Deleted member 1487
The only credit lines open to the Entente throughout the war were non-governmental ones. The non-governmental credit lines were exhausted in early 1917 and the US government advised private banks that extending further credit without collateral, which the Entente was no longer capable of putting up, that they did so at their own risk and the US government would not back their lending. This caused the private loans to dry up, as without collateral US banks had no guarantee that they would recoup their outlays. As it was the Entente war effort seemed like a very bad investment; if you don't like to take my word for it, check out the sources I've repeatedly listed to this effect every time we have this discussion; there were no loans to be had in the US for the Entente by 1917.No USW of itself only has two effects. The first is a change in the pattern of U boast Activity, the second probably is a change in the focus and emphasis of Allied operations in Flanders.
There are then a series of assumptions that with inevitability lead to and the ‘Kaiser wins’ which is total bollocks.
First is that the entente war effort was entirely dependent on US credit, Assertion not fact and ignores that there are non governmental credit lines available to the Entente.
Also I did not say that the Entente war effort was totally dependent on US loans/imports; rather, I said that several very critical imports that were totally dependent on US loans, without which they would have crippled the Entente war effort. No US food, oil, or steel would devastate the ability of France to fight, while it would hobble the British. The Italians would be in trouble, as would the Russians.
Lots of conjecture here based on your own personal bias. Clearly you haven't read the sources which completely debunk all of this. US war entry was the factor that mattered to further loans to the Entente; without the US entering the war, there would be no more loans after March 1917. US war entry was dependent on USW, so without USW there is no US entry and in fact US divestment from the Entente war effort, partly because of the lack of loans, the other part because of Wilson's anger at the Entente for not joining his mediation attempt in late 1916. There was also friction over the Black List and blockade and the fear Wilson had that communist revolutions would result if the war continued, which was a deep fear of his.Second that the US government credit backing was entirely dependent on USW.
If the first assertion is true then it follows that not allowing the credit is not simply a neutral act but in fact an actively pro german act. There is nothing in US policy, or even hinted at in US policy that they would take an action that knowingly would assist a power that was actively enslaving and starving to death Belgians, promoting Bolshevik revolution, spitting even more Belgians, babies this time on bayonets, and using nuns as the clappers in bells. Not all true but all part of US perception.
This is outright false.It’s a leap of faith to far.
The Germans are in no position to move more forces than they did OTL until after Brest Litovsk –March 18, to do that needs a peace settlement in the east earlier, nothing in USW affects that, Kaiserschlacht is oh, March 18. Those battles are fought with the forces available in the west (and see Ludendorff for the pernicious effects of Bolshevik eastern troops on their upstanding western comrades).
http://www.amazon.com/German-1918-O...=sr_1_2?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1219499286&sr=1-2
Germany started moving troops out of the Eastern Front in 1917, at least as early as the October revolution, if not after the collapse of the Kerensky offensive. Documents and sourcing are available in this book.
Caporetto was launched with German troops taken from the Eastern Front.
Eastern Front troops were taken out much sooner than March 1918 to fight in the Kaiserschlacht offensives too.
The blockade was very leaky and only maintained by having a Black List of companies that would be 'black listed' if they didn't comply with the embargo on the CPs. This pissed off the US government, which was going to be a major issue once Entente purchasing no longer made compliance more profitable than confrontation. Without countries in fear of losing the Entente market, which was over 50% of the blockade's enforcement, they would stop complying. Suddenly transshipments are going through and US ships entering German ports are not stopped for fear of antagonizing an increasingly hostile Wilson.Even with no US intervention there is no reason for the British to raise the blockade and no way the Germans can use Ukrainian food until there is a Ukrainian Harvest, normally that would be July/August following planting in the winter, Just how much planting do you think there was in winter 17/18 and how much of that not eaten by horses or ploughed under by wagons. How many Ukrainian peasants are there going to be to cheerfully ship their foodstuffs to Germany and what does germany give in exchange?
Also German food problems in 1916-17 were self inflicted because of the Hindenburg Program that resulted in the breakdown of food distribution; by 1917-18 food issues had seriously improved compared to the Turnip Winter; Germany wasn't mass starving by 1918, but it was hungry. But without US food Italy and France were going to starve, which would have ended the war in revolution in France in 1917. So Germany just needs to make it until 1918 and France has a revolution without US food and fuel.
It won't because France will be starving in 1917 without US food and fuel. Also without the US in the war, the influenze isn't spread to Germany.If the war continues past November 1918 Germany faces another winter of starvation due to the blockade and then influenza causing mass deaths in a very weakened population, disproportionate compared to the entente.
It was the most important thing to the French; with Russia's revolution, France was a ticking time bomb. Petain's most important element in his rehabilitation program were speeches about how US war entry meant the Entente could not lose the war, so wait and the US soldiers would arrive and pick up the slack.The unknown is the effect on French morale of no US intervention, it was used to shore up morale but it was used because it was there not because it was the only thing that mattered.
Improved leave (well leave), rest areas, a government that actively prosecuted the war, round up of socialist pacifists, appointment of Petain changes in operations all had an effect and the French army was very capable of offensive work later in 17 and certainly through 1918
http://books.google.com/books/about/Pyrrhic_victory.html?id=vZRmHkdGk44C
This books talks about how critical the US was to France staying in the war past 1917 just in the sense of morale, not even considering the material effects.