No world war 2, Would the Nazis moderate

I maintain the stance that even the most "moderate" of Nazis are going to lead to an absolute insanity out of the wet dreams of the Khmer Rouge.

Define 'moderate'.

The number of Germans left by 1980.

I'm not even referring to the intended horrors. There will be unintended horrors that come about through their incompetence. The Nazis were not simply tyrants with some extra oddities. They were run by an insane philosophy that did not even pretend, as the Communists did, to be anything but what it was. There's going to be that pet project that leads to a mass famine. There's going to be that paranoia that leads to a group being murdered / exiled / neglected to death based on nothing; and then the next group, and the next. All the things we've seen in the Communist Bloc will happen in Nazi Germany. All the things we have seen happen in other dictatorships will happen, and with an added maliciousness.
 
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By 1938 the Nazis pretty much had to pick a fight over something due to the dysfunctional nature of their war-driven economy. So even if Hitler is out of the way I strongly suspect they still invade and dismember Poland with the help of Stalin.

With their eastern border secured by the non-aggression pact they can then turn their attention to the West. IDK if they have the luck they had OTL in hitting the French hard and where they least expected it but I think a war will still be fought in France and Belgium. If they knock France out and eject the British from the Continent maybe the Nazis decide to stop there for now and not attack the Soviet Union. That would lead to some interesting scenarios.
 

Deleted member 1487

The number of Germans left by 1980.

I'm not even referring to the intended horrors. There will be unintended horrors that come about through their incompetence. The Nazis were not simply tyrants with some extra oddities. They were run by an insane philosophy that did not even pretend, as the Communists did, to be anything but what it was. There's going to be that pet project that leads to a mass famine. There's going to be that paranoia that leads to a group being murdered / exiled / neglected to death based on nothing; and then the next group, and the next. All the things we've seen in the Communist Bloc will happen in Nazi Germany. All the things we have seen happen in other dictatorships will happen, and with an added maliciousness.
It's really hard to say what it would have evolved into with the early death of Hitler or that the regime would survive a long without war covering up for it's economic 'mis-steps'. Social repression and the general insanity of the regime only work so long as foreign policy adventures and economic stability/improvements work out; the general public only really bought in to the regime because of their delivery of economic improvement and foreign policy success; without that I don't think the regime lasts, especially without Hitler and the loyalty he had from substantial elements of the military...which Goering would not.
 
It's really hard to say what it would have evolved into with the early death of Hitler or that the regime would survive a long without war covering up for it's economic 'mis-steps'. Social repression and the general insanity of the regime only work so long as foreign policy adventures and economic stability/improvements work out; the general public only really bought in to the regime because of their delivery of economic improvement and foreign policy success; without that I don't think the regime lasts, especially without Hitler and the loyalty he had from substantial elements of the military...which Goering would not.

Which is why I'd predict that either something sparks up with the Soviets that gives National Socialism a new lease on public trust, or the regime is going to have to tone down to a more "conventional" (As much as that term can be used for such an infant ideology) style of Fascism that leans more heavily on merely being a leading/co-coordinating faction over a coalition of the the traditional Conservative elements of society (The military, old Aristocracy/rural peasantry, industrial interests, the pious Protestants, ect.) in a Corporatist societal structure. You're quite right that the Nazis can't keep a monopoly on power, but as the leadership isen't suicidal I imagine they'd try to prop up their position by divvying the power out in exchange for supporters rather than try a to cling to the dictatorship (Which, if they fall, would leave the only viable alternative as their nightmare scenario; the Bolshevik-Leftists taking command of Germany). Expect it to look alot more like Mussolini's Italy or Franco's Spain in terms of government structure and policy... which while that may limit its expansionist tendancies would also make it somewhat more palatable to the West, who may even be willing to help facilitate "rectifications" to the Polish corridor question (Particularly if, as part of a broader Anti-Soviet move, they can compensate Warsaw with the promise of territorial gains in the East)
 
A public speech to suck up to Hitler and sound tough to the public is not really what he actually thought. Hitler was all about "fuck sustainable economics, we're going to war bitches!" and Goering was maintaining his political position and power by being Hitler's handmaiden, so it is hardly surprising he's echoing what Hitler himself was saying and wanted to hear...because that was what was rewarded by Hitler. When Hitler is out of the picture and Goering isn't about going to war like Hitler was its a lot more likely that Goering out of necessity to protect his regime actually has to focus on sustainable economics. In fact without the entire reason for the unsustainable economic policy, Hitler's planned wars of conquest, there is no reason to maintain that unsustainable economic policy.

Goering's actual historical statements and actions say otherwise. There is no evidence that Goering understood that the reckless armament drive would lead to Germany's ruin unless Germany plunges into war. Furthermore, Goring's opposition to war while continuing to support the economic campaign is evidence against the idea that he was simply saying what Hitler wanted to hear, otherwise he. Goring was loyal to Hitler, but that didn't mean he simply regurgitated the Fuhrer's policies. As a case in point, the speech I quoted was directed at the army, not Hitler. You tried to portray his negotiations with Britain as such, but the topic of the German economy never came up in those. Those negotiations were about trying to avert an impending war over Poland because Goring wasn't sure Germany could win such a war despite the reckless rearmament, economic matters weren't discussed at all. But being unwilling to plunge into a extremely risky war is not the same thing as being unwilling to continue a massive rearmament scheme that Goering himself was heavily responsible for. In fact, it's far more likely that Goering continues rearmament until it's too late for the same reason you posit he'll abandon it: because without the longer-term risk being apparently to him, in the short-term it seems to ensure the protection of his regime. Firstly, by providing legitimacy to the masses due to the perceived economic benefits as well as propaganda value of it making Germany seem big and strong. Secondly, by ensuring the support of the German military who didn't understand sustainable economics any more then the Nazis (and in fact understood it less then Hitler) did but understood that the rearmament program made them really powerful and important and would likely object to any attempts to end it, particularly given the unavoidable accompanying economic pain that would come with it, would invariably give them the perception that Goring was undoing everything Hitler had given them and so Goring must be removed for the good of Germany (and themselves).

Of course, in the end the military might end up later overthrowing Goring anyways to prevent an unwinnable war in 1941 or '42 after the economic troubles catch up with them. Whether they'd then attempt economic normalization (presumably after consulting with leading German economists on the how since, as I observed, the German military had even less economic sense then Hitler) while blaming all the economic pain (which would already be existant by then) on the Nazis or try to tough it out through some other measure until the German people revolt or unhappily muddle along... well, that's harder to say.

Basically, the two most likely outcomes of Hitler dying in '38 remain either a last-gasp war that Germany loses harder then the OTL one or the German military overthrowing the Nazis to prevent said war.

Not necessarily; though this is perhaps just a difference in perspective on my part, I'd argue that if you stop at Munich (for whatever reason), the Nazi government will still have enough of its trustworthiness in check that the changes in the Eastern border can still be reguarded as (acceptable) rectifications to the Treaty of Versailles in line with the idea of ethnic German self-determination. Though its certainly not guranteed, there's a statistically significant chance that a Goering government could reach a detante with the West; particularly if Stalin starts making troubling moves in the direction of the East German states in line with perceived German weakness in his goal of establishing an expanded sphere of Soviet influence.
The evidence says otherwise. The trade wars since 1936 had alienated Western economic interests and the Anglo-French had begun rearmament in earnest in response to the Germans own program. Appeasement was partly built on buying enough time for that rearmament program to mature, since Germany's earlier start currently gave it a military advantage. Had the Anglo-French still had the degree of trustworthiness you are claiming, they would not have objected so violently to the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1939 and then declared war over Poland. Finally, Stalin acting so aggressively without the other major powers already distracted would be royally out of character for him and amounts more to wishful thinking then honest examination of the alternate history scenario.

But even handwaving in western cooperation, that doesn't change that ending rearmament would mean economic pain on a scale too unpalatable to the Nazis leadership to make it a likely option until it all explodes in their face. As I said, the projections were on the order of 2-to-2.5 million unemployed, among other horrible short-term effects and that was in 1936 with Germany in a better domestic position for ending rearmament as well as international. In 1938, the accompanying figures would be orders of magnitude worse as much more of Germany's civilian industry had basically been chopped up and thrown into the flames of armaments.
 
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Personally as long as Hitler is alive they wont. It also really depends on who succeeds Hitler. Goering might not be as rash as Hitler but he's not really a moderate. If say Himmler takes power Germany will be brought to war eventually.
 
Okay, so how does a 1940 NSDAP economic collapse happen?

Food rationing then an partially party partially wildcat KPD/SPD general strike that the einsatzgruppen, police battalions and SA find impossible to put down after the gutters are red and more pro worker intellectuals are given a permanent swim in a canal?

The "good government" factions ala Raul Hilberg would consider this unseemly, probably sufficiently to coup beforehand.

Let's use this as a chance to discuss the political specificity of NSDAP economic collapse 1937-1942.

Yours
Sam R.
 
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