wiking said:
The US entering the war was because of the Subwar. The Zimmermann Note just sped up the entrance of the US into the war.
That said the US had a much different attitude to European war than it did in WW1 and much more restrictive laws against the US supplying anyone with war material and money than they did in WW1.
I don't believe it. If it was about the subwar, U.S. entry wouldn't have waited til after Zimmermann. It followed
Lusitania by about two full years, & about three of war. Yes, the U.S. held a view on freedom of the sea (much the same one as she did at the start of WW2), but it wasn't worth going to war over. It
was a good excuse to hide the fact they'd read a top secret message sent to the German Ambassador...
BlondieBC said:
Well, the Germans might take out the oil fields with the extra air power, but they might find a much less useful way to use the airpower. Part of me thinks they do the same basic game plan in 1942 but with more forces.
Agreed, that looks most likely to me, too. Still, of the things that probably go well for Germany in SU, that strikes me the most consequential & obvious of Britain reducing her effort in NAfr.
BlondieBC said:
Of the options listed, I think taking Leningrad is most likely. Army Group South is probably still on the defensive at the start, so the extra forces go to the center or North Group. Likely enough to bust through the light defenses in the early days. Then a indecisive battle for Moscow that goes a bit better for the Germans. Then the need for resources in the South gets the same decision but with more forces. It stalls out somewhere.
That sounds right, but IDK nearly enough about the theatre to say with confidence.
BlondieBC said:
I would tend to agree Torch is likely in 1943. The logic is there. But the Allies might also be tempted for Norway or an attack on France.
An abortive *Dieppe is disturbingly probable.

BlondieBC said:
Malta is interesting. I lot depends on if Taranto happens. If it does not, it looks pretty likely to me that Italy would invade Malta.
Possible. I have my doubts the Italians could succeed alone...
BlondieBC said:
The Pacific is interesting. I would expect both the USA and UK to have fewer resources in the area. So the Japanese probably push until logistically exhausted.
Agreed.
BlondieBC said:
in 1943 or 1944, the USA does a Central Pacific strategy.
If MacArthur survives, IDK how you manage that.
Did I mention the changed emphasis & lack of CVs is likely to mean Nimitz relies more on subs? (Even if he doesn't shift to minelaying at IJN bases, which is the optimal solution.) Which is not good news for Japan...& means she's liable to be near an economic cliff sooner than OTL.
Plus, lack of CVs is going to delay any counterattacks til about November '43?
BlondieBC said:
Not sure on CVL and CVE. I am not sure built more. I am sure we use more in the Atlantic.
I'm thinking the need to replace merchant hulls is going to mean there's not enough yard space for the OTL proliferation (one might say profusion) of CVEs/CVLs. That being true, "more use" is liable to be off the table in the Atlantic. It certainly is in the Pacific.
Which presumes the NF patrol aircraft haven't so reduced convoy losses alone there's less need for CVEs to begin with.

(Is that getting old?

)
BlondieBC said:
I also would not be surprised to see the Pacific limited to 3-4 carriers until the U-boat war is won.
Possible. As I understand it, tho, the 2-Ocean Navy Act already had provided for more fleet CVs, so might be there are more. Unless the priority gets changed to merchant hulls along the way, & the CV schedules get pushed back.
BlondieBC said:
And there is the interesting question of peace. If the war in the Pacific is dragging on slower than OTL, might the USA or UK look for a peace deal? Or go for some goal other than unconditional surrender?
For Germany? Or Japan? In both cases, as it turned out, the "u.s." demand was more symbolic than real, & it actually stiffened resistance: when you have nothing to lose, you fight to the death.
Against Japan, if things are going badly enough early enough (& they might be), it's possible IMO to get surrender as early as the fall of Saipan, when the government changes.
BlondieBC said:
The bomb is used in Germany first.
Probable, if, indeed, it's used at all. That's the thing: change the schedule of events to take out Avalanche, you take out all the tonnage used to supply the troops, & civilians, for it, & put the burden on Germany. If you use that tonnage to build up (or keep afloat) Britain. you accelerate the date for Neptune, & so war's end...& it gets cut fine if the war ends before the Bomb is even ready.
BlondieBC said:
Lets go at this another way. <snip>
You've just described what Ops Research was doing. How they did it, IDK, but they managed to take quite scant (or scant-appearing to me, anyhow

) data & determine a/c-dropped DCs needed to be set shallower & in a stick of 6, & that bigger convoys were better. So, what happens if Winston or somebody simply listens to Blackett one day & says, "That sounds damned interesting. Can you prove it?" It's a readily butterflyable change IMO: change the conditions, you change how meetings go & what gets presented--if only slightly...& you only need slightly.
That said, I completely agree, doing it the other way is damned hard. Also changing Bomber Command's mind will never be easy.
BlondieBC said:
we know depth charges often cause the lost of contact with the submarine who will turn at the last moment. But how does one test this without using live ammo?
The obvious way: you ask RN submariners who have
been depth charged... That's also why USN submariners did so well against IJN A/S: they trained against a better team.