No-shuttle alternative space timeline

[Archibald]

Whatif the space shuttle program had been scrapped in spring 1970 by Congress ?



James G. Fulton was one of the strongest supporter of the program. IOTL he suffered an heart attack around february 1970 and died 18 month later.




http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/James_G._Fulton

Here's part of an article telling the story. ---

How Jim Fulton Saved the Space Shuttle

by
Frank Sietzen, Jr.
Sunday, September 21, 2003



In the spring of 1970, the House of Representatives Manned Spaceflight Subcommittee sought to bolster the anemic administration request for NASA by a budget boost. It recommended to the full Committee on Science and Astronautics a whopping increase to the manned effort, nearly all for what members then called a "recoverable craft" and a space station. This set in motion a showdown with the full committee, and ultimately for the full House, on what character of manned effort would proceed. The focus was the mark-up for the FY71 NASA Authorization bill.
There, supporters of the reusable logistics vehicle outlined in Nixon's study were hoping to move the concept forward in a big way. If, on the other hand, the project failed to get support for the upcoming Fiscal Year, it would mean the future of manned flight after Apollo and Skylab would most likely end, with resources being shifted to unmanned robotic probes. If critics succeeded in stripping funding for the project (called by NASA a "Space Shuttle"), it would be increasingly difficult - if not impossible - to prevail later. And with the Nixon Administration still uncertain as to the importance it might place on a Shuttle, defeat would make it less likely that Nixon would embrace the idea as his own manned space goal.
Thus, much was riding on the 1971 NASA budget.
Rep. Joseph Karth (D-MN) was the third ranking member of the full committee.
Rep. George Miller (D-CA.) was its chair.
Rep. Olin E. ‘Tiger' Teague (D-TX) was chair of the Manned Flight Subcommittee.
Rep. James Fulton was its ranking Republican. In the spring of 1970 Fulton was recovering from a heart attack and was often missing from early discussions about the shape of the budget, although he was also senior Republican on the full science committee. Many Democrats were grateful for Fulton's intense support for NASA programs, although he often succeeded in irritating some of them with endless questions and advocacy.
Fulton believed a Space Shuttle was crucial if manned flight beyond Apollo were to continue. Karth, by contrast, was a voracious critic of manned spaceflight, and in particular took a dim view of all of the talk about recoverable craft, space stations, and especially Mars missions.
Karth in particular was suspicious of NASA's claims for the cost of its programs. For projections of robotic missions, Karth once referred to such projections as "asinine". "NASA must consider members of Congress stupid idiots," he blasted.
Development of a Space Shuttle was unneeded, and the cost projections "totally unrealistic", Karth predicted. Teague's subcommittee had added $80 million directly for acceleration of Space Shuttle studies, and a total $300 million for advanced Shuttle prototypes, testing, and additional funding for manned space-related infrastructure. The debate began.
Karth told the full science committee that he would support funds for the remaining Apollo missions 16 and 17 but not for the Space Shuttle. He worried aloud that by pushing to start developmental work on the Shuttle before final designs or configurations were selected, Congress would be locked into the need for providing ever larger amounts as the Shuttle took shape.
Rep. Don Fuqua (D-FLA) shot back defending the Teague recommendations. "We're trying to get the best for our space dollar," Fuqua said. The nation needed the reusable capability that the Shuttle offered; and thereby should fund the Shuttle now. But others also objected to the increases.
Some said the $300 million added was too much. "This program is losing romance with the American people," said Rep. Thomas Downing (D-VA). But Teague backed his budget and the need for the Shuttle.
Teague called Nixon's budget for NASA and his indecision on the Shuttle as being "too little". At that time, the White House Bureau of the Budget was also battling NASA over funding to start the Shuttle project. Teague took a dim view of the B0B (predecessor to the Office of Management and Budget - OMB) role in restricting NASA. "I'll bet you this subcommittee of mine knows more about this program than the Bureau of the Budget does!," he told the full committee. The committee voted, and narrowly endorsed Teague's Shuttle increases.
But Karth's anti-Shuttle alternate budget became the official minority position, as the House Appropriations Committee moved the bill to the House floor for debate. Karth had three Democrats supporting his alternative, and three Republicans all from the committee. This bi-partisan split and the narrow passage of Teague's increases gave Shuttle critics hope that they could craft a coalition to kill the Shuttle on the House floor. But to defeat the Shuttle once and for all, Karth would need to rely upon conservative Republicans to an unusual degree.
Although Fulton had come to strongly believe in starting the Shuttle, his support for it might be meaningless. After his heart attack, his recovery made it unlikely that he would even be present for the vote on the floor - much less lobby other members for its passage.
With Fulton likely to be missing, the Republicans (in the minority) would manage their efforts through Rep. Charles Mosher (R-OH). Mosher was deeply troubled by the increases to federal spending. The $300 million proposed by Teague's subcommittee and adopted by the full science committee was too much for him to support. Mosher went to see Minority Leader Gerald R. Ford (R-MI). Ford had little love for the Shuttle idea as well, and was also concerned about the big increase. If Nixon wanted the Shuttle, why didn't he say so? And if Nixon would accept the increases, he should day that, too. Instead, the White House was still silent on what kind of space program it envisioned after Apollo.
Together, Ford and Mosher agreed to support cutting the Shuttle funds from the NASA bill when it got to the House floor. In essence, they would join forces with Karth, who was also planning a move of his own.
Mosher called together his supporters- Reps. Roudebush, Winn, Frey, and Price. Had Fulton been present, an anti-Shuttle coalition would have been much harder to assemble among the Republicans. But in his absence, Mosher thought the cuts would stand. The final debate began on April 23, 1970, less than two weeks after the crippled Apollo 13 had returned from the Moon.
Chairman Miller rose to defend his requests for NASA increases for the proposed Shuttle project. "The key to success for the nation's future space effort lies in the development of a low-cost recoverable and reusable space transportation system," Miller told the House. "The Space Shuttle will dramatically reduce the cost of putting people and cargo into space."
Mosher rose to attack the increases. He expressed dismay that manned spaceflight was getting so large a budget boost beyond the administration's request, and in light of the reductions being made to robotic space missions.
Karth now rose and proposed a substitute. He would fund the Shuttle at a study level only. His amendment would strip out $240 million of Teague's increases, and cut another $50 million from manned spaceflight and another $110 million from Nixon's NASA request. If it passed, there would be no manned space flight after Skylab.
Karth also suggested that in effect funding for the Shuttle in the 1971 Fiscal Year was the opening gambit in a NASA effort to override Nixon and get support for a manned Mars mission. "This mission to Mars will cost $50 to $100 billion before its over," Karth said. The Shuttle was but a down payment on the idea. Even the space station could only be justified by its role in planning more advanced manned missions. And he was against that, too.
Fuqua had heard enough. "I am puzzled by the statement that the Shuttle is in some way mixed up with the Mars landing," he said, looking in Karth's direction. Other Shuttle advocates rose to suggest that mentioning Mars were just an attempt to blunt the arguments for the Shuttle's abilities as a logistics vehicle. By attaching the Shuttle to Mars-and even to a space station- the project might be killed outright. Both Mars and the space station were highly unpopular topics in Congress in the spring of 1970.
These arguments continued, right up to the roll call. In 1970, there were no provisions for electronic voting. Members had to stand in lines, one for or one against. One line was to vote for the Karth amendment, killing Shuttle funding. The other was against – i.e. for the Shuttle
But the battle wasn't yet over. Several members continued to argue over the Shuttle's true purpose as they lined up to vote. Confusion broke out, with some members saying later they thought they were in line to vote to kill the Shuttle, not the Karth amendment. The chair called the total- a 53-53 tie. Under the rules, the proposed amendment failed.
But now, under the House rules, the Republicans could offer to recommit the bill. Mosher was ready to do so, but he had a compromise of his own. He would attach Karth's budget ceiling to the bill, effectively stripping the Shuttle, again, from the NASA FY71 budget. As the ranking Republican on the full committee present with Fulton gone, Mosher would have the last chance to stop Shuttle funding.
But, suddenly, word was flashed to Ford: An ambulance had pulled up to the House chamber, and out came James Fulton. He had known what Mosher was up to all along, and now his aides had tipped him off that Karth's anti-Shuttle move had been narrowly defeated-and was going to prevail if the Republicans joined the liberal Democrats in backing Mosher's budget cut. A visibly weakened Fulton now came onto the House floor.
Silence fell on the chamber, as both Mosher and Fulton turned to Ford. Ford had agreed to support Mosher's cuts, but Fulton was the ranking senior Republican on the full committee.
Fulton huddled with of all people Teague. After a time, he rose and addressed the chair. Fulton had a compromise of his own to suggest. He would move to recommit the NASA bill, but with a $30 million cut to spaceflight operations, not the Shuttle. It would show his fellow Republicans he, too, was concerned about federal spending. But it would allow the full Shuttle funding to proceed.
Which would prevail?
Ford now huddled with chairman Miller. They then announced that Fulton's amendment would be the one introduced-and that Miller now embraced it and not his original bill. A voice vote was quickly called, before the ailing Fulton was forced from the floor. It passed easily, given that seniority was everything to Republicans. And word now spread that Nixon, while still undecided on the Shuttle, would not object to the extra NASA funds.
The House then voted for the entire NASA bill, passing it by the surprisingly close 229-105. Karth and Mosher both wound up voting against the NASA budget after all. In the end, it was Fulton's seniority, not direct support for the Space Shuttle that had saved the day.
The Shuttle survived, but would face additional tests in 1971. In the end, a political coalition would be formed by Teague that pushed the Shuttle through in 1971. Among those would be abandonment of a fully reusable booster, and deferral of the space station that the Shuttle was supposed to service. ----

--------------------------------------------------------

So here's the revised article including Fulton death which is the POD here.

It was a cold day of January 1970. Congressman Jim Fulton was on this way to the House of Representatives Manned Spaceflight Subcommittee when he felt a nasty pain on its left arm, obviously a heart attack. Ambulances were called and rushed to the rescue, but it was too late and he died minute later.
With the death of this man had vanished the last hopes of saving the Shuttle program.

Indeed, two month later, In the spring of 1970, the House of Representatives Manned Spaceflight Subcommittee sought to bolster the anemic administration request for NASA by a budget boost. It recommended to the full Committee on Science and Astronautics a whopping increase to the manned effort, nearly all for what members then called a "recoverable craft" and a space station. This set in motion a showdown with the full committee, and ultimately for the full House, on what character of manned effort would proceed. The focus was the mark-up for the FY71 NASA Authorization bill.
There, supporters of the reusable logistics vehicle outlined in Nixon's study were hoping to move the concept forward in a big way. If, on the other hand, the project failed to get support for the upcoming Fiscal Year, it would mean the future of manned flight after Apollo and Skylab would most likely end, with resources being shifted to unmanned robotic probes. If critics succeeded in stripping funding for the project (called by NASA a "Space Shuttle"), it would be increasingly difficult - if not impossible - to prevail later. And with the Nixon Administration still uncertain as to the importance it might place on a Shuttle, defeat would make it less likely that Nixon would embrace the idea as his own manned space goal.
Thus, much was riding on the 1971 NASA budget.
Rep. Joseph Karth (D-MN) was the third ranking member of the full committee.
Rep. George Miller (D-CA.) was its chair.
Rep. Olin E. ‘Tiger' Teague (D-TX) was chair of the Manned Flight Subcommittee.
Rep. James Fulton had been its ranking Republican before his death. Many Democrats were grateful for Fulton's intense support for NASA programs, although he often succeeded in irritating some of them with endless questions and advocacy.
Fulton believed a Space Shuttle was crucial if manned flight beyond Apollo were to continue. Karth, by contrast, was a voracious critic of manned spaceflight, and in particular took a dim view of all of the talk about recoverable craft, space stations, and especially Mars missions.
Karth in particular was suspicious of NASA's claims for the cost of its programs. For projections of robotic missions, Karth once referred to such projections as "asinine". "NASA must consider members of Congress stupid idiots," he blasted.
Development of a Space Shuttle was unneeded, and the cost projections "totally unrealistic", Karth predicted. Teague's subcommittee had added $80 million directly for acceleration of Space Shuttle studies, and a total $300 million for advanced Shuttle prototypes, testing, and additional funding for manned space-related infrastructure. The debate began.
Karth told the full science committee that he would support funds for the remaining Apollo missions 16 and 17 but not for the Space Shuttle. He worried aloud that by pushing to start developmental work on the Shuttle before final designs or configurations were selected, Congress would be locked into the need for providing ever larger amounts as the Shuttle took shape.
Rep. Don Fuqua (D-FLA) shot back defending the Teague recommendations. "We're trying to get the best for our space dollar," Fuqua said. The nation needed the reusable capability that the Shuttle offered; and thereby should fund the Shuttle now. But others also objected to the increases.
Some said the $300 million added was too much. "This program is losing romance with the American people," said Rep. Thomas Downing (D-VA). But Teague backed his budget and the need for the Shuttle.
Teague called Nixon's budget for NASA and his indecision on the Shuttle as being "too little". At that time, the White House Bureau of the Budget was also battling NASA over funding to start the Shuttle project. Teague took a dim view of the B0B (predecessor to the Office of Management and Budget - OMB) role in restricting NASA. "I'll bet you this subcommittee of mine knows more about this program than the Bureau of the Budget does!," he told the full committee. The committee voted, and narrowly endorsed Teague's Shuttle increases.
But Karth's anti-Shuttle alternate budget became the official minority position, as the House Appropriations Committee moved the bill to the House floor for debate. Karth had three Democrats supporting his alternative, and three Republicans all from the committee. This bi-partisan split and the narrow passage of Teague's increases gave Shuttle critics hope that they could craft a coalition to kill the Shuttle on the House floor. But to defeat the Shuttle once and for all, Karth would need to rely upon conservative Republicans to an unusual degree.
Although Fulton had come to strongly believe in starting the Shuttle, his death doomed the program. With Fulton dead, the Republicans (in the minority) now managed their efforts through Rep. Charles Mosher (R-OH). Mosher was deeply troubled by the increases to federal spending. The $300 million proposed by Teague's subcommittee and adopted by the full science committee was too much for him to support. Mosher went to see Minority Leader Gerald R. Ford (R-MI). Ford had little love for the Shuttle idea as well, and was also concerned about the big increase. If Nixon wanted the Shuttle, why didn't he say so? And if Nixon would accept the increases, he should day that, too. Instead, the White House was still silent on what kind of space program it envisioned after Apollo.
Together, Ford and Mosher agreed to support cutting the Shuttle funds from the NASA bill when it got to the House floor. In essence, they would join forces with Karth, who was also planning a move of his own.
Mosher called together his supporters- Reps. Roudebush, Winn, Frey, and Price. Had Fulton been present, an anti-Shuttle coalition would have been much harder to assemble among the Republicans. But his death meant that Mosher cuts would stand.

The final debate began on April 23, 1970, less than two weeks after the crippled Apollo 13 had returned from the Moon.

Chairman Miller rose to defend his requests for NASA increases for the proposed Shuttle project. "The key to success for the nation's future space effort lies in the development of a low-cost recoverable and reusable space transportation system," Miller told the House. "The Space Shuttle will dramatically reduce the cost of putting people and cargo into space."
Mosher rose to attack the increases. He expressed dismay that manned spaceflight was getting so large a budget boost beyond the administration's request, and in light of the reductions being made to robotic space missions.
Karth now rose and proposed a substitute. He would fund the Shuttle at a study level only. His amendment would strip out $240 million of Teague's increases, and cut another $50 million from manned spaceflight and another $110 million from Nixon's NASA request. If it passed, there would be no manned space flight after Skylab.
Karth also suggested that in effect funding for the Shuttle in the 1971 Fiscal Year was the opening gambit in a NASA effort to override Nixon and get support for a manned Mars mission. "This mission to Mars will cost $50 to $100 billion before its over," Karth said. The Shuttle was but a down payment on the idea. Even the space station could only be justified by its role in planning more advanced manned missions. And he was against that, too.
Fuqua had heard enough. "I am puzzled by the statement that the Shuttle is in some way mixed up with the Mars landing," he said, looking in Karth's direction. Other Shuttle advocates rose to suggest that mentioning Mars were just an attempt to blunt the arguments for the Shuttle's abilities as a logistics vehicle. By attaching the Shuttle to Mars-and even to a space station- the project might be killed outright. Both Mars and the space station were highly unpopular topics in Congress in the spring of 1970.
These arguments continued, right up to the roll call. In 1970, there were no provisions for electronic voting. Members had to stand in lines, one for or one against. One line was to vote for the Karth amendment, killing Shuttle funding. The other was against – i.e. for the Shuttle
But the battle wasn't yet over. Several members continued to argue over the Shuttle's true purpose as they lined up to vote. Confusion broke out, with some members saying later they thought they were in line to vote to kill the Shuttle, not the Karth amendment. The chair called the total- a 53-53 tie. Under the rules, the proposed amendment failed.
But now, under the House rules, the Republicans could offer to recommit the bill. Mosher was ready to do so, but he had a compromise of his own. He would attach Karth's budget ceiling to the bill, effectively stripping the Shuttle, again, from the NASA FY71 budget. As the ranking Republican on the full committee present Mosher now decided to stop Shuttle funding.Ford then agreed to support Mosher's cuts.
Ford then huddled with chairman Miller. An exhausted Miller then announced that Karth's amendment would be the one introduced-and that Miller now embraced it and not his original opinion favourable to the Shuttle. A voice vote was quickly called and passed easily, given that seniority was everything to Republicans. And word now spread that Nixon would probably scrap the Shuttle.

This was done a month later and left NASA in deep sorrow. Thomas Paine left NASA and was replaced by James Fletcher.
Future of manned spaceflight looked gloomy.
Or it will stop, or Nixon could endorse three options for a manned spacecraft
- USAF lifting body
- Apollo CM block.3 (with a new Service Module)
- Big Gemini

In the end Big Gemini was the winner. It would enter service around 1975, too late for Skylab 1 or ATSP.
Then debate raged over the launcher. Titan IIIC sounded the less costly option, but NASA really disliked the idea of launching Big G on top of this rocket. Its SRBs were considered non man rated; it growth potential was near zero, meaning its payload could not improve much despite Big G promises, even if seven-segments SRB were added (in OTL they were developed for MOL in the 60's, forgotten for 20 years then resurrected for Titan IV in the late 80's).
Olin E. Teague then suggested to use Saturn INT-20 instead of Titan IIIC. Saturn INT-20 was basically a Saturn V without second stage, meaning it was so overpowered that F-1s engines had to be shut-down or delete in order to limit G-forces at take off! Teague arguments were as follow

-Saturn INT-20 used proven hardware and saved part of Saturn launchers while much less expensive to build

-The rocket had 100 000Ibs payload, enough to lift decent size space station modules

-It kept the S-IVB stage alive, thus allowing more moon missions if NASA budget rose later (by using of cheap Titan UA-1207 boosters Saturn INT-20 could boost a S-IVB in low earth orbit, thus allowing late LEOR lunar missions)

-It was a launcher powerful enough to replace the cancelled Shuttle. Teague argued that NASA still needed a new launcher to boost its new manned spacecraft.

-Titan III was no solution as its payload was even weaker than Saturn IB while diminishing crew safety.

Difficulties were not over, as in summer 1970 Karth, Mondale and Ford lobbied hard at Nixon to stop manned spaceflight after Skylab missions. Fortunately Teague found an ally called Caspar Weinberger, none other than deputy director of the OMB. He decided that manned spaceceflight should continue and agreed to back Teague Saturn INT-20 proposal. The two men were decisive in Nixon approval of NASA roadmap for the next future.
The document was presented in September 1971.

Nixon announced that future manned system would consist of Saturn INT-20 and Big Gemini to enter service around 1976. Main effort would be targeted to Skylab space stations and ATSP follow-ons.

Remaining Apollo hardware (Saturn IB, CSM and Saturn V SA-514 and -515 ) would be expanded as stopgap until 1975.


(more to come)

 

[Thande]

Ah, so this is the final version of what we were discussing?

Good, though it could use some pictures.

 

[Archibald]

The other thread was a mess of 5 or 6 different alt histories
It was time to develop one of them seriously...

 

[Thande]

The other thread was a mess of 5 or 6 different alt histories
It was time to develop one of them seriously...

True enough. Let's keep this coherent.

Would the multiple Skylabs be launched using the same hardware as OTL?

 

[Romulus Augustulus]

Are they going to go ahead with the three Apollo missions (18, 19, 20) that were cancelled in OTL?

 

[Archibald]

Romulus A. and Thande you have two points here!

Apollo 18, 19 and 20 were to used Saturn SA-513, 514 and 515.
According to Astronautix, Apollo 20 was cancelled first in January 1970.
Apollo 18 and 19 followed in september 1970.
Btw Karth also wanted to cancel Apollo 15 and 16 at the meeting I mention, but Weinberger said "that's enough".

Only one of out of three remaining Saturn V was used for Skylab. It was SA-513 without S-IVB of course.

Skylab backup would have been launched by SA-515 (don't ask me why not SA-514 ) leaving the latter unused.

My POD is 23th april 1970 (don't know the exact day Fulton had his heart attack, so I will use the day the Shuttle was scrapped).

Can't have more Saturn V on the pipeline, as production ended in july 1968, production line was definitively closed by Paine in january 1970.

Even if I could change that, Saturn V can't survive in this ATL because it's just too expensive.
I try to include Nixon budget cuts here.

Considering
- how harshs were NASA budget cuts in 1970,
- the fact that Saturn V production line is closed
- I still need at least two of them for what follow
- Apollo and the moon are not the main goal anymore

I think Apollo 18 and 19 won't survive past september 1970.

 

[Thande]

Good; well not good, obviously, but it makes the TL more realistic.

Romulus A. and Thande you have two points here!

Apollo 18, 19 and 20 were to used Saturn SA-513, 514 and 515.
According to Astronautix, Apollo 20 was cancelled first in January 1970.
Apollo 18 and 19 followed in september 1970.
Btw Karth also wanted to cancel Apollo 15 and 16 at the meeting I mention, but Weinberger said "that's enough".

Only one of out of three remaining Saturn V was used for Skylab. It was SA-513 without S-IVB of course.

Skylab backup would have been launched by SA-515 (don't ask me why not SA-514 ) leaving the latter unused.

My POD is 23th april 1970 (don't know the exact day Fulton had his heart attack, so I will use the day the Shuttle was scrapped).

Can't have more Saturn V on the pipeline, as production ended in july 1968, production line was definitively closed by Paine in january 1970.

Even if I could change that, Saturn V can't survive in this ATL because it's just too expensive.
I try to include Nixon budget cuts here.

Considering
- how harshs were NASA budget cuts in 1970,
- the fact that Saturn V production line is closed
- I still need at least two of them for what follow
- Apollo and the moon are not the main goal anymore

I think Apollo 18 and 19 won't survive past september 1970.

 

[Michel Van]

i look for more data

Joseph Karth was for Manned Mars mission and against shuttle/space station concept.
after the total- a 53-53 tie.
in July 1970 Walter Mondale try proposed also amendment to stop Shuttle
but fail with against 32 pro 28 so Shuttle won at this point NASA change there objectif
they drop Space Station and shuttle became the "Space Shuttle" and look for Parnters
and found them in USAF so the Problems begann
sectary of USAF Robert Seaman qoute:

...The Space Shuttle has significant a military necessity...

USAF demand from NASA modifide the Space Shuttle
Deltawings, Cargo from 12 to 30 tons, Payloadbay of 18 meter by 4.5 meter

Walter Mondale try again to shut down the program by amendment for cut Financing
but fail with against 50 to 26, 61 to 20, 64 to 22.
in spring 1973 the opposition agains the Space Shuttle collapses
source: "colonies in space" by T.A. Heppenheimer Switzerland edition 1980

to chanceld Apollo flight
orginal plans until 28 december 1969 was to use all Saturn V for Apollo Moon landing
Apollo 11 G-mission landing on moon fast return with small sampel from moon
Apollo 12-15 had to be H-Mission: 35 hours EVA range 0.6 mile
Apollo 16-20 had to be J-Mission: 54 hours EVA range 7.5 miles with Rover
(and Skylab launch by Saturn IB, a used S-IVB stage is rebuilt to Labor in Orbit)
after Nixon became President thing change

4 january 1970 NASA declare that Apollo 20 is chanceld for Skylab
and production of Saturn V is stop
further reduce budget, force NASA to more cuts.
September 1970 they had to chanceld more Apollo flights
Apollo 15 H-Mission and Apollo 19 J-Mission was chanceld
the Saturn V to use for Skylab A in 1972, Skylab B in 1975 and large 6 men Space Station in 1976.
Apollo 16 to 18 became Apollo 15 to 17
(the Saturn V from Apollo 18 is used as Backup in case Skylab A fails)

OTL after September the Apollo program was dead
source:
"Apollo the Lost and Forgotten Missions" by David J. Shayler
ISBN 1-85233-575-0
this is best book about Apollo mission and AAP

 

[Archibald]

From 1970 to 1974 things won’t change a lot in the USA compared to OTL. Apollo 15, 16 and 17 lunar missions, Skylab A teething problems happen as in OTL. Of course Saturn INT-20 and Big G are prepared to their first flight planned for late 1975.

The period from september1970 to September 1971 was a hard time for NASA. Now that the Shuttle was dead and Big Gemini the only option, choosing the rocket which will boost the spacecraft would prove crucial to NASA future. But it was not the only thing which worried new administrator James Fletcher. Saturn V production line had been definitively closed in January 1970 and there were no hopes of reopening it in a context of shrinking budgets, even for two or three rockets.

This meant that only a single Saturn V would be available for Skylab A in 1973, leaving its sibling without rocket to launch it. Fletcher had no other choice than cancel two more Apollo missions, Apollo 18 and Apollo 20. But that’s was not the main problem. The Shuttle was not only the ferry to the space station, it was much more than that, NASA great program for the decade, aiming at diminishing the cost of space transportation. Big Gemini could not really replace the Shuttle as a “superscience” program because it was much more modest and would be ready quickly.

NASA solved these problems by turning its mind towards space stations. Skylab had been considered as only a first step into this new area, much more ambitious projects had been drawn. Obviously the next step should be a permanently manned space station with a crew of 6 or more. As Von Braun noticed in a memo in December 1970, the very last Saturn V could be used to boost the core of a future modular space station, probably in the late 70’s. Problem was Skylab B, which was gave no improvement toward the –A, while eating a precious Saturn V.

At the same time discussions were on the way for an american-soviet rendez-vous in space. Two ideas were examined in 1971. They were

- Docking an Apollo to a Salyut, which was the leading option until December 1971, when it was found impossible adding a second docking port to first generation Salyuts;

- Docking Skylab B and a Salyut.

Both ideas were rejected on technical grounds, mainly because of pressure levels within spacecrafts. It was found easier to dock a Soyuz to an Apollo CM via an airlock carried by the US capsule. But the idea of docking space stations together was not dead.

Skylab A was finally launched in May 1973 but was damaged one minute in flight. The antimeteroit shield tore loose and broke a solar panel, temperature within the station climbed to unacceptable levels, the other solar panel didn’t extended. Over the next 9 months, three Apollo CMs docked to the wrecked station and their crews repaired it. In the end the whole planned program was accomplished. Skylab A was then abandoned and boosted to a highest orbit by the crew of “Skylab 5” CSM in April 1974.

Now it was time to launch Skylab B, using of the remaining Saturn V. But it was no longer similar to its sibling. Salyut/ Skylab studies had led to another concept, brainchild of Von Braun (even if he was no longer at Marshall). When Skylab A had been launched the huge S-II stage had followed it in orbit, before tumbling across the atmosphere and being destroyed at reentry. Von Braun openly stated that this was a waste, as S-II dimensions were clearly superior to Skylab stations. So he drafted an audacious plan. It summarized 10 years of Wet Workshop, Skylab A and Salyut/ Skylab B studies and operations. The aim was to change the S-II into a crude “Wet Workshop” and kept it linked to Skylab B while in orbit. Not only it would triple the internal volume available for the astronauts; its atmosphere would be similar to Soviet Salyut. Indeed the S-II was to form the link between the two stations, solving pressurisation problems. To achieve such results the S-II would have been modified as follow

– A set of solar arrays similar to Skylab A and B

– Hatches and venting systems in the huge LOX and hydrogen tanks, to allow astronauts transits and experiences

– An airlock between Skylab B and the S-II for transition from Salyut to Skylab atmospheres

– The central J-2 was to be removed and replaced by a docking port.

– Later, an Apollo CSM would carry an improved ATSP airlock/ docking module there;

– A Salyut would dock there.

– Having only four J-2 instead of five would of course mean less energy, Ie lower orbit. This was not a problem as Soviet hardware tended to have lower orbit than Skylab / Apollo due to lower efficiency of Proton / Soyuz rockets.

– The Skylab B / S-II / Salyut complex would therefore have a compromised orbit (inclination and altitude) to ease soviet operations.

– Various means of boosting the altitude of the complex were studied. They were a fully fuelled Apollo Service Module launched by a Titan III; a Big G cargo module launched by a standard Saturn INT-20; or an S-IVB launched by an uprated Saturn INT-20.

Saturn SA-514 was to be used for the operations and was taken out of storage late 1973. The S-II was modified by North American (now Rockwell) in 1974. Planned launch date was September 1975, just after ATSP, and in time for 4th July 1976 bicentennial celebrations. The operation would expend the last CSM / Saturn IB vehicle. Big G had already been tested in late 1975 and its first manned flight was planned for early 1977.

On 21st September 1975 Saturn SA-514 roared to the sky. Minutes latter the Skylab B and the S-II were placed into a 210 km orbit. Lessons learned from Skylab A payed, and the launch was uneventful. In February 1976 the very last Apollo capsule (at the time) was launched by Saturn SA-212. It carried the Salyut docking module. The CSM carefully docked the module at the rear of the huge complex, then undocked, and headed to the standard docking port on the “dry” part of the station. The crew stayed there for 70 days. Big Gemini (now known as Gemini C) Gemini C-2 mission followed on July 4th 1976. Next step was to add the Salyut to this.

Soviet reaction

Nixon decision to scrap the shuttle puzzled the soviets in 1970. But they had, too, their own worries. The N1 giant rocket had blown up its launch pad in February and July 1969. Korolev was badly missed; its successor Mishin was really not up to the task. The N1 and lunar program nevertheless continued, even if the soviets had been beaten on the moon and the rocket totally unreliable. But opposition to Mishin was mounting. Chelomei and Glushko met in September 1970 and agreed to join their forces against Mishin and its N-1 rocket. The aim was to replace it by a storable propellant rocket with fewer engines, none other than the UR-700. Glushko influence was thus decisive in December 1970 to avoid cancellation of work on the UR-700. Glushko was in good terms with Afanasyev, itself close from Brezhnev and Kosygin. Mishin was removed from the head of OKB-1 in July 1971 after the death of Soyuz 11 crew and the third failure of the N1. Glushko, Okhapkin and Kozlov were offered the head of OKB-1. Okhapkin accepted. Ustinov was furious and worried as he had backed Mishin in 1966.

The consequence of all this was a major reorganisation of Soviet spaceflight program in late 1971.

On 17th February 1972 Central Committee of the Communist Party and Council of Soviet Ministers Decree “On work on UR-700, DOS (Salyut) and MKBS/ MOK civilian space stations, TKS manned ferry, and cancellation of the Almaz, N1' and L3 was issued. This meant that Chelomei Almaz was cancelled and space stations gave to Okhapkin OKB-1. Already build Almaz have to be changed into unmanned spy satellites, or civilian Salyuts. Soyuz T and the TKS were to be used to ferry crew and cargo to the stations, but they wouldn’t be ready until the late 70’s.

DOS-2 and Cosmos 557 failed respectively in 1972 and 1973. Almaz 2, 3, and 4 were launched unmanned within the same period, some of them failing, too, in the process. Salyut 4 was finally a success, but not before January 1975. Then a second generation Salyut followed. It had two docking ports. The program was accelerated after Salyut 4 and Skylab B successes. Salyut 6 joined the complex in late 1976. The huge station now weighed 145 tons. From this moment TKS, Soyuz T and Gemini-C ferried crew and cargo to the complex. On 24th December 1977 Gemini C-5 and TKS-3 docked to each end of the station, which for the time weighed more than 200 tons. This was truly the climax of Soviet- US “Join space program”… before the 1978 breakdown.

 

[Thande]

Ah, an earlier Shuttle-Mir/ISS-type project (if more modest) instead of a one-off propaganda exercise like Apollo-Soyuz. I wonder what the end of detente will do to that...

 

[Archibald]

Indeed from 1978 relations between the USA and USSR started to sour, and Skyliout (as Leonov and Slayton had nicknamed it in 1977) was the victim of the end of detente. The Soviets first announced that they will only send Soyuz spacecrafts to it, not TKS.

Although an impressive achievement by itself, the station was plagued by various problems. Among them was the very low orbit of the station, which implied monthly reboosts by either Gemini C or the TKS. Skylab B had never been build for resupply, even if Gemini-C partially solved the problem. The S-II quickly showed its limits: its accommodations were non existents; the structure was weakened by the changing atmosphere from Salyut to Skylab. Last but not least each nation had its own 2nd generation modular station project, MOK and Skyhab.

Soviet and American crews nevertheless met at the station until the end of 1979 and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Programs to boost the station were scrapped, but Skylab-A “incident” in July 1979 forced NASA to desorbit the thing. This was the last cooperative effort between the two nations for 10 years. Skyliout burned over the South Pacific on 23rd March 1981. ;-)

At the time both countries had their own giant space station program in development for years.
MOK and Skyhab were to be launched by the last Saturn V and the new UR-700, and later completed by smaller modules.
Both space stations cores were ready around 1982. Skyhab was boosted in space on May 16th 1982 by the very last Saturn V.
MOK central core followed in March 1983. Over the following years the two space complexes were slowly completed. Soviets modules were derivatives of Salyut and FGB (TKS cargo module) while NASA docked 50 tons modules to Skyhab using Gemini C and/ or Saturn INT-20.

At the time temperature of the Cold War had gone to the bottom after Brezhnev death in 1981. Andropov and Reagan had started rattling their sabres, more exactly their space weapons. Both stations were suspected of military activities by the other side.

As a consequence spaceplanes projects were resurrected on both side of the iron curtain. Their role was to act as “reusable ferries” between the ground and spaces stations.

Since 1971 and the cancellation of the Shuttle USAF studied a lifting-body, flexible rocket plane. Progresses were closely monitored by the Soviets which had their own project. The X-24D project was officially disclosed to the world by Reagan in January 1982. The US President linked USAF spaceplane and Skyhab using its bellicist, anti-communist usual rhetoric and tone.
Andropov answered three days later by disclosing MAKS and announced “imminent launch” of the MOK. He stunned the world when he announced that a second core was in the jigs, and was a true “battle station”. The monster, 110 tons module called “Polyus” was launched by an UR-700 in 1985 but failed to reach orbit.

USAF had shown much interest in the S-IVB stage of Saturn, particularly since Philip Bono had demonstrated in the late 60’s that it would make a simple, expendable Single-Stage-To-Orbit with few modifications. Once NASA obtained Saturn INT-20 in 1971, improved engines had been introduced. The second batch included F-1A uprated engines, while the single J-2 of the S-IVB was replaced by an annular aerospike derivative. The S-IVB becomes the S-IVC.

This improved even more the stage potential as an expendable SSTO.
USAF first grabbed the S-IVC for its ALS heavy launcher which replaced the Titan III in 1981.
It had all what USAF wanted: unexpensive, flexible SRBs as first stage, topped by high energy upper stage. As an air Force general noticed ironically “this was simply a revival of the Space Launching System cancelled in 1961 in favour of the Titan III”.

Once the Air Force put its hands on the S-IVC and its aerospike engine, they decided to use the stage as an SSTO to put a 10 tons spaceplane into orbit. The spaceplane was a straightforward derivative of the X-24B, and kept its rocket engine to manoeuvre into orbit. The S-IVC would itself place it into orbit with the X-24D, separate, and re-enter the atmosphere. Later the S-IVC received sensors to complete X-24D mission. Using a single stage eliminated range safety issues and allowed USAF to launch its spaceplanes from Edwards, Groom Lake, White Sands (and not only Vandenberg).

So the Soviet answer to this was MAKS, a tripropellant / expendable tank / air-launched (from an An-124) mini Shuttle. The X-24D flew in 1987; the Soviet spaceplane was cancelled when USSR crumbled in 1989. Both were supposed to wage war in space, intercepting ICBM warheads and destroying them with advanced kinetic missiles.

In 1986 Reagan decided to give the final blow to USSR. He announced “We will go back to the Moon before the end of the Century”.
He described a realistic plan based on LEOR, Saturn INT-20, improved Big Gemini, S-IVC expendable tug, S-IVD LLV (Lunar Logistic Vehicle), plus of course the NLM, New Lunar Module.
Saturn INT-20 would receive ALS Solid-rocket-motors to boost its payload to 125 tons. this was enough to put a fully-fueled S-IVC tug in LEO.

 

[Thande]

Very nice! Earlier (but still failed) Polyus is interesting.

Would there really be such a thing about going back to the moon in 1986, especially since NASA was still mostly using the same hardware as it had in the 1960s (whereas in OTL, it seemed as though the shuttle vs. a moon programme was an either/or proposition)? I would have thought a manned Mars mission might be tabled (though, if we're realistic, it would probably be scaled down later).

 

[bard32]

Whatif the space shuttle program had been scrapped in spring 1970 by Congress ?



James G. Fulton was one of the strongest supporter of the program. IOTL he suffered an heart attack around february 1970 and died 18 month later.




http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/James_G._Fulton

Here's part of an article telling the story. ---

--------------------------------------------------------

So here's the revised article including Fulton death which is the POD here.



This was done a month later and left NASA in deep sorrow. Thomas Paine left NASA and was replaced by James Fletcher.
Future of manned spaceflight looked gloomy.
Or it will stop, or Nixon could endorse three options for a manned spacecraft
- USAF lifting body
- Apollo CM block.3 (with a new Service Module)
- Big Gemini

In the end Big Gemini was the winner. It would enter service around 1975, too late for Skylab 1 or ATSP.
Then debate raged over the launcher. Titan IIIC sounded the less costly option, but NASA really disliked the idea of launching Big G on top of this rocket. Its SRBs were considered non man rated; it growth potential was near zero, meaning its payload could not improve much despite Big G promises, even if seven-segments SRB were added (in OTL they were developed for MOL in the 60's, forgotten for 20 years then resurrected for Titan IV in the late 80's).
Olin E. Teague then suggested to use Saturn INT-20 instead of Titan IIIC. Saturn INT-20 was basically a Saturn V without second stage, meaning it was so overpowered that F-1s engines had to be shut-down or delete in order to limit G-forces at take off! Teague arguments were as follow

-Saturn INT-20 used proven hardware and saved part of Saturn launchers while much less expensive to build

-The rocket had 100 000Ibs payload, enough to lift decent size space station modules

-It kept the S-IVB stage alive, thus allowing more moon missions if NASA budget rose later (by using of cheap Titan UA-1207 boosters Saturn INT-20 could boost a S-IVB in low earth orbit, thus allowing late LEOR lunar missions)

-It was a launcher powerful enough to replace the cancelled Shuttle. Teague argued that NASA still needed a new launcher to boost its new manned spacecraft.

-Titan III was no solution as its payload was even weaker than Saturn IB while diminishing crew safety.

Difficulties were not over, as in summer 1970 Karth, Mondale and Ford lobbied hard at Nixon to stop manned spaceflight after Skylab missions. Fortunately Teague found an ally called Caspar Weinberger, none other than deputy director of the OMB. He decided that manned spaceceflight should continue and agreed to back Teague Saturn INT-20 proposal. The two men were decisive in Nixon approval of NASA roadmap for the next future.
The document was presented in September 1971.

Nixon announced that future manned system would consist of Saturn INT-20 and Big Gemini to enter service around 1976. Main effort would be targeted to Skylab space stations and ATSP follow-ons.

Remaining Apollo hardware (Saturn IB, CSM and Saturn V SA-514 and -515 ) would be expanded as stopgap until 1975.


(more to come)

Thirty years ago, I was at my father's house in Alameda, California. I was in
his garage and I found the Arthur C. Clarke book, The Promise of Space, which mentioned a manned mission to Mars no later than 1975 to
1980. After Apollo 17, we had Skylab from 1973 to 1974. After Skylab, it was the famous Apollo-Soyuz mission, which ended with the handshake in
space. It was Deke Slayton's first, and last, mission. Slyaton had been with
NASA since the beginning of the manned space program. He was one of original Mercury Seven. However, he'd been grounded for most of his career
due to an ear infection. So he was never part of Mercury, Gemini, and most
of Apollo, including Apollo 11-Apollo 17. Apollo 13 was scrubbed. Most people thought it was bad luck. It was thirteenth mission, it was launched at
the thirteenth hour and thirteenth minute, on Friday 13, 1970. All of which, if you're superticious, equals bad luck.

 

[PMN1]

You might want to throw some of the designs here into the mix, the need to protect the shuttle seems to have consigned a lot of designs to the drawing board.



http://www.dunnspace.com/leo_on_the_cheap.htm





On page 190 of this book, there is mention of a USAF program for a 1980 low cost launch vehicle, to supplement the Shuttle

In 1980, the Air Force contracted TRW to develop a low-cost booster configuration that would have a payload lift capability equal to the maximum capacity of the Space Shuttle. TRW took the original 1969 study that had been accomplished for NASA, which proposed a family of simple pressure-fed boosters, and updated it to be consistent with 1981 technology and cost. The result was an unmanned launch vehicle called the Low Cost Shuttle Surrogate Booster (LCSSB).

The LCSSB configuration was very similar to the original baseline vehicle in the 1969 NASA study. The booster had three pressure-fed stages, with a first-stage thrust of 30.25 million Newtons (6.8 million pounds). The first stage used four engines, each with a thrust of 7.56 million Newtons (1.7 million pounds). These four engines were identical to the second-stage engine, except that the first-stage engines had a higher chamber pressure and an expansion ratio of 6:l (for sea-level/low-altitude operations), compared with the second-stage engine expansion ratio of 31:l (for high-altitude/vacuum operations). Keeping the designs of the first- and second-stage engines essentially the same would have kept development costs down. The booster had a payload capacity to low earth orbit of 29,756 kilograms (65,600 pounds) when launching due east from Cape Canaveral. When launching into a 90-degree polar orbit, the LCSSB had a lift capacity of 23,178 kilograms (51,100 pounds). The system had a launch cost for production vehicles of $59.2 million per launch (including all launch processing and support costs). This equated to a cost of $1,989 per kilogram ($901 per pound) to LEO, assuming an easterly launch (see table 9).

Under Secretary of the Air Force Pete Aldridge encountered a storm of opposition from NASA and some members of Congress when he sought funding in the mid-1980s (pre-Challenger) for a small buy of Titan complementary expendable launch vehicles to augment the Shuttle fleet. It is therefore not surprising that the concept for the LCSSB, formally proposed one month after the first successful Shuttle flight, ended up going nowhere.

 

[Archibald]

I know "LEO on the cheap". It was a nightmarish download for my old computer (and bl**dy windows)
I've discovered there that Diamant had been the only pressure-fed rocket ever used on regular basis.

Would there really be such a thing about going back to the moon in 1986, especially since NASA was still mostly using the same hardware as it had in the 1960s (whereas in OTL, it seemed as though the shuttle vs. a moon programme was an either/or proposition)? I would have thought a manned Mars mission might be tabled (though, if we're realistic, it would probably be scaled down later)

Don't forget Saturn have been upgraded with F-1A and up-to-date aerospike. The Jarvis concept of 1985 (OTL) used Saturn hardware (as Constellation... well we can say J-2X is no longer a J-2...)
Btw the way there's still plenties of things to do on the Moon after Apollo, including a base.

for the Mars mission I'm open to suggestions.
As we discussed in others thread the NERVA albeit a mature and interesting concept is no longer possible after Greenpeace, TMI and Chernobyl.
I have to dug Ionic propulsion (the SERT satellite and things like that).

 

[Michel Van]

wat about this ?

Transformation of Saturn INT-20 in Reusable Launcher in 1980s !

in Study for Space Shuttle there were projects for use of S-IC stage
one idea was to put wings on S-IC stage and fly it back to Cap Kennedy.
http://www.astronautix.com/lvs/winturnv.htm
http://www.secretprojects.co.uk/forum/index.php/topic,2174.0.html

the S-IC from INT-20 is "over" power for launch medium payloads.
but has reserve for extra mass like wings, jetengine, etc.
(this also limit the G-forces at take off!)

also make S-IVB to S-IVC with an annular aerospike engine make it reusable
it use the aerospike engine as a heatshield !
by the way of the J-2S, was also a aerospike version called J-2T-250K

so we got working reusable rocket
Saturn S-ID fly back to Launch side. the S-IVC land after some orbit also at Launch side.
so wat is bad thing ? payload lost do more Mass of return equipment
for Wing first stage aroung 32% and Ballistic landing stage around 16% (32%+16% = 48%)
so a Saturn INT-20 can launch 36000 kg up to 113000 kg in low orbit (with 4.68 G limit)

a reusable Saturn INT-20 (3 x F-1) launch 37440 kg in orbit.
(a dispensable Saturn INT-20 launch 78000 kg)
36000 kg is mass of Gemini C

 

[Archibald]

I had thought about replacing INT-20 "castrated" S-IC by something reusable (albeit the philospophy was different).

I thought about a pressure-fed Big Dumb Booster which would fell back in the ocean using parachutes and been reusable. I know NASA also studied this for the Shuttle aside the "winged S-IC"

This would be a mean for NASA saving Saturn INT-20 if Nixon' OMB decided "this S-IC is too expensive because it is not reusable"

Btw never thought adding weight to the S-IC to prevent it being overpowered, and even less that this weight could be wings, engine, etc.
Yep I feared those massive losses in payload...


This study www.spacefuture.com/archive/a_single_stage_to_orbit_thought_experiment.shtml
by Gary Hudson says that a S-IVB (expendable) SSTO would have a payload of 10 000 to 12 000 Ibs in LEO (roughly 5.4 metric tons).
I suppose that having an annular Aerospike (such as the J-2T-250k) would improve these numbers, but I have no idea of the margin. I supposed this was enough to launch a X-24B derivative...

 

[Archibald]

The S-IVC = a omniscient stage
(from stages to Saturn INT-20, 2005)

...the Douglas S-IV saga could have ended with Saturn IB and Apollo CM in 1978. But scrapping of the Shuttle in spring 1970 gave this stage a second life. As the Centaur, Transtage and Agena before it, this stage became America workhorse for space exploration.
The S-IVB and its improved variants were quickly used in a wide range of roles. USAF had interest in the J-2 since project Lunex, so it was not a surprised that the S-IVB was part of the ALS, replacement of the Titan III in the late 70’s. By sharing the stage with USAF NASA lowered its price thanks to a higher production rate. Both services agreed on the J-2T-250K annular aerospike to the replace the standard J-2, giving birth to the S-IVC. This engine revealed the true potential of the S-IVC as 1st generation SSTO, a fact which was not lose by USAF when launching the X-24D.

NASA also found other roles for the S-IVC aside second stage of Saturn INT-20. Reagan decided in favour of a “faster better cheaper” moon program in the mid – 80’s. The S-IVD variant was created as an expendable tug for Moon applications. Its goal was to boost Gemini-C, the LLV, and New Lunar Module to EML-1, EML-2 or lunar orbit...

EML-1 and -2 = Earth Moon Lagrange points.
A much more interesting place than lunar orbits (which are unstable due to things calls "mascons") to put a space station or dock with a LM.

 

[Thande]

EML-1 and -2 = Earth Moon Lagrange points.
A much more interesting place than lunar orbits (which are unstable due to things calls "mascons") to put a space station or dock with a LM.

Didn't NASA in OTL consider putting a Skylab in Lunar orbit?

 

[Michel Van]

Didn't NASA in OTL consider putting a Skylab in Lunar orbit?

yes but the plans were vage, very vage

"Lunarlab" is a Wet Orbital Workshop launch by Saturn V
during fly to moon the astronaut build the station inside fuel tank S-IVB
after 4 day the CSM take "Lunarlab" in to Low lunar orbit

[NOTE this were plans BEFOR the discovery the instabilty of lunar orbits.

Gravitational anomalies slightly distorting the orbits of the Lunar Orbiters led to the discovery of Mass concentrations ("mascons"), concentrations of mass beneath the lunar surface caused by large impacting bodies at some remote time in the past. These anomalies were too small to be of significance for the short time the Apollo Project's spacecraft were in lunar orbit.

on long term like Lunar orbital station gona crash on lunar surface]

the Lunalab are for CSM storage in longterm AAP surface misson 14-90 days
the CSM pilot joins the Lunarlab crew for that time

later concept like ALSS, SLA, drop a mini orbital hab for CSM crew
SLA mission fly with 4 astonauts (2 LM 2 CSM-Orbital Hab)
http://www.astronautix.com/craft/alsrbase.htm
italian forum
http://www.forumastronautico.it/index.php?topic=5976.0

attache picture show ALSS launch configuration


SLA Mini-Base concept for extended lunar missions, SD 70-516, Vol. 1 summary;
Space division, north American Rockwell, Doweney, California, september 1970