No War in Europe: Does Japan still launch the Pacific Campaign?

[Admiral Fischer]

Well, since the force pool location is southern China for the Sickle, and not Indochina (though RTL headquartered in Saigon/Ho Chi Minh City), I would have to dig into the OOB and see what could be redirected in an ATL configuration.

I have no idea what this sickle you keep talking about it is, but the OTL OOB isn't going to be useful in determining necessary changes to Japanese logistics chain, aviation strength, and most importantly, operational targets. In 1941, with French Indochina at their disposal, the Japanese planners could count on dumps in Haiphong, Cam Rahn Bay, and Saigon for continuous supply operation, where ammunition and fuel were pooled for months at the expense of the Chinese theater, which caused grievances and protests from the China Expeditionary Army to the high command. Indeed, the main invasion force was assembled and received the initial supplies from South China, but further supports were provided from the logistics base in French Indochina. The Senshi Sosho vol.1 dedicates a whole subchapter to explain this logistics chain, and notes how the 26th Army's operation in the British Malaya was depended on maintaining rail link between Saigon and the British Malaya, which passed through Siam. The botched British attempt to destroy this rail link at the Perak river crossing is mentioned, apparently it took only ten days to restore the bridge to service.

This picture, however, changes as whole for the 1940 war plan. Obviously, the Japanese force can't use French Indochina to pool their supplies, or use its airfields, unless they capture one. This meant, first, the Malaya operation had to wait before the Japanese invasion force could establish a bridgehead in French Indochina to enable supporting the invasion of Malaya, and indeed the plan called for the capture of the Da Nang Airfield, Cam Rahn Bay, Saigon, and Hanoi at the first phase of the war. That and the Borneo operation accomplished, only then the British Malaya operation could proceed, according to the 1940 war plan. However even if port and railroad facilities are captured intact, they wouldn't be able to supply the invasion as much they did during the historical invasion of Malaya, with the operations in French Indochina consuming supplies and requiring aviation supports as much as the British Malaya operation does. Second, it was under such circumstance that the Japanese Army planners pointed Mersing as the main landing site, as Mersing was nearest to Singapore than any other potential land sites, despite of anticipated difficulties in landing on the site. The Army had to capture Singapore as soon as possible before the operation turn into a potential disaster, so they had look at Singapore and only Singapore. Third, the plan was submitted before the French surrender, and Siam's position wasn't clear as yet. The Army planners valued Singora and its airfield in Siamese Malaya as a potential support base for the British Malaya operation, and the 1940 plan called for occupying the site but because of the Siamese neutrality they had to insert a conditional clause that Singora would be occupied only if the circumstances allows such. Which is unlikely to come for this scenario, because its very premise is European war not happening at all, and without common Indochinese border with Japan Siam is more likely to sit down and watch before weighting into one side. For the case where Japan violates the Siamese neutrality anyway, I can't speak, but it is significant that the 1941 plan does not mention any 'circumstances' at all in occupying Singora. (EDIT:... while the 1940 one does.)

Considering such constraints it is no wonder that the 1940 war planners called for only two divisions to be deployed to British Malaya and French Indochina each.

Looks like the 38th and the "Dash Forward" with assigned support units are about it for Phase II operations after Malaya falls. IOW what RTL happened.

The division was a part of the phase I operation and did their part by securing Hong Kong. The division was earmarked for the Dutch East Indies after the fall of Hong Kong, and this was decided before the war.

 

[McPherson]

I have no idea what this sickle you keep talking about it is, but the OTL OOB isn't going to be useful in determining necessary changes to Japanese logistics chain, aviation strength, and most importantly, operational targets. [snip]

It can be called scythe, crescent or whatever.

Part of

You have to use OTL OOBs because that is the maximum force structure and logistics setup the IJA and IJN have available.

the 26th Army's operation in the British Malaya

25th Route Army, not the 26th.

I am aware of the Pacific War and how it actually worked. Indochina was going to be hit, but Philippine Islands would done just as well (See Map.)

 

[Admiral Fischer]

It can be called scythe, crescent or whatever.

I still don't get the glossary. Why can't you call it just Malayan Operation just like everyone does without unnecessarily confusing naming scheme?

You have to use OTL OOBs because that is the maximum force structure and logistics setup the IJA and IJN have available.

Which setup would not be available for the Japanese, without supply pools and airfields in French Indochina, plus the railroad that supported the British Malaya operation.

I am aware of the Pacific War and how it actually worked. Indochina was going to be hit, but Philippine Islands would done just as well (See Map.)

So we were discussing about the scenario where Japan attacks the Philippines as well? Then it's possible that Saigon and Cam Rahn Bay wouldn't even be touched during the first phase of the war. In the case for a war 'against the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and China', the 1940 war plan called the Japanese Army to attack the northern part of French Indochina through the Sino-Vietnamese border and amphibious operations, but for its southern part, including Saigon and Cam Rahn Bay, there is a huge question mark, because the plan says that part was to be attacked 'as far as possible', implicating southern French Indochina was of secondary priority. The operation against British Borneo and Malaya was to be executed only if the circumstances allows it. To the other direction, the Army was to deploy one regiment to attack Guam, and again, two divisions to the Philippines operation.

 

[McPherson]

I still don't get the glossary. Why can't you call it just Malayan Operation just like everyone does without unnecessarily confusing naming scheme?

Because the Japanese internally called it a number of things? Look the whole RTL Southern Resources Area operation was split into two phases and four subgroupings. these worked out in order of importance:

1. Philippine Islands. (Homma)
2. Indo-China (This was actually a part of the South China offensive and involved the Battle of South Guangxi. There was fighting between the French and the Japanese. the Japanese did not "just walk in" because Hitler forced the French to allow it.)
3. Malaya/Thailand/Burma (Yamashita and Shōjirō Iida)
4. Phase II Indonesia (broken down into 3 further operations known as west, center, and east).

Officially, this octopus was known as the Operation to Secure the Greater East Asia C-Prosperity Sphere. THAT was its official name. "Sickle" was shorthand for the local operations in Thailand and Malaya and what flowed into Sumatra and Java.

French Indochina...

Which setup would not be available for the Japanese, without supply pools and airfields in French Indochina, plus the railroad that supported the British Malaya operation.

Already answered. (^^^)

So we were discussing about the scenario where Japan attacks the Philippines as well? Then it's possible that Saigon and Cam Rahn Bay wouldn't even be touched during the first phase of the war. In the case for a war 'against the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and China', the 1940 war plan called the Japanese Army to attack the northern part of French Indochina through the Sino-Vietnamese border and amphibious operations, but for its southern part, including Saigon and Cam Rahn Bay, there is a huge question mark, because the plan says that part was to be attacked 'as far as possible', implicating southern French Indochina was of secondary priority. The operation against British Borneo and Malaya was to be executed only if the circumstances allows it. To the other direction, the Army was to deploy one regiment to attack Guam, and again, two divisions to the Philippines operation.

Frankly, I don't see how anything gets sorted (naval geography) without the Japanese securing the Philippine Islands. They can clobber the British at Singapore rather easily without Indo-China as long as they have the Philippine Islands, but if the Philippine Islands plugs their sea lines of communication, they cannot move into the South China Sea. And given the situation after WW I forward, this Philippine Islands problem is a matter of critical geographic necessity to Japan, especially after the Washington and London Naval treaties.

Here is a map to show you what Tokyo sees as it goes to war. (what it believes.)

Blue is US airpower reach. Yellow is RN tactical sortie radius. The arrow is the "Through Ticket to Manila". (which the Japanese expected.) and that arrow pointed at Pearl Harbor is their answer to the "Through Ticket" or whatever version of Orange the USN had cooked up.

Battlespace is the South China Sea. (triangle)

Some speculations about the Pacific War are just ASB fodder and this whole thread is 1 of them. To create scenarios against the naval geography is pointless. Cause if the British and Americans had gotten together in 1940 and thought it through: (^^^) that was what could have happened... because it did. They were on the losing side of it.

Absolutely brilliant Japanese plan. Far better than anything the incompetent Germans ever came up with. Only trouble is that they came up against pros like themselves, and I do not mean the British.

 

[Admiral Fischer]

Snip

Not a single part of your post is backed by historical references.

Cite the source.

 

[Admiral Fischer]

So you went silent the moment I asked for references and sources, and as I highly doubt your capability to provide anything to back your own claim, as shown by your 'borantia' Google-fu translation, I think it's time to call the bullshit.

Because the Japanese internally called it a number of things? Look the whole RTL Southern Resources Area operation was split into two phases and four subgroupings. these worked out in order of importance:

1. Philippine Islands. (Homma)
2. Indo-China (This was actually a part of the South China offensive and involved the Battle of South Guangxi. There was fighting between the French and the Japanese. the Japanese did not "just walk in" because Hitler forced the French to allow it.)
3. Malaya/Thailand/Burma (Yamashita and Shōjirō Iida)
4. Phase II Indonesia (broken down into 3 further operations known as west, center, and east).

Officially, this octopus was known as the Operation to Secure the Greater East Asia C-Prosperity Sphere. THAT was its official name. "Sickle" was shorthand for the local operations in Thailand and Malaya and what flowed into Sumatra and Java.

There was no such thing called as "Southern Resources Area operation". Nor "Operation to Secure the Greater East Asia C-Prosperity Sphere". The name of the campaign, the 'Southern Campaign' as the November 10 Agreement referred, was officially designated as 'A-Go Operation'. See the Senshi Sosho vol.1, p.74.

The Japanese Navy planners did split their operations into multiple phases and substages, but their vision of the first phase included Dutch East Indies operation as the second and the third substage, the first substage being the landing operation in the Philippines, British Borneo and Malaya, and the second substage being the operation against south eastern Dutch East Indies, in the order of Manado and Tarakan, Balikpapan and Kendari, Banjarmasin and Makassar, and if possible Sorong, Kota Ambon, and Kupang as well. The last substage was Sumatra and Java. See the Senshi Sosho vol.80, p.137, pp.140-141, pp.185-186.

The Army planners had other idea. They too divided the operation into three phases, but their definition of the 'first phase' ranged anything from the Philippines, British Malaya, Borneo, the Moluccas, Timor, and to southern Sumatra. their second phase, on the other hand, was limited to the operation in northern Sumatra, Java, and southern Burma, and the third phase is essentially about entrenching themselves into the conquered lands, with leaving a note for the possible operation in Burma. See the Senshi Sosho vol.1, pp.75-76.

French Indochina...

Already answered. (^^^)

You did not. You answered none of the points made on the issue of French Indochina, and that is in a literal sense.

Frankly, I don't see how anything gets sorted (naval geography) without the Japanese securing the Philippine Islands. They can clobber the British at Singapore rather easily without Indo-China as long as they have the Philippine Islands, but if the Philippine Islands plugs their sea lines of communication, they cannot move into the South China Sea. And given the situation after WW I forward, this Philippine Islands problem is a matter of critical geographic necessity to Japan, especially after the Washington and London Naval treaties.

Interestingly, the Japanese Army disagree with you. Since their attempt to scrap the Philippines operation from the war plan in 1935, the Army continued to question the wisdom of invading 'the uncivilized, disease-ridden lands' of Philippines, in the words of Kawabe Torashiro. Their eyes were on the resources-rich Malaya and East Indies, not the Philippines. It was not until October 1941 that the Army at last agreed to put the Philippines operation on the same priority as the British Malaya operation. For the 1935 Army-Navy dispute over the Philippines, see the Senshi Sosho vol.91, p.262. For the 1941 Army-Navy dispute over the Philippines, see the Senshi Sosho vol.1, pp.38-40.

Here is a map to show you what Tokyo sees as it goes to war. (what it believes.)

Blue is US airpower reach. Yellow is RN tactical sortie radius. The arrow is the "Through Ticket to Manila". (which the Japanese expected.) and that arrow pointed at Pearl Harbor is their answer to the "Through Ticket" or whatever version of Orange the USN had cooked up.

Battlespace is the South China Sea. (triangle)

As demonstrated above, Tokyo had no agreed plan on the Philippines until the last minute before the war, let alone belief. That map coming from your head, not the Japanese leaders at the time.

Some speculations about the Pacific War are just ASB fodder and this whole thread is 1 of them. To create scenarios against the naval geography is pointless. Cause if the British and Americans had gotten together in 1940 and thought it through: (^^^) that was what could have happened... because it did. They were on the losing side of it.

The changes between the 1940 and 1941 war plans are substantial enough to refute this.

Absolutely brilliant Japanese plan. Far better than anything the incompetent Germans ever came up with. Only trouble is that they came up against pros like themselves, and I do not mean the British.

Your personal impression aside, the Japanese actions throughout 1940-1941 was reliant on the German escalation of the Second World War. Even Japan's peace plan, "Draft Proposal for Hastening the End of the War" of November 1941, was built upon the premise of the German victory in Europe. Japan rode on the train of opportunism, and their successes were dependent on external factors. Such opportunism was openly expressed when the incompetent Germans occupied the Netherlands in 1940. No operation against Dutch East Indies was considered before 1940, including the 1940 war plan, yet upon hearing the news the Navy immediately sent out the Fourth Fleet to pressure Dutch East Indies, and added the area as a potential target for operation for the 1941 war plan. On this 'Do not miss the bus' mentality, see Senshi Sosho vol.91, pp.454-456. On the sudden ambitions of the Japanese Navy on Dutch East Indies and the role of the Fourth Fleet during the immediate aftermath of the German occupation of the Netherlands, see pp.442-447.

 

[McPherson]

Not a single part of your post is backed by historical references.

Cite the source.

Hyperwar.

 

[Admiral Fischer]

Hyperwar.

That website has hundreds if not thousands of articles and simply saying 'Hyperwar' isn't helpful in identifying the actual source of your claim.

 

[McPherson]

It does have about 2,000 articles (all based on original source documents) on the Pacific War., Then there are about 450 books in my personal library and there is the Pacific War Encyclopedia, plus my own work, but the point is, if you want chapter and verse on minutiae, then read "Those Marvelous Tin Fish" and you'll find everything you need from Japanese typewriters used in the Pearl Harbor 14 part message to what made the Sherman tank the Sherman tank, to why Australia ditched the UK after being lied to for the last time.

This is not a PHD peer review. It is just me using what I know and responding to one of those threads that has no plausible ATL basis in fact.

McP.

 

[Admiral Fischer]

It does have about 2,000 articles (all based on original source documents) on the Pacific War., Then there are about 450 books in my personal library and there is the Pacific War Encyclopedia, plus my own work, but the point is, if you want chapter and verse on minutiae, then read "Those Marvelous Tin Fish" and you'll find everything you need from Japanese typewriters used in the Pearl Harbor 14 part message to what made the Sherman tank the Sherman tank, to why Australia ditched the UK after being lied to for the last time.

This is not a PHD peer review. It is just me using what I know and responding to one of those threads that has no plausible ATL basis in fact.

McP.

So your sources cannot be verified, and claims unproven and long rebutted, yet you keep deflecting the issue when people point out it.

I'm not asking you for detailed address of the article writers, I just want to identify the actual source of your claim and that's all. What's the point of your self-boast when your points are refuted to the ground and you are not even trying to contribute any meaningful points to the discussion.

This is the dictionary definition of bullshit.

 

[McPherson]

So your sources cannot be verified, and claims unproven and long rebutted, yet you keep deflecting the issue when people point out it.

I'm not asking you for detailed address of the article writers, I just want to identify the actual source of your claim and that's all. What's the point of your self-boast when your points are refuted to the ground and you are not even trying to contribute any meaningful points to the discussion.

This is the dictionary definition of bullshit.

Rhetoric is not a negation. Graphing a battlespace with NWC orange plan kriegspiel (war game) outcomes is. If you cannot see it, that is your problem, not mine.