No US intervention in Lebanon in 1982, PLO destroyed

Suppose that the US had not cobbled together the Multi-National Force in Lebanon to intervene, and arranged the evacuation of the PLO to Tunisia. So as a result, Israel destroys the PLO, with Arafat likely ending up dead. What would be the end result?
 

raharris1973

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Maybe an earlier intifada, as with their external champions dead, people within the occupied territories take matters into their own hands.
 
Suppose that the US had not cobbled together the Multi-National Force in Lebanon to intervene, and arranged the evacuation of the PLO to Tunisia. So as a result, Israel destroys the PLO, with Arafat likely ending up dead. What would be the end result?
How does one lead to the other?
 
Maybe an earlier intifada, as with their external champions dead, people within the occupied territories take matters into their own hands.
That would change things Iran wasn't able to act on a large scale but Syria and the Soviets were. Some group would take their place with support from Syria and the Soviet Union, probably with strong socialist leanings. That would get ugly.
 
Without the PLO, I would assume that the Islamist movement in Israel and the territories would grow stronger, and be even more of a factor in the First Intifada whenever it would come. It would also mean that secular Palestinian nationalism would be likely more Communist in its leanings than OTL with the PFLP taking a more active role, although it'd likely be a lot weaker without the dynamism of Arafat.
 

Ak-84

Banned
MNF-Leb was cobbled together to pull Israel’s fat out of the fire. If it does not exist Lebanon becomes Israel’s Vietnam, Afghanistan and Iraq all in one.

They might collapse in this senario.
 
MNF-Leb was cobbled together to pull Israel’s fat out of the fire. If it does not exist Lebanon becomes Israel’s Vietnam, Afghanistan and Iraq all in one.

They might collapse in this senario.

Not really. Israel was winning at the time, and opposed the MNF's entry into Beirut. Ariel Sharon (Defense Minister at the time) was actually pretty pissed off over what he saw as the MNF stealing his victory. He wanted the PLO destroyed, and in the end international intervention resulted in the PLO getting evacuated to Tunisia. There was a lot of friction between the IDF and MNF, in particular with the USMC. There were quite a few instances where IDF troops and US Marines nearly exchanged fire.

Of course, in the end Israel withdrew to the "security zone" in southern Lebanon in 1985, and fought a long guerrilla war with Hezbollah that has been compared to Israel's Vietnam.
 

Ak-84

Banned
The only one who thought they were winning was Sharon, who had badly misled the Israeli cabinet about the whole operation and ended up being essentially sacked before its end. The Israelis has suffered 3000+ casulaties and had not taken Beruit itself, which comes to about 50 a day or a platoon day. It was unsutainable, and they actually saw senior officers refuse outright to assult the city center since they knew they were going to get cut to ribbons.

It was done by Reagan to save Israeli face. Only the major leadership of the PLO evacuated, the cadres remained.
 
The only one who thought they were winning was Sharon, who had badly misled the Israeli cabinet about the whole operation and ended up being essentially sacked before its end. The Israelis has suffered 3000+ casulaties and had not taken Beruit itself, which comes to about 50 a day or a platoon day. It was unsutainable, and they actually saw senior officers refuse outright to assult the city center since they knew they were going to get cut to ribbons.

It was done by Reagan to save Israeli face. Only the major leadership of the PLO evacuated, the cadres remained.

Israel had taken heavy losses, but it was winning. The Syrians had been decisively defeated, and the PLO had been pushed back to Beirut where it was under siege. Also, Israeli casualties in the war from the start in 1982 to the pullback to the security zone in 1985 were 657 dead, 3,887 wounded, and 4 missing. A hard price to pay, but not utterly devastating, and it must be remembered that PLO and Syrian losses were far heavier.

With regard to senior officers refusing an assault, I believe you're referring to Colonel Eli Geva, who commanded the 211th Armored Brigade, and refused to attack both because he believed his own forces would suffer heavy casualties but also because he wanted to spare civilian lives. However, despite the fact that casualties would likely have been heavy, there's no doubt the IDF would have won in the end. The IDF had already faced that kind of heavy urban combat in that war during the battle to take the Ain al-Hilweh camp.

Reagan didn't intervene to save Israeli face. The IDF was, more than anything, annoyed, and as stated before, there were severe tensions and cases where fire was almost exchanged.
 
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Reagan didn't intervene to save Israeli face. The IDF was, more than anything, annoyed, and as stated before, there were severe tensions and cases where fire was almost exchanged.

I was on my second round of active serivce at the time & several of my peers were involved in those confrontations. One witnessed a brief gunfight between a panicked Israli mech infantry platoon and a Italian squad on outpost. Another saw a Israli infantry company square off against a US Marine platoon he was attached to. Then there was the well published incident where the Israli tank column tried to force its way into a US Marine position.

The general consensus of the Marines post fiasco is all this could have been prevented by a bit of standard boiler plate diplomacy at mid level. But that never happened. The amphibious force command tried to make direct contact with the local Israli General, but was told to cease that effort from 'the top'. Instead they got to watch the Israli soldiers "flail" around for some weeks.

Intitally relations with the Leabese, including the PLO were good. Then something went sour at the higher diplomatic level & some factions started poking at the international force. Some claim the senior officials in Washington did not understand the growing influence and threat of the Iranians present in Lebanon & failed to take actions to counter it. Others claim serious bungling at the top. Note how the entire international force was targeted for attacks. Making unlikely the problem was just with the local US force on the ground, or the US itself.
 
I was on my second round of active serivce at the time & several of my peers were involved in those confrontations. One witnessed a brief gunfight between a panicked Israli mech infantry platoon and a Italian squad on outpost. Another saw a Israli infantry company square off against a US Marine platoon he was attached to. Then there was the well published incident where the Israli tank column tried to force its way into a US Marine position.

With regard to time when the IDF tanks tried to force their way into the Marine position, that was the one where the Marine captain jumped on the tank with a pistol, wasn't it? I know there were quite a few of those, and it was actually a subsequent standoff between an IDF armored column and a Marine position that resulted in a meeting which defused tensions. BTW do you have any source on the Israeli Italian gunfight? It sounds like it would be interesting to read about.
 

Ak-84

Banned
Israel had taken heavy losses, but it was winning. The Syrians had been decisively defeated, and the PLO had been pushed back to Beirut where it was under siege. Also, Israeli casualties in the war from the start in 1982 to the pullback to the security zone in 1985 were 657 dead, 3,887 wounded, and 4 missing. A hard price to pay, but not utterly devastating, and it must be remembered that PLO and Syrian losses were far heavier.
IDF casualties in the Beruit battle were about 400 killed and 2600 wounded, for around 3000.Out of about 75,000 total troops. In about 2 months of fighting. Thats a causlty rate of 50 a day. As a comparison, the Normandy campaign had a rate of about 2200 a day, for almost the same period (the battles were fought on almost the same dates 38 years apart infact). Total casualties were about 150,000 (you get different numbers, several don't count airforce and Navy losses some do), out of about 2 million total troops. The Israeli casualty rate 3000 out of 75000 is around 4%. No modern army can sustain such losses. Normany was about 7.5% of all engaged were casulaties.

And this is after using heavy artillery and airpower to avoid as much use of troops as possible. Not sustainable.
With regard to senior officers refusing an assault, I believe you're referring to Colonel Eli Geva, who commanded the 211th Armored Brigade, and refused to attack both because he believed his own forces would suffer heavy casualties but also because he wanted to spare civilian lives. However, despite the fact that casualties would likely have been heavy, there's no doubt the IDF would have won in the end. The IDF had already faced that kind of heavy urban combat in that war during the battle to take the Ain al-Hilweh camp.
Comparisons between an attack on a major urban centre and a refugee camp are misplaced. At al-Hilweh the Israelis were able to employ heavy firepower to end resistance, for densely packed together and exposed peoples. In Beruit, the use of standoff weapons did not achieve the end of major resistance as hoped for.
 
IDF casualties in the Beruit battle were about 400 killed and 2600 wounded, for around 3000.Out of about 75,000 total troops. In about 2 months of fighting. Thats a causlty rate of 50 a day. As a comparison, the Normandy campaign had a rate of about 2200 a day, for almost the same period (the battles were fought on almost the same dates 38 years apart infact). Total casualties were about 150,000 (you get different numbers, several don't count airforce and Navy losses some do), out of about 2 million total troops. The Israeli casualty rate 3000 out of 75000 is around 4%. No modern army can sustain such losses. Normany was about 7.5% of all engaged were casulaties.

First of all, it was 368 dead and 2,383 wounded, and I think that's actually the combined toll of the entire advance to Beirut and the Siege of Beirut itself. And most of the wounded would not have been permanently out of action, and would have been able to return to service after recuperating. But more importantly, the IDF could have finished it before it got to the point where it was not sustainable. Had the IDF seriously pushed into Beirut, it would likely have fallen to a determined assault well before IDF casualties got to be too much. The PLO could not have held out long enough against vastly superior numbers and firepower.

Comparisons between an attack on a major urban centre and a refugee camp are misplaced. At al-Hilweh the Israelis were able to employ heavy firepower to end resistance, for densely packed together and exposed peoples. In Beruit, the use of standoff weapons did not achieve the end of major resistance as hoped for.

The refugee camp was in effect an urban area.
 
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.... BTW do you have any source on the Israeli Italian gunfight? It sounds like it would be interesting to read about.

Wont be read unless Captain Dave Sedivic or I write it. Dave was a Marine Lt & with the Naval Gunfire Liaison Section of the Marine Expeditionary Unit. He was zipping about the area in a jeep and approaching the intersection when the Israeli Platoon on the opposite side was attacked. He speculated it was a group from a Lebanese Christian Facist organization that hit the IDF platoonwith RPG, but thats his opinion. What he witnessed was a IDF M113 APC on fire, several Israeli dead and wounded in or near it, fresh bullet holes and broken glass in the surrounding buildings. spent brass everywhere on the street, a squad of very pissed off Italian Marines with their weapons on the Israelis, the Israelis aiming at them and screaming threats. After a few minutes a Italian Captain showed up with a Italian Marine infantry company & the Israelis quit scaring everyone put their fire out, picked up their dead & departed. The Italian medics determined two elderly Lebanese women left in the street were dead & put them aside under a tarp or poncho.

Dave embellished the story considerably, but this is the essential skeleton of it. He was convinced the Italians had fired at the Israelis since there was fresh brass around their sandbagged position. He was one corner turn away when the shooting went down, but prudently did not stick his head out & move to the checkpoint until the gunfire faded. My take is Dave thought the IDF sloppy & unevenly disciplined & that probably colored his view of the event.
 
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