No WW2: Would the Soviets intervene in Asia?

Absent a second war in Europe, would the Soviets have intervened in the second Sino-Japanese War?

Stalin was a cautious fellow, but considering how easily the Soviets defeated Japan at Khalkin Gol it seems like it'd be a safe move for the USSR to drive the Japanese from the mainland. They'd gain Manchuria and Korea as satellites and the most they could lose to Japan is northern Sakhalin (where Japan was mostly benefitting from the oil anyway IIRC).
 

trurle

Banned
Absent a second war in Europe, would the Soviets have intervened in the second Sino-Japanese War?

Stalin was a cautious fellow, but considering how easily the Soviets defeated Japan at Khalkin Gol it seems like it'd be a safe move for the USSR to drive the Japanese from the mainland. They'd gain Manchuria and Korea as satellites and the most they could lose to Japan is northern Sakhalin (where Japan was mostly benefitting from the oil anyway IIRC).
I would not call Khalkin Gol victory easy. Actually, with ~40% of Soviet forces involved been the casualties, it was closer to Pyrrhic victory definition. Both Soviets and Japanese learned a hard lessons that time. And by the time of Khalhin Gol, Soviets has already occupied Xinjiang province. Without WWII in Europe, likely result will be some sort of partition of China between Soviet, Japanese and may be British (although British stance in this case will be much stiffer than in OTL - i.e. likely no OTL arms import embargo to China in 1940).
 
Absent a second war in Europe, would the Soviets have intervened in the second Sino-Japanese War?

Stalin was a cautious fellow, but considering how easily the Soviets defeated Japan at Khalkin Gol it seems like it'd be a safe move for the USSR to drive the Japanese from the mainland. They'd gain Manchuria and Korea as satellites and the most they could lose to Japan is northern Sakhalin (where Japan was mostly benefitting from the oil anyway IIRC).

Maybe is the best answer I can give you. Once the Red Army is rearmed and reformed, the temptation would certainly be there, especially so long as Japan is stuck neck deep in China.

I would not call Khalkin Gol victory easy. Actually, with ~40% of Soviet forces involved been the casualties, it was closer to Pyrrhic victory definition.

Khalkin Ghol may not have been an easy victory per-say, as the Japanese forces put up a quite spirited (if doomed) resistance, but it was not remotely Pyrrhic. Also, had Soviet casualties really been 40% of their force then that would have stopped the forces committed at Nomonhan dead long before they could complete the annihilation of the 23rd Division. The combat parts of the Soviet formations would have vanished.
 
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trurle

Banned
Khalkin Ghol may not have been an easy victory per-say, as the Japanese forces put up a quite spirited (if doomed) resistance, but it was not remotely Pyrrhic. Also, had Soviet casualties really been 40% of their force then that would have stopped the forces committed at Nomonhan dead long before they could complete the annihilation of the 23rd Division. The combat parts of the Soviet formations would have vanished.
Due logistical problems, Soviets has very much reduced non-combat forces in the Khalkin Gol. If you calculate casualties in the Soviet front-line units only, typical figures would range in 50-80% range. Also, casualties may be misleading for long battles like Khalkin Gol, because of many casualties (wounded and sick) returning to service before end of battle. Your statement "The combat parts of the Soviet formations would have vanished" should apply to 40% losses (which roughly corresponds to 90% casualties), not 40% casualties.
 
Due logistical problems, Soviets has very much reduced non-combat forces in the Khalkin Gol. If you calculate casualties in the Soviet front-line units only, typical figures would range in 50-80% range. Also, casualties may be misleading for long battles like Khalkin Gol, because of many casualties (wounded and sick) returning to service before end of battle. Your statement "The combat parts of the Soviet formations would have vanished" should apply to 40% losses (which roughly corresponds to 90% casualties), not 40% casualties.

The Soviets actually had far more significant logistical assets committed to Khalkin Ghol then either Japanese or even in comparison to the forces they deployed in, say, the first half of the winter war (relative to size, of course). And as I also said: if 90% of Soviet combat forces were casualties then the Soviets would not have won as they did. Period. Not happening. It's not possible. The Soviets would have ground to a halt far short of their objectives and the Japanese forces would have emerged perfectly intact instead of utterly obliterated. It would not even be enough to classify even as a pyrrhic victory. It would be, at best, a minor defeat.

Given that the Soviets did achieve their objectives and did annihilate the defending Japanese forces and did do so in such a decisive that they both sides recognized it as a clear Soviet victory, a analysis that both professional military men and historians have upheld for nearly the past 80 years now. Not only that, but the Soviets also retained enough strength to defeat some subsequent hasty counterattacks launched by the Japanese in early-September before the cease-fire was declared. All that only leads to one conclusion: Soviet casualties were not, in fact, 40% of total forces committed.

I can see where you, and others, might be getting that mistaken impression however: most strength figures given for Nomonhan, most notably Wikipedia, are for a particular point in time and not for total forces committed while the casualty figures are frequently for the entire battle. What would present a more accurate picture is casualties for Soviet forces in a given time. For example, at the time offensive which decided the campaign in the final ten days of August saw the Soviet force of some ~55,000 troops (51,000 Red Army and a few thousand Mongolians) suffer approximately 9-10,000 casualties. That corresponds to a casualty rate of around 16-18%... which is much more plausible.
 
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Stalin was a cautious fellow, but considering how easily the Soviets defeated Japan at Khalkin Gol it seems like it'd be a safe move for the USSR to drive the Japanese from the mainland. They'd gain Manchuria and Korea as satellites and the most they could lose to Japan is northern Sakhalin (where Japan was mostly benefitting from the oil anyway IIRC).

"Why did the Soviet command only squeeze out the Japanese invaders, but did not go over to the offensive on the territory of Manchuria? The prevailing position of the [Soviet] command is explained by the words of Stalin about the danger of unleashing a long and costly war. Iosif Vissarionovich understood how hazardous invading these territories, under conditions of a significant strengthening of Germany and the manifestation of the latter's aggression, could be. It was on this basis that the USSR willingly agreed to a ceasefire even though the initiative came from the Japanese leadership.

Most of all, in this brief war, the selflessness of the Japanese warriors, who were ready to die but did not give up their positions, was surprising. This situation would be understandable if the Soviet army were to advance on the ancestral lands of these people for the purpose of seizure and conquest, but on the Mongolian border the aggressors were the Japanese. The explanation for such insane fury could only be found in active ideological propaganda, which was conducted since the end of the 1920s in Japan. Fanatical soldiers and officers were a real weapon that was directed against our soldiers who defended the freedom of their allies. On the other hand, there was practical sense in the actions of the Soviet leadership: the Soviet Union could not allow a dangerous and strong (by that time) Japan on its borders. The actual conquest of China was a testament to the strength of the Japanese forces, so the operations in Mongolia had a special significance for the security of our country."

-- Vadim Sobin

About the casualties: according to Boris Sokolov, the total number of Soviet-Mongol personnel who participated in all stages of the battle was about 125,000; given this, a cumulative casualty toll of 29,000 corresponds to a wear rate of just over 23%. Of course, combat units, especially ground troops, were disproportionately affected. Historian Maksim Kolomiets identifies 51,950 men among the latter by August 20, the day Zhukov's final offensive began - not including the Mongol People's Army. Zhukov states that from that date until the 30th Soviet troops took 9,284 casualties, excluding sick, and, of course, the losses of the Mongolians - broken down as 1,569 dead, 7,583 wounded, and 131 missing. Thus, during that time the attrition rate among the front-line troops was at least 18%. Probably most of these losses were incurred in the first half of the offensive phase, before the 23rd Division's resistance was broken and its remnants routed back toward Nomonhan in an attempt to avoid encirclement: the Soviet command reported 546 dead, 3,637 wounded, and 28 missing from August 20-22 alone, and the Japanese counterattack on the southern flank from the 24th to the 26th probably accounted for much of the remainder.

On the IJA side, out of all forces theoretically under the jurisdiction of 6th Army headquarters (including air units), the total wear rate was about 24% (26.5% including sick). However, this conceals the fact that from an administrative standpoint the bulk of the 6th Army consisted of units that were never thrown into battle, such as the 2nd, 4th, and 1st Divisions, and were only assigned to it at the very end of the conflict in the hopes of launching a counteroffensive. The troops that carried out the majority of the real fighting - the 23rd Division and elements of the 7th Division - suffered devastating casualties: 68% for the former (76.5% including ill), and 32.6% for the latter. Although the Soviet forces were badly bloodied, the Japanese, when it came to those formations at the point of contact, lost one division virtually destroyed and a second one crippled.
 
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trurle

Banned
About the casualties: according to Boris Sokolov, the total number of Soviet-Mongol personnel who participated in all stages of the battle was about 125,000; given this, a cumulative casualty toll of 29,000 corresponds to a wear rate of just over 23%. Of course, combat units, especially ground troops, were disproportionately affected. Historian Maksim Kolomiets identifies 51,950 men among the latter by August 20, the day Zhukov's final offensive began - not including the Mongol People's Army. Zhukov states that from that date until the 30th Soviet troops took 9,284 casualties, excluding sick, and, of course, the losses of the Mongolians - broken down as 1,569 dead, 7,583 wounded, and 131 missing. Thus, during that time the attrition rate among the front-line troops was at least 18%. Probably most of these losses were incurred in the first half of the offensive phase, before the 23rd Division's resistance was broken and its remnants routed back toward Nomonhan in an attempt to avoid encirclement: the Soviet command reported 546 dead, 3,637 wounded, and 28 missing from August 20-22 alone, and the Japanese counterattack on the southern flank from the 24th to the 26th probably accounted for much of the remainder.

On the IJA side, out of all forces theoretically under the jurisdiction of 6th Army headquarters (including air units), the total wear rate was about 24% (26.5% including sick). However, this conceals the fact that from an administrative standpoint the bulk of the 6th Army consisted of units that were never thrown into battle, such as the 2nd, 4th, and 1st Divisions, and were only assigned to it at the very end of the conflict in the hopes of launching a counteroffensive. The troops that carried out the majority of the real fighting - the 23rd Division and elements of the 7th Division - suffered devastating casualties: 68% for the former (76.5% including ill), and 32.6% for the latter. Although the Soviet forces were badly bloodied, the Japanese, when it came to those formations at the point of contact, lost one division virtually destroyed and a second one crippled.
Good compilation and reasonable conclusion. I should add one bizarre fact. The Japanese has suffered 1:1 ratio of wounded to killed among casualties (too much dying from wounds), which mostly explained by contemporary IJA rule forbidding to deliver first aid without direct order of commissioned officer. In cases then officer was unavailable, enforcement of this rule by non-commissioned officers and fellow soldiers has resulted in excess deaths. The rule was appealed immediately after Khalkin Gol though.
 
Good compilation and reasonable conclusion. I should add one bizarre fact. The Japanese has suffered 1:1 ratio of wounded to killed among casualties (too much dying from wounds), which mostly explained by contemporary IJA rule forbidding to deliver first aid without direct order of commissioned officer. In cases then officer was unavailable, enforcement of this rule by non-commissioned officers and fellow soldiers has resulted in excess deaths. The rule was appealed immediately after Khalkin Gol though.

I would be more quick to attribute such a distribution to the fact that many IJA units were simply surrounded and fought virtually to annihilation. In those units there was no way to evacuate any wounded, and the latter were left to die, killed themselves, or were killed by the Soviets.
 
No, I don't think so. Stalin was more interested in Europe than Asia. Prior to Fascism, Communism was the Big Bad. There was a fear that Communism would topple the Western World and Fascism was to be celebrated for standing up against Stalin and the Communists. To my understanding there is evidence to suggest that prior to WWII, the USSR had plans to invade Europe, whether it would be successful is debatable, but it's likely an attempt would be made.
 

trurle

Banned
I would be more quick to attribute such a distribution to the fact that many IJA units were simply surrounded and fought virtually to annihilation. In those units there was no way to evacuate any wounded, and the latter were left to die, killed themselves, or were killed by the Soviets.
"Left to die" part definitely contributed. Regarding "killed themselves, or were killed by Soviets", no evidence. No war diaries i read mention suicides or systematic killing of wounded Japanese in Khalkin Gol. In fact, compared to later German campaigns, more significant effort to take prisoners was made by Soviets. For example, repeated offers to surrender for Japanese cornered in bunker before throwing grenade inside. The conflict was simply too short for atrocities to build up.
 
I thought Soviet tanks account for many of the differences in casualty rates if not the victory itself?

I do think the USSR might go after Japan and China without a war in Europe though doing so could be a cause for invasion and, thus, a cause for war in Europe...
 
"Left to die" part definitely contributed. Regarding "killed themselves, or were killed by Soviets", no evidence. No war diaries i read mention suicides or systematic killing of wounded Japanese in Khalkin Gol. In fact, compared to later German campaigns, more significant effort to take prisoners was made by Soviets. For example, repeated offers to surrender for Japanese cornered in bunker before throwing grenade inside. The conflict was simply too short for atrocities to build up.

Well, I meant more to say that they were killed by the Soviets during the progress of the battle from shellfire, explosions, and whatnot, but the Red Army committed war crimes too. The most notable instance was probably the 9th Armored Brigade's incineration of the Japanese camp at Uzur Nur on 22 August. Although Uzur Nur served as a resupply point and depot for motorized units, there was also a large field hospital, 10 meters tall, clearly marked with Red Cross symbols on its sides. Soviet tanks attacked the tent anyway and ran over the helpless patients struggling to crawl out of their path, then burned the whole place down.

As for suicides, they happened as well. For example, when the Japanese finally withdrew from Fui Heights on the northern flank, the immobile wounded were issued two grenades - one to use against the enemy, and the other for themselves. Since they were going to die, it was expected that they at least be able to take out a few enemies with them while they did so.
 
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