And that’s why the German tank would not be the VK 3002. However, Germans should have been aware of the Soviet A-20 tank designed from 1937, with prototype in summer 1939.
And sloped armour and easy to produce designs shouldn’t take a Nazi rocket scientist to figure out.
How? The USSR was a locked down nation that getting intelligence out of was nearly impossible. Everyone failed to do so pre-WW2, not just Germany, so it is no surprise that a Soviet prototype tank wouldn't be known about. No one in the world outside a small group in the USSR even knew about it.
Sloped armor was of course known about, the French used it in their tanks (they had more rounded armor, but the effect is the same), the issue was the belief that it limited the ability to angle the armor in combat (which was true to a degree and became more so when the Soviets got really crazy with sloping in the IS-3 front hull design) and that it would increase overall weight and size of a tank design while limiting internal crew space. That is true to a degree too, as the T-34 and Panther were both pretty cramped compared to say a Panzer III or IV. But the demonstrated combat ability of the T-34 proved the point that the advantages outweighed the drawbacks in a way that the French designs did not. Without the combat experience of a successful sloped armor design the Germans largely didn't see the benefits. I also think it might have had to do with the Heer's insistence on using front drive tank designs, which meant having sloped armor created a lot of weight and space issues up front, as the driver then had to compete for space with the front drive. The Soviets didn't have that issue due to the rear drive, while the German army kept rejecting industry's efforts to suggest a rear drive design (like the DB VK3002...and DB's VK2001 design).
Eventually the German army was forced to concede on the sloped armor part, but kept the front drive, which created a relatively cramped Panther. If they had just gone with DB's VK2001/2401 design they'd have had a much more versatile design:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/VK_20#Daimler_Benz
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Panther_tank#Development_and_production
The DB design resembled the T-34 in its
hull and
turret and was also to be powered by a diesel engine. It was also driven from the rear drive sprocket with the turret situated forward. The incorporation of a diesel engine promised increased operational range, reduced flammability and allowed for more efficient use of petroleum reserves. Hitler himself considered a diesel engine imperative for the new tank.
[14] DB's proposal used an external
leaf spring suspension, in contrast to the MAN proposal of twin torsion bars. Wa Pruef 6's opinion was that the leaf spring suspension was a disadvantage and that using torsion bars would allow greater internal hull width. It also opposed the rear drive because of the potential for track fouling. Daimler Benz still preferred the leaf springs over a torsion bar suspension as it resulted in a silhouette about 200 mm (7.9 in) shorter and rendered complex shock absorbers unnecessary. The employment of a rear drive provided additional crew space and also allowed for a better slope on the front hull, which was considered important in preventing penetration by armour-piercing shells.
[10]
IDK, did the the Heer ever beat an enemy who had well prepared, trained and equipped armoured forces? It’s one thing to smash through France’s terrible use of tanks, and another to face Wallies in North Africa, or Soviets post-Stalingrad.
You're missing a pretty important component there, that is in air power. In 1940 the Germans ruled the skies over France, which won them the campaign. In North Africa largely the Allies ran the show in the air, which dramatically tipped the scales in their favor given the poor showing of US ground forces especially early on. Plus in North Africa there was the horrible Axis supply situation, lack of forces and equipment, and huge advantage of the Allies at sea and just in numbers on the ground. Meanwhile post-Stalingrad things weren't as clear cut either, 3rd Kharkov saw the victorious Soviet armor forces getting smashed while exploiting their victory by a mauled German force....which again was able to seize air control over the decisive ground battles. At Kursk during the German offensive the air war was a mixed affair, but still the Germans largely smashed the Soviets and if not for the huge Soviet reserves, the Wallies invading Sicily, and the huge Soviet army able to attack elsewhere at the same time the fighting around Kursk was not going the way of the Soviet tank armies; they were down to their last two uncommitted Tank Corps after having two entire Tank Armies largely rendered combat ineffective by individual Panzer Corps. Zitadelle was were the Tiger tank was at the pinnacle of it's relative power too and it performed extremely well, as that situation was exactly what it had been designed for.
Post-Zitadelle though despite the German army smashing up the Soviet armored forces during the Soviet counter offensives on the flanks of Kursk at that point the Soviets were simply able to grind through due to numbers. I know a certain other poster here will vehemently disagree with that take, but look at the casualties during the entire Kursk period; the Soviets simply used their reserves to absorb appalling losses until the Germans ran out of men and equipment. I don't think you could really say that was a function of a well prepared armor force deciding the day, rather it was deep pockets and a willingness to take any losses to force a breakthrough (or absorb an enemy offensive). It worked. Of course then later by 1944 German forces were so depleted and fighting on so many more fronts that virtually any advantage at the tactical level basically didn't matter anymore, as the forces arrayed against them were so numerous and powerful that it was simply a matter of time until collapse came. Arguably that was true post-Stalingrad too.