For a bit more on the French field artillery reforms of 1909-1911, see the attachment.
Merci & Thanks. Its great to have someone here with the time to have accomplished some research. Appreciate the effort.
What publication was that page from?
For a bit more on the French field artillery reforms of 1909-1911, see the attachment.
Both of the excerpts are from my doctoral thesis, which will (one day!) become a book called "Form, Fit, and Function: The Armies of the Western Front, 1895-1915." You can find the whole thing here.Merci & Thanks. Its great to have someone here with the time to have accomplished some research. Appreciate the effort.
What publication was that page from?
LOL Perhaps its my old military mind, but I believe I detect innuendo and nostalgia in that....I like velocity.
If WWI is just postponed to 1917 I'm not sure the difference will be significant, but add five more years and we might see some French "guerre éclair" confirming the general offensive doctrine and focus on light artillery.
Is it just me, or does anyone else get all happy and smiling looking at fine looking artillery?
I can see a bunch of shiny new French, or German armored cars coming to grief in the Forrests of the Ardennes, around Metz, or the Vosges & everyone drawing the wrong conclusions.
The 34 cm cannon were naval guns, including installation @ coastal fortifications. I've not seen evidence they were available for field use in 1914. Their fielding as a siege weapon in 1915 came after the deficiency in French heavy artillery was proven.
The Schneider 28cm mortar may have been fielded in late 1915 or more likely 1916, assuming opposition within the artillery/ordnance community did not cancel or further delay the project. Those guys had been opposing adoption of new medium and heavy weapons for some time. There are questions about the effectiveness of the ammunition against fortifications, but I don't have any reliable information at hand. Just a lot of second and third hand stuff about supposed inadaquacies of French ammunition & prewar Russian tests. All of 16 were planned for a siege regiment.
A lot of options for medium and heavy artillery were available to the French army. They failed to understand the need & it required some months of combat experience to convince them otherwise. Without that combat experience I cant see it likely they will have a much improved artillery park in 1917. We cant even count on the items ordered circa 1914 to not be canceled by the light artillery proponents.
Its starting to look like the greatest gain through 1917 would be in the air with a small bomber force fielded, & better air reconissance that extends above the tactical into the operational sphere.
Doctrinally the cult of the offensive might be on the way out, but the effects would not yet be much in evidence among the regiments, or army staff.
Command & control is a related item to the tactical and operational doctrines. Is there any evidence the quantity of communications equipment would be increased through 1917. Or was the kit on hand considered suffcient?
Hmm... The US Army got to the idea in late 1918 of parachuting a brigade of five to seven thousand men onto Metz. I have to wonder if the French would be as fou as to seize on the same?
I very much agree with Redbeard. Awareness of German numerical superiority would lead the French Army of the decade after 1914 to pursue two remedies. One would be the mobilization of the manpower of the French Empire. The other would be the search for technical means that allow them to make the most of the limited manpower available to them. The latter, when combined with a powerful cultural trend towards modernism and the continuation of the cult of Napoleon, will push the French Army in the direction of mechanically-enhanced mobility.
This, I suspect, would have a relatively early effect on the cavalry, which would embrace bicycle troops (already in progress), armored cars (already under discussion), field guns mounted on the back of trucks (already in progress), motorcycles (particularly to carry machine guns), chasseur à pied units mounted in trucks, and close cooperation with aviation. One contributor to this would be the realization that, even with three-year service, the French cavalry would never ride as well as its British and German counterparts. (The rank-and-file in British and German cavalry regiments had a very high percentage of long-service soldiers, thereby enabling a very high standard of horsemanship, horse management, and field craft.)
What did the US Army do with this idea in the 1920s? ...
... Could the French army of this OP experiment with moving men by air? Though would the passenger planes of the era have enough capacity to move a large enough formation to be useful? How many aircraft would be needed, and would it be reasonable to have that many aircraft be in service?
...
I'm wondering how the French motorized cavalry might be organized.
Hoplophile and others,
Why did the British and German cavalry have a higher percentage of long-service soldiers in the rank-and-file?
Where did the 'Territorial' units fit into this?