No WW1: the Economic Factors.

[Grey Wolf]

I think China has better prospects than everyone is thinking. By 1914 it had begun rebuilding its navy with orders for cruisers and destroyers placed in Europe. This indicates a degree of financial and politicial stability after the events of 1912, and with the great powers probably more focused on China other than anywhere else (apart from sporadic events in the Eastern Mediterranean), the republic would have a better chance of holding together than in OTL. Japan is certainly not going to have a free hand, and whatever multi-partite agreement from the Boxer Wars was implemented, would still hold the powers together.

Its no guarantee, but its far from the assumed guarantee of inevitable collapse

Best Regards
Grey Wolf

 

[I Blame Communism]

I think China has better prospects than everyone is thinking. By 1914 it had begun rebuilding its navy with orders for cruisers and destroyers placed in Europe. This indicates a degree of financial and politicial stability after the events of 1912, and with the great powers probably more focused on China other than anywhere else (apart from sporadic events in the Eastern Mediterranean), the republic would have a better chance of holding together than in OTL. Japan is certainly not going to have a free hand, and whatever multi-partite agreement from the Boxer Wars was implemented, would still hold the powers together.

Its no guarantee, but its far from the assumed guarantee of inevitable collapse

Best Regards
Grey Wolf

China's problem was internal: Yuan Shikai had already secured his dictatorship by 1914, and one of the ways in which he had done this was putting his cronies in charge of the provinces where he suspected revolutionary sentiment was against him. These military governors would become the warlords when they revolted against his decision to make himself emperor. If he dies before implementing this plan, prospects are better, but the control of the provinces by ambitious military men who can defy the government if its policies infringe on their power is the more fundamental problem. It would take a very cunning statesman, but if a loyal and effective army could be created, like the one the GMD built in Guandong, and used to destroy the military governors without an interval of wholesale anarchy, that would be good.

Japan is most certainly not going to have a free hand, indeed. Going back to Russia, an important question here is the fate of Manchuria. Zhang Zuolin already had enough military clout to play silly-buggers with the central government in 1915, so if there's a warlord period he'll probably still take control (the warlord period is also important for Manchuria as its Sinicisation was sealed by the rush of migrants looking for safety under Zhang's stable and econimically sound governance). In OTL, obviously, Zhang was able to establish his rule under the watchful eyes of Japan while Russia was fighting WW1. Without WW1, Russia will be eager to recoup their losses of 1905. Zhang, being a smooth operator, will no doubt play the two great powers off against one another.

Assuming no warlord period, and Zhang not taking control (although he had a great deal of power in this very important and sensitive region so he might be put in charge of some sort of "Machurian Autonomous Region" if he collaborated against the other warlords), hmm... if the Chinese government attempts to interfere with great power priveledge, it's got another thing coming. It would need to set its own house in order first, and that would take a decade at least. But if it manages and becomes an effective state, I can see its sovereignty in Manchuria being taken up by a power which won't be keen on Russia nor have any particular love for Japan, and has already been co-operating with the republic in the region...

It's ze Germans!

 

[W.W.A.F.T.]

I think China has better prospects than everyone is thinking. By 1914 it had begun rebuilding its navy with orders for cruisers and destroyers placed in Europe. This indicates a degree of financial and politicial stability after the events of 1912, and with the great powers probably more focused on China other than anywhere else (apart from sporadic events in the Eastern Mediterranean), the republic would have a better chance of holding together than in OTL. Japan is certainly not going to have a free hand, and whatever multi-partite agreement from the Boxer Wars was implemented, would still hold the powers together.

Its no guarantee, but its far from the assumed guarantee of inevitable collapse

Best Regards
Grey Wolf

While it is true that things looked pretty good for china in 1914, the truth of the matter is that, the seeds of warlordismhad already been sewn by 1913, what's more, the chinese only contributed 1000 trench diggers to the war in europe, hardly the sort of regime-runing effort that russia made.

the breakapart will happen, but once it sarts there are two main possibilities, once the warlordism starts the foriegn powers operating in the region will snap up any rebellious provences and turn them into imperial holdings (alternatively ,but very unlikely, the foriegners could show some foresight and wait till total anarchy sets in and then divy up the whole country, more or less, between them). once this process begins the chinese will either not notice/care/ be able to do anything about it, or, they'll see that they're being devoured piece by piece and stop fighting amongst themselves long enough to repel the foriegn devils.

if the colonisers are successful than china will look rather similar to imperial era africa ( to be specific, expanded french indochina, expanded holdings around macau and hong kong, american holdings near the philippenes, russian turkmenistan and mongolia, along with german, dutch, and japanese colonies scattered about, and a GMD cotrolled rump state and a manchuria that is either fully independant or "independant" and trapped in either german or russian orbit.). if the chinese are succsessful than you have a china that modernizes sooner by dint of starting earlier and being more open to foriegn investements.

 

[I Blame Communism]

While it is true that things looked pretty good for china in 1914, the truth of the matter is that, the seeds of warlordismhad already been sewn by 1913, what's more, the chinese only contributed 1000 trench diggers to the war in europe, hardly the sort of regime-runing effort that russia made.

the breakapart will happen, but once it sarts there are two main possibilities, once the warlordism starts the foriegn powers operating in the region will snap up any rebellious provences and turn them into imperial holdings (alternatively ,but very unlikely, the foriegners could show some foresight and wait till total anarchy sets in and then divy up the whole country, more or less, between them). once this process begins the chinese will either not notice/care/ be able to do anything about it, or, they'll see that they're being devoured piece by piece and stop fighting amongst themselves long enough to repel the foriegn devils.

if the colonisers are successful than china will look rather similar to imperial era africa ( to be specific, expanded french indochina, expanded holdings around macau and hong kong, american holdings near the philippenes, russian turkmenistan and mongolia, along with german, dutch, and japanese colonies scattered about, and a GMD cotrolled rump state and a manchuria that is either fully independant or "independant" and trapped in either german or russian orbit.). if the chinese are succsessful than you have a china that modernizes sooner by dint of starting earlier and being more open to foriegn investements.

Not everybody would be so keen on this. Russia and Japan are the most traditionally imperialist regarding China and of course they're at total cross-purposes. America has its open door policy, and I don't really see why direct annexations serve British, French, or German interests better than commercial cncessions.

 

[W.W.A.F.T.]

Not everybody would be so keen on this. Russia and Japan are the most traditionally imperialist regarding China and of course they're at total cross-purposes. America has its open door policy, and I don't really see why direct annexations serve British, French, or German interests better than commercial cncessions.

well, there is a chance that the foriegners don't snaffle up china once it starts to come apart at the seams, but imperial land hunger has historically been motive enough, even when national iterests could be better served by other means. and even with the open door policy the americans would join in once the europeans started the process, for fear of being muscled out of china anyways.

 

[I Blame Communism]

well, there is a chance that the foriegners don't snaffle up china once it starts to come apart at the seams, but imperial land hunger has historically been motive enough, even when national iterests could be better served by other means. and even with the open door policy the americans would join in once the europeans started the process, for fear of being muscled out of china anyways.

But throughout the 19th century when China was in a vulnerable position, Britain and France attacked it for concessions, not land. The powers are all mutually suspicious and several (the USA, Germany) have far more to loose than to gain.

 

[W.W.A.F.T.]

But throughout the 19th century when China was in a vulnerable position, Britain and France attacked it for concessions, not land. The powers are all mutually suspicious and several (the USA, Germany) have far more to loose than to gain.

very well I yield the point to you sir. assuming then that there is no "scramble for china", you would still see a couple more city-colonies, built on the same pattern as macau and hong kong.

 

[I Blame Communism]

very well I yield the point to you sir. assuming then that there is no "scramble for china", you would still see a couple more city-colonies, built on the same pattern as macau and hong kong.

That was already the de-facto situation of Qingdao, Port Arthur, and Zhanjiang, and Shanghai internationally. There probable would be scuffle for influence in China, but not direct annexations.

 

[Moltke]

But if it manages and becomes an effective state, I can see its sovereignty in Manchuria being taken up by a power which won't be keen on Russia nor have any particular love for Japan, and has already been co-operating with the republic in the region...

It's ze Germans!

I like this. I'm trying to visualize this picture ... throw some more paint on the canvas please. Are you saying that this semi-autonomous Manchuria plays mainland china off against Japan and/or Russia and then perhaps plays another foreign power (ie Fritz) off against Russia and/or Japan? That is some mighty Bismarckian (if that's a term good, if not consider it coined) diplomacy Or did I not understand your train of thought?

Give me some estimated years or a time frame you think something like this can develop. 1916? 1919? I agree that a resurgent Russia (especially one with the Romanovs still at the helm) would be all too willing to right the wrongs of 1904 and toss some vengeance toward the rising sun. Manchuria seems like the battleground for such a thing ... Besides upsetting the French by upsetting the British by upsetting the Japanese is there any reason to believe the Russians are not eventually going to be marching in? As their economics fall into place and their military still immense, they can throw a lot of weight around. Maneuvers such as this could be exhibit A and alarm bells for the UK and Germany on the rising strength of the Bear too. I like the idea of a semi-independent Manchuria but keeping her alive is difficult. A glory seeking Kaiser just might rush in, especially if it wedges or creates difficulties for the Ivans or Japs. Are we talking a country/area roughly equivalent to Manchukuo? Given time, they could be pretty interesting. All those who drool over Chinese fragmentation TL's commence comments.

 

[I Blame Communism]

I like this. I'm trying to visualize this picture ... throw some more paint on the canvas please. Are you saying that this semi-autonomous Manchuria plays mainland china off against Japan and/or Russia and then perhaps plays another foreign power (ie Fritz) off against Russia and/or Japan? That is some mighty Bismarckian (if that's a term good, if not consider it coined) diplomacy Or did I not understand your train of thought?

Well, in 1914 Zhang Zuolin had already risen from bandit to commander of all the troops in southern Manchuria. In OTL after the collapse into warlordism he took over the whole place (about Manhukuo saized, yes) and ran as a de-facto state, an effective one, too, but he had to tread carefully around the Japanese, with their base at Port Arthur and their railway concessions. But then Chiang comes along, knocks heads, takes control of central China. The Japanese think that Zhang is trying to play him off against them, and going to cut a deal to become governor of Manchuria on the Nanjing government's behalf, so they kill him. His son takes over... and a few years later they think the same thing of him, invade, oust him, and set up Manchukuo.

However let's imagine the situation is much the same, except that Russia is more aggressive, confident, and expansionist in the far east. Both sides want to control Manchuria, and Zhang in the middle is leaning towards one when the other tries to undermine his power, threatening to move to the other...

Where Germany comes in is if China manages to get back on its feet. This took quite a while (over a decade) OTL, but we can probably find away to make the warlord period shorter and less severe. They'll want to re-assert their sovereignty in Manchuria, but they'll need soebody's help to do that. Germany had already started to invest in China before WW1, they don't like Russia, and they have no particular reason to be keen on Japan. I can imagine a Sino-German Co-Operation springing up.

Give me some estimated years or a time frame you think something like this can develop. 1916? 1919? I agree that a resurgent Russia (especially one with the Romanovs still at the helm) would be all too willing to right the wrongs of 1904 and toss some vengeance toward the rising sun. Manchuria seems like the battleground for such a thing ... Besides upsetting the French by upsetting the British by upsetting the Japanese is there any reason to believe the Russians are not eventually going to be marching in? As their economics fall into place and their military still immense, they can throw a lot of weight around. Maneuvers such as this could be exhibit A and alarm bells for the UK and Germany on the rising strength of the Bear too. I like the idea of a semi-independent Manchuria but keeping her alive is difficult. A glory seeking Kaiser just might rush in, especially if it wedges or creates difficulties for the Ivans or Japs. Are we talking a country/area roughly equivalent to Manchukuo? Given time, they could be pretty interesting. All those who drool over Chinese fragmentation TL's commence comments.

I'm not sure about timeframe. It rather depends on developments inside China, and how long the warlord era lasts. Until China has got its house in order, it's a Russo-Japanese matter. What "China" can Germany support? The warlord in Beijing this week? But if we have a situation where Zhang has been playing Beijing as well as Moscow and Tokyo and China has never suffered terribly severe warlordism, it could all happen as early as 1920, probably.

Russia getting ambitious and rolling into Manchuria, damn the Entente, would serve as a good signal of its rising power and freedom of action, I think. Say German-backed China is scheming schemes, and the Russians have none of this and blast their way in same as Japan did OTL. China's angry and frightened, so is Japan, and by extension Germany and possibly Britain. This could be a catalyst for rapproachment.

 

[DuQuense]

Absent a GW The Ukraine remains the bread basket of Europe.

This means no great expansion of the US Midwest grain areas into the Dust Bowl areas.
While whe see some due to previous attempts to farm the Great American Desert, the Dust Storms will be a lot less severe.

With out the Great war and the Government take over of the Economies during the war, There is no precedent for massive government intervention into the Economy during the Great Depression*. There is also no Precedent for stopping the Convertibility of Gold/Silver money.
No great government expansion of powers, and stealing of the Real Money around the world in the 1930's.

*I still see a great Panic around the 1930's due to general trends, Cycles overlapping, and the poorly regulated financial sectors.

Japan either way looks to be in a better situation as they probably can consolidate holdings in China and fully integrate Formosa and Korea.
"Integrate"? That sounds rather unfortunate. Their attempts to Nihonise Korea were all miserable failures.

While Japan attempted almost from the beginning to Nihonise Formosa [with some degree of success] It never was able to agree on this as the Policy for Korea.

However Nihonization was the policy at the time GW1, and absent the Great war, Probably would have remained the policy by default.

With out GW1 there is no Naval expansion into the south pacific [German Islands], no Naval ships in the Med, ect. and no war time expansion of the Army.
There is going to be no US begging Japan to send troops to Siberia, And the Japanese Military adventurism there of.

While whe will still have the Military getting good press from it's response to the 1922 Earthquake, I see this as a Smaller, more professional oriented Military.
As such probably not as inclined to brush aside the wishes of the Diet, and go off on its on.

 

[I Blame Communism]

Absent a GW The Ukraine remains the bread basket of Europe.

This means no great expansion of the US Midwest grain areas into the Dust Bowl areas.
While whe see some due to previous attempts to farm the Great American Desert, the Dust Storms will be a lot less severe.

With out the Great war and the Government take over of the Economies during the war, There is no precedent for massive government intervention into the Economy during the Great Depression*. There is also no Precedent for stopping the Convertibility of Gold/Silver money.
No great government expansion of powers, and stealing of the Real Money around the world in the 1930's.

*I still see a great Panic around the 1930's due to general trends, Cycles overlapping, and the poorly regulated financial sectors.


While Japan attempted almost from the beginning to Nihonise Formosa [with some degree of success] It never was able to agree on this as the Policy for Korea.

However Nihonization was the policy at the time GW1, and absent the Great war, Probably would have remained the policy by default.

With out GW1 there is no Naval expansion into the south pacific [German Islands], no Naval ships in the Med, ect. and no war time expansion of the Army.
There is going to be no US begging Japan to send troops to Siberia, And the Japanese Military adventurism there of.

While whe will still have the Military getting good press from it's response to the 1922 Earthquake, I see this as a Smaller, more professional oriented Military.
As such probably not as inclined to brush aside the wishes of the Diet, and go off on its on.

Some interesting stuff here. The two wars hugely inflated states, so that's a big butterfly. Quibble: I believe Japan's Siberian adventure was all its own, and the US made it withdraw.

 

[Moltke]

While Japan attempted almost from the beginning to Nihonise Formosa [with some degree of success] It never was able to agree on this as the Policy for Korea.

However Nihonization was the policy at the time GW1, and absent the Great war, Probably would have remained the policy by default.

So, lets jump forward with this then. Is there any reason why you wouldn't be inclined to see a Japan (with a Korea,Formosa and probably still some of the regions in Southern China not emerging as a mighty economic force as the century moves on? This may be an assumption, okay this is an assumption but would she actually whether any kind of recession or downturn that may or may not happen in the 30's better than some of the Western powers?

With out GW1 there is no Naval expansion into the south pacific [German Islands], no Naval ships in the Med, ect. and no war time expansion of the Army.
There is going to be no US begging Japan to send troops to Siberia, And the Japanese Military adventurism there of.

While whe will still have the Military getting good press from it's response to the 1922 Earthquake, I see this as a Smaller, more professional oriented Military.

In other words you see essentially a peaceful more calm Empire of Japan? I think as Japanese power grows, and without being bloodied by the Soviets you might underestimate their thoughts on projecting that power a bit. Perhaps in a much more limited way but I think Japan as a whole was okay with making sure those around her knew who was on top. My thoughts turn to Russia. If Russia develops into a colossus, then never mind. But if or when Russia falls into some kind of revolt or chaos ... I think Japan would swing in for a bite of Siberia or Kamchatka ...

 

[W.W.A.F.T.]

the graet dpression was a worldwide thing because the americans were the ones financing the reconstruction of europe. if thre is no reconstruction of europe, the depression is not really going to be felt outside of the united states. and since there is no dustbowl and the american economy only grew in the 20's instead of booming like it actually did, this depression is probably not going to be called great, and it will most likely be shrugged off within 6 years or so.

of course this means that the US is in really big trouble somewhere down the line, when a big depression finally does happen.

 

[Jaded_Railman]

*I still see a great Panic around the 1930's due to general trends, Cycles overlapping, and the poorly regulated financial sectors.

Economies don't just cycle because they feel like it, there's reasons for the cyclical activity. Without WWI, there's not going to be an essentially broken gold standard running the international capital markets, which means that the US Federal Reserve System won't have to support the Bank of England, and the two of them won't have to support the rest of the gold standard countries. We get more or less what we have today, just without the potential for massive over-issue, because of the tie to gold, with the US and the rest of the world running economies based on central bank sourced finance.

Honestly, I see no reason for there to be a crash when and where it happened IOTL. The specific deflationary policies that led to the OTL crash were a response to the crash in Germany in 1927, which was a result of the hyperinflation earlier in the decade. Without war reparations, the hyperinflation isn't going to happen. It'd be fascinating to see how the international situation evolves with a US central bank that doesn't have to essentially immediately take the 'weight of the world' on its shoulders upon foundation.

But really, World War I was such a seminal event, all around but especially in the economic sphere, that I think it's pretty much impossible to predict how the world's economy would have evolved without it. There certainly isn't going to be a Wall Street Crash in late 1929 and a Great Depression that lasts from then on through the middle 40's, but who's to say the world's central bankers won't find some other way to screw up? Perhaps there's a real sector shock (discovery of Arabian oil? the rise of radio? could be one of a million things) which the central banks find themselves unable to cope with while keeping to the gold standard, so they break the golden promise and set us on the path of stagflation, decades early.

 

[Jaded_Railman]

the graet dpression was a worldwide thing because the americans were the ones financing the reconstruction of europe. if thre is no reconstruction of europe, the depression is not really going to be felt outside of the united states. and since there is no dustbowl and the american economy only grew in the 20's instead of booming like it actually did, this depression is probably not going to be called great, and it will most likely be shrugged off within 6 years or so.

of course this means that the US is in really big trouble somewhere down the line, when a big depression finally does happen.

It's funny, because the Depression started in Germany, not the US. In 1927, the German stock market crashed as Hjalmar Schacht intervened to prick what he believed to be a bubble. The American stock market bubble that followed was a consequence of the Fed's reaction to the German crash (or, rather, the Fed's reaction to the BoE's reaction to the French reaction to the crash), not an antecedent.

 

[von Adler]

It is possible that Franz Joseph lives another few years if the stress of ww1 is not placed upon him, I guess. In such a case, 1917 might not be as difficult.

Then again, with Franz Ferdinand at the helm, things might become interesting in Austria-Hungary.

Franz Ferdinand wanted a federated Empire and wanted to break the back of the Hungarian elite. The Hungarians were nationalistic, racist towards their Slavic and Romanian citizens and quite uncooperative in the workings of the Empire, causing the Austrians endless grief.

I can see Franz Ferdinand launching a coup d'etat in 1917 to crush the Hungarians. Personally, I think he would have the support of the Austrian part of the Empire (Czechs, Poles, Slovenians, Sudeten-Germans and Austrians, with the Italians indifferent) and probably also from the Romanians, Croats and Slovaks in the Hungarian part of the Empire.

Hungary was, much like Russia, controlled by the landed elite. Such a social situation lends itself badly to economic and social development, which probably means that the Hungarian nobility will have less resources at its hand once the civil war beaks out. The Hungarian Royal Army will probably support Franz Ferdinand, while the Honved will support the Hungarian nobility - the Hungarians staffed the Royal Army with the Slavs and Romanians and gave them much lower priority than their Hungarian-staffed Honved (Home Guard) which meant that those formations were lower quality and less armed than the Home Guard. The Austrians prioritised the Imperial Army before their own Landwehr (Home Guard). However, the prestige of the support of the Royal Army to the Emperor and King will be significant in this situation.

I think a new 1848, albeit without Russian intervention, is likely. The Hungarian nobility will be broken in Hussar cavalry operations against machine-guns.

As for Russia, it will maintain a steady economical development, but will probably be plagued by a lack of heavy industrial development. When the capital is in the hands of a landed elite (the Russian nobility, who will make money of agriculture and raw material extraction), industrial development tend to be slow and focused on light manufacture in such cases, as there's no real market without a large middle class. The landed nobility will spend the money on luxuries, art and construction of estates rather than industrial investments. Without the war, Romanov-na-Murmane/Murmansk will not be built up to a major port and city and it will not be linked by rail. Likewise, the trans-siberian railway will not be finished in 1916, but later, and it will probably not be expanded with crossing railroads. The Russian heavy industry will most likely be based around major government investments only - navy, trans-siberial railway and arms and munition factories (with the latter being inadequate for the needs, which will not be discovered without war). The 1914-1916 expansion of Russian war-related industry will probably not happen. While the economy will improve, investments by European powers will be based around raw material extraction (infrastructure and extraction and packaging facilties) rather than heavy industry.

As long as German, British and French industry can supply the small Russian middle class with consumer goods and provide shipping, raw material extraction equipment (such as mining equipment, oil pumps, agricultural machinery) and infrastructure equipment cheap (so that said raw material extraction and agriculture remains profitable) there's no incentive for the Russian landed elite to spend their capital on industrial investments rather than the next extravagant ball in Petrograd or another Fabergé egg.

This is the main problem of economical development of many nations during this time. The whole Drang nach Osten partially arose as a reaction to eastern Germany, especially East Prussia slowly being drained of people moving westwardfor work in the industries of Germany as the great estates held by the Prussian nobility made out the same problem there - a severe impedement on economical and social development.

 

[I Blame Communism]

It is possible that Franz Joseph lives another few years if the stress of ww1 is not placed upon him, I guess. In such a case, 1917 might not be as difficult.

Then again, with Franz Ferdinand at the helm, things might become interesting in Austria-Hungary.

Franz Ferdinand wanted a federated Empire and wanted to break the back of the Hungarian elite. The Hungarians were nationalistic, racist towards their Slavic and Romanian citizens and quite uncooperative in the workings of the Empire, causing the Austrians endless grief.

I can see Franz Ferdinand launching a coup d'etat in 1917 to crush the Hungarians. Personally, I think he would have the support of the Austrian part of the Empire (Czechs, Poles, Slovenians, Sudeten-Germans and Austrians, with the Italians indifferent) and probably also from the Romanians, Croats and Slovaks in the Hungarian part of the Empire.

Hungary was, much like Russia, controlled by the landed elite. Such a social situation lends itself badly to economic and social development, which probably means that the Hungarian nobility will have less resources at its hand once the civil war beaks out. The Hungarian Royal Army will probably support Franz Ferdinand, while the Honved will support the Hungarian nobility - the Hungarians staffed the Royal Army with the Slavs and Romanians and gave them much lower priority than their Hungarian-staffed Honved (Home Guard) which meant that those formations were lower quality and less armed than the Home Guard. The Austrians prioritised the Imperial Army before their own Landwehr (Home Guard). However, the prestige of the support of the Royal Army to the Emperor and King will be significant in this situation.

I think a new 1848, albeit without Russian intervention, is likely. The Hungarian nobility will be broken in Hussar cavalry operations against machine-guns.

That's one possible end, but I think the Hungarians knew this and were thus willing to negotiate. Interesting point about FJ, though.

As for Russia, it will maintain a steady economical development, but will probably be plagued by a lack of heavy industrial development. When the capital is in the hands of a landed elite (the Russian nobility, who will make money of agriculture and raw material extraction), industrial development tend to be slow and focused on light manufacture in such cases, as there's no real market without a large middle class. The landed nobility will spend the money on luxuries, art and construction of estates rather than industrial investments. Without the war, Romanov-na-Murmane/Murmansk will not be built up to a major port and city and it will not be linked by rail. Likewise, the trans-siberian railway will not be finished in 1916, but later, and it will probably not be expanded with crossing railroads. The Russian heavy industry will most likely be based around major government investments only - navy, trans-siberial railway and arms and munition factories (with the latter being inadequate for the needs, which will not be discovered without war). The 1914-1916 expansion of Russian war-related industry will probably not happen. While the economy will improve, investments by European powers will be based around raw material extraction (infrastructure and extraction and packaging facilties) rather than heavy industry.

And your evidence is? Russia clearly was developing heavy industries. Moscow's textiles and St.Petersburg steel were well established before the war. The capital was not solely in the hands of the landed nobility, a middle-class was in fact emerging from the rapid industrailisation Russia had already experienced, not to mention the large amounts of foreign capital that had been and were being invested in Russia's industries. Railway growth after 1885 had been tremendous: why should it just stop? Murmansk won't need to become a major port because Russia will be trading through the Baltic and Black seas, obviously, and finishing the Transsiberian (which mostly was finished) was a high priority. The stuff about arms manufacture is partly true but smells to me like broken-window fallacy: our we to assume that without the war there would have been no growth in the Russian economy at all?

As long as German, British and French industry can supply the small Russian middle class with consumer goods and provide shipping, raw material extraction equipment (such as mining equipment, oil pumps, agricultural machinery) and infrastructure equipment cheap (so that said raw material extraction and agriculture remains profitable) there's no incentive for the Russian landed elite to spend their capital on industrial investments rather than the next extravagant ball in Petrograd or another Fabergé egg.

This position is rather undermined by the fact that Russia already had industrialised tremendously given its starting position. Obviously it was only at the cusp of an "industrial revolution" and therefore still had a small middle class. Everyone starts small, but all the factors were in place for it to grow. Education was improving (more than half of Russian men even in the rural districts were literate in 1914) and social mobility, while low, had increased since 1861. Labour existed, especially after the Stolypin reforms ended migration restrictions. Resources existed (and would as you say only be exploited more thoroughly). Capital was pouring in from the west at a huge rate (look at Russia's share of international debt in the period).

You're arguing based on your prejudices about how a society dominated by nobles (and this has been exagerrated anyway) should behave without looking at the evidence.

This is the main problem of economical development of many nations during this time. The whole Drang nach Osten partially arose as a reaction to eastern Germany, especially East Prussia slowly being drained of people moving westwardfor work in the industries of Germany as the great estates held by the Prussian nobility made out the same problem there - a severe impedement on economical and social development.

This is a total misreading of the situation. People were leaving the estates because a natural consequence on industrialisation is people moving to industrial cities from the countryside in large numbers. Germany's industrial cities were, for reasons of where the resources were located and so on, located in the Rhine valley (but also in other places like Silesia, which was hardly free of estates in 1815), so you go a mass movement west. That people were moving to factories that were spirnging is clear evidence that Germany, despite having a political, economically, and socially powerful landowning class, was fully able to industrialise. And you'll observe that in Russia, too, people were moving off the estates (after 1861 and then 1907, obviously) and into the industrial cities. These cities just wern't bunched up anywhere in particular, but look at some of the urban growth in this period! Baku and Novonikolayevsk (Novosibirsk) are only some of the most striking examples.

 

[W.W.A.F.T.]

It's funny, because the Depression started in Germany, not the US. In 1927, the German stock market crashed as Hjalmar Schacht intervened to prick what he believed to be a bubble. The American stock market bubble that followed was a consequence of the Fed's reaction to the German crash (or, rather, the Fed's reaction to the BoE's reaction to the French reaction to the crash), not an antecedent.

a world without the depression, now that would be something worth seeing.

and another thing I notice, with all these other economic behemoths sharing the world with them, germany, britain, japan, china, russia, the US is going to have one hell of a struggle gaining its place on the top of the economic heap, maybe it never reaches that position in this world.

 

[Jaded_Railman]

Britain might be able to maintain its financially dominant position a bit longer, but by the time of the world wars the US was already the world's largest industrial power. The fluke of the wars was the US gaining 50% of the world's industrial output, not the 25% it maintained under normal conditions.

The disconnect between the European states and the US was that the US was a continental power and the European states were all sub-continental (except, maybe, Russia). While sub-continental states can expect to occasionally get leads that they can maintain for quite a while on continental ones, once the continental power starts modernizing and catching up, there's very little the sub-continental powers can do to stop it over-taking them.

However, one interesting spin-off is that the US remains the world's biggest debtor, instead of becoming the world's biggest creditor. However, the first time the Bank of England raises its discount rate in an attempt to halt a gold outflow, expect an interesting reaction on the part the Federal Reserve System. Considering the American public's reaction to 1907 (namely, the Federal Reserve System itself), the possibility of a rate war between the two central banks isn't entirely out of the question. This could, itself, drive a bubble and subsequent depression.