827 was MIA.
Which seem to fit pretty good with the German data - although the timespan is slightly different and WF consisted of other units as well.

Now, I seem to recall Glantz providing an estimate of roughly 50k troops escaping from the pocket in first few days of August in his derailed book.
He also quotes a 20th Army report placing that armies losses up until 20.July at 24k.

All in all, I would probably put the number of troops in the pocket at around 250k (and I dont have all my data at hand, so its not as accurate as it should be).

You make a fair point, around 100k Soviets of the 13th army had been encircled at IIRC Mogilev and captured/killed.

Thanks for the info about POW hauls, where did you get all that information??? Your sourcing for all of these Eastern Front discussions has been very detailed and excellent, what are you using? Thanks for contributing.

So is it your estimate that the Soviets would have lost an additional 100k or more men in the pocket or were those KIA/WIA during the pocket exliftration and after?

 

[per70]

About 100k was encircled at Mogilev, but half escaped that pocket.
Add in the 100k partially encircled troops of 22nd and 27th armies, 80% of which escaped, and you get the sense that the Germans got too greedy and attempted too much - ending up with a lot of missed opportunities instead.

With regards to the question at hand, I'm certain the Germans could have closed the pocket if they had made it their priority.
Besides PzGr2, Glantz asserts that PzGr3 moved too far to the north of Smolensk, and could have contributed more if not.

The resulting benefit for the Germans would be threefold.
(1) probably another 50-100k pow's.
(2) a faster resolution of the battle. The Mogilev siege ended after 10 days. If we assume a similar timespan for the Smolensk encirclement, the pocket collapses about 7-10 days ahead of schedule (as the Soviets run out of suppl)y.
(3) Those 7-10 days were pretty hard on the Germans troops (especially the motorized troops) which had to endure attacks from both inside and outside the pocket. Eliminate the inside threat, and you get fewer German casualties as a result

Thanks for the kind remark. Apart from a lot of books, I'm looking at original documents when I've got the time.
The pow data can be found here (add 2 to the counter to get the next document in the series): http://wwii.germandocsinrussia.org/pages/85664/zooms/8