No Russians lend lease

Would russia be able to win against germany in ww2 without lend lease from England and U.S?

  • yes

  • no

  • maybe


Results are only viewable after voting.

jahenders

Banned
gorilla-warfare_o_681688.jpg

It's awesome, but the cost in bananas is prohibitive ...
 

jahenders

Banned
The Japanese are not going to be invading the soviet union, they have their hands full with China, the British, the Dutch, the French and the complete attention of the United States.

Keep in mind, as well, that the Soviets and Japanese had clashed for several months 1939, with about 100K troops involved in an undeclared conflict called the "Nomonhan Incident" by Japanese or the the "Battle of Khalkhin Gol" by the Russians. There were between 30K and 50K casualties and the Japanese were crushed.
 

Daniels

Banned
I think most people agree that without LL the Soviets are either screwed or have just enough to achieve a stalemate. The more interesting question are the political consequences. So Hitler attacks the USSR, by December 41 Britain and the US are allies with the USSR and say something like: " Look you aided Hitler during the first 22 months of the war and we hate communism - on the other hand we hate Germany even more than you. So here is the deal - you keep on fighting and we will keep on fighting as well. Dont expect anything more than that."

All the LL stuff that OTL went to Russia goes to North Africa instead, as a result the Africa Korps is defeated sometimes in January/February 43. The Soviets however have a much harder time during Blau. They either loose the Caucasus or manage to push the Germans back a little but overall Uranus will look more like OTL Mars. And this is where it gets interesting. If the Soviets loose the Caucasus they have no other choice than to negotiate a peace treaty in mid 1943. The communist party will be in turmoil, and Russia will have barely enough food and fuel for its army/population and will be unable to resume the war in the next few years. This will enable the Germans to transfer substantial forces to the West, making any invasion impossible or reversing it and giving them the chance to defeat the Allied bomber offensive creating a stalemate in 1944 that will lead to a cease fire with the Western Allies.

If the Soviets survive Blau and manage to push the Germans back to lets say Rostov, Stalin will demand a second front immediately. The Red Army will be far more exhausted than OTL and food problems will be much more severe. In such a situation he would give the Wallies an ultimatum- second front now or im out. If the Wallies decline the results would be similar to what I described above. If they really do it and land in France in mid 1943, they will suffer a great defeat which will lead Stalin to quit the war, leading again to a similar scenario as described above.
 
"Look you aided Hitler during the first 22 months of the war and we hate communism - on the other hand we hate Germany even more than you. So here is the deal - you keep on fighting and we will keep on fighting as well. Dont expect anything more than that."

Then the news leaks out (likely from Soviet sympathizers in the West, which were quite considerable by November/December 1941) that the United States and Great Britain are actively harming the war effort against Germany, increasing the cost in Anglo-American lives, by refusing to aid the Soviets. These governments are subsequently either forced to change their policy by an angry electorate or are voted out in favor of a administration who will.

All the LL stuff that OTL went to Russia goes to North Africa instead, as a result the Africa Korps is defeated sometimes in January/February 43.

Don't see how that will happen. As I noted previously, very little the WAllies sent the Soviets were things they themselves were using at the time, as most of it was either obsolete or had been rejected for service. What probably happens to that equipment is it just gets scrapped without serving any useful purpose. The North Africa campaign likely proceeds similarly to OTL. It's in the Sicilian and Normandy campaigns that we see the difference and that difference is a distinctly negative impact on the WAllied campaign.

The Soviets however have a much harder time during Blau. They either lose the Caucasus or manage to push the Germans back a little but overall Uranus will look more like OTL Mars.

Also don't see this happening. General scholarly consensus is that lend-leases impact on the campaigns of 1942 was pretty nonexistent. Blau likely will be harsher for the Soviets, particularly in the Caucasus, but not decisively so. The German advance is still liable to grind to a halt in the mountains of the Trans-Caucasus region for much the same reason as OTL. Looking over at Soviet OOBs during Uranus and Mars, not a single Soviet ground formations in either was equipped with any lend-lease weapons. And the overwhelming bulk of the Soviet truck park at this time were still Soviet vehicles, with lend-lease vehicles still only making up ~10% at most. Operation Uranus and Mars succeeded and failed (respectively) because of Soviet and German actions, not WAllied ones.

It's in 1943 that the lack of lend-lease most likely begins to have an decisive impact on the Eastern Front battles.
 
Last edited:
Keep in mind, as well, that the Soviets and Japanese had clashed for several months 1939, with about 100K troops involved in an undeclared conflict called the "Nomonhan Incident" by Japanese or the the "Battle of Khalkhin Gol" by the Russians. There were between 30K and 50K casualties and the Japanese were crushed.
That's why I say they aren't going to tempt fate twice.. They are way over stretched .. And I mean way by the time they commit to war with the USA.. No way in hell they have offensive power to just say oh hell yeah lets invade the Soviet Union ;)

They are bogged down in se Asia. China.. And worried that the thing they just awoke in December is going give them a ritualistic colonoscopy since they didn't put their hands up and surrender.

The Japanese were formidable .. But having the resources to just lalligag into the Soviet Union.. No.

Christ the only reason they are so successful in China is the civil war raging and. Government in China that could find 20 China men At once that had a common enemy except themselves and the Japanese and they were happy fighting themselves.
 

Daniels

Banned
General scholarly consensus is that lend-leases impact on the campaigns of 1942 was pretty nonexistent..... not a single Soviet ground formations in either was equipped with any lend-lease weapons

Really? Seem to have missed that. Alexander Hill argues the exact opposite in his articles: British LL tanks and the battle of Moscow and British LL aid and the Soviet war effort June 41- June 42. Britain had delivered some 14 000 tons of aluminium by June 42 while the Soviets produced some 50 000 during the entire year. By January 1st 1942 the Soviet air defence forces had 1470 serviceable fighter aircraft, including 99 Hurricanes and 39 Tomahawks,corresponding to 9.4% of total Soviet stock. LL tanks were used at Charkov and at the defence of Stalingrad and as training machines to train Soviet tank drivers.

And according to Zaloga and Grandsen " At the beginning of 1943 there were 1023 Lend-Lease tanks in Soviet tank units; 61-68% of Soviet tank brigades were equipped solely with Russian tanks, 19-22% were equipped with both Soviet and Western models, and 10 to 17% relied exclusively on British and American machines".
 
Really? Seem to have missed that. Alexander Hill argues the exact opposite in his articles: British LL tanks and the battle of Moscow and British LL aid and the Soviet war effort June 41- June 42. Britain had delivered some 14 000 tons of aluminium by June 42 while the Soviets produced some 50 000 during the entire year. By January 1st 1942 the Soviet air defence forces had 1470 serviceable fighter aircraft, including 99 Hurricanes and 39 Tomahawks,corresponding to 9.4% of total Soviet stock. LL tanks were used at Charkov and at the defence of Stalingrad and as training machines to train Soviet tank drivers.

And according to Zaloga and Grandsen " At the beginning of 1943 there were 1023 Lend-Lease tanks in Soviet tank units; 61-68% of Soviet tank brigades were equipped solely with Russian tanks, 19-22% were equipped with both Soviet and Western models, and 10 to 17% relied exclusively on British and American machines".
I
It comes down to defining the Soviet fiscal year

Model years 42 and 43 were 6 months behind ;)
 

Archibald

Banned
Aircraft-wise there was a lot of obscolescent or rejected types - see Bell P-63s (3300 build) and P-39s (10 000 or so).
 
Then the news leaks out (likely from Soviet sympathizers in the West, which were quite considerable by November/December 1941) that the United States and Great Britain are actively harming the war effort against Germany, increasing the cost in Anglo-American lives, by refusing to aid the Soviets. These governments are subsequently either forced to change their policy by an angry electorate or are voted out in favor of a administration who will.



Don't see how that will happen. As I noted previously, very little the WAllies sent the Soviets were things they themselves were using at the time, as most of it was either obsolete or had been rejected for service. What probably happens to that equipment is it just gets scrapped without serving any useful purpose. The North Africa campaign likely proceeds similarly to OTL. It's in the Sicilian and Normandy campaigns that we see the difference and that difference is a distinctly negative impact on the WAllied campaign.



Also don't see this happening. General scholarly consensus is that lend-leases impact on the campaigns of 1942 was pretty nonexistent. Blau likely will be harsher for the Soviets, particularly in the Caucasus, but not decisively so. The German advance is still liable to grind to a halt in the mountains of the Trans-Caucasus region for much the same reason as OTL. Looking over at Soviet OOBs during Uranus and Mars, not a single Soviet ground formations in either was equipped with any lend-lease weapons. And the overwhelming bulk of the Soviet truck park at this time were still Soviet vehicles, with lend-lease vehicles still only making up ~10% at most. Operation Uranus and Mars succeeded and failed (respectively) because of Soviet and German actions, not WAllied ones.

It's in 1943 that the lack of lend-lease most likely begins to have an decisive impact on the Eastern Front battles.
Soviet sympathies in the west is highly over rated, and when you're back is to the wall, other people's junk buys you time. You think of all the trucks, transport and other items . Everyone including Stalin knew they were screwed with out Lend lease. Was the impact immediate.. Uhm . No, however that immediate impact was felt with just the knowledge that help is on the way.

Honestly the Soviets are lucky they weren't lumped in with the axis and considered and aggressor state who got stabbed by the devil they made a pact with

And that part can't be made undone
 
Really? Seem to have missed that. Alexander Hill argues the exact opposite in his articles: British LL tanks and the battle of Moscow and British LL aid and the Soviet war effort June 41- June 42. Britain had delivered some 14 000 tons of aluminium by June 42 while the Soviets produced some 50 000 during the entire year. By January 1st 1942 the Soviet air defence forces had 1470 serviceable fighter aircraft, including 99 Hurricanes and 39 Tomahawks,corresponding to 9.4% of total Soviet stock. LL tanks were used at Charkov and at the defence of Stalingrad and as training machines to train Soviet tank drivers.

Which would be nice except, firstly, we're talking about the entirety of the Soviet war effort throughout 1942 as a whole and not Moscow specifically. The quantity of lend-lease which was sent to the USSR in 1942 constituted ~10% of the monetary value, ~15% of the shipping tonnage, and was 1/5th of that which was sent to Britain in the same year. Even the British acknowledged how little the west was actually contributing with Churchil flat-out telling the Soviet ambassador that all he could offer was, to quote, "a drop in the ocean". And the evidence is this was the utmost the WAllies could do: the still relatively immature state of American armament mobilization and the demands of the Pacific and African theater prevented any more. The WAllies sent what they could spare, not what they needed.

Even focusing on Moscow, firstly none of the lend-lease equipment reached the front until the end of November, at which point the German offensive was well towards running out of steam. And the subsequent Moscow counter-offensive relied primarily on infantry and artillery, with armor and aircraft occupying an entirely secondary role because even with lend-lease, armored vehicles and aircraft was hellishly scarce. This meant the Soviets had only limited armor and air resources which they had to dole out carefully and were thus unable to have a decisive impact on the battle.

And according to Zaloga and Grandsen "At the beginning of 1943 there were 1023 Lend-Lease tanks in Soviet tank units; 61-68% of Soviet tank brigades were equipped solely with Russian tanks, 19-22% were equipped with both Soviet and Western models, and 10 to 17% relied exclusively on British and American machines".

1,023 lend-lease AFVs constitutes ~7% of the total Soviet armor park in the winter of 1942-43. Removing it still leaves the Soviets with a nearly 3:1 advantage in armor over the Germans. Nor does it change the operational situation as it existed at Stalingrad, with extensive German forces crammed into the nose of a salient guarded by weak, ill-equipped, demoralized, ill-trained, and ill-led Romanian and Italian forces against which the Soviets can freely mass their overwhelming armored force. German generals like to argue after the war they lost at Stalingrad because they were outnumbered. In reality, they lost because they fucked up and were outgeneralled, outmaneuvered, and even (during the defensive phase) outfought.

Soviet sympathies in the west is highly over rated,

No, it is not. We have endless statements from both people on the street and the WAllied leadership stating sympathetic viewpoints toward the Soviets. Mass rallies and fundraisers were held in Britain and American expressing support for the Soviets from 1941 onward. Polls showing extensively positive views of the USSR. Known western Communists with Moscow-connections were allowed to travel, speak, and publish freely while those with known fascist views and connections were censored and repressed.

The Western Allies were not pro-Communist in 1941-45, but they were certainly pro-Soviet. And the reason behind this support is blatantly obvious: Soviet blood was being spilled in fighting the Germans to save that of British and American.

You think of all the trucks, transport and other items.

Items which began arriving en-masse in 1943, not 1941-42.

Honestly the Soviets are lucky they weren't lumped in with the axis and considered and aggressor state who got stabbed by the devil they made a pact with

Hardly. The memory of Soviet aggression in late-39/early-40 had faded by mid-1941 and the German invasion very much transformed them into victims in western eyes. It would have taken extraordinary events (alongside outright strategic stupidity on the part of Anglo-American leaders) for the Soviets to not get L-L. There was some lingering anti-communist sentiment even following Barbarossa, but it was very much drowned out by anti-fascist sentiment which contained a very extensive pro-Soviet element. There is nothing unusual about the aid the WAllies ultimately sent to the Soviets, it all boils down to stark political and military realities readily apparent to everyone at the time with functioning senses.
 
Last edited:

Daniels

Banned
The quantity of lend-lease which was sent to the USSR in 1942 constituted ~10% of the monetary value, ~15% of the shipping tonnage, and was 1/5th of that which was sent to Britain in the same year.

Just because the British got more does not mean that LL to the USSR was useless. During 42 some 600 000 tons of food reached the USSR and fed well over a million soldiers. This had "no effect" in 42? During 42 some 5000 tanks reached the USSR which were used to train Soviet tank drivers and therefore freed thousands of superior Soviet tanks for battle. This had "no effect" in 42? And I could go on and on.

1,023 lend-lease AFVs constitutes ~7% of the total Soviet armor park in the winter of 1942-43. Nor does it change the operational situation as it existed at Stalingrad

The Soviets had perhaps some 20 000 tanks by this time period - but only 8000 were in the theatre of operations and only around half of these were operational. So suddenly the 7% jump to 20-25% - hardly trivial. Also the operational situation existed because the Soviets threw in everything they had - including LL material. On October 7th I think - the Germans reported 98 "Soviet" tanks destroyed of which some 60 were British and American models. This use of LL tanks prevented them from seizing a valuable position which the next day enabled the Soviets to.... you get the picture?
 
Which would be nice except, firstly, we're talking about the entirety of the Soviet war effort throughout 1942 as a whole and not Moscow specifically. The quantity of lend-lease which was sent to the USSR in 1942 constituted ~10% of the monetary value, ~15% of the shipping tonnage, and was 1/5th of that which was sent to Britain in the same year. Even the British acknowledged how little the west was actually contributing with Churchil flat-out telling the Soviet ambassador that all he could offer was, to quote, "a drop in the ocean". And the evidence is this was the utmost the WAllies could do: the still relatively immature state of American armament mobilization and the demands of the Pacific and African theater prevented any more. The WAllies sent what they could spare, not what they needed.

Even focusing on Moscow, firstly none of the lend-lease equipment reached the front until the end of November, at which point the German offensive was well towards running out of steam. And the subsequent Moscow counter-offensive relied primarily on infantry and artillery, with armor and aircraft occupying an entirely secondary role because even with lend-lease, armored vehicles and aircraft was hellishly scarce. This meant the Soviets had only limited armor and air resources which they had to dole out carefully and were thus unable to have a decisive impact on the battle.



1,023 lend-lease AFVs constitutes ~7% of the total Soviet armor park in the winter of 1942-43. Removing it still leaves the Soviets with a nearly 3:1 advantage in armor over the Germans. Nor does it change the operational situation as it existed at Stalingrad, with extensive German forces crammed into the nose of a salient guarded by weak, ill-equipped, demoralized, ill-trained, and ill-led Romanian and Italian forces against which the Soviets can freely mass their overwhelming armored force. German generals like to argue after the war they lost at Stalingrad because they were outnumbered. In reality, they lost because they fucked up and were outgeneralled, outmaneuvered, and even (during the defensive phase) outfought.



No, it is not. We have endless statements from both people on the street and the WAllied leadership stating sympathetic viewpoints toward the Soviets. Mass rallies and fundraisers were held in Britain and American expressing support for the Soviets from 1941 onward. Polls showing extensively positive views of the USSR. Known western Communists with Moscow-connections were allowed to travel, speak, and publish freely while those with known fascist views and connections were censored and repressed.

The Western Allies were not pro-Communist in 1941-45, but they were certainly pro-Soviet. And the reason behind this support is blatantly obvious: Soviet blood was being spilled in fighting the Germans to save that of British and American.



Items which began arriving en-masse in 1943, not 1941-42.



Hardly. The memory of Soviet aggression in late-39/early-40 had faded by mid-1941 and the German invasion very much transformed them into victims in western eyes. It would have taken extraordinary events (alongside outright strategic stupidity on the part of Anglo-American leaders) for the Soviets to not get L-L. There was some lingering anti-communist sentiment even following Barbarossa, but it was very much drowned out by anti-fascist sentiment which contained a very extensive pro-Soviet element. There is nothing unusual about the aid the WAllies ultimately sent to the Soviets, it all boils down to stark political and military realities readily apparent to everyone at the time with functioning senses.

Hardly? While I must admit that there was Soviet sympathizes .. ( not in a bad way ) most prevailing opinion was not to trust them period. Hence why after fdr passed on policy changed very very quickly.

It was all love as long as someone else was dying to win ththe war in Europe
 
During 42 some 600 000 tons of food reached the USSR and fed well over a million soldiers. This had "no effect" in 42?

Not to a degree that would actually be felt. Even without that food, the Soviets could have still fed those soldiers enough to keep them in battle. I've only ever seen one detailed analysis of the Soviet food situation which incorporates a thorough inspection of lend-lease ("The Bread of Affliction") and it notes that the quantity of staple foods (particularly grains) shipped to the USSR throughout the entire war was only enough to last the Red Army less then a month. It was in supplementing the Soviet diet with fats and oils that lend-lease did a great deal.

During 42 some 5000 tanks reached the USSR which were used to train Soviet tank drivers and therefore freed thousands of superior Soviet tanks for battle.

Soviet crews trained on the same vehicles they took into battle, so no this did not have any effect.

Furthermore, training Soviet crews who would be fighting in domestic models on foreign models would have been counter-protective: the drastic difference in the respective internal layouts and design would have confused the crewmen once they transferred to the front-line to a crippling degree in battle.

Finally: had the Soviets used all of their lend-lease for training as you are basically claiming (5,000 vehicles is roughly the total number of armor sent to the USSR), there wouldn't have been any encountered by the Germans in the frontlines.

The Soviets had perhaps some 20 000 tanks by this time period - but only 8000 were in the theatre of operations and only around half of these were operational.

Total Soviet armored park within the Theater of Operations as of the end of November 1942 was ~13,000 AFVs (hence my ~7% number), of which ~4,000 were committed to the region within which Uranus occurred and ~4,500 were committed to the region within which Mars occurred. Of these, 0 (that is zero) were foreign models.

Also the operational situation existed because the Soviets threw in everything they had - including LL material.

Incorrect: that the Soviets had forces to mass against these overexposed flanks was very much a function of them only feeding in just enough forces to Stalingrad to keep the battle there going, they did not "throw in everything". The reason the operational situation existed because the German forces at Stalingrad were improperly deployed - criminally so in fact. Had the Germans disposed the proper forces on the flanks, avoided over-committing to the city, and actually performed some decent reconnaissance to decipher Soviet intentions the Soviet attack could well have turned into a debacle like Operation Mars regardless of the state of lend-lease to the Soviets.

Hardly? While I must admit that there was Soviet sympathizes .. ( not in a bad way ) most prevailing opinion was not to trust them period. Hence why after fdr passed on policy changed very very quickly

Except it was not and did not. The United States and Britain showed extroardinary degree of trust to the Soviets, confiding in them secrets that the Soviets never would have reciprocated on. A good example is Bradley providing a map to his Soviet counterpart with a detailed map showing all of his own division's positions. The Soviets were flat out astonished and thought this might be some kind of trick until their own aerial reconnaissance, deep-infiltration teams, and radio intercepts confirmed it. And this attitude did not change immediately when FDR died: Truman's actually carried on FDR's policies towards the Soviets until the war ended. When Winston Churchill gave his Iron Curtain speech in 1946, the prevailing reaction among the audience was "why is he bad-mouthing the Russians?"

It would take the Berlin Blockade, among other things, for the West's attitude towards the Soviets to harden into true hostility.
 
Last edited:
4. Agreed. That, imo, is the big downside to this scenario, that the Holocaust has more time to operate and kill more people.
Not just the Holocaust. German forced were responsible (directly or indirectly) for the deaths of perhaps 20% of the population in the occupied USSR. Give them more time and this will be certainly higher. This is also true for the other occupied countries in Eastern Europe.
 
Honestly the Soviets are lucky they weren't lumped in with the axis and considered and aggressor state who got stabbed by the devil they made a pact with

And that part can't be made undone
There is luck and there is the fact that Germany was a serious threat, while it would take substantial anti-Soviet propaganda to make the Soviets look threatening in 1941.
 

Daniels

Banned
Total Soviet armored park within the Theater of Operations as of the end of November 1942 was ~13,000 AFVs (hence my ~7% number), of which ~4,000 were committed to the region within which Uranus occurred and ~4,500 were committed to the region within which Mars occurred. Of these, 0 (that is zero) were foreign models.I

According to Krivosheev the RA had 20 600 tanks+spgs on 1st January 43 of which 8100 were in the ToO. As for the rest - Im tired of debating in cyrcles. I interpret the avaliable numbers that LL had an impact in 42 allready - you interpret them that they didnt. Lets leave it at that.
 

Deleted member 1487

Not to a degree that would actually be felt. Even without that food, the Soviets could have still fed those soldiers enough to keep them in battle. I've only ever seen one detailed analysis of the Soviet food situation which incorporates a thorough inspection of lend-lease ("The Bread of Affliction") and it notes that the quantity of staple foods (particularly grains) shipped to the USSR throughout the entire war was only enough to last the Red Army less then a month. It was in supplementing the Soviet diet with fats and oils that lend-lease did a great deal.
That's cherry picking a stat. Yes LL was not focused on grain, they provided the things the Soviets were lacking like canned meats and very energy dense food like fats. The Soviet military would have had a 38% calorie cut without LL and that was the very crucial protein and fats without which they could not have survived. Soviet grain was not enough to keep soldiers fit to fight.
https://rbth.com/business/2015/05/08/allies_gave_soviets_130_billion_under_lend-lease_45879.html
History professor Oleg Budnitsky speaks with RBTH about the economic assistance the U.S. gave the USSR in WWII.
RBTH: How great was the economic importance of military cooperation between the USSR and the U.S.? What is the importance of Lend-Lease for the formation of economic relations between our countries?

Oleg Budnitsky: It was large-scale military technical assistance from the Allies, especially the U.S., but also the UK and Canada. Volumes of this support are assessed differently. In the Soviet tradition, it was assumed that it was 4 percent of the total production capacity of the USSR, but the latest research shows that in reality the level was as high as 7 percent. The importance of economic cooperation with the U.S., UK and Canada cannot be overestimated. According to the dollar rate of 2003, the inflation-adjusted value of these supplies amounted to $130 billion. These supplies were critical in some key areas. For example, in the beginning of 1942, Western tanks fully replenished Soviet losses, and exceeded them by three times. About 15 percent of the aircraft used by Soviet air forces were supplied by Allies, including the Airacobra fighter and Boston bomber. The Allies supplied 15,000 state-of-the-art machines at that time; for example, famous Soviet ace Alexander Pokryshkin flew Airacobra, as did the rest of his squadron. He shot down 59 enemy aircraft, and 48 of them were thanks to American military equipment.

RBTH: If we speak not only about the supply of military equipment, but also industrial appliances and accessories, what was the volume of cooperation here?

O.B.: One of the main areas of cooperation was aviation fuel. The USSR could not produce gasoline with high octane. However, it was this fuel that was used by the equipment supplied by the Allies. In addition, the Achilles heel of the Soviet Army was communication and transport. The Soviet industry simply could not meet the demand either in number or in quality.

For example, the army lost 58 percent of its vehicles in 1941 alone. To recover these losses, the Allies supplied more than 400,000 vehicles, mainly trucks, to the USSR. During the occupation, the German concern Daimler Benz set up a vehicle assembly line at a factory in Minsk (now the capital of Belarus). After the liberation of the city, the assembly of American vehicles under Lend-Lease was organized there.

It was not only supplies of finished products, but also raw materials that were extremely important – metals, chemicals and products, which were either not produced in the USSR or lost to the enemy. For example, more than half of Soviet aircraft were produced using aluminum supplied by the Allies.

RBTH: What portion of these supplies served military needs directly, and can we talk about a fully-fledged civil partnership?

O.B.: In the first protocol of Lend-Lease (there were four of them), only 20 percent of deliveries were in military equipment, while 80 percent were related to industrial and food production. The Allies supplied 1900 locomotives to the USSR, while only 446 locomotives were produced in the country itself during the same period, as well as 11,000 carriages, while only a few more than 1,000 were made in the USSR. It is impossible to imagine how the Soviet economy would have functioned without these supplies. For example, the telephone cable provided by the Allies could wrap the Earth at the equator. The Allies’ aid was also critical in the reconstruction of production in the liberated regions of the country, including the role of seeds for the resumption of agriculture. Specific products were also supplied; the Allies delivered 610,000 tons of sugar to the USSR, whereas the USSR itself produced little more than 1.46 million tons.

RBTH: How serious was the decline in cooperation after the war?

O.B.: The fall was quite sharp, in the first place because Lend-Lease had ended. The equipment destroyed during the fighting was written off, but what was left was to be returned. Before ending the war, the USSR and the U.S. were negotiating loans for the restoration of the national economy. In particular, the U.S. offered to the Soviet leadership a large-scale loan for 35 years at 2 percent per annum. There were counter-pleas from the Soviet government, specifically Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov tried to negotiate a loan for $6 billion for 30 years, but economic ties failed to develop. The USSR was afraid to get into economic dependence on the West, since the Soviet leadership did not believe in the sincerity of help from the Allies.

Oleg Budnitsky is Director of the International Center for the History and Sociology of World War II and Its Consequences at the Higher School of Economics.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lend-Lease#US_deliveries_to_the_USSR
The United States gave to the Soviet Union from October 1, 1941 to May 31, 1945 the following: 427,284 trucks, 13,303 combat vehicles, 35,170 motorcycles, 2,328 ordnance service vehicles, 2,670,371 tons of petroleum products (gasoline and oil) or 57.8 percent of the High-octane aviation fuel,[24] 4,478,116 tons of foodstuffs (canned meats, sugar, flour, salt, etc.),
Almost all of it calorie dense foods, especially the lacking protein and fats.

It has been estimated that American deliveries to the USSR through the Persian Corridor alone were sufficient, by US Army standards, to maintain sixty combat divisions in the line.[40][41]

Provided ordnance goods (ammunition, artillery shells, mines, assorted explosives) amounted to 53 percent of total domestic production.[24] One item typical of many was a tire plant that was lifted bodily from the Ford Company's River Rouge Plant and transferred to the USSR. The 1947 money value of the supplies and services amounted to about eleven billion dollars.[42]
 
Would russia be able to win against germany in ww2 without lend lease from England and U.S?
(Assuming that the UK and USA are otherwise still fighting in the war, roughly as in the OTL,) A couple of questions for you, which often seem to me to get overlooked on these threads:
1) The Russians still have money. What is Stalin prioritising to purchase from the Western Allies?
2) The Western Allies' industrial capacity has not been diminished simply because they are not supplying Stalin with lend-lease. What are the Western Allies doing with industrial capacity which is neither supplying Stalin with goods which he is purchasing in this timeline, nor supplying otherwise OTL lend lease? How does this affect the state of readiness and equipment of the Western Allies' own armed forces and their fighting efficiency? What does shipping which would otherwise be moving cargo to the USSR (or in the case of warships, escorting said cargo convoys) do instead?

If the UK and USA are still belligerents, Stalin's Russia is not fighting in a vacuum; how are resources that would otherwise be supplied to Russia (or used to get them there) being used against the Axis instead? What impact does pressure which did not otherwise exist coming from a different direction to the OTL have on the Axis on the Eastern Front?
 
1. And the brits will have another year of cohorts reaching draft age to help with those manpower needs.

And as they are pulling from the Empire also, that factor works better for them than for the Germans.


2. THe Japanese? Sure. But no more than OTL. With their rapidly sinking fleet and infinite enemies in Asia, they aren't going to be doing anything special with that extra year.

3. A separate Peace would be the worst case scenario from the point of view of the leaders of the time. But it is pretty unlikely
Why? No LL and support for country which tied 75% German land troops we can see separate peace.
 
Top