No ULTRA, no MAGIC

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So I think everyone here who has even the slightest knowledge of the second world war knows the importance to the allies of their successfull codebreaking of the German and Japanese codes.

So lets assume that for some reason the allies are not as successfull at breaking either the German or the Japanese codes. Either by the Germans and/or Japanese improving their encoding routines or by the allies not getting their hands on codebooks or encoding machines for instance.

What would the effects be?

I think that the naval war both in the Atlantic and definetly in the Pacific would be quite different.
 
First and largest difference is the Allies pay more attention to other inteligence sources. In the specific case of radio more resources are put into common signals analysis: Direction finding, transmitter strength/characteristics, operator characteristics or "fist', frequencies used, number of messages, length of messages, message tags that are not concealed by encryption. Note how the Soviet military which had very little aces to ULTRA sources still had a advantage in intelligence & deception ops from latter 1942. Lacking that they put their resources into all the more conventional sources.

Then there is air reconissance, ground reconissance, prisoner interrogation, spy networks. Some of the most important Allied intel coups were outside the ULTRA system. ie: Phillipino gureillias capturing the Japanese fleet operational plans for defending the Marianas in 1944. In other cases ULTRA failed to provide the essential information. ie: The 'Morning Air' offensive in Feb/March 1943. The 'Watch on the Rhine' operation in December 1944 was another. In both cases the warnings for thise operations existed for the Allies from other sources but they were not seen due to a over reliance on ULTRA by specific Allied intelligence leaders or their organization.

People tend to focus on the assistance of penetration of the Enigma encryption system to the Allies in the Battle of the Atlantic. More important was to the deception operations. the feed back for those ops from reading the highest level German messages. The deception operations were fine tuned through ULTRA information.
 
So I think everyone here who has even the slightest knowledge of the second world war knows the importance to the allies of their successfull codebreaking of the German and Japanese codes.

So lets assume that for some reason the allies are not as successfull at breaking either the German or the Japanese codes. Either by the Germans and/or Japanese improving their encoding routines or by the allies not getting their hands on codebooks or encoding machines for instance.

What would the effects be?...
The USA and Stalinist Russia still win. It probably takes them a bit longer, since Germany may only have one land front to worry about (in the east) and hold out long enough to be the recipient of the first atomic bombs.
Edit:
This is assuming 'Germany first' remains a priority. If/when the UK is starved into capitulation, the USA may prioritise the Pacific, and simply cram as much supply into Russia via Vladivostok as possible, until Japan is 'settled'.

Further Edit:
Possibly really good news for Italy if Italy is the last Axis power left standing, as it might not fight to the bitter end if it finds 'unconditional surrender' a viable option and everyone else has largely ignored them until Japan and Germany are done for.
 
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... If/when the UK is starved into capitulation,

....

Extemely unlikely.

Even during the months when the Brits were shut out of the German naval Enigma messages the submarines failed to sink the 750,000 tons calculated as necessary to defeat Britain.

Churchill made some wild claims during the war, in part because he was genuinely worried, and in part because he frequently lied to gain advantage. There were also a couple moments on real panic or fear within the Admirality. Revisiting the numbers postwar it became clear the Battle of the Atlantic was never in as great a crisis as seemed. One of the factors the Allies did not grasp were the actual losses of German submarines. They badly under estimated both the actual losses, and over estimated the number the Germans could sustain and keep up effective operations. ie: In March 1943 Churchill and several key leaders in the RN thought the BoA had hit a tipping point. They were half right but were wrong about which way it had tipped and when. In April Raeder had to accept the submarines losses through the winter had crossed above the line where the offensive could be sustained. To put it another way the Allies had won by March but failed to realize it. They had incomplete information and misinterpreted part of what they did have.
 
Extemely unlikely.

Even during the months when the Brits were shut out of the German naval Enigma messages the submarines failed to sink the 750,000 tons calculated as necessary to defeat Britain.

Churchill made some wild claims during the war, in part because he was genuinely worried, and in part because he frequently lied to gain advantage. There were also a couple moments on real panic or fear within the Admirality. Revisiting the numbers postwar it became clear the Battle of the Atlantic was never in as great a crisis as seemed. One of the factors the Allies did not grasp were the actual losses of German submarines. They badly under estimated both the actual losses, and over estimated the number the Germans could sustain and keep up effective operations. ie: In March 1943 Churchill and several key leaders in the RN thought the BoA had hit a tipping point. They were half right but were wrong about which way it had tipped and when. In April Raeder had to accept the submarines losses through the winter had crossed above the line where the offensive could be sustained. To put it another way the Allies had won by March but failed to realize it. They had incomplete information and misinterpreted part of what they did have.
So long as the Germans are sinking more allied merchant shipping tonnage than new construction is coming off the slips, the battle to starve the UK is heading in their (i.e. the German) direction. In the original timeline they were doing that until late 1943 according to Churchill's figures (see The Second World War, Volume 5, page 5)*.
No ENIGMA broken means allied convoys can't be rerouted to avoid known axis submarine locations, which means the submarines likely get more chances to sink merchant ships.

Edit:
* Sorry. Don't have a scanner at the moment to get an image of the chart in question, and can't find an image (further edit: of the chart) online. Maybe tomorrow.
 
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Ian_W

Banned
No ENIGMA broken means allied convoys can't be rerouted to avoid known axis submarine locations, which means the submarines likely get more chances to sink merchant ships.

Edit:
* Sorry. Don't have a scanner at the moment to get an image of the chart in question, and can't find an image (further edit: of the chart) online. Maybe tomorrow.

Wrong. Even without cracking the message, hearing any submarine transmission - and to make pack tactics work, submarines have to transmit, and then direction finding means convoys can be re-routed around patrol lines.

In any case, commitment of VLR Liberators to ASW work wins the Battle of the Atlantic.
 
Churchill has come to be regarded as a unreliable source. As i noted earlier he lied frequently to achieve his goals. John Ellis in 'Brute Force' has a chapter on this subject with several interesting charts. Hughes & Costellos 'The Battle of the Atlantic' is the work with the greatest depth I've seen on the question of when the BoA was won or lost.

The core problem for the Germans is each time they started running up the cargo ships sunk they found after a couple months the losses of their boats accrued faster. Each time Rader cut his losses and restarted the attacks elsewhere. In terms of the ration of cargo ships sunk to submarines sunk the most favorable moment was in early 1942. In the spring the numbers of subs sunk rose, dropped again as the patrols were shifted, rose again in the late summer, & then in the winter of 1942 - 43 started rising to a level they had never seen before. In April the north Atlantic patrols were withdrawn


In any case, commitment of VLR Liberators to ASW work wins the Battle of the Atlantic.

Which finally occured in March 1943. The bomber barons of both the RAF & US AAF had prevented VLR aircraft from being effectively used in 1942. It was a combination of Churchill, Roosevelt, & a few other leaders becoming fed up with the air forces policy that forced the issue in favor of the ASW mission. Had the same preception of crisis come six months or a year, or any time sooner the bomber barons would have had to give up a hundred of their precious aircraft. As one critic put it: the bomber losses for one night of RAF missions was enough to double the German submarine loss. Only 48 Liberators transfered to Coastal Command were enough to firmly pin German sub losses well above the unsustainable level.
 
Scanned the chart:
Merchant Shipping Losses 001.jpg
 
Churchill has come to be regarded as a unreliable source. As i noted earlier he lied frequently to achieve his goals. John Ellis in 'Brute Force' has a chapter on this subject with several interesting charts. Hughes & Costellos 'The Battle of the Atlantic' is the work with the greatest depth I've seen on the question of when the BoA was won or lost.

The core problem for the Germans is each time they started running up the cargo ships sunk they found after a couple months the losses of their boats accrued faster. Each time Rader cut his losses and restarted the attacks elsewhere. In terms of the ration of cargo ships sunk to submarines sunk the most favorable moment was in early 1942. In the spring the numbers of subs sunk rose, dropped again as the patrols were shifted, rose again in the late summer, & then in the winter of 1942 - 43 started rising to a level they had never seen before. In April the north Atlantic patrols were withdrawn




Which finally occured in March 1943. The bomber barons of both the RAF & US AAF had prevented VLR aircraft from being effectively used in 1942. It was a combination of Churchill, Roosevelt, & a few other leaders becoming fed up with the air forces policy that forced the issue in favor of the ASW mission. Had the same preception of crisis come six months or a year, or any time sooner the bomber barons would have had to give up a hundred of their precious aircraft. As one critic put it: the bomber losses for one night of RAF missions was enough to double the German submarine loss. Only 48 Liberators transfered to Coastal Command were enough to firmly pin German sub losses well above the unsustainable level.
Churchill (The Second World War, Volume 5 again) puts the 'vital period as April-July 1943:
Submarine Losses.jpg

I seem to remember reading mention that the Azores being important to the anti-submarine warfare issue; until permission was gained from Portugal to use them, there was a crucial section of the Atlantic which couldn't be covered with airpower. Wikipeda puts the 'lease' of the Azores as being late 1943, though, after what Churchill (in the chart above) identifies as the 'decisive phase':
Wikipedia said:
... In August 1943, Portugal signed the Luso-British agreement, which leased bases in the Azores to the British. The occupation of these facilities until October 12, 1943 was codenamed Operation Alacrity by the Allies.[7] This was a key turning point in the Battle of the Atlantic, allowing the Allies to provide aerial coverage in the Mid-Atlantic gap; helping them to hunt U-boats and protect convoys. Churchill surprised members of parliament (MPs) when he said he would use a 14th-century treaty; many MPs had not known that Portugal and England had the oldest operational alliance in the world, the Anglo-Portuguese Treaty of 1373....
 
Wrong. Even without cracking the message, hearing any submarine transmission - and to make pack tactics work, submarines have to transmit, and then direction finding means convoys can be re-routed around patrol lines.

In any case, commitment of VLR Liberators to ASW work wins the Battle of the Atlantic.
If the allies are too incompetent to crack codes, what odds that they're too incompetent to use bombers against submarines? Before El Alamein in the OTL (especially at the UK end of things) everything apart from the air 'Battle of Britain' tried against the Germans or Japanese seems to have been one long series of blunders and pratfalls. Even the Bismarck almost got away, having been lost during the chase. :(
(In fact isn't there one story that it was an ENIGMA intercept that put the British back onto the Bismarck? Assume the Bismarck escapes due to no ENIGMA, repairs in a French port, and then goes on to wreak havoc on the shipping lanes, and the Merchant ship losses are going to take a potentially big swing even further in German favour.)
 
I'm not sure that the first part of my previous post was a very rational piece of argument (although I'm happy with the 'No ENIGMA means Bismarck possibly unleashes shipping lane mayhem?' point).
I think I may be getting a bit het up, and ought to take a breather from this thread for a while.
 
I'm not sure that the first part of my previous post was a very rational piece of argument (although I'm happy with the 'No ENIGMA means Bismarck possibly unleashes shipping lane mayhem?' point).
I think I may be getting a bit het up, and ought to take a breather from this thread for a while.
It's not a bad point though. The Brits did seem to have swallowed the idiot pill for much of 1940-2. I think it was a mix of tactical incompetence on land, especially in armoured warfare, and over optimism regarding the air offensive. The navy generally performed adequately, with a few exceptions against Japan.

But it's also true that if the situation in the Atlantic and shipping war generally had got worse than OTL there were available options that could have been taken to boost the ASW effort. The Liberators or even Stirlings could have been shaken loose from the bomber barons at any point in 1942 had the shipping losses become intolerable. Since OTL the aircraft were committed to ASW when the leaders decided it was essential, it is reasonable to think that would also be the case in a TL without Magic.

Not sure about the Bismarck though. Wasn't it as much radio location once it transmitted than enigma that gave the RN the steer?
 

hipper

Banned
It's not a bad point though. The Brits did seem to have swallowed the idiot pill for much of 1940-2. I think it was a mix of tactical incompetence on land, especially in armoured warfare, and over optimism regarding the air offensive. The navy generally performed adequately, with a few exceptions against Japan.

But it's also true that if the situation in the Atlantic and shipping war generally had got worse than OTL there were available options that could have been taken to boost the ASW effort. The Liberators or even Stirlings could have been shaken loose from the bomber barons at any point in 1942 had the shipping losses become intolerable. Since OTL the aircraft were committed to ASW when the leaders decided it was essential, it is reasonable to think that would also be the case in a TL without Magic.

Not sure about the Bismarck though. Wasn't it as much radio location once it transmitted than enigma that gave the RN the steer?

the tactical "incompetence" during 1942 in the western desert campaign was the result of more code breaking, this time Italian and German look up the good source on Wikipedia it's hard to be brilliant when your enemy knows what your plans are.

"Bombier command in 1942 was indeed on the the idiot pill however.

Cheers

Hipper
 
the tactical "incompetence" during 1942 in the western desert campaign was the result of more code breaking, this time Italian and German look up the good source on Wikipedia it's hard to be brilliant when your enemy knows what your plans are.

"Bombier command in 1942 was indeed on the the idiot pill however.

Cheers

Hipper
Thanks. I was aware of the code breaking but I think there were also failures of doctrine in the handling of tanks.
 
Churchill (The Second World War, Volume 5 again) puts the 'vital period as April-July 1943:
View attachment 278114

Nice charts, but they only show submarines numbers & not what they accomplished, or were failing to accomplish. Churchill is welcome to his opinion, however Donitz’s opinion was the opposite. The month Churchill claims was the “Crisis’ ts the month Donetiz admiteded he had lost the mid Atlanitc battle .


Here is some information drawn from Huges & Coatello ‘The Battle of the Atlantic’. Unlike Churchill theyy were not interested in generating postwar justifications for ealier decisions.


.........................Ships Built...GRT Sunk.......Ships Sunk......Subs Operational........Sunk Globally

.........................................................................................In N Atlantic


Jul-Sep 41.......600,000........750,000................90.......................30......................6


Oct-Dec 41.....600,000........800,000................70.......................35....................17


Jan-Mar 42.......800,000.....2,100,000.............225.......................45....................11 Operation Drum Beat


Apr-Jun 42.......850,000......1,350,000............240.......................60....................10


Jul-Sep 42.......3,000,000......2,750,000...........290.......................95...................32


Oct-Dec 42.....2,500,000......2,000,000...........260......................100..................34


Jan-Mar 43......2,750,000.....1,500,000............200.....................100..................40


Apr-Jun 43......3,800,000........900,000............120........................90..................73


Jul-Sep 43.......3,000,000........850,000..............75........................60..................73


First note where the crisis is in ships sunk vs launched. That is ongoing in 1941 & becomes ‘bad’ in early 1942. In mid 42 the US ship industry pays off the previous 18 months of construction and worker training. From there on the number built exceed that sunk & that particular crisis is over.


Note the ratio of operational subs in the N Atlantic to ships sunk & GRT sunk. Selected dates presented, but I think most folks here can do arithmetic for the other dates.


Jul-Sep 41.........1-3 ships..........1-25,000 GRT sunk


Jan-Mar 42.......1-5 ships..........1-46,600 GRT sunk Operation Drum Beat


Jul-Sep 42........1-3 ships..........1-28,947 GRT sunk


Apr-Jun 43........1-1.3 ships.......1-10,000 GRT sunk The period Churchill claimed as crisis.


Another interpretation is from Ellis ‘Brute Force’ He presents the number of tons cargo embarked for the UK vs that lost to submarines annually. For 1941 it is close to 6%. In 1942 it nearly doubles to 10%, In 1943 it drops back down to between 4 & 5 %.


Ellis also goes into the effectiveness of subs sinking cargo on a per sortie basis. The numbers fall out similar to Hughes & Costellos, showing the worst days for the Allies as in early to mid 1942. I dont have a clear idea why the British were so concerned about the mid Atlantic battle in 1943. Some convoys took serious losses that winter, others crossed with only one or two ships sunk, or none.



I seem to remember reading mention that the Azores being important to the anti-submarine warfare issue; until permission was gained from Portugal to use them, there was a crucial section of the Atlantic which couldn't be covered with airpower. Wikipeda puts the 'lease' of the Azores as being late 1943, though, after what Churchill (in the chart above) identifies as the 'decisive phase':

There were both British and US plans to seize the Azores were it justified. Through 1942 the cost was not judged worth the benefit. The Azores were of primary benefit to the mid Atlantic routes. Even with VLR aircraft the Azores contribute marginally to covering the N Atlantic routes. & as we know the Brits decided against using VLR aircraft for ASW. There was a lot of pressure on Portugal from when Op Torch was executed. It was feared the cargo routes to the Med would sufferer severe losses, but that expectation did not develop. Greenland was better positioned than the Azores for covering the N Atlantic routes. As it was the VLR aircraft flew ASW missions out of Iceland and Newfoundland.
 
I was in Chicago recently and went to the Science and Industry Museum and naturally visited their excellent U505 exhibit

On the walls of the Museum is a literal tally of the ships sunk by year and in 1942 a staggering number of ships were lost - the majority of them during the 2nd happy time on the Eastern Sea Board - and those ships amounted to 1/4 of all allied merchant ships sunk by the axis during the 2nd WW

I suspect that the British were more concerned in 1943 than in 42 because it was the ships coming to Britain that were being sunk 43 - while many of the ships being sunk off the eastern seaboard in 42 were not 'ship for ship' as critical to the war effort.

Its pretty amazing if you think about it - Critical point (or not?) was considered as being in 43 - while less than a year later the Allies had the assets to send an escort carrier hunting group based around the USS Guadalcanal to the West Coast of Africa to deliberately hunt down and possibly capture a single sub (U505)
 

Ian_W

Banned
If the allies are too incompetent to crack codes, what odds that they're too incompetent to use bombers against submarines? Before El Alamein in the OTL (especially at the UK end of things) everything apart from the air 'Battle of Britain' tried against the Germans or Japanese seems to have been one long series of blunders and pratfalls. Even the Bismarck almost got away, having been lost during the chase. :(
(In fact isn't there one story that it was an ENIGMA intercept that put the British back onto the Bismarck? Assume the Bismarck escapes due to no ENIGMA, repairs in a French port, and then goes on to wreak havoc on the shipping lanes, and the Merchant ship losses are going to take a potentially big swing even further in German favour.)

The Germans being better at their codes and the Allies being incomptent to use aircraft against submarines are quite distincy things.

Yes, you can do a Gudestein or a Wiking and assume the Allies drink a whole lot of lead paint.

Regarding the Azores, Id think VLR Liberators in Newfoundland and Ireland will do a job on the Black Gap.
 
Wrong. Even without cracking the message, hearing any submarine transmission - and to make pack tactics work, submarines have to transmit, and then direction finding means convoys can be re-routed around patrol lines.

Wrong. The radio intercept only tells you where one submarine is. It does not tell you where that submarine is going to be stationed on patrol. Submarines can receive messages and deploy without transmitting.

Look at the losses in 1940-1941. Average of 437K from July 1940 to June 1941; average of 171K from July 1941 to November 1941. Because the British got hold of naval Enigma materials, and starting reading naval Enigma in July - "playing blind-man's-bluff with their open", in the phrase of one historian.

There was one telling incident - ULTRA provided the positions of a U-boat patrol line, but one of the boats misread its orders and went to a wrong location. The Admiralty had re-routed a convoy through that location, because there wasn't supposed to be a U-boat there. But there was, the convoy was spotted, and attacked with heavy losses.
 
... while less than a year later the Allies had the assets to send an escort carrier hunting group based around the USS Guadalcanal to the West Coast of Africa to deliberately hunt down and possibly capture a single sub (U-505).

USS Guadalcanal was on patrol in that area for several weeks against any U-boats there, not just U-505.
 
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