35. So how was this stint?
We did well. During this period there were a large number of bomb blasts in the nwfp with Ajmal Khattak and Azam Hoti sitting in Kabul indulging in anti-Pakistan speeches and activity. In order to convey a message to Sardar Daud that we could play the same game and to assess the training level of the resistance an operation was initiated in Panjsher Valley in August 1975. The operation was a total success. The Afghans suffered heavily in men and equipment and Daud sought peace and accepted the Durand Line. He initiated an agreement in mid-1976. However, the formal agreement was not signed in view of Zia’s take over.
36. When did Pakistan enter the Afghan scenario as a party, which was assisting the anti-Daud insurgents in Afghanistan?
In October 1973 while I was serving as ig fc an Afghan named Habibur Rahman (Shaheed) came and contacted me about setting up a resistance movement in Afghanistan with active military assistance of Pakistan. I conveyed the same to Mr Bhutto, who accepted my proposal in view of the changed situation in Afghanistan and asked me to organise training of Afghans.
37. What was the political and military aim of the Pakistani govt of that time?
From 1947 till that date all Afghan governments had generally not been friendly towards Pakistan. They raised the bogey of Pakhtunistan but refrained from acting against us in 1965 and 1971 when at war with India because of the political environment after the Liaquat Bagh meeting. There were a large number of bomb blasts. Mr Z.A Bhutto was very clear even in 1973 after Daud's coup. An analysis of the regional environment was undertaken, highlighting the break in the Afghan system of continuity; the impending generational change in the leadership in the USSR and China (Chou had died). The inability of continuity/stability in Iran with removal of Shah of Iran from the scene. Being the last of the party ideologues it looked likely that the ussr leadership may take the opportunity to move once more and invade Afghanistan, a step towards the fulfilment of Peter the Great’s will (1777). Thus we established the base of Afghan Mujahideen resistance in 1973.
38. What type of assistance was provided to the Afghan resistance and which Pakistani agencies were involved?
We gave them basic infantry weapons, some specialised training in how to conduct guerrilla warfare under an ssg team until it was discontinued 05 July 1977 by Gen Zia, who lacked the strategic vision.
39. At what stage did the ssg enter the scene as the principal agency that trained the Afghan resistance?
They (a team) imparted training in the belief that they were training Frontier Corps personnel (all trainees were enlisted in the Frontier Corps before training)
40. What was the isi role in Afghanistan in the period 1974-77?
It was a top secret affair and the isi had no role. The secret was shared between Mr Bhutto, myself, Aziz Ahmad and the then Army Chief Tikka Khan. This was for obvious reasons. The Foreign Office could with, nonchalance deny if raised at un or any other forum.
41. Who were the pioneers of the anti-Daud Afghan resistance?
These were Ustad Rabbani, Hikmatyar, Ahmad Shah Masood and a host of others who came to Pakistan after October 1973.