No Westland Lysander, Army gets two A/C types instead

[ArtosStark]

Does that mean that there's an Army Aviation equivalent of the Inskip Award ITTL? That is the Army Co-operation squadrons are transferred from the RAF to the Army in the second half of the 1930s?

Probably not required. If the Army Cooperation command had the same level of, well, Cooperation, as Coastal Command ended up having with the Navy that is probably sufficient. Joint training to determine what is needed, what fits with Army doctrine and how Army doctrine could be changed to better make use of air assets. If you were to give Army Cooperation Squadrons back entirely the Army would have to reestablish training and support infrastructure and manpower basically from scratch. Either that or take back the entire remaining RAF, not going to the Navy. Which is probably not the optimal path either.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Probably not required. If the Army Cooperation command had the same level of, well, Cooperation, as Coastal Command ended up having with the Navy that is probably sufficient. Joint training to determine what is needed, what fits with Army doctrine and how Army doctrine could be changed to better make use of air assets. If you were to give Army Cooperation Squadrons back entirely the Army would have to re-establish training and support infrastructure and manpower basically from scratch. Either that or take back the entire remaining RAF, not going to the Navy. Which is probably not the optimal path either.

Although I agree, that wasn't why I asked. The way @tomo pauk wrote the OP suggested that the army co-operation squadrons were transferred from the Army to the RAF in the 1930s. I was asking for conformation that it was what he meant and I still am.

 

[tomo pauk]

Does that mean that there's an Army Aviation equivalent of the Inskip Award ITTL? That is the Army Co-operation squadrons are transferred from the RAF to the Army in the second half of the 1930s?

Anyway we improve the standing of the Army 'airforce' is okay with me.

 

[Peg Leg Pom]

I'm not sure whether it was AM or War Ministry, but someone tried to have a do-everything aircraft in a single type even against a peer opponent. That didn't worked back in ww1, and it will not pass any serious test in the 1930s.

To further my comments on the viability of a "Do Anything" aircraft I'd like to also mention the Bristol F2 Fighter which served from 1916 to 1935 in many roles and the Wooden Wonder itself the De Havilland Mosquito. Multi Role Combat Aircraft are very doable with the right designers and powerful enough engines.

 

[tomo pauk]

To further my comments on the viability of a "Do Anything" aircraft I'd like to also mention the Bristol F2 Fighter which served from 1916 to 1935 in many roles and the Wooden Wonder itself the De Havilland Mosquito. Multi Role Combat Aircraft are very doable with the right designers and powerful enough engines.

I have no problem with Britsfit in a role of a fighter back in ww1, or in a role of a trainer after that. Viability against a peer enemy past late 1920s is not where it was good.
Mosquito was again an excellent aircraft, but mentioning it here it misses the point - 3000 HP onboard per aircraft was not an option for the Army cooperation in the second half of 1930s.

 

[Peg Leg Pom]

I grant you're not getting a Mossie any earlier than late 1939 and Army Co=operation squadrons aren't getting their hands on them, but it proves multi role aircraft can be done. Now consider if De Havilland had designed the Don not with a 500hp Gypsy King but a late model Kestrel, early Merlin or in keeping with the original air cooled inline engine a Napier Dagger. With up to twice the HP it actually had it would be a very different aircraft and capable of operational use by Army Co-operation squadrons.

 

[CB13]

Probably not required. If the Army Cooperation command had the same level of, well, Cooperation, as Coastal Command ended up having with the Navy that is probably sufficient. Joint training to determine what is needed, what fits with Army doctrine and how Army doctrine could be changed to better make use of air assets. If you were to give Army Cooperation Squadrons back entirely the Army would have to reestablish training and support infrastructure and manpower basically from scratch. Either that or take back the entire remaining RAF, not going to the Navy. Which is probably not the optimal path either.

In terms of the supply chain specifically, although there is a cost for the redundancy, is there not also a significant benefit to having all the supplies flow through Army Supply Chains? So that instead of being dependent on RAF basing and supply chains, the Army could always place their aircraft exactly where they wanted them? My thinking here is if the FAA could do it, why couldn't an Army Air Force, if the benefit was seen as justifying the additional investment?

And in terms of Flight Training, if you already have a distinct FAA, does it make sense to create a common/shared Royal Air Training Centers from existing infrastructure where costs would be shared by the RAF, FAA, and this hypothetical Army Air Force to manage all basic training.... following which each entity takes its own recruits to complete their own Advanced Training?

 

[ArtosStark]

My thinking here is if the FAA could do it, why couldn't an Army Air Force, if the benefit was seen as justifying the additional investment?

The FAA overwhelmingly used RAF infrastructure. For most of the interwar period the FAA was entirely a ship based entity. Its size was determined by what the ships could carry. It had basically no training organization, no reserve, and no base infrastructure or organization of its own. It had to try and create these things while simultaneously managing a massive expansion. And they suffered for it.

The Army Air Force would be in much the same boat. Perhaps made worse by the relative lack of interest in increasing funding for the Army. If the Army could not manage to mechanize their cavalry regiments prior to the war despite considerable will to do so, due to a lack of resources then how will it manage the creation of an Air Force with a parallel training and logistics system to the RAF?

It’s possible they would manage it. Certainly a closer coordination with air assets would be helpful. But I suspect there may be even fewer of those assets available than IOTL. Even if they do end up more fit for purpose (which is not guaranteed, considering the problems the RN had specing aircraft).

 

[Peg Leg Pom]

The Army Air Force would be in much the same boat.

The closest the Army got to its own Air Force was the Glider Pilot Regiment that was wholly dependent on the RAF for flight training, basing and technical support. There were also individual Artillery Officers trained as pilots for Auster AOP's, but the AOP Squadrons were part of the RAF.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Link to the OP.

This is what I wrote in Post 15,

Equip the OTL army co-operation squadrons with Hurricanes (built by Westland instead of the OTL Lysanders) for CAS & tactical reconnaissance and form flights of Austers for AOP & light liaison (on the scale of one flight per division) 3 years earlier than OTL, i.e. from 1938 instead of from 1941.

The Hurricane entered service in November 1937 and the Lysander entered service in May 1938. IOTL the first 144 Lysanders were ordered from Westland in September 1936. If 144 Hurricanes were ordered from Westland in September 1936 there's enough time for No. 16 Squadron to re-equip with Westland-built Hurricanes in May 1938 and enough time for Rolls Royce to expand its factories to build the extra Merlin engines.

It doesn't fit the conditions in the POD. However, it's feasible, it's affordable and it's what the RAF ended up doing IOTL. Albeit many of the Lysander squadrons converted to Curtiss Hawks instead of Hurricanes. Last, but by no means least, we have more Hurricane squadrons during the Battle of Britain. According to Bowyer in "Aircraft for the Few" there were 162 "Lizzies" in 9 squadrons at the height of the battle. Imagine what Dowding and Park could have done with another 162 Hurricanes in 9 squadrons.

The above was what I was going to do in "The Hour of the Hurricane - An Imaginatively Titled Hawker Hurricane Thread".

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

This is the first of several extracts from the Third Report of the Defence Requirements Committee published in February 1936.
National Archives Catalogue Reference: CAB/24/259 Image Reference: 0026
[Page 7 Of My Transcript]
VI.―AIR FORCE PROGRAMME AND REQUIREMENTS.
​

31. Army Co-operation Squadrons.

• For the Regular Contingent.-We recommend the provision of 7 squadrons (each of 12 aircraft) and 1 squadron for communication purposes to accompany the Regular Contingent. (5 squadrons are already in existence.)
• For the Territorial Army.—In view of our proposal to reserve the decision as to whether, or when, the proposals for reconditioning the Territorial Army can be implemented we feel justified in suggesting a reduction in the number of squadrons of army co-operation aircraft intended to accompany territorial divisions. For a number of reasons it is inadvisable to make no provision at all under this head, and whilst reserving approval to the full proposals for providing the Territorial Army with army co-operation squadrons until the detailed proposals for the role of the Territorial Army in war is brought up for further consideration, we recommend:-
• That authority should be given to make a beginning with the equipment and provision of Army Co-operation squadrons for the Territorial Army by the provision of 4 additional auxiliary squadrons. It may be noted that this provision will still further increase the strength of our first-line aircraft above the figure of 1,512.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

This is the second of several extracts from the Third Report of the Defence Requirements Committee published in February 1936.
National Archives Catalogue Reference: CAB/24/259 Image Reference: 0026
[Page 36 Of My Transcript]
VI - Air Force Programme and Requirements.
(For details, see Schedule III.)
​

80. As indicated in paragraph 34 above, the proposals of the Air Council comprise—

(ii) The provision of Army Co-operation squadrons to accompany the field forces on the following scale:​

(a) First contingent (regular), 7 squadrons (each of 12 aircraft);​

(b) One squadron for communication purposes to accompany the first contingent;​

(c) Second contingent (territorial) (after 4 months), 4 or 5 squadrons;​

(d) Third contingent (territorial) (after 6 months), 4 or 5 squadrons;​

(e) Fourth contingent (territorial) (after 8 months), [4 or 5 squadrons] to be raised on mobilisation.​

• Present arrangements allow for 5 Army Co-operation Squadrons of the Royal Air Force to accompany the first contingent of the Field Force, each squadron having 18 aircraft. The War Office have represented that from the point of view of Army organisation, it would be preferable if there were 7 squadrons each of 12 aircraft. This arrangement would provide a squadron for co-operation with each of the two Corps headquarters and five Divisions constituting the first contingent of the Field Force (vide paragraph 65). In a war of movement it is desirable that Divisional Commanders should be able to control the air reconnaissance on their own immediate fronts. If a total of only 5 squadrons is available, such an arrangement would clearly not be possible. A further argument in favour of the new proposal is that a squadron of 12 aircraft is a more mobile and compact unit for a war of movement than one of 18, owing to the reduction in quantity of transport, stores, &c. On the other hand, the 7-squadron organisation will be rather more expensive in personnel and accommodation.
• A squadron is required to accompany the first contingent for intercommunication by air, especially to assist Commanders and Staff Officers to maintain touch between formations and units when roads are congested and other communications are bad. Details of equipment and strength will require discussion between the Air Ministry and War Office, and for this item no financial provision is at present included.
• The 8 squadrons required as the complement of the 8 territorial divisions of the second and third contingents would be auxiliary air force squadrons.
• As, however, there are practical limits to the number of auxiliary squadrons which can be effectively raised, the Air Council propose to meet these requirements in part by an increase of 4 additional auxiliary squadrons (over and above the 16 at present included in the scheme for home defence), and in part by converting—from bombers to Army Co-operation—four of the auxiliary squadrons at present earmarked as part of the Air Force expansion scheme. To replace these units four new regular bomber squadrons would be raised. The adoption of this plan would enable squadrons to be raised in localities where they could co-operate with the territorial divisions to which they are allotted.
• It may later be necessary to raise two more squadrons, in order to bring the complement for Territorial Divisions up to 10.
• In addition to the above, additional spotter flights will eventually be required for co-operation with Coast defences at Home, probably three flights in all. No financial provision for this is at present included.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

This is the third of several extracts from the Third Report of the Defence Requirements Committee published in February 1936.
National Archives Catalogue Reference: CAB/24/259 Image Reference: 0026
[Page 47 Of My Transcript]
Air Force Programme and Requirements.​

(15) The Air Force Programme and Requirements include (paragraph 80):—

(ii) Army Co-operation squadrons to accompany the field forces on the following scale :-—​

First Contingent (regular), 7 squadrons (each of 12 aircraft), together with one squadron for communication purposes.​

Second Contingent (territorial) (after 4 months), 4 or 5 squadrons;​

Third Contingent (territorial) (after 6 months), 4 or 5 squadrons;​

Fourth Contingent (territorial) (after 8 months), to be raised on mobilisation.​

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

This is the fourth of several extracts from the Third Report of the Defence Requirements Committee published in February 1936.
National Archives Catalogue Reference: CAB/24/259 Image Reference: 0026
[Page 93 Of My Transcript]
SCHEDULE III TO D.R.C. 37.
Royal Air Force Requirements.
Memorandum by the Chief of the Air Staff.
ARMY CO-OPERATION.​

• 37. The recommendation of the War Office that 12 Territorial Army Divisions (of which 8 will be ready in the first six months) should be equipped on a scale to enable them to take part in military operations against a major Power, will involve the provision of air units for ''Army Co-operation'' duties with those divisions. As it is not contemplated the Territorial Divisions will begin to go overseas in less than four months after the outbreak of war, the Air Ministry suggest that the necessary aircraft co-operation could be effectively and most conveniently provided by units of the Auxiliary Air Force. There will be sufficient time after the outbreak of war to complete their training to the necessary standard.
• 38. Sources of recruitment for the Auxiliary Air Force are, however, limited, and it is not possible to count upon recruiting more than 20 Auxiliary Squadrons as maximum. In the scheme for the employment of the Auxiliary Air Force to which the Air Ministry are at present working, there will be 16 squadrons in all. They are required for Home Defence, and form an integral part of the programme for maintaining Metropolitan parity with Germany.
• 39. The Air Ministry propose that the 8 squadrons required for co-operation with the 8 Territorial Divisions shall be provided, as to 4 of them, by forming 4 new Auxiliary Air Force Squadrons and by thus bringing their number up from 16 to 20; and as to the remaining 4, by converting existing Bomber squadrons of the Auxiliary Air Force into Army Co-operation squadrons and replacing them in the Home Defence Force by 4 regular units.
• 40. Future requirements for the Army are likely to include:
  • (a) the provision of two more squadrons, making ten in all, for co-operation with Territorial Divisions;
  • (b) Spotter Flights, probably three in all, for co-operation with Coast Defences;
  • (c) a squadron for communication purposes to accompany the first contingent of the Field Force.
  • No financial provision for any of these three requirements is included in the present proposals.
• 41. Provision is also made for converting the 5 squadrons of 18 aircraft each, at present allotted to the Field Force, to 7 squadrons of 12 aircraft each.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

The number of Army Co-operation squadrons in the Metropolitan Air Force in the expansion schemes was as follows:

• Scheme A was for 60 army co-operation aircraft in 5 squadrons by 31.03.39.
• Scheme C was for 90 army co-operation aircraft in 5 squadrons by 31.03.37.
• Scheme F was for 132 army co-operation aircraft in 11 squadrons by 31.03.39. This included 4 auxiliary squadrons.
• All subsequent expansion schemes up to and including Scheme L were also for 132 army co-operation aircraft in 11 squadrons by 31.03.39. This included 4 auxiliary squadrons.
• Scheme M was for 108 army co-operation aircraft in 9 squadrons by 31.03.42. This included 2 auxiliary squadrons.

The number of Army Co-operation squadrons in the Metropolitan Air Force increased from 5 in April 1934 to 9 in September 1939. This included 2 auxiliary squadrons.

• At 01.04.34 there were 5 squadrons (Nos. 4, 13, 16 and 26) all of which had converted to Lysanders by September 1939.
• No. 53 Squadron was formed on 28.06.37 on Hectors and converted to the Blenheim IV in January 1939.
• No. 59 Squadron was formed on 28.06.37 on Hectors and converted to the Blenheim IV in May 1939.
• No. 613 Squadron was formed on 01.03.39 and on 03.09.39 was equipped with Hawker Hinds. It converted to Lysanders in April 1940.
• No. 614 Squadron was formed on 01.06.37 and on 03.09.39 was equipped with Hawker Hinds. It converted to Lysanders in November 1939.