No War 1914 - Naval Trends

Probably sometime in the late 30s, early 40s. Honestly, that's about the earliest anyone can abandon the Battleship. And that's assuming that aircraft are still at the same developmental stage as OTL. And that's something I seriously doubt. WWI spurred huge advances in aircraft. Look at the difference in state of the art aircraft in 1913 verses state of the art in 1919. Without the war, almost all of that development gets butterflied away. It may be 1950 or later before we see carriers become the potent striking force they became in 1940.
There would actually be more aircraft development. Afer WW1 Germany was effectively banned from development, not much happenedin Russia, former A-H was too small for any development and banned as well and France had financial troubles. It might be a bit slower 1914 to 1918 but afterwards the development happens faster, is globally better funded and more happens at the same time.
 
I don't think the example of Pedestal is that great. Yes, the convoy was savaged, but it got through. A true surface force would have forced it to retreat (as in Vigorous) or intercepted it.
 
There would actually be more aircraft development. Afer WW1 Germany was effectively banned from development, not much happenedin Russia, former A-H was too small for any development and banned as well and France had financial troubles. It might be a bit slower 1914 to 1918 but afterwards the development happens faster, is globally better funded and more happens at the same time.
You would also have a smaller number of more skilled pilots - probably about 4000-5000 pilots in UK by 1918 (up from 2000 in 1914). Aircraft will be designed to be safer, stronger and more powerful. Maneuverability just means the biplane is around longer. Engine power was increasing at a slower rate 1914-1918 than it had pre-war. At the pre-1914 rate the world speed record was increasing, it was a good 4-5 years off trend by 1918-19 (in 1919 it was 260mph but from 1914 trend it should have been 340mph). Engines for warplanes had to be reliable and serviceable in the field, not performance driven. Money for research and development evaporated and production fell off a cliff postwar in a boom and bust cycle. The Atlantic would have been flown in 1914 not 1919. The flying boat doesn't require the infrastructure that larger land based planes do. Air travel would start in earnest.
 
Some numbers that relate to the 'Why' for sea power.

These numbers are from 1908 and form a business case for naval power.

Merchant Ships
Empire 9,500 ships, 17m tons
Rest of the World 9,500 ships 16m tons

Over 12,000 ton ships GB (34), Rest of World (10)
Over 10,000 ton ships GB (49), Rest of World (46)
Over 5,000 ton ships GB (567), Rest of World (506)

Over 20 knots speed GB (7), Rest of World (7)
Over 18 knots speed GB (41), Rest of World (23)
Over 16 knots speed GB (106), Rest of World (106)
Over 12 knots speed GB (960), Rest of World (830)

Imports and Exports
Empire £2,000,000,000
German Empire £729,000,000
USA £685,000,000
France £539,000,000
Russia £205,000,000
A-H £195,000,000
Italy £158,000,000

Empire breakdown:
UK £1,304,000,000
India £240,000,000
Australia £125,000,000
Canada £117,000,000
NZ £36,000,000
South Africa £76,000,000
Egypt £50,000,000
South Africa £76,000,000

With the exception of Canada's £70,000,000 of overland trade with the US, all this trade had to be protected at sea. As only 30% of Canada's trade was overseas, you can see why they had little need for a navy and they simply consumed the protection provided by GB taxpayers.

British shipping was also carrying £400,000,000 of foreign trade. £300,000,000 worth of trade is at sea at any one time.
 
Now I'm thinking of the seven naval battles fought around Guadalcanal in 1942. Exactly four battleships showed for one surface battle. Four surface battles were fought with cruisers, destroyers, submarines, and land based aircraft. The USN held its BB back until it had nothing else left to fight with, the Japanese held theirs back lest they empty the fuel depots.

But, its unlikely anyone is gong to abandon the BB by 1918 or even 1920. Big guns are just too attractive.

The IJN figured that the Decisive Action would expend 500,000 tons of fuel. They fought four decisive actions, Midway, Guadalcanal Campaign, Philippine Sea and Leyte Gulf. They didn't know the Guadalcanal Campaign was a decisive action, otherwise they would have committed decisive forces (including the battle fleet).
 
The US was also experiencing a bit of a battleship shortage just then, courtesy of the Kido Butai.

Actually by this point the USN had its numbers back up to the 6th December level. Beyond that Halsey had four on hand during the October/November battles & only used two in one of the three battles fought those months. But we digress.
 
I don't think the example of Pedestal is that great. Yes, the convoy was savaged, but it got through. A true surface force would have forced it to retreat (as in Vigorous) or intercepted it.

Lining up the losses for each side & looking at what actually got through suggests the efficiency of the small ship/aircraft mix for Italys position.
 
You would also have a smaller number of more skilled pilots - probably about 4000-5000 pilots in UK by 1918 (up from 2000 in 1914). Aircraft will be designed to be safer, stronger and more powerful. Maneuverability just means the biplane is around longer. Engine power was increasing at a slower rate 1914-1918 than it had pre-war. At the pre-1914 rate the world speed record was increasing, it was a good 4-5 years off trend by 1918-19 (in 1919 it was 260mph but from 1914 trend it should have been 340mph). Engines for warplanes had to be reliable and serviceable in the field, not performance driven. Money for research and development evaporated and production fell off a cliff postwar in a boom and bust cycle. The Atlantic would have been flown in 1914 not 1919. The flying boat doesn't require the infrastructure that larger land based planes do. Air travel would start in earnest.
The huge number of WW1 aircraft available after the war to be purchased cheaply gave civil aviation an enormous boost, leading to more pilots and more aviation, which led to a demand for replacement aircraft.
 
The huge number of WW1 aircraft available after the war to be purchased cheaply gave civil aviation an enormous boost, ...

...& the glut on the market put a number of start up aviation companies out of business. Difficult to estimate what effects that had on innovation & progress during the 1920s. On top of that there was the reduction in aviation investment in Germany, the Austrian-Hungarian region from treaty restrictions, and the general collapse of the Russian & Ottoman empires. Be interesting to examine the aviation trends to 1914 & extrapolate them on to 1920 or beyond.
 

Driftless

Donor
...& the glut on the market put a number of start up aviation companies out of business. Difficult to estimate what effects that had on innovation & progress during the 1920s. On top of that there was the reduction in aviation investment in Germany, the Austrian-Hungarian region from treaty restrictions, and the general collapse of the Russian & Ottoman empires. Be interesting to examine the aviation trends to 1914 & extrapolate them on to 1920 or beyond.

I think that's spot-on. Along with those thoughts, for all of the development of technologies from 1914 through 1918 that were useful for warplanes, I'd think there might have been some useful roads-not-taken for civil or experimental aviation. To be sure, some of those advancements certainly aided aviation in general.
 

Driftless

Donor
To combine the aviation discussion with the OP, I do think you would see more development of long range seaplanes for naval use - especially by those countries with widely spread colonies. Those bigger seaplanes could cover more ocean more quickly than their sea-bound counterparts, and their need for permanent infrastructure is less. With no WWI, you probably see civilian counterparts to those big flying boats a few years earlier: an India or Australia Clipper?
 
Perhaps the Great War did divert or stunt sea plane development. Would the greater payload of sea planes encourage larger torpedoes 1914-1920? Or was torpedo development hindered by other factors at that time?
 
Lining up the losses for each side & looking at what actually got through suggests the efficiency of the small ship/aircraft mix for Italys position.

I think it's more informative to look at whether Italy achieved her objectives, rather than the losses inflicted.

Her objectives in the Med were to maintain contact with her African possessions and to prevent enemy convoys passing through the central Med, such as to Malta. Certainly, the historic combination of light craft and aircraft was able to deter and inflict significant losses on enemy shipping. But it was not able to stop convoys reaching Malta.

The most effective use was against the Harpoon convoy, but the survivors still reached Malta. It was the presence of the Italian battle fleet that forced the Vigorous convoy to retreat.
In Pedestal, it was the same story - air power and light forces were able to take a toll but they were unable to prevent passage. Italy had failed to achieve her objective while British losses were acceptable for the operational result achieved.

While it's true to say that the RN and Merchant Navy could not sustain those losses much longer, the operational results meant that they didn't need to.

Aircraft and light craft are valuable and useful, but Italy still needs a respectable surface threat capable of deterring convoy passage, or at least of forcing the enemy fleet to fight in conditions most unfavourable for it.
 
Operation PEDESTAL can be called a strategic success. It was also a near run thing & the Brits could not afford many such victories. Nine of fourteen cargo ships were sunk & a tanker sunk at the docks @ Valetta. Also the carrier Eagle was torpedoed & sunk, two cruisers were sunk & a destroyer. A similar number of war ships were damaged. All that by air and light naval forces. Two Italian cruisers were damaged by a Brit submarine. Nothing larger than a Italian destroyer actually engaged in battle.

Here's a partial list of supply runs made to Malta. I've not been able to proof read it or cross check it, so some items are missing. It is clear air did the most damage to the Brit ships in the Malta area, followed by submarines and torpedo boats. Not much in the way of cargo ships was sunk by anything larger. One question that pops into mind is the damage possible had the Italian air force or the small ships been as effective as the Japanese or USN were in 1942. The Italian airfare seems singularly ineffective in 1940. The Italians also clearly had trouble with night battles in 1940 & much of 41.

July 40
Battle of Calabria
Giulio Cesare Damaged
Misc destroyer splinter damage
Both fleets and convoy reach destination
Aircraft ineffective, no torpedo boat action

August
Operation Hurry First Club run
Italians opposed with two moderate air attacks & air. Insignificant damage. Italians not trained for night battle.

September
Operation Hats Convoy MF2 of three fast cargo transports
Italian surface fleet failed to intercept.

October
Operation MB 6 Two simultaneous fast convoys from Gibraltar & Alexandria
Italians fail to identify convoys in time to sortie battle fleet.
Battle of Cape Passero had a Brit light cruiser defeat torpedo boats & destroyer @ night.

November
Operation Judgement Fast convoy ME3 covered by air attack on Italian battle fleet in harbor
Italian battles ships torpedoed by air attack.

Operation White Club run from Gibraltar
Operation failed when eight of twelve Hurricanes launched ran out of fuel

Operation Collar Complex operation including cargo convoy to Malta, air attacks on Italian airbases, & Alexandria to Gibraltar transfer of warships
Italian battle fleet sortied, failed to make effective night attack. Italian submarines fail at night intercept.

December
Convoys MW5A, MW5B, ME5, MG1
Italians fail to identify convoys & fail to intercept

January 1941
Operation Excess Four cargo ships from Gibraltar to Mata & Piraeus
German aircraft intercept, sinking one cruiser, severely damaging a destroy & aircraft carrier Illustrious hit by five bombs. Italian torpedo boat sunk & Italian BB damaged in related operation raiding a port.

Axis air attack on Malta damages cruiser Essex & additional damage to Illustrious.

Febuary
Operation MC8 Cruisers & destroyers run men & some material to Malta
Axis fail to intercept.

March
Operation MC9 Four cargo ships disperse & reach Malta undercover of weather & night.
Axis fail to intercept. Two cargo ships hit in Valetta harbor

April
Operation Winch & Operation Dunlop
Club run Gibraltar to Malta. Single cargo ship escorted to Malta, four empty cargo ships depart Malta under escort, diversionary battle fleet op to cover cargo ships.
Insignificant losses to either side

Tarigo Convoy or Sfax action
Brit destroyers intercept Italian cargo convoy & sink all five cargo ships & one escort, losing one Brit destroyer.

Operation Temple Two Brit cargo ships attempt to infiltrate from Gibraltar to Malta
One sunk by a mine

May
Operation Tiger & Splice Multifaceted op. with convoy from Gibraltar to Alexandria, dropping off a cargo ship at Malta & a cargo convoys from Alexandria to Malta same week.
Axis failed in effective interception as German X Air Corps was in transfer to Balkans.
One cargo ship lost to mine approaching Alexandria.

Operation Splice Club Run to Malta, with no losses.

June
Operation Rocket, Tracer, Railway I & II Club runs to Malta

July
Operation Substance Six cargo ships Gibraltar to Malta. Battle fleet from Alexandria as diversion.
Italian air attacks sank a destroyer, damaged cruiser, destroyer, & cargo ship.
Raid on the harbor by aircraft, torpedo boats and midget subs failed.

August Nothing?

September
Operations Status I, II Club Runs

Operation Propeller Two cargo ships traveling independently.

Operation Halberd Nine cargo ships escorted by battle flirt from Gibraltar to Malta
Air attacks damage BB Nelson & sink one cargo ship
Italian battle fleet sorties & then turns back without interception.

October
Operation Callboy Club Run

Operation MG3 Four empty cargo ships from Malta to Gibraltar independently.
One cargo ship lost to Italian air attack. One driven back to Malta

November
Operation Perpetual Club Run
Ark Royal sunk by submarine

Operation Astrologer Two unescorted cargo ships Gibraltar to Malta
Both sunk by air attacks

Operation Chieftain & Landmark Diversionary fake convoys with battle fleets
Scared the Italians into delaying a convoy

December
Operation MD1 Single cargo ship escorted Gibraltar to Malta
Italian air attacks intercept but fail. Italian battle fleet sortie fails to intercept

January 1942
Operation MF2 One fast cargo ship from Alexandria with cruiser escorts. One cargo ship from Malta returned with escorts
Axis air and submarines fail to intercept.

Operation MF3 Four cargo ships in two convoys from Alexandria
Air attacks sink one cargo ship & submarine one destroyer.

In repeat operation two cargo ships transit Alexandria/Malta & opposite direction. No interception.

February
Operation MF5. Three cargo ships from Alexandria with destroyers & cruiser escort.
Two cargo ships sunk by air attack. Third tried back to Alexandria.

One destroyer sunk at dock in Valletta harbor by air attack.

March
Operation Spotter Club Run

Operation MG1 Four cargo ships from Alexandria, with cruiser & destroyer escorts.
Italian BB sortied with cruisers. Came close, causing the convoy to disperse. Air attacks sank one cargo ship at sea. Other three made harbor, but were sunk at docks before significant cargo unloaded.

Operation Picket Club Run
Italian submarines intercept, but torpedo attack ineffective.

April
Operation Calendar Club Run by USS Wasp

Two submarines & two destroyers sunk in Valetta harbor by Axis air attacks

May
Operations Bowery & LB Club runs

June
Operation Style Club Run

Operation Julius Simultaneous convoys from Alexandria with eleven & Gibraltar with six cargo ships.
Air attacks vs the western convoy damaged one Brit cruiser & sank four cargo ships . Two Brit destroyers were sunk after a surface action with Italian destroyers. The eastern convoy duels with Italian torpedo boats, submarines, and air attacks four days. A cruiser, three destroyers and two cargo ships sunk. A Italian battle fleet failed to intercept as the convoy turned about to Alexandria.

July
Operation Pinpoint A fast minelayer made a partially escorted run to Malta
Italian air and submarine attacks failed to damage the ship.

Operation Insect Club Run
Carrier Eagle had a fan of torpedos bracket her & all miss

August
Op Pedestal See above

Operation Baritone Club Run

September
Submarine running supplies to Malta lost

October Four supply subs reach Malta
None lost

Operation Train Club Run

November
Operations Age & Crupper Efforts two slip independant cargo ships through
Attempt to run cargo ships disguised as French intercepted by French
Minelayer with cargo gets through air attacks
Six destroyers from Alexandria reach Malta no losses

Operation Stone Age Convoy MW13 of four cargo ships from Alexandria
One Cruiser severely damaged by air attacks

Misc submarine cargo missions

December
Operation Portcullis From Alexandria" five cargo ships of convoy MW14 & nine on convoys MW15-18
All Arrived intact. Axis air attacks ineffectual
 
The huge number of WW1 aircraft available after the war to be purchased cheaply gave civil aviation an enormous boost, leading to more pilots and more aviation, which led to a demand for replacement aircraft.
The WW1 surplus aircraft were unsuitable for civil aviation. On the back of 5 years worth of fit-for-purpose development from aircraft such as Russia's Sikorsky Ilya Muromets and a growing market able to afford and demand safe airtravel without being impoverished by the war, you could probably be in a position much better than 1918-19 OTL.
 
Perhaps the Great War did divert or stunt sea plane development. Would the greater payload of sea planes encourage larger torpedoes 1914-1920? Or was torpedo development hindered by other factors at that time?
RN plans were for 300 aircraft (about 100 flying boats and 200 seaplanes) supported by a base network of 18 air-stations. The first mission of flying boats will be to counter airships. They will need to be cannon armed as incendiary bullets 'burning bullets' were illegal.
 
To combine the aviation discussion with the OP, I do think you would see more development of long range seaplanes for naval use - especially by those countries with widely spread colonies. Those bigger seaplanes could cover more ocean more quickly than their sea-bound counterparts, and their need for permanent infrastructure is less. With no WWI, you probably see civilian counterparts to those big flying boats a few years earlier: an India or Australia Clipper?

IIRC once you get beyond 30,000 lb ground weight for land based aircraft then they need concrete runways which is a considerable infrastructure investment. This isn't an issue for flying boats and you just need a large lake. You will probably have railways investing in airtravel as they already have the market and know how for 'travel' sector while money would be easy to come by unlike OTL.
 
I think that's spot-on. Along with those thoughts, for all of the development of technologies from 1914 through 1918 that were useful for warplanes, I'd think there might have been some useful roads-not-taken for civil or experimental aviation. To be sure, some of those advancements certainly aided aviation in general.
The war brought Rolls-Royce into the aero engine market. They would have gone in anyway but they were insisting on liquid cooled inline when the Army requested rotary. The Rotary engine was continued with way past the logical application of such engines because of the need for numbers. I'd argue that this stunted development coupled with pilots setting the requirements for dog-fighting.

Looking at Pilots, a RN Air Service by 1918 on pre-1914 trends would number about 600-700 pilots. Of the OTL 22,000 WW1 Empire pilots 4,400 were killed, 1,000 of those were in training and the RNAS lost it's cadre to the RAF anyway. 25% casualty rate in peacetime would not be tolerated leading to safer aircraft.
 
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...& the glut on the market put a number of start up aviation companies out of business. Difficult to estimate what effects that had on innovation & progress during the 1920s. On top of that there was the reduction in aviation investment in Germany, the Austrian-Hungarian region from treaty restrictions, and the general collapse of the Russian & Ottoman empires. Be interesting to examine the aviation trends to 1914 & extrapolate them on to 1920 or beyond.
That is a good and valid point. However I don't seen the popularisation of civil aviation happening as quickly without the glut of aircraft and trained pilots. Many surplus bombers (for example) became the backbone of small cargo outfits because they were available at a fraction of the price of purpose built civil aircraft.

I think that's spot-on. Along with those thoughts, for all of the development of technologies from 1914 through 1918 that were useful for warplanes, I'd think there might have been some useful roads-not-taken for civil or experimental aviation. To be sure, some of those advancements certainly aided aviation in general.
I've wondered about the possibilities of Coandă and Wittgenstein getting together to revolutionise aviation (and establish a Mitteleuropean Hegemony) in Berlin.

For those of you unfamiliar with this bit of historical weirdness he's a quick summary.
In 1904, the brilliant Romanian engineer Henri Coandă (he of the eponymous effect and flying saucer) went to collage at the Technische Hochschule in Berlin, where his artillery regiment was stationed. There he became fascinated by aviation and aeronautical engineering. He graduated in 1906, at the same time Ludwig Wittgenstein (heir to the Wittgenstein steel empire, the the second-largest fortune in Austria-Hungary at the time) entered the college. Wittgenstein was also interested in aeronautics.
Now get the two men together, fund and develop Coandă's jet engine and save Wittgenstein from wasting his life (and fortune)[1].
Aviation is, by 1915 and the outbreak of the Great War, far more advanced and the Central Powers (including Italy[2]) win handily and impose a settlement on Europe that marginalises Britain and America and creates a better world.

This is likely to become an AiTaS scenario outline sometime[3].



[1] Yep.

[2] Because why not?

[3] When time permits...
 
Probably sometime in the late 30s, early 40s. Honestly, that's about the earliest anyone can abandon the Battleship. And that's assuming that aircraft are still at the same developmental stage as OTL. And that's something I seriously doubt. WWI spurred huge advances in aircraft. Look at the difference in state of the art aircraft in 1913 verses state of the art in 1919. Without the war, almost all of that development gets butterflied away. It may be 1950 or later before we see carriers become the potent striking force they became in 1940.

Without the Second World War I tend to see the Battleship holding on through the 1950s given its better all-weather capability, especially in the North Sea and Atlantic, aircraft will be more defensive but growing in capability through the 1930s and 1940s. But in restricted geography like the Adriatic, coastal Italy, the Med between Italy and Libya, the Aegean, the Black Sea and Baltic, I can see the big ships under pressure faster from the potential of aircraft supporting lighter units that have speed, torpedoes and flexibility. The 8-inch cruiser was thought of as equal to anything but the Battleship, equaling the pre-Dreadnoughts, so for the Austrians, Greeks, Italians or Turks he Cruiser might be good enough combined with air power and lighter forces with mine fields.
 
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