No unrestricted submarine warfare

Deleted member 1487

No USW of itself only has two effects. The first is a change in the pattern of U boast Activity, the second probably is a change in the focus and emphasis of Allied operations in Flanders.

There are then a series of assumptions that with inevitability lead to and the ‘Kaiser wins’ which is total bollocks.

First is that the entente war effort was entirely dependent on US credit, Assertion not fact and ignores that there are non governmental credit lines available to the Entente.
The only credit lines open to the Entente throughout the war were non-governmental ones. The non-governmental credit lines were exhausted in early 1917 and the US government advised private banks that extending further credit without collateral, which the Entente was no longer capable of putting up, that they did so at their own risk and the US government would not back their lending. This caused the private loans to dry up, as without collateral US banks had no guarantee that they would recoup their outlays. As it was the Entente war effort seemed like a very bad investment; if you don't like to take my word for it, check out the sources I've repeatedly listed to this effect every time we have this discussion; there were no loans to be had in the US for the Entente by 1917.

Also I did not say that the Entente war effort was totally dependent on US loans/imports; rather, I said that several very critical imports that were totally dependent on US loans, without which they would have crippled the Entente war effort. No US food, oil, or steel would devastate the ability of France to fight, while it would hobble the British. The Italians would be in trouble, as would the Russians.


Second that the US government credit backing was entirely dependent on USW.

If the first assertion is true then it follows that not allowing the credit is not simply a neutral act but in fact an actively pro german act. There is nothing in US policy, or even hinted at in US policy that they would take an action that knowingly would assist a power that was actively enslaving and starving to death Belgians, promoting Bolshevik revolution, spitting even more Belgians, babies this time on bayonets, and using nuns as the clappers in bells. Not all true but all part of US perception.
Lots of conjecture here based on your own personal bias. Clearly you haven't read the sources which completely debunk all of this. US war entry was the factor that mattered to further loans to the Entente; without the US entering the war, there would be no more loans after March 1917. US war entry was dependent on USW, so without USW there is no US entry and in fact US divestment from the Entente war effort, partly because of the lack of loans, the other part because of Wilson's anger at the Entente for not joining his mediation attempt in late 1916. There was also friction over the Black List and blockade and the fear Wilson had that communist revolutions would result if the war continued, which was a deep fear of his.

It’s a leap of faith to far.

The Germans are in no position to move more forces than they did OTL until after Brest Litovsk –March 18, to do that needs a peace settlement in the east earlier, nothing in USW affects that, Kaiserschlacht is oh, March 18. Those battles are fought with the forces available in the west (and see Ludendorff for the pernicious effects of Bolshevik eastern troops on their upstanding western comrades).
This is outright false.
http://www.amazon.com/German-1918-O...=sr_1_2?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1219499286&sr=1-2
Germany started moving troops out of the Eastern Front in 1917, at least as early as the October revolution, if not after the collapse of the Kerensky offensive. Documents and sourcing are available in this book.
Caporetto was launched with German troops taken from the Eastern Front.
Eastern Front troops were taken out much sooner than March 1918 to fight in the Kaiserschlacht offensives too.

Even with no US intervention there is no reason for the British to raise the blockade and no way the Germans can use Ukrainian food until there is a Ukrainian Harvest, normally that would be July/August following planting in the winter, Just how much planting do you think there was in winter 17/18 and how much of that not eaten by horses or ploughed under by wagons. How many Ukrainian peasants are there going to be to cheerfully ship their foodstuffs to Germany and what does germany give in exchange?
The blockade was very leaky and only maintained by having a Black List of companies that would be 'black listed' if they didn't comply with the embargo on the CPs. This pissed off the US government, which was going to be a major issue once Entente purchasing no longer made compliance more profitable than confrontation. Without countries in fear of losing the Entente market, which was over 50% of the blockade's enforcement, they would stop complying. Suddenly transshipments are going through and US ships entering German ports are not stopped for fear of antagonizing an increasingly hostile Wilson.

Also German food problems in 1916-17 were self inflicted because of the Hindenburg Program that resulted in the breakdown of food distribution; by 1917-18 food issues had seriously improved compared to the Turnip Winter; Germany wasn't mass starving by 1918, but it was hungry. But without US food Italy and France were going to starve, which would have ended the war in revolution in France in 1917. So Germany just needs to make it until 1918 and France has a revolution without US food and fuel.

If the war continues past November 1918 Germany faces another winter of starvation due to the blockade and then influenza causing mass deaths in a very weakened population, disproportionate compared to the entente.
It won't because France will be starving in 1917 without US food and fuel. Also without the US in the war, the influenze isn't spread to Germany.


The unknown is the effect on French morale of no US intervention, it was used to shore up morale but it was used because it was there not because it was the only thing that mattered.
Improved leave (well leave), rest areas, a government that actively prosecuted the war, round up of socialist pacifists, appointment of Petain changes in operations all had an effect and the French army was very capable of offensive work later in 17 and certainly through 1918
It was the most important thing to the French; with Russia's revolution, France was a ticking time bomb. Petain's most important element in his rehabilitation program were speeches about how US war entry meant the Entente could not lose the war, so wait and the US soldiers would arrive and pick up the slack.
http://books.google.com/books/about/Pyrrhic_victory.html?id=vZRmHkdGk44C
This books talks about how critical the US was to France staying in the war past 1917 just in the sense of morale, not even considering the material effects.
 
Mikestone8 said:
The ZT was a precautionary measure against the event of a US declaration of war
yourworstnightmare said:
The US entry into the war is quite dependent on the Unrestricted Submarine Warfare. So the US entry into the war would be butterflied away.
Nonsense. The Telegram was an effort by Germany to get Mexico to take an action that will distract the U.S. from supplying arms & material to the Brits & French. And U.S. entry into the war had damn all to do with USW; if it did, there would have been a DoW when Lusitania was sunk.:rolleyes:
 

Deleted member 1487

Nonsense. The Telegram was an effort by Germany to get Mexico to take an action that will distract the U.S. from supplying arms & material to the Brits & French. And U.S. entry into the war had damn all to do with USW; if it did, there would have been a DoW when Lusitania was sunk.:rolleyes:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zimmermann_Telegram
The message came as a coded telegram dispatched by the Foreign Secretary of the German Empire, Arthur Zimmermann, on 16 January 1917 to the German ambassador in Mexico, Heinrich von Eckardt. Zimmermann sent the telegram in anticipation of the resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare by Germany on 1 February, an act which Germany predicted would draw the neutral U.S. into war on the side of the Allies.[2]

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sussex_pledge
The Lusitania did not result in war because of the Germans making the Sussex Pledge, warning Americans off of taking the Lusitania, including taking out a huge newspaper ad to that effect before its set sail, and the US being somewhat aware that there were munitions on board. It took several more sinkings in 1917 before Wilson felt he could potentially get a DoW, but the Zimmermann Telegram clinched it, bringing even the pro-Central Powers factions in the US over to Wilson's side.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RMS_Lusitania#Reaction
The British felt that the Americans had to declare war on Germany. However, US President Woodrow Wilson refused to overreact.[43] During the weeks after the sinking, the issue was hotly debated within the US government, and correspondence was exchanged between the US and German governments. German Foreign Minister Von Jagow continued to argue that the Lusitania was a legitimate military target, because she was listed as an armed merchant cruiser, she was using neutral flags and she had been ordered to ram submarines – in blatant contravention of the Cruiser Rules.[51][52][53] He further argued that Lusitania had on previous voyages carried munitions and Allied troops.[52] Wilson continued to insist that the German government must apologise for the sinking, compensate US victims, and promise to avoid any similar occurrence in the future.[54] The British were upset at Wilson's actions – not realizing that it reflected general US opinion at the time. Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan advised President Wilson that “ships carrying contraband should be prohibited from carrying passengers … t would be like putting women and children in front of an army.”[55] Bryan later resigned because he felt the Wilson administration was being biased in ignoring British contraventions of international law, and that Wilson was leading the USA into the war.[56]

A German decision on 9 September 1915 stated that attacks were only allowed on ships that were definitely British, while neutral ships were to be treated under the Prize Law rules, and no attacks on passenger liners were to be permitted at all.[56][57]


Really, do some basic research before posting blatant factual inaccuracies.
 
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BlondieBC

Banned
First is that the entente war effort was entirely dependent on US credit, Assertion not fact and ignores that there are non governmental credit lines available to the Entente.

Second that the US government credit backing was entirely dependent on USW.

If the first assertion is true then it follows that not allowing the credit is not simply a neutral act but in fact an actively pro german act. There is nothing in US policy, or even hinted at in US policy that they would take an action that knowingly would assist a power that was actively enslaving and starving to death Belgians, promoting Bolshevik revolution, spitting even more Belgians, babies this time on bayonets, and using nuns as the clappers in bells. Not all true but all part of US perception.

It’s a leap of faith to far.

The Germans are in no position to move more forces than they did OTL until after Brest Litovsk –March 18, to do that needs a peace settlement in the east earlier, nothing in USW affects that, Kaiserschlacht is oh, March 18. Those battles are fought with the forces available in the west (and see Ludendorff for the pernicious effects of Bolshevik eastern troops on their upstanding western comrades).

Even with no US intervention there is no reason for the British to raise the blockade and no way the Germans can use Ukrainian food until there is a Ukrainian Harvest, normally that would be July/August following planting in the winter, Just how much planting do you think there was in winter 17/18 and how much of that not eaten by horses or ploughed under by wagons. How many Ukrainian peasants are there going to be to cheerfully ship their foodstuffs to Germany and what does germany give in exchange?

If the war continues past November 1918 Germany faces another winter of starvation due to the blockade and then influenza causing mass deaths in a very weakened population, disproportionate compared to the entente.

The unknown is the effect on French morale of no US intervention, it was used to shore up morale but it was used because it was there not because it was the only thing that mattered.
Improved leave (well leave), rest areas, a government that actively prosecuted the war, round up of socialist pacifists, appointment of Petain changes in operations all had an effect and the French army was very capable of offensive work later in 17 and certainly through 1918

No ever said entirely. I have seen estimates to a loss of 25% to 35% of supplies, maybe more in a few critical areas. We are talking about 15 million USD of goods per day. We don't have to speculate, JPM figures from OTL give us a good indication of scale. And simply put, without US government support, no private entity can come up with anywhere near this figure of cash (gold) for the Entente. We know some of the critical areas. OTL the RN was short of oil for the fleet by the early USA entry. ITTL it is worse. The harvest was not good in the USA late in the war. Food issues for Entente. We have other threads going over the details, so I will not repeat them all.

And we know the USA policy from OTL which was secured loans only. We are not saying there will be a policy change. We are saying the Fed and Wilson continue OTL policies that CHANGED after the DOW.

I have read the entire NY Times for the war. You are overstating the effectiveness of the British PR. Effective? yes. But no where near that effective.

Russians likely do leave war early, but even if they don't, Germans still win. Just slower and less decisively. And the key point is the reduction of the Entente. Starting by summer 1917 at latest, the Entente will have a large (25%-35%) reduction of supply. Less food. Less bullets. Much less effective armies. So it is a little stronger Germany and much weaker Entente. And this gives the Entente an unwinnable hand. Likely the Entente comes to peace table in 1917. Likely France and Italy do much worse than OTL in 1917. But even with Russia holding out until exactly OTL departure date and almost perfect command decisions in 1917 by France, the Entente is still doomed. Without the supplies from OTL, the 1918 German offensive goes much better. Also they will be lacking the USA troops which free up French and British troops. And the Entente will be too weak for a significant counter attack. Now the date of the end is important. Germany will get a better deal in the west if it can force France to the table in 1917 than early 1918. Early 1918 is better than late 1918. But we are dealing with the harshness of the peace deal on France and colonial issues instead of who wins.
 
wiking said:
wikipedia said:
Zimmermann sent the telegram in anticipation of the resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare by Germany on 1 February, an act which Germany predicted would draw the neutral U.S. into war on the side of the Allies.
Anticipation is not fact. Moreover, the Germans had an interest in keeping the U.S. out, & had been actively conniving with Mexican rebels. Which has damn all to do with USW.
wiking said:
Lusitania did not result in war because of the Germans making the Sussex Pledge
Nor was she the sole instance, only the most prominent. None sufficed. Then the Telegram arrived, & war was declared. It's about proximate cause & about the fact Wilson could scarcely admit they'd stolen a copy of the damn telegram.:rolleyes: (Nor was Britain going to admit she'd decrypted it.:eek::rolleyes:)
 

Deleted member 1487

Anticipation is not fact. Moreover, the Germans had an interest in keeping the U.S. out, & had been actively conniving with Mexican rebels. Which has damn all to do with USW.
Sources?
Anticipation in this sense means it was only issues BECAUSE of the anticipation that USW would mean war with the US.
 
Nonsense. The Telegram was an effort by Germany to get Mexico to take an action that will distract the U.S. from supplying arms & material to the Brits & French. And U.S. entry into the war had damn all to do with USW

See the opening sentences of the ZT.

"We intend from the first February to begin unrestricted submarine warfare. It will be attempted nonetheless to keep the United States neutral. In the event that this not succeed we should offer Mexico alliance on the following terms - -"

IOW the ZT was sent as a precaution against war with the United States being brought on by USW. So had Germany not adopted USW, there would almost certainly have been no ZT.

; if it did, there would have been a DoW when Lusitania was sunk.:rolleyes:

The Lusitania was not an American ship.

By contrast, on March 18, 1917, no less than three US merchantmen were sunk on the same day. The USW of 1917 was, from a US pov, a totally different case from anything that had happened in 1915.
 
Also I did not say that the Entente war effort was totally dependent on US loans/imports; rather, I said that several very critical imports that were totally dependent on US loans, without which they would have crippled the Entente war effort. No US food, oil, or steel would devastate the ability of France to fight, while it would hobble the British.

And I str that by the second half of the war, the US was also the Allies' main supplier of horses - the principal form of transport at that time.




Suddenly transshipments are going through and US ships entering German ports are not stopped for fear of antagonizing an increasingly hostile Wilson.

Maybe not directly into German ports - the North Sea was sown thick with minefields - but certainly into Dutch and Scandinavian ones.
 
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Mikestone8 said:
"In the event that this not succeed we should offer Mexico alliance "
So tell me, what happens if they don't offer Mexico anything?

Also, pray tell, what does this mean for all the other meddling Germany was doing in Mexico, with an eye to keep the U.S. out, USW or no?

It's not like you can ignore one but not the other.
 
Wiking –
On loans not the point I am making. The point is the direct correlation through USW to US declaration war AND the availability of US manufacturing capacity to the being entirely contingent on US declaration of war and subsequent cash loans to the Entente . Absent a US declaration the US still faces a significant internal downturn if it ceases to have the Entente market. Absent a US dow it is in the interest of the US government and of US industry to continue to accept payment from the Entente, presumably at much less favourable terms or the entente sources from countries that will accept sterling – which after all amount to around a third of the population of the world and one of which is a short walk over the US border.
Whatever Wilsons views, and he did change them remarkably quickly and carried the country with him with no significant issues. It remains that discontinuing Entente purchases not only has a negative impact on the US domestically but also in context is a pro German act.
On that matter I that the US refused to participate in the Swedish sponsored inter neutral conference on the black list because the action would favour Germany.
I am not saying this is definitive I am saying that you cannot draw a direct and inevitable correlation.
Not sure what the Zabecki link is intended to demonstrate and have no desire to pay $188 to find out but on the face of it this is a study on poor german planning in 1918 and the inability of the german army to sustain its offensives. What I am actually saying is that USW has no direct effect on the eastern front and any change in the US position would not accelerate events there or change troop availability for the CP. Only a decision not to pursue the goals expressed in BL would.
Disagree with you on that but nevertheless the generally malnourished (common useage not medical definition) state of the german population following the hunger winter leaves it more vulnerable to any epidemic disease generally. Not sure why you think lack of US involvement would render Germany immune from a global pandemic. There is no clear point of origin the latest study puts in in Etaple by the way not Kansas and there is some evidence that it may have originated within the CP, certainly the evidence that the effects were felt first in the CP. But it’s a pandemic.
Once again there is an assumption on the inevitability of societal collapse in France with no argument put forward as to how. The only country that suffered this during the war was Russia which had special circumstances and remarkable incompetence and help.
I don’t disagree that the OTL the fact of American belligerence was used a lot by Petain, why not it was there and a good argument. I do disagree with the inevitability of French collapse without it. The French army had a number of important grievances what were addressed internally and would have had an effect, How much is an unknown. In fact the French army continues to fight well in the total absence of US forces until summer 18 which suggests that this was a temporary morale event that could be and was handled by the French, very quickly.

Blondie never really claimed that British PR was that effective, which suggests there is an underlying level of US support for the Entente powers irrespective of events.
 

Deleted member 1487

Wiking –
On loans not the point I am making. The point is the direct correlation through USW to US declaration war AND the availability of US manufacturing capacity to the being entirely contingent on US declaration of war and subsequent cash loans to the Entente . Absent a US declaration the US still faces a significant internal downturn if it ceases to have the Entente market. Absent a US dow it is in the interest of the US government and of US industry to continue to accept payment from the Entente, presumably at much less favourable terms or the entente sources from countries that will accept sterling – which after all amount to around a third of the population of the world and one of which is a short walk over the US border.
Whatever Wilsons views, and he did change them remarkably quickly and carried the country with him with no significant issues. It remains that discontinuing Entente purchases not only has a negative impact on the US domestically but also in context is a pro German act.
I'm not talking about what the US banks and government would do, but rather what they did in fact do prior to their declaration of war.
The US banks did stop loaning money to the Entente because they couldn't collateralize their loans. The US government issued recommendations to the effect that any risk a bank took to make unsecured loans would not be backstopped by the US.

Wilson fully understood what it would mean to the US economy to let the Entente stop being able to take out loans as they ran out of collateral; he just thought it was going to happen eventually anyway, so it made no difference whether it happened in 1917 or 1918, just that by 1918 the US economy would be even more leveraged to the Entente war effort, specifically because they had made uncollateralized loans. So Wilson thought it would be better not to enable the banks to make unsecured loans, as it would mean less of an economic downturn rather than later; it would also help bring the war to a close sooner, as the Entente would have to negotiate if they ran out of US loans and imports, something they refused to do in late 1916.

The US banks had no interest in making unsecured loans on their own, so they stopped in March 1917. Without the US declaring war in April, then the policy would have continued. They had no interest in the overall economy, just that the Entente could pay them back.

So I have no idea what you aren't understanding; the US would just continue their policies that they had enacted by March 1917 IOTL, rather than totally reversing themselves in April 1917 when they declared war.
The only way that loans could continue to the Entente is if the US government decided to offer guarantees to US banks, in effect securitizing further uncollateralized loans; they categorically refused to do this until they declared war in April 1917. There is no reason for them to change this policy unless they were entering the war; it was already a policy in place to let US banks stop making loans and let the economy take a short term hit to avoid bigger problems later. It had the added benefit for Wilson to make the Entente negotiate.


On that matter I that the US refused to participate in the Swedish sponsored inter neutral conference on the black list because the action would favour Germany.
I am not saying this is definitive I am saying that you cannot draw a direct and inevitable correlation.
By Spring 1917 Wilson was changing his mind. Once Entente exports ran out, then the desire to find other markets was increasing the pressure US businesses were putting on him.


Not sure what the Zabecki link is intended to demonstrate and have no desire to pay $188 to find out but on the face of it this is a study on poor german planning in 1918 and the inability of the german army to sustain its offensives.
Zabecki has a list that shows the transfer of divisions from the Russian Front started in Autumn 1917 and were pretty much finished by March 1918 when peace was signed by the Bolsheviks.


What I am actually saying is that USW has no direct effect on the eastern front and any change in the US position would not accelerate events there or change troop availability for the CP. Only a decision not to pursue the goals expressed in BL would.
The Eastern Front was affected by the US entering or not entering the war. USW only had to do with whether or not the US enters. US entry is what kept Russia in the war long enough for the Kerensky offensive to take place; without the US entry negotiations would have started before July.

Disagree with you on that but nevertheless the generally malnourished (common useage not medical definition) state of the german population following the hunger winter leaves it more vulnerable to any epidemic disease generally. Not sure why you think lack of US involvement would render Germany immune from a global pandemic. There is no clear point of origin the latest study puts in in Etaple by the way not Kansas and there is some evidence that it may have originated within the CP, certainly the evidence that the effects were felt first in the CP. But it’s a pandemic.
Once again there is an assumption on the inevitability of societal collapse in France with no argument put forward as to how. The only country that suffered this during the war was Russia which had special circumstances and remarkable incompetence and help.
There a lots of theories that have come out about the Flu in 1918, but if the war doesn't last that long, then the way it spread IOTL wouldn't happen and the German people would be getting fed much better before it shows up.

I don’t disagree that the OTL the fact of American belligerence was used a lot by Petain, why not it was there and a good argument. I do disagree with the inevitability of French collapse without it. The French army had a number of important grievances what were addressed internally and would have had an effect, How much is an unknown. In fact the French army continues to fight well in the total absence of US forces until summer 18 which suggests that this was a temporary morale event that could be and was handled by the French, very quickly.
Yes, there were other issues the French had, but the Russian revolution played a part in defeatism, as did the US entry on the desire to hold out. In fact it is the single most important reason the French army held out in 1918, because the presence of US soldiers seriously boosted French morale. Also note that the French army didn't take the offensive except for two small instances prior to the US putting an army in the line in 1918.
 
On that matter I that the US refused to participate in the Swedish sponsored inter neutral conference on the black list because the action would favour Germany.

Was that his reason or just his excuse?

St Woodrow was not a team player. He always had his own agendas and pursued them with little or no regard for what anyone else thought - even his own Senate. He would never join anything sponsored by someone else.
 
It remains that discontinuing Entente purchases not only has a negative impact on the US domestically but also in context is a pro German act.

How so? There is no change of policy involved. Hitherto, the US has granted secured loans but not unsecured ones. That policy simply continues.

Incidentally, (see Devlin, pp585-6) even those sympathetic to the Allies didn't necessarily support unsecured loans. In Nov 1916 W P Harding, Governor of the Federal Reserve Board, sought an interview with Secretary of State Lansing - who was decidedly negative about the idea. Lansing was one of the most openly pro-Allied figures in the Administration, but where money was concerned he was pro-American and nothing other. A week later Harding drafted a note discouraging subscription to such loans, and showed it to President Wilson - who advised making it even stronger.

If Lansing didn't view unsecured loans as a goer, one wonders who would. TR maybe?
 
Even with USA not in, there is a lot to like about the Allies position early 1917, the blockade is getting pretty effective, Turnip winter just happened in Germany, Murmansk railway is open to Russia. Lack of USA cash means less stuff for the barrage, no allied offensives on the west front or Italy or Kerensky offensive (may not be a bad thing), just wait on the blockade to keep working, keep picking on the Ottomans
 
Even with USA not in, there is a lot to like about the Allies position early 1917, the blockade is getting pretty effective, Turnip winter just happened in Germany,

The turnip Winter was down to the inefficiencies of Germsn food production/distribution and had little or nothing to do with the blockade.

In fact, the blockade got serious only after US intervention, which meant that exports to the Northern Neutrals (mostly from America) could be controlled without the need for a physical blockade.


Murmansk railway is open to Russia. Lack of USA cash means less stuff for the barrage, no allied offensives on the west front or Italy or Kerensky offensive (may not be a bad thing), just wait on the blockade to keep working, keep picking on the Ottomans


The Allies went ahead with their offensives despite knowing that they had only to survive into next year for American resources to win things for them. Without that assurance the offensives certainly go ahead, and are probably persisted in longer.
 
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