No Pearl Harbor, No War in the Pacific?

I think the big 'what if' is, does War Plan Orange go into effect? Without a declaration of war the US is rather badly limited in options. Does any more of the fleet get based in the Philippines to intimidate Japan? How much naval and air power can the UK spare for the Pacific? Same for the Dutch? And what will Stalin do (probably the same as OTL, especially if Scorge can convince him Japan won't attack)?

By the mid or late 1930s US Navy War Plan Orange had been superseded, predominately, by the Rainbow War Plans.
 
What about the affect on the campaign?

I see two additional problems with this scenario. First, based on what old and fallible memory, historically the Japanese did kind of a pincer movement on the Dutch East Indies. One of the two pincers went through the southern Philippines once US forces were pinned up in the Bataan peninsula. The other pincer went through Malaysia and Singapore. I suppose the Japanese could have gone directly from Indochina into Borneo, but that leaves Japanese forces in Taiwan out of the equation. Also, an invasion force going directly from Indochina to Borneo would be covering a much longer distance--probably a good 600 miles, which would make land-based air cover problematic.

Second, the US could do a lot of things short of war to make life difficult for the Japanese. If the US decided to be 'neutral' in the same way they were in the North Atlantic, they could track Japanese ships and report the locations to the British. They could send large amounts of Lend Lease directly where the British needed it, and if the Japanese tried to stop the shipments then that's an act of war. The US could build up Wake, and then begin a buildup in Guam. The Pacific fleet could maneuver aggressively in the Central Pacific, tying up Japanese assets to keep an eye on them. The US could send more pilots and planes, including bombers, to the Flying Tigers, who were constituted before the US entered the war officially. They could, and would build up aggressively in the Philippines, as several people have pointed out.

In terms of Lend Lease, historically the US apparently suspended Lend Lease for about a month after Pearl Harbor to rebuild defenses in Hawaii--seizing planes that would have been bound to the British, and replacing them with later production. Without Pearl Harbor, presumably those planes would have gone to Britain, and probably to the Far East. I doubt if they would be enough to make much difference, but the Brits would have had at least some additional equipment minus Pearl Harbor.

Bottom line: In addition to the problems already mentioned, the Japanese would have had more difficulty creating a second pincer to attack the Dutch East Indies, and the US would have had a host of options short of war to make the Japanese miserable and provoke the Japanese into an attack at a time of the US's choosing. That doesn't necessarily mean that leaving the US alone was a bad idea. It just means that it had some additional downsides.
 
If you think about it the war with China which is the Cause of the Boycott, which leads to the Pacific war was totally unnecessary.
Japan was #2 or #3 in Investment in China. [For a captive Market]
Japan had extensive Iron and Coal Fields in Korea and Manchuria.
It had radiply growing industries using the Cheap labor of Korea. [ cheap compared to Japanese costs]
It had Manchuria for Ranches and Farms to fed everyone.
And the south Sea islands for a touch of Exotica.

If it had stopped in 1935, and concentrated on Internal development, It would have passed Britian and France by the late '60's ~early '70's.

So whe need a POD in the early '30's just after taking Manchuria that totally knocks the Militarists, out of Power.

?Any Ideas?
 
DuQuense - Very good points. Of course, as I mentioned, was Japan in a position to exploit any or all of this? And I agree, the militarists would have to go to achieve this. And don't forget China is still fighting back, making that difficult at best.

DaleCoz - Been a _big_ fan of your AH for a long time. You're right of course, Roosevelt is bound and determined to get the US into the war and will do anything and everything possible to provoke Japan into making the first move. Can you imagine him trying to base the Pacific Fleet in the Philippines to provoke Japan?

Getting the militarists out of office would be a big help but, given what's going on, that seems doubtful. And under no circumstances would they leave the US with large forces at their back door unmolested.
 
And don't forget China is still fighting back, making that difficult at best.
Japan took manchuria in 1931, then forced China to agree to it. and the two were at peace
Then in 1935 came the Battle of the Great Wall where Japan forced China to Agree that the Border would be the Great Wall.
Again came a peace treaty.
Then came in 1937 the China war

So if you can remove the Militants between 1931 and 1935, there wouldn't be any fighting.

If you remove the Militants before 1931, They wouldn't have Manchuria, But they may be more stable without It.
Let me think about this.


[Whe need more Japanese, Korean, and Chinese members]
 
Unfortunately, the POD is ASB, because it's based on a false premise. It's not what the U.S. would do, or could do, it's what the Japanese thought the U.S. would do. IJN was positive, if Japan attacked Britain, the U.S. would immediately join in. Seeing the threat from the P.I. to SLOCs to DEI,:eek: this was just not on.:rolleyes: Hence, attacks on the P.I., & Pearl Harbor, were essential. There's also an issue of bureaucratic in-fighting: IJN didn't want to lose status (or face, or budget $$...:eek:) to IJA, so it proposed indivisibility...which led inescapably to the need to attack Pearl Harbor. Correct? No. Rational? To Japan, maybe. Sensible? Hell, no.:eek::eek: Suicidal? Oh, yeah.
 
IJN was positive, if Japan attacked Britain, the U.S. would immediately join in.

Do you happen to know who in the IJN was positive? Even better do you have English language sources? I am slightly confused. Rear-Adm. Maeda Minoru, head of General Staff Intelligence Bureau, certainly believed that operations in the East Indies would inevitably lead to war with the USA (interview, 19 June 1962, Boeicho Senshibu Archives). His argument was that they were the same race. However, he was only a Rear-Admiral. Fukudome Shigeru suggested that Admiral Shimada, the Navy Minister, did not want to attack America (The Japanese Navy in World War II, ed. David C. Evans, page 6). Parshall and Tully state on page 24 of "Shattered Sword" that Admiral Nagano, Chief of Staff, did not want to attack America but they do not give a source. These were the two top admirals. The conclusion that America would fight seems to have been reached in war game involving the Combined Fleet in early 1941 but I do not know who played America (Maeda?). Yamamoto, who was theoretically commanded by Nagano may have ignored his superiors if he had fallen in love with the Pearl Harbor idea. However, we do not really know his views (or at least I don't).
 
Do you happen to know who in the IJN was positive? Even better do you have English language sources?
I can't name names offhand, & I"m not sure if any were actually named, but that was the conclusion Peattie & Evans came to in Kaigun. It's my suspicion, nothing more really, IJN was using it as a lever on IJA a) for budget reasons, b) to dissuade them from attacking DEI, or c) both.
 
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Yamamoto, who was theoretically commanded by Nagano may have ignored his superiors if he had fallen in love with the Pearl Harbor idea. However, we do not really know his views (or at least I don't).

Yamamoto's quote "we have awakened a sleeping giant" is admission that attacking the US was a _huge_ mistake. He drew up the Pearl Harbor attack in the hopes of doing enough damage to allow Japan to sieze what they needed, then dig in and inflict enough casualities to force some sort of terms out of the US. Instead they failed to declare war before the attack began and caused enough uproar to inflame the US public. As Adm. Halsey said, "when we're done the Japanese language will only be spoken in hell!"
 
The United States promised to leave the Philippines and I think 1946 was already decided on in the early FDR presidency as the year to go. All Japan had to do is wait a couple of years for them to leave and then take it over with no one to stop them.

That solves one of their problems.
 
The United States promised to leave the Philippines and I think 1946 was already decided on in the early FDR presidency as the year to go. All Japan had to do is wait a couple of years for them to leave and then take it over with no one to stop them.

That solves one of their problems.

True, but the oil embargo forced Japan to act immediately or be forced to abandon China.
 

HJ Tulp

Donor
The United States promised to leave the Philippines and I think 1946 was already decided on in the early FDR presidency as the year to go. All Japan had to do is wait a couple of years for them to leave and then take it over with no one to stop them.

That solves one of their problems.


1946 would be the year of independence for the Phillipines, I really doubt that the Americans would totally leave that part of Asia.
 
The United States promised to leave the Philippines and I think 1946 was already decided on in the early FDR presidency as the year to go. All Japan had to do is wait a couple of years for them to leave and then take it over with no one to stop them.

That solves one of their problems.

Your date is not only correct but, IIRC, historical. The PI did become fully independent in 1946... as a close US ally to this day. Since 1936, it had had its own army and government in any case. No way is the US going to just stand by and let Japan invade their new best pal in the Pacific.

Poland, it should be pointed out, was never a part of the British Empire.
 
No Pearl Harbour doesn't necessarily mean no Pacific War but it might have been worth risking it. If America intervened American warships would be operating far from bases and with little air cover as intervention would result in an all out attack on the Phillipines. The ships would have been sunk without the feeling of treachery that Pearl Harbour produced so a compromise settlement might be reached. There are limit to provocation and it is concievable that the U-boats would have pushed their luck even further after the sinking of the Reuben James. There would be limits to what Congress would tolerate
 

HJ Tulp

Donor
No Pearl Harbour doesn't necessarily mean no Pacific War but it might have been worth risking it. If America intervened American warships would be operating far from bases and with little air cover as intervention would result in an all out attack on the Phillipines. The ships would have been sunk without the feeling of treachery that Pearl Harbour produced so a compromise settlement might be reached. There are limit to provocation and it is concievable that the U-boats would have pushed their luck even further after the sinking of the Reuben James. There would be limits to what Congress would tolerate


I don't see any reason not to use the PI incase of American intervention.
 
No Pearl Harbour doesn't necessarily mean no Pacific War but it might have been worth risking it. If America intervened American warships would be operating far from bases and with little air cover as intervention would result in an all out attack on the Phillipines. The ships would have been sunk without the feeling of treachery that Pearl Harbour produced so a compromise settlement might be reached. There are limit to provocation and it is concievable that the U-boats would have pushed their luck even further after the sinking of the Reuben James. There would be limits to what Congress would tolerate

Um, are you saying America had no naval and air bases in PI? Because they sort of did.

In any case, the Japanese in our world attacked both PH and PI more-or-less simultaneously. There is no concievable benefit to not attacking Pearl Harbour, it will only leave a few more American ships at large. If the Phillipines attack is to be perceived as "honourable" in America (and I don't think this would have caused a compromise peace at any point), it must be declared. Why not just make sure Pearl Harbour is pre-declared? Obviously that would be a sham, since the fleet would already be on the way... but that would also be true for a PI-alone attack, unless every Japanese admiral has a sudden heart-attack and is replaced with a ridiculously cautious political officer.
 
By the time the main fleet had sailed to the Philiines, the Japanese would have knocked out most of the bases rendering them unusable like they knocked out Darwin.

Um, are you saying America had no naval and air bases in PI? Because they sort of did.

In any case, the Japanese in our world attacked both PH and PI more-or-less simultaneously. There is no concievable benefit to not attacking Pearl Harbour, it will only leave a few more American ships at large. If the Phillipines attack is to be perceived as "honourable" in America (and I don't think this would have caused a compromise peace at any point), it must be declared. Why not just make sure Pearl Harbour is pre-declared? Obviously that would be a sham, since the fleet would already be on the way... but that would also be true for a PI-alone attack, unless every Japanese admiral has a sudden heart-attack and is replaced with a ridiculously cautious political officer.
 
True, but the oil embargo forced Japan to act immediately or be forced to abandon China.

I don't know, I think the US wanted China's independence guaranteed and the ports open to trade (Obviously since they felt strongly enough about it to embargo Japan), but also that they realized that in order to get Japan to agree, certain concessions had to be made, like they would to any independent nation.

If Japan had seriously negotiated, then they likely could have held onto Manchuria and some very few northern conquests. Maybe even hold onto Indochina. In the near future, Japan's actions could be overlooked as the cold war emerges, and as the oil reserves in Manchuria are discovered, they could become fully self-sufficient.

This would require a change in the thought of the Japanese though, one that allows them to lose a lot of prestige in order to secure a more stable future.
 
sl

If the Japan decides to take a calculated risk and disregard the danger from the US, and Pearl Harbor never happens they will have more recourses to use against the British and after taking Singapore they will try and capture key points in the Indian Ocean and India.
A direct result of Japan not attacking US will be no declaration of war from Germany and Italy to US. That means that the British will have a very tough time fighting the Japanese in the Indian front and the Indian Ocean and the German/Italian forces in North Africa and the Mediterranean. They (German/Italian/Japanese) might ever collaborate and coordinate their offensives to put even more pressure on the Brits.
All this can be possible if the Japanese try and fight the war in a more “sanitized” way and the American congress insist on keeping the country out of the war.
 
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