No War 1914-1917, Changes to French Army?

Merci & Thanks. Its great to have someone here with the time to have accomplished some research. Appreciate the effort.

What publication was that page from?
Both of the excerpts are from my doctoral thesis, which will (one day!) become a book called "Form, Fit, and Function: The Armies of the Western Front, 1895-1915." You can find the whole thing here.
 
If WWI is just postponed to 1917 I'm not sure the difference will be significant, but add five more years and we might see some French "guerre éclair" confirming the general offensive doctrine and focus on light artillery.

I very much agree with Redbeard. Awareness of German numerical superiority would lead the French Army of the decade after 1914 to pursue two remedies. One would be the mobilization of the manpower of the French Empire. The other would be the search for technical means that allow them to make the most of the limited manpower available to them. The latter, when combined with a powerful cultural trend towards modernism and the continuation of the cult of Napoleon, will push the French Army in the direction of mechanically-enhanced mobility.

This, I suspect, would have a relatively early effect on the cavalry, which would embrace bicycle troops (already in progress), armored cars (already under discussion), field guns mounted on the back of trucks (already in progress), motorcycles (particularly to carry machine guns), chasseur à pied units mounted in trucks, and close cooperation with aviation. One contributor to this would be the realization that, even with three-year service, the French cavalry would never ride as well as its British and German counterparts. (The rank-and-file in British and German cavalry regiments had a very high percentage of long-service soldiers, thereby enabling a very high standard of horsemanship, horse management, and field craft.)
 
Hmm... The US Army got to the idea in late 1918 of parachuting a brigade of five to seven thousand men onto Metz. I have to wonder if the French would be as fou as to seize on the same?
 
I can see a bunch of shiny new French, or German armored cars coming to grief in the Forrests of the Ardennes, around Metz, or the Vosges & everyone drawing the wrong conclusions.
The 34 cm cannon were naval guns, including installation @ coastal fortifications. I've not seen evidence they were available for field use in 1914. Their fielding as a siege weapon in 1915 came after the deficiency in French heavy artillery was proven.

The Schneider 28cm mortar may have been fielded in late 1915 or more likely 1916, assuming opposition within the artillery/ordnance community did not cancel or further delay the project. Those guys had been opposing adoption of new medium and heavy weapons for some time. There are questions about the effectiveness of the ammunition against fortifications, but I don't have any reliable information at hand. Just a lot of second and third hand stuff about supposed inadaquacies of French ammunition & prewar Russian tests. All of 16 were planned for a siege regiment.

A lot of options for medium and heavy artillery were available to the French army. They failed to understand the need & it required some months of combat experience to convince them otherwise. Without that combat experience I cant see it likely they will have a much improved artillery park in 1917. We cant even count on the items ordered circa 1914 to not be canceled by the light artillery proponents.

Its starting to look like the greatest gain through 1917 would be in the air with a small bomber force fielded, & better air reconissance that extends above the tactical into the operational sphere.

Doctrinally the cult of the offensive might be on the way out, but the effects would not yet be much in evidence among the regiments, or army staff.

Command & control is a related item to the tactical and operational doctrines. Is there any evidence the quantity of communications equipment would be increased through 1917. Or was the kit on hand considered suffcient?

Thinking about your earlier comments about the Metz fortifications and the need for heavy artillery to smash them, the bomber could be seen as an alternative. French air power enthusiasts would promote the bomber as an alternative to the heavy siege artillery; the heavy artillery proponents could see the bomber as a way to get around the light artillery club.

Armored cars, trucks, and aircraft could extend the life of the cult of the offensive. An operational/strategic theory develops that motor vehicles using the French road network combined with airplanes could concentrate extra force against a weak point in the German defense. It is the cult of the offensive, so of course the offensive will be able to concentrate better than the defense, even using the same technologies.
 
Hmm... The US Army got to the idea in late 1918 of parachuting a brigade of five to seven thousand men onto Metz. I have to wonder if the French would be as fou as to seize on the same?

What did the US Army do with this idea in the 1920s? Along with paratroopers, how much did the various armies experiment with moving units by air? I'm thinking of an alternate 1930's where countries like the USA, Canada, the USSR and Australia develop air-transportable units.

Could the French army of this OP experiment with moving men by air? Though would the passenger planes of the era have enough capacity to move a large enough formation to be useful? How many aircraft would be needed, and would it be reasonable to have that many aircraft be in service?

Dang it, now I want a couple of 1917-18 era wargames with all these shiny new technologies and units that we're speculating about. Oh, and the time and fellow gamers to play them.
 
I very much agree with Redbeard. Awareness of German numerical superiority would lead the French Army of the decade after 1914 to pursue two remedies. One would be the mobilization of the manpower of the French Empire. The other would be the search for technical means that allow them to make the most of the limited manpower available to them. The latter, when combined with a powerful cultural trend towards modernism and the continuation of the cult of Napoleon, will push the French Army in the direction of mechanically-enhanced mobility.

This, I suspect, would have a relatively early effect on the cavalry, which would embrace bicycle troops (already in progress), armored cars (already under discussion), field guns mounted on the back of trucks (already in progress), motorcycles (particularly to carry machine guns), chasseur à pied units mounted in trucks, and close cooperation with aviation. One contributor to this would be the realization that, even with three-year service, the French cavalry would never ride as well as its British and German counterparts. (The rank-and-file in British and German cavalry regiments had a very high percentage of long-service soldiers, thereby enabling a very high standard of horsemanship, horse management, and field craft.)

Hoplophile and others,
Why did the British and German cavalry have a higher percentage of long-service soldiers in the rank-and-file?

I'm wondering how the French motorized cavalry might be organized.
 
What did the US Army do with this idea in the 1920s? ...

Not much. There were eventually some experiments with air transport. In the 1930s there was a exercise where a infantry battalion & some cannon were air transported from one side of the Panama Canal Zone to the other. Probably some others.

... Could the French army of this OP experiment with moving men by air? Though would the passenger planes of the era have enough capacity to move a large enough formation to be useful? How many aircraft would be needed, and would it be reasonable to have that many aircraft be in service?

As of 1940 the French Army had a couple companies of parachute commandos, to be dropped in small teams behind the enemy front.

Note how the Italians were able to provide the air transport and organizations to move a few regiments of infantry from Morocco to Spain in 1937. Also the Red Army was experimenting mid 1930s with massed paratroop drops. At least one of those included a division HQ according to foreign (German?) observers.

In the case of the US 1918, it was Billy Mitchel who did the proposal/feasbility study for the Metz operation. He proposed the operation for the spring of 1919, when the offensive to the Rhine river got underway. A brigade of over 7,000 men was to be used, presumably two infantry regiments and a MG battalion plus a HQ company.
 
...

I'm wondering how the French motorized cavalry might be organized.

The Belgians had small troops of a few armored cars scattered out to the division cavalry groups & to the single Cav Div. Its not clear if they saw the things as scout vehicles, or as a MG carrier & support weapon.
 
Hoplophile and others,
Why did the British and German cavalry have a higher percentage of long-service soldiers in the rank-and-file?

For the high percentage of long-service soldiers in German cavalry regiments, see the attachment.
 

Attachments

  • German Cavalry.pdf
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A quick glance at the YO/Te of the French & German Cavalry shows the German Div were approx double the size with a proportionate comparison in fire power. I suspect the Germans were expecting to get a lot more out of their large cavalry formations than the French. The single BEF Cav Div sent in August 1914 was near double again over the German. Nearly four times the fire power in a French Cav Div. Don't have comparable info for the Russian or Austrian/Hugarian cavalry.

Just adding a half dozen armored cars with some Hotckiss MG to each French CD shows a divergence in combat power. Add a dozen by 1917 & they become a different animal.
 
Here, by the way, is an excellent painting, by the soon-to-be famous Georges Scott, of the new field uniform tested by the French Army in 1912.

Tenue Reseda 1912 copy.jpg
 
The French Army of the immediate pre-war period was well aware of its relative weakness in the realm of cavalry. Indeed, one of the many reforms carried out by Joffre during this period was the creation of two additional cavalry divisions and the re-arming of the horse artillery (with a Schneider 75mm gun), as well as the provision of a third horse artillery battery and a "cyclist group" (of some 400 men) to each cavalry division. (The picture shows some of the men of the 6th Cyclist Group, which was assigned to the 6th Cavalry Division.)

6eGCC_1914.jpg
 
Here, by the way, is a link to a splendid order-of-battle for the French Army of August 1914.

The work of Mark Conrad, it is both well researched and well presented.
 
For the French it should be subtle but potentially significant. Although I do not believe any far reaching changes sweep the French Army in this period without the pressures of and lessons from war itself, I think several things get better experimented with and thus give a better springboard for change if war comes 1916 or after. A significant shift should occur in the Anglo-French "alliance"; first, the Liberal Party and Grey should be out of power after 1915 and by 1916 the Russians should be looking far more menacing than Germany. Germany and the USA are vying to be the second greatest Naval power but Russia should soon return to its naval (as well as imperial) ambitions, both the USA and Russia directly threaten British dominance in China. That means the Franco-Russian alliance is going to change, either the French double down on attacking Germany to aide Russia in destroying Germany or they get cold feet. Even by 1917 it might not mean an end to the two front war for Germany but one must ponder if France feels so confident in pursuing such an offensive.

Overall I think France holds to an offensive doctrine at least until a true break with Russia occurs. It should open the door to any innovations that promote mobility and offensive warfare, e.g. the bicycle, the truck, the light automatic "rifle" (machinegun) and/or self loading rifle, airplanes, armored cars, etc.

Should war come I think the French will have a few years more usage of the self-loading rifle in specialist service, they likely modernize the heavy artillery yet it should remain rather small with emphasis on the mobile light guns. I agree that the French likely pursue armored cars as an ersatz cavalry sooner than anyone else and might even begin to think about using motorization to put mobility to its infantry as well as artillery. I further agree that air warfare gets more attention in theoretical battles as proponents advocate how it can act as far reaching scouts, longer ranged artillery and so forth. While I think no real develops get fielded the French at least should have more debate and enough experiments to be poised to rapidly adapt to the reality of war, perhaps better than they did. Even without the BEF the French might do much better in a war with Germany who should be focused East, a war that likely still bogs in the West, still offering no strategic victory for France unless Russia pulls off the win, but a war that might evolve faster and look more like how it got thought to fight at the very end just before its end.
 
Where did the 'Territorial' units fit into this?

The territorial regiments had a system of depots that was separate from, but roughly parallel to, that of the active/reserve infantry regiments. (There were 145 territorial infantry regiments, one for each "subdivision" into which European France was divided. Each of these had its own depot. There were 173 active infantry regiments and 173 reserve regiments, each pair of which shared a depot. Of these, 145 were affiliated with a subdivision and 28 were not.)
 
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