No Pearl Harbour raid. Victory for Japan?

I said that before. But if they pull off a Tsushima in Hawaiian waters, (35% chance) and land their troops, and take possession, it does not take a genius to figure out that they have corked Uncle. They have 6,200 kilometers to supply a garrison in Oahu. To the Indonesian oil fields it is about the same distance.

San Francisco to Oahu is roughly 3,800 km. To the Indonesian oil fields it is 14,000 km. Have you ever heard of Antoine Jomini? How about Dennis Mahan? How about Alfred Thayer Mahan? They were sort of eclipsed by Clauswitz and Sun Tzu, but they, all three, did harp on one thing that is often overlooked. If the enemy has taken up a strong position between where you are and you need to go, then you are short sheeted in the shaddocks. He can dictate terms of battle to you because of his interior lines of movement.

That is what the Japanese did in the Mandates (And botched it because they did not forward deploy. Already commented on how the Indonesian fuel oil contamination led to their late 1943 early 1944 IJN inaction.); but it is about the much better attrite and decrease strategy going forward, if the shock of losing not only the PACFLT but HAWAII does not bring Uncle to the table.

Uncle has to mount a rather large Normandy type operation to retake Hawaii. That will take at least 2 years and then he will be about where he starts March 1942 RTL after that operation. Instead of a 3 year 9 month war, you have a full 6 year war. What will that cost? RTL 125,000 dead; 380,000 wounded; $67BUSD. ATL triple it.

McP.

P.S. They mounted their Pearl Harbor raid and moved those 15 divisions equally far through quite disorganized but fierce opposition with incredible rapidity with the lift they had allocated (about 3 million GWT) in 4 different directions and in the space of just 120 days. (Malaya barrier, Philippine Islands, Indian Ocean Raid, and of course Burma, Don't you think that I'm aware of exactly what they could do if they had to do it?

In 120 days, they don't have 120 days. Hawaii was so far from Japanese supply lines they had to strap barrels of oil on to the sides of their ships. Here is an entire thread on why this is impossible. https://www.alternatehistory.com/fo...pearl-harbor-as-an-invasion-of-hawaii.424093/
 
I said that before. But if they pull off a Tsushima in Hawaiian waters, (35% chance) and land their troops, and take possession, it does not take a genius to figure out that they have corked Uncle. They have 6,200 kilometers to supply a garrison in Oahu. To the Indonesian oil fields it is about the same distance.

San Francisco to Oahu is roughly 3,800 km. To the Indonesian oil fields it is 14,000 km. Have you ever heard of Antoine Jomini? How about Dennis Mahan? How about Alfred Thayer Mahan? They were sort of eclipsed by Clauswitz and Sun Tzu, but they, all three, did harp on one thing that is often overlooked. If the enemy has taken up a strong position between where you are and you need to go, then you are short sheeted in the shaddocks. He can dictate terms of battle to you because of his interior lines of movement.

That is what the Japanese did in the Mandates (And botched it because they did not forward deploy. Already commented on how the Indonesian fuel oil contamination led to their late 1943 early 1944 IJN inaction.); but it is about the much better attrite and decrease strategy going forward, if the shock of losing not only the PACFLT but HAWAII does not bring Uncle to the table.

Uncle has to mount a rather large Normandy type operation to retake Hawaii. That will take at least 2 years and then he will be about where he starts March 1942 RTL after that operation. Instead of a 3 year 9 month war, you have a full 6 year war. What will that cost? RTL 125,000 dead; 380,000 wounded; $67BUSD. ATL triple it.

McP.

P.S. They mounted their Pearl Harbor raid and moved those 15 divisions equally far through quite disorganized but fierce opposition with incredible rapidity with the lift they had allocated (about 3 million GWT) in 4 different directions and in the space of just 120 days. (Malaya barrier, Philippine Islands, Indian Ocean Raid, and of course Burma.). I'm very aware of exactly what they could do if they had to do it, because what they did in the Southern Resources Area was far more logistically and militarily difficult RTL than taking Hawaii ATL. They did not attempt Hawaii because that was not possible with all the other operations they planned and executed. If they had postponed the sickle by 4 months, then Hawaii is mountable. A successful Hawaii operation means a still difficult SRA campaign which follows that also hobbles the China War, but what the hey? At least you have your bargaining position for a truce if you are Yamamoto.

Haven't you turned Hawaii into a massive version of Wake and Rabaul combined?

To "stopper" the American fleet you have to defend the base and to defend the base that leaves you devoid of resources to actually acquire the raw materials you need. So the Americans have six months or so to work out how they run a war without Pearl - it probably involves Subic and Singapore, both of which are likely to still be in allied hands given the concentration of Hawaii. Is it an efficient way to run the Allied war - no. Is it more efficient that the Japanese plan of trying to build a fortress Hawaii - yes.
 
If that notice is a demarche, or an actual declaration of intent to attack another nation, and threatens the US if the US interferes (still a demarche) what will be the result?



I understand the distasteful bigotry that infused the Pacific War, but let us put that aside for the larger issue, in that can we agree that there was intense hostility and confliction between the Americans and Japanese because of conflicting geo-political and economic interests in China? (Refer to map.(^^^)



Hmmm. If your government's top military and civil echelon has lost control of the mid-grade field officers who have started a no-win war in China, and you have a psychotic as your foreign minister and the senior government leadership is too frightened to confront the hereditary chief of state and tell him he needs to bring order to the chaos his inaction, and passive connivance has caused, then what are you as the SENIOR military leadership supposed to do?

A lot of them tried to rein in the crazies and were assassinated. That is a real historical fact.

Those that were left, chose to make the best war they could and they botched it. I mean there IS ONLY ONE MOVE THAT HAS A SNOWBALL'S CHANCE.

View attachment 480053

It takes everything Japan has, all 15 divisions they have allotted for the Southern Resources Area, all their lift, and everything they can scrap up that floats and flies and they better not miss when the PACFLT fights them, cause if they lose that one battle in their one main-chance gamble, they are DONE. The US will crush them like an egg in the riposte.

Holy Mackerel! That is truly balls to the wall. You're a braver man than I, McPherson.
 
If, if Hawaii could be taken I think it would end up isolated and cut off much like Rabaul. Just bigger. There would be no pressing strategic need to retake the Hawaiian Islands then. But it would take a year or more before they were fully cut off and their air assets reduced.



Derek Pullem's makes this point in his post #222.

"Haven't you turned Hawaii into a massive version of Wake and Rabaul combined?

To "stopper" the American fleet you have to defend the base and to defend the base that leaves you devoid of resources to actually acquire the raw materials you need. So the Americans have six months or so to work out how they run a war without Pearl - it probably involves Subic and Singapore, both of which are likely to still be in allied hands given the concentration of Hawaii. Is it an efficient way to run the Allied war - no. Is it more efficient that the Japanese plan of trying to build a fortress Hawaii - yes."
 

McPherson

Banned
In 120 days, they don't have 120 days. Hawaii was so far from Japanese supply lines they had to strap barrels of oil on to the sides of their ships. Here is an entire thread on why this is impossible. https://www.alternatehistory.com/fo...pearl-harbor-as-an-invasion-of-hawaii.424093/

The old Tully and Parshall argument. Note the time? After a presumed victory at Midway. Note the conditions? A half dozen fast fleet oilers have been sunk (Dutch efforts.) The Indonesian oil fields have been sabotaged. The SRA campaign has burned through 800,000 barrels of Japanese heavy fuel and 120,000 barrels of av-gas. The IJA reserve is scattered and committed in a 3 front war in the SRA and yes, under those conditions with a aroused US fleet and air garrison in Hawaii, invasion of Oahu is impossible.

The April numbers (Coral Sea result.) make it ridiculous.

But I am not talking April or May 1942 when you have an alert defender, the code breakers are active, the Japanese have burned half their oil and scattered their lift to the winds. What I discuss is September 1941.

Now on January 24 1941, Roosevelt's war honchos, Frank Knox and Henry Stimson, got together and talked HAWAIIAN turkey. The two of them cooked up a letter of instruction (LOI) to be forwarded to the Army and Navy commands IN THAT PLACE. May I quote that letter?

"The dangers [of an attack upon the fleet] envisaged in their order of importance and probability are considered to be: (1) Air bombing attack (2) Air torpedo plane attack, (3) Sabotage, (4) Submarine attack, (5) Mining, (6) Bombardment by gunfire."

Attack Upon Pearl Harbor by Japanese Armed Forces – 77th Congress, Senate Document No. 159.

Was that letter of instruction followed?

Aircraft warning system? Nope.
Offshore air patrol by Army or Navy aircraft? Nope.
AAA deployed and fighter interception plan implemented? Are you kidding? Caught on the ground, the planes destroyed. The AAA battery ammunition ashore and afloat was locked up; the AAA crews were not trained or prepared or by their guns collocated. It's a miracle PACFLT put up the flak she did. The IJN may have been impressed and appalled at the AAA of 7 December, but compared to what a prepared USN could do, it was nothing.
Any kind of system of dispersal and alert 5? Again are you kidding?

How long did it take the national guard division to man unprepared coast defenses that 7 December? 14 hours. With what? Mostly rifles and machine guns. There was coast defense artillery. But it was sited by Spanish American War/WW I logic.

post-1506-1340492041.gif


Where do we land? IJA?

p31_zoom_5241a8ce884c93.73686016.jpg


Haleiwa beach.

upload_2019-8-13_10-35-38.png


Note the gap?

Can we do it IJA?

Barely if everything goes right. The question is how many Daihatsus will we have left after the first wave claws ashore. Follow on echelons will have to be there immediately. No less than 7 divisions in 140 transports. Ship to shore requires at least 800 Daihatsus. (140 tonne LCIs). Do the Japanese have that?

Unfortunately as the SRA campaign demonstrates. Yes, they do.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------

The US PACFLT is still manned at 75% in September 1941 as LANTFLT siphons off the cream of the personnel. Training is still peacetime tempo. Air garrison is fairly strong with 85 Navy/Marine planes of all types and 140 AAC aircraft present. There is the one understrength national guard infantry division (~80%) still trying to bulk up and equip to meet a wartime TOE using obsolete equipment. PACFLT has torpedo, shell and bomb defects it knows nothing about. It will take a half year of war to show them that their pre-war stocks are defective. PACFLT is tanker short almost a dozen oilers as here fleet train has been stripped to support LANTFLT and the neutrality patrol.

The air defense has no radar, aside from the stuff mounted aboard the fleet, no good intercept coordination center ashore, no fleet command center ashore, a staff riddled with imbeciles (Pye and Ghormley for example.) and an admiral who is still stuck in 1935. (Kimmel). As for Short, he is trying and he thinks he knows what he does, but he is sabotage happy and has not pair attention to the Knox/Stinson LOI which is filed away forgotten in Navy and Army headquarters file rooms.

Note this. If the Japanese can take on Singapore and carry it off, a very high risk operation, with the SRA campaign in full swing and add Burma to it, what the hello makes Oahu so ridiculous to contemplate for these madmen who planned the SRA campaign?

I gave them 35% odds of pulling it off if they commit everything they have. That's actually better odds than they should have had at Lingayen Gulf or Singapore.

Haven't you turned Hawaii into a massive version of Wake and Rabaul combined?

To "stopper" the American fleet you have to defend the base and to defend the base that leaves you devoid of resources to actually acquire the raw materials you need. So the Americans have six months or so to work out how they run a war without Pearl - it probably involves Subic and Singapore, both of which are likely to still be in allied hands given the concentration of Hawaii. Is it an efficient way to run the Allied war - no. Is it more efficient that the Japanese plan of trying to build a fortress Hawaii - yes.

They took and held Rabaul and Wake to the end of the war, remember?

As for Subic, and Singapore? Follow up through Thailand and Indochina/Burma is overland and arduous, but doable without the Indochina convoys. Or they could pull a couple of divisions from around Shanghai and hustle them south. Philippine Islands s is cut off, so there is no resupply of that garrison. it can be taken in a follow up operation.

Now mind you, PACFLT has to be Nagumo clobbered exactly as in the RTL and he will have to stick around to cover the Kondo invasion convoy. That is where it gets dicey, because that is a two week long fight between what's left of PACFLT not at Pearl rushing home, the Americans ashore, and they are more or less wide open to the RN and Dutch until the Oahu operation is finished. Chancy.

And as for balls to the wall? If you are going all in. Go all in.
 
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nbcman

Donor
The old Tully and Parshall argument. Note the time? After a presumed victory at Midway. Note the conditions? A half dozen fast fleet oilers have been sunk (Dutch efforts.) The Indonesian oil fields have been sabotaged. The SRA campaign has burned through 800,000 barrels of Japanese heavy fuel and 120,000 barrels of av-gas. The IJA reserve is scattered and committed in a 3 front war in the SRA and yes, under those conditions with a aroused US fleet and air garrison in Hawaii, invasion of Oahu is impossible.

The April numbers (Coral Sea result.) make it ridiculous.

But I am not talking April or May 1942 when you have an alert defender, the code breakers are active, the Japanese have burned half their oil and scattered their lift to the winds. What I discuss is September 1941.

Now on January 24 1941, Roosevelt's war honchos, Frank Knox and Henry Stimson, got together and talked HAWAIIAN turkey. The two of them cooked up a letter of instruction (LOI) to be forwarded to the Army and Navy commands IN THAT PLACE. May I quote that letter?
Teensy problem with your proposed Haleiwa beach invasion in December:

The winter surf season...
The winter Hawaii surf season, which runs from approximately November through March, is where you can expect the largest swells of all year... in particular, large swells from the North, West and North-West are common on the North Shore. Swells will normally be around 6-12 feet, with bigger swells pushing 30 feet at times! This is when the pro-surfers come out to play and the North and West sides of the Hawaii Islands really liven up, especially The North Shore, Oahu.

How well do Daihatsus handle 6-12+ foot swells? There's a good reason why the US didn't put coastal defenses on the North Shore because it was improbable / impossible to land there.
 

McPherson

Banned
Teensy problem with your proposed Haleiwa beach invasion in December:

How well do Daihatsus handle 6-12+ foot swells? There's a good reason why the US didn't put coastal defenses on the North Shore because it was improbable / impossible to land there.

Quite well at Java. The Japanese also faced worse in the Philippine Islands and pulled it off. In December and January.
 
...snip....
That is what the Japanese did in the Mandates (And botched it because they did not forward deploy. Already commented on how the Indonesian fuel oil contamination led to their late 1943 early 1944 IJN inaction.); but it is about the much better attrite and decrease strategy going forward, if the shock of losing not only the PACFLT but HAWAII does not bring Uncle to the table.

Uncle has to mount a rather large Normandy type operation to retake Hawaii. That will take at least 2 years and then he will be about where he starts March 1942 RTL after that operation. Instead of a 3 year 9 month war, you have a full 6 year war. What will that cost? RTL 125,000 dead; 380,000 wounded; $67BUSD. ATL triple it.

P.S. They mounted their Pearl Harbor raid and moved those 15 divisions equally far through quite disorganized but fierce opposition with incredible rapidity with the lift they had allocated (about 3 million GWT) in 4 different directions and in the space of just 120 days. (Malaya barrier, Philippine Islands, Indian Ocean Raid, and of course Burma.). I'm very aware of exactly what they could do if they had to do it, because what they did in the Southern Resources Area was far more logistically and militarily difficult RTL than taking Hawaii ATL. They did not attempt Hawaii because that was not possible with all the other operations they planned and executed. If they had postponed the sickle by 4 months, then Hawaii is mountable. A successful Hawaii operation means a still difficult SRA campaign which follows that also hobbles the China War, but what the hey? At least you have your bargaining position for a truce if you are Yamamoto.

The offer being the Japanese will return Hawaii and go no further South than the Malay barrier in exchange for a peace treaty with the U.S.? So much would depend on what happens after the Hawaiian campaign when the Japanese try to take the British and Dutch colonies. And also a Pacific War that drags on until 1947? The Americans will still be producing atomic bombs by July 1945. And will have the long range planes to deliver them. Not against Hawaii but Japan.
 

nbcman

Donor
Quite well at Java. The Japanese also faced worse in the Philippine Islands and pulled it off. In December and January.
The US stopped their invasion of Lingayen Gulf in Jan 1945 due to sea swells of 6-8 feet. As far as I can see, the highest surf conditions are on the south side of Java (6-12 feet) while the Japanese landed on the northern shores. Do you have an actual citation where the Japanese faced 6-12 feet waves on average plus waves up to 30'-or worse conditions than this.
 
Can Japan land troops in Hawaii?

Yes.

Can Japan establish a beachhead there with just Marine forces successfully?

Yes.

Can that beachhead take out the entire defensive garrison and successfully take over Oahu?

Slim maybe. There are very few tanks for the Allies and most of their fuel reserves are imperiled by the attack at Pearl. If nothing else it gives the IJN a fuel source if the Americans don't sabotage the fuel remaining. It also potentially gives them access to the hulks in place to be raised and refitted for IJN use along with a host of other technical and technological trophies.

Once established on Oahu can they fan out and take over the rest of the Hawaiian chain?

Yes though only with difficulty. Leave even one island unconquered and you get the base from which the US retakes Oahu circa late 1942/early 1943 or in the alternative the main island of Hawaii itself to be used as a beachhead. Ironically this may lead to much greater development of Hawaii as an Army territory with Oahu/Pearl Harbor obviously as the naval venue.

Otherwise it becomes a protracted effort as Hawaii becomes either a priority to retake ASAP or potentially used as leverage in a peace treaty. There will be some sort of peace proposal floated after a successful attack like this and it will stir paranoia the likes of which might make McCarthy blush. I would pity the Japanese garrison on the receiving end of an American assault on the islands especially in 1944. Look for the war to be delayed by at least a year and for Japan to deploy more advanced models of submarines and aircraft before war's end, at the least the submarines I-201 and I-401, carrier aircraft A6M7 Reppu, bomber G8N, fighter aircraft Ki-84 and Ki-100, completed carrier Shinano, and perhaps a mass production version of the Shimakaze destroyer. What other projects are able to come to fruition because of the delay are also anyone's guess (does the Type 4 or Type 5 rifle come into play? Does China surrender thinking the Americans can no longer help them? What becomes of Russia with Vladivostok cut off from the rest of the Allies?) though this also makes Alaska likely a peripheral target and perhaps held longer by Japan and further, if Dutch Harbor falls then Alaska's future changes markedly.
 

McPherson

Banned
Not my fault if the Higgins was not all its cracked up to be. The IJA were also insane.



You can land in that surf. Worse was faced on D-day Normandy and worse at Guam. QED.

and further...

FINAL LANDING OPERATIONS

THE LANDINGS

According to the COMMANDER THIRD AMPHIBIOUS FORCE: "On schedule, at .0930, the first wave of LVT's hit the Lingayen beaches. The expected excellent weather prevailed: skies cloudy with thin broken cirrostratus, scattered alto-cumulus and cumulus; wind force 3 (7 to 10 knots) from the south-southeast and visibility limited to 6 miles by a slight haze aggravated by the dust and smoke kicked up by the pre-H-hour bombing and bombardment.

By mid-morning (of the second day of the assault) the 6 to 8 foot surf at the beaches, resulting from the increased swell, had caused landing operations to come to a halt."



--8--


The cause of the increased swell was the small typhoon which had developed and moved westward from the Peleliu area over the Sulu Sea and thence on to dissipate near the French Indo-China coast. On the third day of the assault the swell diminished and conditions improved rapidly to permit continued landing operations. Plates 1 to 4, prepared from the COMMANDER THIRD AMPHIBIOUS. FORCE synoptic maps plainly illustrate the movement and effect of this typhoon. Task Force 38, operating in the South China Sea at this time was to feel the affect of this typhoon upon its air and fueling operations.


SURF OBSERVATIONS

Aerological officers from the THIRD AMPHIBIOUS FORCE and from the SEVENTH AMPHIBIOUS FORCE were airborne in carrier based aircraft over the landing beach to furnish surf observations by radio. The reports were extremely accurate and in the words of the COMMANDER THIRD AMPHIBIOUS FORCE: "these reports were much appreciated by both the Attack Force Commander and by the Commanding General of the XIV CORPS. The latter characterized the reports as clear, concise and very useful, amply justifying the employment of these aerological officers in this type of duty."

It was temporary and not significant. Operating with a small typhoon at your back is not exactly being "cautious" either. The USN was insane, too.
 
They took and held Rabaul and Wake to the end of the war, remember?

As for Subic, and Singapore? Follow up through Thailand and Indochina/Burma is overland and arduous, but doable without the Indochina convoys. Or they could pull a couple of divisions from around Shanghai and hustle them south. Philippine Islands s is cut off, so there is no resupply of that garrison. it can be taken in a follow up operation.

Now mind you, PACFLT has to be Nagumo clobbered exactly as in the RTL and he will have to stick around to cover the Kondo invasion convoy. That is where it gets dicey, because that is a two week long fight between what's left of PACFLT not at Pearl rushing home, the Americans ashore, and they are more or less wide open to the RN and Dutch until the Oahu operation is finished. Chancy.

And as for balls to the wall? If you are going all in. Go all in.

I don't think it's a winning strategy - but neither was the OTL version either. Its pay off is an extra 12 months to catch up with the OTL schedule in reducing the Southern Resource Area defenders and preparing new defences. However if you give Singapore or the Phillipines an extra 3 months (especially Singapore) then they are significantly tougher nuts to crack. Philippines aren't cut off - it's just significantly more difficult.

The hard decision for the Americans will be to accept an occupation of Hawaii by the Japanese as a dead end and not prepare for an early invasion. Defending (and maybe attacking) the rest of the Pacific with the British and Dutch and Australians pays off here.
 
If the Japanese were able to pull off a successful Hawaiian campaign what happens next? I would guess there would be a even higher level of fear and a bigger build up of defensive forces along the North American West coast. Including Canada if Japan goes to war with the British Empire too.

I would think this would butterfly away the Aleutian campaign. It serves no purpose now for Japan and they would prefer to use their resources elsewhere.

After the successful conclusion of the Hawaiian campaign what if the Japanese attacked the Philippines and the DEI but did not attack the British? Does Japan need the Burmese rice if they have Thailand and Indochinas' rice? Do they need the Malayan rubber if they have all the rubber from Indochina and the DEI? With all the oil of Indonesia and Dutch Borneo does Japan need Brunei? Are there other natural resources in Malaya that Japan can't get elsewhere?

1941 has not been a good year for Great Britain what with the losses in the Battle of the Atlantic and the worsening situation in North Africa and the Mediterranean. And now they're watching what at the time appears to be an unstoppable German advance into the Soviet Union. Then they're shocked further by the destruction of most of the U.S. Pacific Fleet and the Japanese capture of important American territories. Soon followed by the Americans cutting a peace deal with Japan in exchange for the return of Hawaii but not the Philippines as the U.S., shaken by their heavy naval losses in the Pacific and further losses to Operation Drumbeat braces for their new war with Germany and Italy.

So if Japan announces to the British that they are going to take Indonesia and it would be best for all concerned that the British stay out of the way would Churchill agree? The Japanese do have a history of honouring agreements. Don't they? If the Japanese can get an agreement with the British then there is no need go to war with the British Empire. Are the Royal Navy assets that Great Britain can spare at that time to send to the Far East and base in Singapore a significant threat to the entire IJN? So if there is no pressing need for Japan to go to war with the British then why would they? In this scenario Japan in 1942 has all the former Dutch colonies,Indochina,Thailand and the Philippines. A peace treaty with America and an agreement with Britain. Sounds like victory to me. At least for time being.
 
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McPherson

Banned
I don't think it's a winning strategy - but neither was the OTL version either. Its pay off is an extra 12 months to catch up with the OTL schedule in reducing the Southern Resource Area defenders and preparing new defences. However if you give Singapore or the Phillipines an extra 3 months (especially Singapore) then they are significantly tougher nuts to crack. Philippines aren't cut off - it's just significantly more difficult.

I know it is not a winning strategy. But I kind of disagree about the US response and about Singapore. Singapore you could give all the resources available that the UK earmarked RTL for those three months and Perceival, Phillips, and Wavell and that whole rotten command structure the British had (especially the RAF setup), would still have failed. They were strong enough already, just not well led or prepared. It does matter that the leadership, civilian and military, really sucks in Malaysia and Burma, you know?

The hard decision for the Americans will be to accept an occupation of Hawaii by the Japanese as a dead end and not prepare for an early invasion. Defending (and maybe attacking) the rest of the Pacific with the British and Dutch and Australians pays off here.

Subs, subs and more subs, and get Australia ready as the launch pad for the comeback.[/QUOTE]
 
There might be a small chance that they actually invade and capture Oahu and/or other islands in the chain. Now you have American citizens being held prisoner and American soil occupied (I know, state in 1959, but how would it be spun?) by the evil Japanese. US built around 300 subs during the war with range to cut off those islands. First they isolate them, then they take them back. If the attack on Pearl pissed off the US, wait until they learn what the Japanese did while occupying Hawaii. Slave labor, executions and systematic raping of American citizens will not fair well in public opinion polls. Sure it will take longer, but that just means more ships, subs, tanks and planes built by the US. The US HATED Japan after Pearl. After this, well instant sunshine is coming to a non-fire bombed city near you. In the end IMHO Japan will lose but maybe be worse off.
 

nbcman

Donor
Not my fault if the Higgins was not all its cracked up to be. The IJA were also insane.



You can land in that surf. Worse was faced on D-day Normandy and worse at Guam. QED.

and further...



It was temporary and not significant. Operating with a small typhoon at your back is not exactly being "cautious" either. The USN was insane, too.
Unfortunately, this is what it looks like out from the North shore at times (68' waves):


And on shore:


Typical waves at Guam are under 10' in December/January. I am not seeing any of your claims of Japan encountering worse surf conditions than the North Shore of HI proven. So not QED.
 
There might be a small chance that they actually invade and capture Oahu and/or other islands in the chain. Now you have American citizens being held prisoner and American soil occupied (I know, state in 1959, but how would it be spun?) by the evil Japanese. US built around 300 subs during the war with range to cut off those islands. First they isolate them, then they take them back. If the attack on Pearl pissed off the US, wait until they learn what the Japanese did while occupying Hawaii. Slave labor, executions and systematic raping of American citizens will not fair well in public opinion polls. Sure it will take longer, but that just means more ships, subs, tanks and planes built by the US. The US HATED Japan after Pearl. After this, well instant sunshine is coming to a non-fire bombed city near you. In the end IMHO Japan will lose but maybe be worse off.

But what if Japan gives Hawaii back to the U.S. in early 1942 to conclude a peace treaty?
 

nbcman

Donor
You do know that your own HYPERWAR citation was all the proof I needed?
Actually, no. The Hyperwar citation noted that 6-8 feet swells stopped the USN landing operation. Now how will waves double to five times that size or more affect the IJN when they are landing on the North Shore of Hawaii? Daihatsus might be better than a Higgins boat but can they ride waves like a surfboard?
 
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