No US entry into WW I, does the Entente still win?

[Aelita]

Without US entry into the war, it is quite possible that both the Entente and the Central Powers end up facing some sort of revolution. France was certainly on the brink of full revolt IOTL, as was Germany. Britain faced some of her worst strikes in the post-war economic malaise. If the war stalemates any longer than it did IOTL, everything is going to get dicey.

Both sides will face terrible economic privation

 

[Deleted member 1487]

Indeed, however bad thing are for the Anglo-Freanch forces. The Germans are in much worse shape. I'm shocked how people can bring up Entente weakness. Then neatly forget that both in terms of the home front and front-line army. German morale was even more brittle, than the British or French. Both of whom were free to import food, reinforcements and vital war-suppies. While the Germans were near-starving and their war-industry couldnt keep up production anymore. Fighting though 1916-18 had pretty much buggered the German economy. The fact that junta ruling Germany wasnt very good at running a war-effort, didnt help either.

How can the British and French continue to import goods when they have no money to do so??? The French were broke and needed to import everything, as their most productive farm land and all their coal and iron mines were in German hands. Proportionally the French alone had already in 1917 lost more men than Germany had, which was fighting on 3 fronts. Their morale was shot and needed American entry into the war to get them back on the offensive. Robert Doughty, author of "pyrrhic victory", the definitive work on the French war effort in the English language, states that even the French were declaring that by 1918 without the knowledge that the Americans were coming the French army would not have been able to take the field again and would have surrendered in 1918, not because they physically could not fight on, but rather that they did not have the will to carry through to the bitter end with all the losses that would entail. The British cannot beat the Germans on their own.

I am not disagreeing that the Germans were in a very bad position, but the French had a lower threshold for pain at this point in the war thanks to their terrible losses (more in the first 6 weeks of the war than the US combat losses in all of WW1 and 2!) and dependency on foreign trade (which has dried up here). Granted, much of the Germans problems in 1916-1918 were caused by Ludendorff-Hindenburg and their ridiculous war economy program, which pretty much collapsed the German home front. It wasn't the fighting that was the problem, rather, it was the incompetent handling of the war economy that caused much of Germany's problems. In this scenario however it is impossible to have them in charge and not have a submarine offensive. We would need Falkenhayn to stay in command, which would butterfly away the Hindenburg program and the problems it caused. Let's say that Romania has the good sense not to enter the war in 1916, which leaves Falkenhayn in command.

The Germans by 1918 simply cannot win, their offensives would run out of steam as their troops, artillery and industry were utterly worn out with no hope for replacements or improvement. The Kaiser's men didnt have proper supplies of food & ammo and their morale was shot.

Things would be different in 1918 in this scenario, as 1917 will play out differently. Germany would not be as badly worn out with a weaker blockade and the Entente could not sustain the same kind of pace as OTL in 1917 without American war loans. It is very likely that by 1918 Russia would have already exited the war and the Western powers started negotiations under Wilson or independently in the Netherlands.

Nevertheless November 1917 could be a major change, as the US won't be in the war here when Caporetto goes down, which OTL toppled the French government. Instead of Clemenceau Cailluix may well have gotten the nob for the premiership, and he wanted immediate negotiations. With France broke ITTL France may have little choice but to start negotiations.

Actually it was unrestricted submarine warfare combined with the Zimmerman telegram topped with Germany using a means of communication provided by Wilson in violation of international law and the protests of Secretary of State Robert Lansing to send the telegram which brought the US in to the war.

Very true.

Yeah, people talk about troop, numbers blockades and imports. And forget more insubstantial factors like morale, or state & diplomatic competence. Lets face it from 1916-1918 the staggering cack-handed incompetence of the German junta is almost unbelievable. People talk about how no US DOW eases the blockade on Germany. Which is all fine and dandy but the small matter, that the German high-command had already pliedrived the German economy/industry right into the ground. Simply to fulfil short-term (late 1916 to 1917) needs.

All of these factors are just as important with the Entente too, who now don't have enough more to import nearly the same number of goods, Wilson breathing down their necks to compromise and threatening to do something about the blockade, and the get to watch as their allies in Eastern and Southern Europe topple. By the time 1918 rolls around the French are likely to have had political upheaval and won't be near as strong as OTL 1918. Meanwhile the Germans are stronger than OTL 1918 and have an erstwhile ally in Wilson, who wants the war to end.

No one is stating that Germany will win, she cannot. We are stating that the Entente will be forced to negotiate and probably would pick up Germany colonies and get a status quo ante bellum in the West. This appears to be a German victory, as they get Eastern Europe and have toppled Russia. They probably will also get to pick up Austria and perhaps Bohemia-Morovia when AH collapses. The Ottomans are a lost cause, though depending on when peace happens, the Bulgarians can avoid losing anything and the Italians will probably fall into civil war over getting nothing at the peace table.

 

[Lazzars]

i thought that germany was on the brink of internal collapse, they were almost out of food and short on moral (not that the entente wasn't either though).

would the germans have rushed into their spring offensive without the threat of american troops being deployed to the theatre? they clearly had the tactics to be able to break through the allied trenches by then but not the objectives or logistics to back it up. if there hadn't been a larger threat looming could the germans have really held on any longer anyway? or even given the entente a reverse of otl where an allied offensive comes first and is reversed followed by a huge german advance?

after all the US were at war with german in 1917 but (in terms of boots on the ground) were not a force until the next year. but when they were there, they came in huge numbers

 

[Saladan]

One important point I feel I should bring up is that from what I've read all the internal revolts in Austria-Hungary were for more autonomy and not for out right independence. It wasn't until the US (or Wilson specifically) said that they would grant them independence when they won that the revolts got out of hand. Austria-Hungary is unstable but it seems to me that a lot of people are overestimating it's internal problems a bit.

 

[yourworstnightmare]

One important point I feel I should bring up is that from what I've read all the internal revolts in Austria-Hungary were for more autonomy and not for out right independence. It wasn't until the US (or Wilson specifically) said that they would grant them independence when they won that the revolts got out of hand. Austria-Hungary is unstable but it seems to me that a lot of people are overestimating it's internal problems a bit.

Well, the Czechs were promised an own State by the Entente in 1915.

 

[Uriel]

Germany was short of food for two years but fragged on as long as there was a chance for victory. Only when that was gone their moral collapsed.
And in 1918 there was actually hope that the food situation would improve in the future, thanks to the occupation of Ukrainia.

Industry was in bad shape too, but they made it work until then and had continued to do so. Production shortages? Yes. Collapse? No.

As allready mentioned France lost its most important coal and iron regions at the begining of the war and was in a critical contition (means: dependant on British and American imports) since then.

And although they were better feed, the french army had huge discipline problems since 1915/1916. They shot severall hundred men for mutiny while the Germans shot ~ 70. If the French push their offensive to hard they might very well expirience another large mutiny.

 

[Uriel]

Well, the Czechs were promised an own State by the Entente in 1915.

Czechs were very unruly and a large number of czech soldiers deserted.

But the British were also expierincing major unrest in Ireland and India.

 

[Mikestone8]

Nevertheless the balance favors Germany even if it means they give up the Uboat campaign;

I take it you mean the unrestricted campaign.

Something often overlooked is that losses to u-boats were climbing fast even before USW was adopted. By Jan 1917 (the last month before USW) they had already tripled from the level of a year before.

If the Jan 1917 level were maintained through 1917, total sinkings that year would be around 4.4 million. True, this is a big drop from the 6.3 million of OTL, but it's still more than 1914, 1915 and 1916 put together, and the reduction will be easily offset by the drop in imports from the US due to the financial problems already discussed, and to the poor US harvests of 1916 and 1917.

Then there is the sticky issue of the Wilson administration finally being willing to confront the Entente over the blockade issue in 1917; after cutting of loans to the Entente, US businesses wanted trade with the continent again and Germany had amassed a large gold stockpile during the war. Without the declaration of war glossing over this problem, by mid-to-late 1917 the US will be pressing the Entente on the issue, which they will have to back down on or face the prospect of USN escorted convoys of merchantmen seeking to dock in German ports.

Agreed, though I doubt if such convoys would attempt to go directly to Germany. Both sides had sown the North Sea and Balltic so thick with minefields as to make this an extremely dangerous undertaking. But from the Allied pov, convoys to Holland or Norway would be just as bad.

I'm also doubtful whether such convoys would try to force their way through the blockade - that would be risking an exchange of shots between British and US warships, which I shouldn't think any US Administration would want. However, if they were turned back, the US might well have said "If we cannot sail freely in these waters, we will not sail there at all", and ended all such sailings, laying down that if Britain wanted US goods, she would henceforth have to send her own ships for them. This could be important, since it would make USW a far safer option for the Germans. If no American ships are entering British waters, then clearly none can be sunk there, so USW, though it may still attract American disapproval, will not lead to a head-on collision.

It is often overlooked that (Allied-US and especially Anglo-US) relations would not have stood still in 1917. Until Germany "changed the subject" by adopting USW and sinking US ships, these were bad and getting worse due to arguments over blacklists etc. Some kind of economic reprisals are a distinct possibility if American neutrality is maintained.

Food exports, as I've already mentioned, are liable to dry up even without government action, simply because American food is all being consumed at home. The other big export (even bigger than munitions) is cotton. Wilson probably won't embargo that, as it would hurt his Southern supporters, but Hughes, if elected, would not have that particular consideration.

 

[rast]

ISomething often overlooked is that losses to u-boats were climbing fast even before USW was adopted. By Jan 1917 (the last month before USW) they had already tripled from the level of a year before.

Exactly, they were quite successful in cruiser warfare with submarines, which was much more to the liking of the sub commanders, who loved using their guns instead of torpedoes (too few of the latter on board, and about 50 % of them missing or failing). Even Q-Ships weren't seen as mortal danger, once the existence of this type was widely known - one had to be more careful but could still execute business.
Only problem were the German admirals, who insisted on 'all-or-nothing', i.e. unrestricted submarine warfare, blightly ignoring the overall success achieved by submarine cruiser warfare - and closing their ears to the voices of the front line commanders.

 

[Mikestone8]

i thought that germany was on the brink of internal collapse, they were almost out of food and short on moral

But both points were much aggravated by US intervention. This led to a drastic tightening of the blockade (since the most powerful neutral was now no longer neutral) and growing American strength in 1918 was important in convinncing Germans that they could not win.

The converse, of course, was equally important. From April 1917, the Allies knew that, could they but hang on, they were certain of victory - hence Pétain's renunciation of big offensives in favour of "waiting for the Americans". What does he tell his men if no americans are coming?

Incidentally, if the Germans, as sometimes claimed, were on the brink of collapse, their opponents don't seem to have noticed. As late as August/September 1918, leading figures on the Allied side were anticipating campaigns in 1919 or even 1920. Haig, of course, was confident that he could win in 1918, but in the past he had been equally certain he could win in 1917 or 1916. He was rather like the stopped clock that gives the right time twice a day.

after all the US were at war with german in 1917 but (in terms of boots on the ground) were not a force until the next year. but when they were there, they came in huge numbers

And their indirect effect was also important.

Being inexperienced, they were initially snt to quiet sectors of the Front, thus releasing more seasoned British and French for the crucial theatres. Thus the Anglo-French forces which won the big battles of 1918 had been considerably (albeit indirectly) reinforced by the release of many of their number from less crucial areas.

 

[SavoyTruffle]

Regardless of whom the peace favors, Europe will fall into chaos by then. A likely scenario is that the USA could fill the power vacuum, but it's Wilson we're talking about here...

 

[yourworstnightmare]

Regardless of whom the peace favors, Europe will fall into chaos by then. A likely scenario is that the USA could fill the power vacuum, but it's Wilson we're talking about here...

Actually Wilson is still a better choice for American dominance than someone who took the Monroe Doctrine seriously.

 

[wkwillis]

The Germans and their allies were pretty evenly matched against the Russians, French, English, and their allies.
1. As long as the Russians, French, etc, don't launch attacks they can persist at the front. They will continue to trade depth for survival for another two years. Certainly about as long as the Germans can hang on.
2. The portion of French agriculture held by the Germans was much less than the portion of French coal, iron ore, and industry.
3. Convoy caused a dramatic drop in loss of shipping, and the shipping left was more than enough to bring in nitrates, oil, various ores, and tropical products for England.
4. Germany couldn't get food out of the Ukraine without Russian railcars, locomotives, etc. That was the important part of Brest-Litovsk from the German point of view. If Russia continues to gradually retreat from the Ukraine, it's going to take the livestock and railstock with it. No substantial food for Germany.
5. Financial collapse was going to be important for both sides. The imposition of wealth taxes was going to cause political difficulties for the varied governments.

 

[Mikestone8]

The Germans and their allies were pretty evenly matched against the Russians, French, English, and their allies.
1. As long as the Russians, French, etc, don't launch attacks they can persist at the front. They will continue to trade depth for survival for another two years. Certainly about as long as the Germans can hang on.

How do the Russians hang on for two years? Even OTL, they packed in after the Bolshevik Revolution, which came only eight months after US intervention, and there's not the slightest reason for continued US neutrality to prevent or delay this.

2. The portion of French agriculture held by the Germans was much less than the portion of French coal, iron ore, and industry.
3. Convoy caused a dramatic drop in loss of shipping, and the shipping left was more than enough to bring in nitrates, oil, various ores, and tropical products for England.

The convoy system took quite a while to arrange. Even OTL, it started in May yet wasn't fully in place until September - and that was with the help of a lot of destroyers and other small warships from the US to assist with escort duties. Remove them, and its introduction will take even longer.

Also, The financial and foodstuff problems resulting from US abstention (see several previous messages) will curtail imports far more than the submarine campaign.

4. Germany couldn't get food out of the Ukraine without Russian railcars, locomotives, etc. That was the important part of Brest-Litovsk from the German point of view. If Russia continues to gradually retreat from the Ukraine, it's going to take the livestock and railstock with it. No substantial food for Germany.

If the war doesn't continue into 1918 (and without US intervention it very probably doesn't) that will be academic.

In any case, what do you mean by "gradually retreat"? There was nothing particularly gradual about the German overrunning of Ukraine in March-April 1918.

5. Financial collapse was going to be important for both sides. The imposition of wealth taxes was going to cause political difficulties for the varied governments.

There will indeed be financial troubles - every country had them OTL. But Germany's will certainly be less serious than those suffered by OTL's Weimar Republic.

 

[bernard patton]

If the Entente is really desperate why couldn't Britain just print loads of money and hope the inflation doesn't get out of control until after the war ends, and sell loads of war bonds on the promise of reparations from the defeated enemy? That's how Germany managed to survive for so long.

 

[Domoviye]

For the money problem, couldn't the British and French sell some colonies to the US, or use them as collateral?
I know the US wasn't as big into outright colonialism as the Europeans, but a lot of Americans would probably be ok with a deal like that.
As long as the Entente has the money to buy goods, it could probably pull out a win against the Central powers. Not a big win, but provided the Germans don't break out during the 1918 offensive, it should be enough to force Germany to terms.
Without the money, the Central powers get a small win.

 

[miketr]

If the Entente is really desperate why couldn't Britain just print loads of money and hope the inflation doesn't get out of control until after the war ends, and sell loads of war bonds on the promise of reparations from the defeated enemy? That's how Germany managed to survive for so long.

Germany wasn't trying to import from the world market. By end of 1917 the UK had sent their gold reserves and in effect sold most of their foreign assets.

The US treasury was supporting the pound as I recall so with out that support pound enters free-fall; especially once they turn on the printing press.

Plus the US won't be doing much selling as without treasury backing the big US banks like JP Morgan discover they have spent the last few years buying junk bonds form London. Plus the orders dry up just about over night. So the US economy has bust in 1917 and several very large banks collapse.

Without US entry all of the US production and steel shipments to UK and France are gone for 1918. The US was 20% of the ententes war material and the biggest chunk of it was in 1918. No US entry and the entente will simply lack the material resources to attack Germany and nothing like the mechanized advanced they did in the last 100 days.

No USA is a game changer.

 

[miketr]

For the money problem, couldn't the British and French sell some colonies to the US, or use them as collateral?
I know the US wasn't as big into outright colonialism as the Europeans, but a lot of Americans would probably be ok with a deal like that.
As long as the Entente has the money to buy goods, it could probably pull out a win against the Central powers. Not a big win, but provided the Germans don't break out during the 1918 offensive, it should be enough to force Germany to terms.
Without the money, the Central powers get a small win.

USA had zero interest in Africa so that leaves new world stuff but how much would the British be willing to sell and how much would the USA be willing to buy?

Biggest change for the Germany is Treaty of Brest-Litovsk and Bucharest holds. That changes the map of Europe. Even if its status quo ante peace in the west its a big win for Germany.

In the west the Germans can't really attack either. A-H is on its knees and Italy if it gets hit hard again goes out.

So what happens is Germany hits Italy again in 1918. Germany is forced to send troops to the Balkans to shore up the collapsing Hapsburg state. More and more of the manpower needs to be used to do internal security and line of communications work.

Someone attacks on the Western Front and the other side responds. Neither goes anywere. France/UK lack materials and Germans manpower. Winter of 1918 everyone looks at one another and realizes that no one is going to win this mess.

Germany spends the next decade or two fighting brushfire wars in Central and Eastern Europe trying to hold onto their gains and pull something out of the ruins of the Hapsburg state. By 1940 we have German power block that stretches deep into Russia and deep into the Balkans.

Michael

 

[BlairWitch749]

The answer is it depends

if the us doesn't actually commit ground troops but still wages defacto economic warfare (ie kitting out the BEF and the French) its quite possible it could end in an exhausted slatemate status quo pro ante type deal (i don't know how long the french could have maintained control without the americans to boost morale)

if the us is utterly and truly neutral, you could see the central powers win the war by 1917

 

[JjeeporCreepor]

I wonder, though, whether a "victorious" post-WW1 Germany wouldn't still suffer from the sort of political instability it did in OTL late-1910s-early-1920s. I mean, by OTL 1917-18, it was already a de facto military dicatorship with the Kaiser marginalised by Hindenburg and Ludendorff, a situation that only ended with the collapse in October-November 1918.

Any negotiated peace settlement (say the terms suggested by a couple of posters above - 1914 borders in the West and an end to the German colonial empire in return for Brest-Litovsk-like dominion in the East), is still, I'd argue, going to be unacceptable to the real nationalist wingnuts like Tirpitz and his cronies or to the people proposing things like incorporating Flanders into the Reich etc.

At the same time, Germany is still likely to be enmeshed in Russia and E Europe militarily even after the war with Britain, France etc is over. How long is a peace with the Bolsheviks, assuming they still gain power, going to last in the longterm? How tempted will the German military be to intervene in any Russian civil war (in OTL, they helped the Whites in Finland), especially if it encroaches on territories now within their sphere of control, like the Baltics and Ukraine? Not to mention the likelihood of continued instability in the Ottoman Empire and A-H, which might suck in German troops.

And continued conflict of this sort would only feed into the fact that revolutionary socialist politics are already entrenched in Germany and might well lead to some sort of flare-up anyway, possibly in direct relation to continued military action in Russia.

So, while I don't really know how plausible a negotiated settlement would be in the event of US non-intervention or how it would play out, I would argue that Germany's (or any of the involved powers', really) problems would not necessarily be over. I don't think it would necessarily end as badly as it did in OTL, especially if the Depression doesn't happen as per OTL, but I could almost imagine Germany ending up like Fascist Italy writ large or maybe a militarist regime like OTL Japan, or something along those lines.