No Royal Air Force

As is written above it would be better from the start for close air support (Like a 2nd Tactical Air Force from the start of the war). But the disadvantages would be the lack of strategic bombing.
So probably the war would have been different, with a stronger German industrial capacity.
 
The RFC could be said to have three parts:
- Air Defence,
- Front line suipport - fighters, to attack enemy recon and attack aircraft, recon aircraf, and close support aircraft.
- The Independent Air Force - that set out to attack enemy rear areas.

When the RFC took over the RNAS and renamed itself the RAF - in order to emphasis its independence - CAS operations were cast aside. While the Independent Air Force (no coincidence that one of its leading lights was Trenchard), expanded into Bomber Command.

But with no merger, it would have meant many RNAS officers staying with the RN and getting promoted - and therefore expanding the 'Air Power' appreciation within the Navy.
However, the postWW1 RFC may within the Army has less funds, less influence.
You could have the either extreme, whereby the BoB is lost because of out-dated fighters, or the Germans are held at Sedan because of sustained Dive/bomber attack, and attack aircraft. Either way, Lancaster/Halifax is a dream
 
Just had a thought on the strategic bombing thing, it might not be so bad after all if the RNAS can be persuaded to retask some long range-patrol aircraft to carry heavier than intended bomb-loads at a cost of patrol range.
 
You could have the either extreme, whereby the BoB is lost because of out-dated fighters, or the Germans are held at Sedan because of sustained Dive/bomber attack, and attack aircraft. Either way, Lancaster/Halifax is a dream
I'm not so sure about the first option, the question is how does the lack of an RAF change politics?

If the politicians retain a fear of British cities being levelled but there is no bomber mafia to push 'the bomber will always get through' then the ATL fighter command could be at least as strong if not stronger as the RFC/RNAS strive to prove that the heavy bomber is in fact quite stoppable, and thus a waste of fund that could be spent on the FAA/CAS/something else.
 
The lack of change could be a big turning point, or it could have almost no effect at all, depending on how it is acted on. The RNAS could become much improved if the right people have the right ideas, and are funded by the same old government that OTL didn't seem to have funds. Coastal Command, including maritime strike, under RN control, could become a more effective entity with the exact same provisions. Budget allocations would have to be modified, or shared with other RN services. Bomber Command would wield a smaller stick, but you cannot believe the bomber will always get through and not have bombers. OTL combined operations CAS would still depend on somebody coming up with the idea of establishing the correct administration and protocols for future battles, and ensure that equipment and weapons are available, in timely fashion to do so.

It all requires someone with an analytical mind and a steadfast determination to effect the correct course, in the right post, at the right time, as Dowding did with Fighter Command. But they need more Dowdings. Many more.
 

Pangur

Donor
There is another consideration which is that to have a better RNAS/FAA you will need the right people in senior posts in both the RN and the RNAS/FAA - air minded in the case of the former. As for RFC,how air minded was the British army in the 20`s & 30`s?
 
The idea that no RAF means no strategic bombing is spurious. The USAAC developed into a strategic bombing force as did a large part of the IJA and IJN AF and elements of just about everyone.

Through the 1920’s and 30’s air interception is not really viable and the bomber will always get through (near as damn it) so a countervalue strategy is a viable deterrent, especially with the possibility of gas bombing. Tactical air power works on two levels one is very operational (Luftwaffe/USAAF) the other tends to be more direct support of the battlefield (RAF/USAAF). In that the RAF is building on the RFC practice from WW1.

With limited funds the British air arm will end up focussing on the ‘strategic’ bomber/fighter equation no matter as the technology leads that way, with elements of battlefield support as there is a need for long range deployment across the empire and imperial policing will both need both long range flying, navigation and battlefield support, later a need and a viable option for ADGB arises.

If anything keeping the RNAS in being will lead to earlier better long range aircraft – B17, G3/G4 series equivalents to cover the maritime patrol and patrol bombing requirement.
 
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