I’ll go more into detail on this later, but the Americans can more afford the expenditure of retaking the islands than the Japanese can afford to spend in shipping to maintain the threat.
No Pearl Harbor attack, instead...
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I’d also add that the defense of the northern flank is overrated, since the Americans aren’t going to attack from the Aleutians, at least not primarily. They’re always going to be coming out of the south and west. Ie Australia/the Philippines and Hawaii.
As I understand the Philippines weren't even necessary and they could have just as well skipped them.
The US on the way back? Maybe, though it was politically challenging. Japan? Heavens, no. The Philippines in US hands were a knife at the throat of their entire southern lunge. And they couldn't just rely on the US to stay out: US polls showed majority support for taking any action to support the Dutch and British around that area, even if it risked war with Japan.
Yes, that. I know it's politically challening, but I understood it was military not necessary and they could have gone straight for Okinawa.
Fuzzy Dunlop
Banned
. . . and have a Coral Sea style battle on steroids where the IJN can mallet the USN.
Has anyone war gamed this?
The US, in 1933. The US liked it so much they altered all of War Plan Orange to never try anything like it.
Yes, such wasted attacks would certainly Doolittle for the Japanese war effort.
Of course, if we look at what the US sent into the Alaskan/Aleutian's campaign in response to the OTL invasion, we can start to see what that cost the US in terms of forces better deployed elsewhere. It isn't what is there on those islands that matters, it is what the enemy is afraid the other guys can do from there. We need only look at what the Japanese did in response to the only two bombing raids conducted from the Aleutians to realize that there is indeed benefits beyond the obvious.
As I stated to Guilded Age Nostalgia, the United States can better afford to dedicate forces to retaking the islands than the Japanese can afford to sustain the garrisons there. Remember, they only have a limited shipping pool with which to move troops, sustain island garrisons, and maintain their colonies - and they started with only 65% of what they needed just to sustain their civilian economy.
Sustainment of Midway Island and the Aleutians are going to disproportionally suck up Japanese merchant shipping due to the sheer distance from any Japanese bases, and this is no bueno for a country with inadequate shipping to begin with and few prospects for making up that gap. Worse, they open up that merchant shipping to attrition, particularly around Midway; American submariners are going to be salivating at the chance to interdict Japanese shipping from the French Frigate Shoals, and early-war Mark 14s aside, they're going to reap a toll Japan cannot afford.
This also assumes the Japanese can even take Midway Island. Midway has twice as many Marines in December 1941 (pg.23) as Wake did, and has even nastier terrain, namely the reef several hundred yards offshore. Given what happened at Wake I suspect 2500 Japanese troops aren't going to cut it, especially since the Kido Butai can't stay around very long. While 1000 miles west of Pearl, nonetheless the First Air Fleet is only going to have fuel for a few days of ops. The larger Guam force is more viable, but the Marines can hold out long enough for the carriers to need to skedaddle, and at that point the Japanese have to contend with the Pacific Fleet moving out in force.
These were objections raised to the actual Midway operation:
Shattered Sword, pages 34-35.
And you seriously believe they would be able to pull that off? The Japanese were notoriously slow at constructing airfields throughout the war - the same construction force allocated to Midway was shipped off to Guadalcanal after the failure of that operation and was still not done a month later when the Marines came a-calling. Buin on Bougainville is another example: the Japanese tried to get the damn thing built for most of the campaign and didn't finish until 1943. They just didn't have heavy construction equipment on hand.
For goodness' sake, the US was devoting up to 1500 men constructing Midway's facilities and defenses and it still took them the better part of two years! And where's the aircraft, fuel, and munitions coming from?
Based on their track record, such a speedy turnaround is an utter fantasy on the part of the Japanese. Wouldn't be the first time.
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From: Parshall, Jonathan; Tully, Anthony. Shattered Sword: The Untold Story of the Battle of Midway .
Operation MI would begin at the same time that Kakuta opened his attacks on Dutch Harbor: N-3 day (4 June Tokyo time, 3 June local). Nagumo’s force—six fleet carriers (CarDivs 1, 2, and 5), two fast battleships from BatDiv 3, two heavy cruisers, and eleven destroyers with their light cruiser flotilla leader—would approach Midway from the northwest. On the morning of the 4th (Tokyo time), Dai-ichi Kidō Butai would be in position to strike. It was believed that a single attack would be sufficient to destroy the American airbase and its aircraft. The Japanese presumed that they would have the element of strategic and tactical surprise on their side, because offensive activities would be opened concurrently with Operation AL. Thus, Nagumo’s carriers would simply sweep in unannounced and deliver a death blow against American airpower on the island. Day N-2 (5/4 June) would see additional air strikes, with the Japanese turning their attention toward reducing the island’s defenses in preparation for the coming amphibious operation. While it was understood that Nagumo would have to deal with any American carriers that ventured north from Pearl Harbor to contest the Midway invasion, it was anticipated that the Americans would not be able to steam the distance between Hawaii and Midway in any less than three days. This being the case, Nagumo would only have to attend to one thing at a time. Nagumo’s force would also use ten of its Type 97 carrier attack planes for scouting purposes. Each of these aircraft would search out to a range of 400 miles to help provide early warning of the American fleet. Ground operations would begin on the morning of N-1 day (6/5 June). The Japanese would land on Kure Island, a tiny islet sixty miles west of Midway. Rear Admiral Fujita Ryūtaro’s Seaplane Tender Group would secure this objective with a small contingent of troops. It was then to be put into operation as a seaplane base for use against Midway itself.
On the morning of N-Day (7/6 June), Midway would be assaulted by a mixed group of both Navy and Army units. The landing would be carried out by barge, known in the Imperial Navy as Daihatsu, each of which could carry about 100 soldiers as far as the reef. From there, the men would have to wade the remaining 200 or more yards, through the lagoon, and onto the beaches by foot. The Navy’s 2nd Combined SNLF, consisting of some 1,500 soldiers, would be landed on Sand Island. Eastern Island would be invaded by the 1,000 men of Colonel Ichiki Kiyonao’s regiment, named the Ichiki Detachment after its commander. Both forces would be landed on the southern shores of the islands, where the reef was less of an obstacle to amphibious movements. An additional landing on Sand Island’s northwest corner was also planned, if necessary. Accompanying the combat troops were two construction battalions (some of which were equipped with American construction material captured at Wake Island) and other auxiliary personnel necessary to repair Midway and turn it into a frontline air base, bringing the total ground forces to over 5,000. The transports would also be hauling along ninety-four cannon, forty machine guns, six Type A midget submarines, five motor torpedo boats, and all the accoutrements to develop Midway into a major outpost. Additional midget submarines, as well as land-based torpedo tubes and a dozen 20-cm guns, were slated for delivery in mid-June. In a fashion that was typical of Japan’s interservice cooperation, the Army troops would sail separately from Yokosuka, while the SNLF troops would sail from Kure. Both the Army and Navy had their own separate transports, and neither service was willing to accommodate the other aboard their own ships. Both private fleets would rendezvous at Saipan and thereafter would sail together under the command of Rear Admiral Tanaka Raizo’s Transport Group. This force consisted of the light cruiser Jintsū, ten destroyers, three patrol boats, twelve transports, and several oilers. In relative proximity to Tanaka would sail Vice Admiral Kurita Takeo’s Close Support Group, which was centered on the four powerful heavy cruisers of CruDiv 7—Kumano, Suzuya, Mikuma, and Mogami. This quartet’s forty eight-inch guns were to provide fire support for the landing. However, the Imperial Navy’s raison d’étre was engaging enemy warships, not supporting landings. The Navy had never spent much time developing any sort of formal approach for spotting and coordinating gunfire ashore for troops. In hindsight, there is a very real question as to how effective CruDiv 7 would have proved to be in this role had it actually been put to the test. Kurita was accompanied by two destroyers and an oiler. Also near to hand, but sailing separately, was a minesweeper group consisting of three minesweepers, three subchasers, and an ammunition ship.
Somewhat farther away would be the Invasion Force Main Body, under the command of Vice Admiral Kondō Nobutake. It consisted of the other two members of BatDiv 3— Hiei and Kongo—under Rear Admiral Mikawa Gun`ichi. Four heavy cruisers1—Atago, Chōkai, Haguro, and Myōkō—also accompanied the force. The screen for this powerful unit was commanded by Rear Admiral Nishimura Shōji aboard the light cruiser Yura, which led seven destroyers. Also included in this group was the fine new light carrier Zuihō and her plane guard destroyer. All three of these formations—Tanaka’s, Kondō’s, and Kurita’s—were to approach Midway from the west-southwest. Midway was scheduled for capture on the 6th (local time), leaving a day for the base to be put back into operation in advance of the expected sea battle with the Americans. During this time, Nagumo’s carriers would be supporting the invasion and simultaneously moving to the northeast of the island in preparation for the naval battle. His force was expected to be in position to support Kondō from the north-northwest by the end of the 6th. Kondō, for his part, would keep his battleships ready to deliver backup fire support against Midway if stiff resistance was encountered. The backstop to both Kondō’s and Nagumo’s forces was Yamamoto himself and his Main Body. Centered on BatDiv 1—Yamato, Nagato, and Mutsu—this force contained the largest guns in the fleet. It was to follow behind Nagumo during the initial phase of the operation. Within this force would be several smaller formations that could maneuver independently if need be. One of them, the Special Group, consisting of seaplane tenders Chiyōda and Nisshin, which were carrying midget submarines and motor torpedo boats, respectively, to reinforce Midway once it was captured. The second special formation, the Carrier Group, consisted of the ancient light carrier Hōshō. Around all of the elements of the Main Force would be Rear Admiral Hashimoto Shintaro’s Screening Force, consisting of light cruiser Sendai and eight destroyers. Three oilers accompanied the group. Once Midway was secured, the Main Body would be in position to support Kondō should the need arise. It was strongly believed that after six months of war, the Americans were now sufficiently weakened and demoralized that they would only sortie from Pearl Harbor with some coaxing. Kondō was the bait. Among other things, his flotilla contained a pair of capital ships (Hiei and Kongō), which made it a force worth attacking. At the same time, his two battleships were fast enough to extricate themselves from trouble if need be. Yamamoto apparently did not want to tip his hand by revealing his Main Body too soon, in the belief that such a massive array of firepower would induce the Americans to stay home.
Actually taking Midway makes perfect sense in the context of the Japanese strategic plan. I've wondered why they did not seize it December/January 1941/42. But it serves no purpose in the context of the US strategic war plans. All of them.
Japans naval leaders wanted to reproduce their victory at Tushima Straits 44 years earlier. That is the USN set out across the Pacific to save the Philippines & be ambushed far from its bases on the West Coast of the US. The establishment of Truk as a naval base and satellite airfields and seaplane stations across the Manfates provided a base in the central Pacific for this ambush.
The USN wanted nothing to do with this. Look up the history of War Plan ORANGE, the Five RAINBOW plans, and Kimmels WPP-46. All overlapping and integrated plans for a Pacific war.
The USN was testing plans for a Pacific war with Japan from shortly after the War Scare of 1907. Those were staff studies, map exercises, and fleet exercises at sea and were updates almost annually. These were some of the most throughly tested war plans of the first half or the 20th Century. The conclusion from all that was it would be suicide to rush off to fight the Japanese without a year or more of preparation. The fleet exercises and staff studies showed the battle fleet would lose up to 70% of its combat effectiveness before it reached the Philippines. Mechanical degradation, crew exhaustion, attrition from submarines and carrier raids, would attrition away the combat effectiveness. The Japanese got around that by having the base at Truk. USN war games made it clear it was essential that intermediate bases be established. This is what caused USMC Major Pete Ellis to do his seminal study 'Advanced Base Operations in Micronesia' in the early 1920s. In that he examined and refined the requirements for seizing those bases with Marine and Army landing forces.
Kimmels WPP-46 stated clearly the Pacific Fleet would remain on the strategic defense, covering the western Hemisphere until the Fleet was built to the necessary offensive strength. It did allow for raids and opportunistic actions.
Japans naval leaders wanted to reproduce their victory at Tushima Straits 44 years earlier. That is the USN set out across the Pacific to save the Philippines & be ambushed far from its bases on the West Coast of the US. The establishment of Truk as a naval base and satellite airfields and seaplane stations across the Manfates provided a base in the central Pacific for this ambush.
The USN wanted nothing to do with this. Look up the history of War Plan ORANGE, the Five RAINBOW plans, and Kimmels WPP-46. All overlapping and integrated plans for a Pacific war.
The USN was testing plans for a Pacific war with Japan from shortly after the War Scare of 1907. Those were staff studies, map exercises, and fleet exercises at sea and were updates almost annually. These were some of the most throughly tested war plans of the first half or the 20th Century. The conclusion from all that was it would be suicide to rush off to fight the Japanese without a year or more of preparation. The fleet exercises and staff studies showed the battle fleet would lose up to 70% of its combat effectiveness before it reached the Philippines. Mechanical degradation, crew exhaustion, attrition from submarines and carrier raids, would attrition away the combat effectiveness. The Japanese got around that by having the base at Truk. USN war games made it clear it was essential that intermediate bases be established. This is what caused USMC Major Pete Ellis to do his seminal study 'Advanced Base Operations in Micronesia' in the early 1920s. In that he examined and refined the requirements for seizing those bases with Marine and Army landing forces.
Kimmels WPP-46 stated clearly the Pacific Fleet would remain on the strategic defense, covering the western Hemisphere until the Fleet was built to the necessary offensive strength. It did allow for raids and opportunistic actions.
I'm not a WWII expert by any means (especially compared to some on this site) but is Japan attacking Pearl twice an option? I remember hearing that a second wave was planned but called off - what if Japan launches that second wave and causes even more damage?
Garrison
Donor
The whole point of PH was to deliver a massive blow to the US Pacific Fleet that in conjunction with their other attacks would render the USA unable/unwilling to prosecute the war and get them to make peace on terms favourable to Japan. The only plan crazier than OTL for Japan would be not trying to deliver that knockout blow and settling in for the sort of attritional war that leaving the Pacific Fleet intact would involve.
They did launch two waves. The debate is usually on whether a third wave was worth doing, and general consensus is no - there weren’t really any targets left, the planes would have to land in the dark, aircraft losses were mounting, and their destroyers were rapidly approaching bingo fuel.
Because they need every scrap of shipping and manpower they can muster to take other, closer, more strategically valuable islands?
It’s really not complicated.
Midway was weakly defended in December 1941. One option would be to use the amphib force designated for Wake to seize Midway. Then pick off Wake later as resources allowed. In the Wake operation there was a outside chance Fletchers Task Force would have been caught in a unfavorable battle had he made a relief or evacuation attempt. The same situation could develop around Midway in December, slightly more balanced. The Japanese could hope to ambush a relief force as they missed doing @ Wake.
The issue isn't the forces they need, but the shipping of the forces. If they want to seize Midway, they'll have to not seize something else.
As I noted in my earlier reply, Midway is more heavily defended than Wake in December 1941, with double the number of Marines. Further, given the distance that force needs more shipping, shipping that has to come from the limited pool allocated to either the southern operations or sustaining Japan’s economy, and the distance also still limits the ability of Japanese warships to stick around.
Given Second Wake still took fifteen days, even if the Marines don’t beat back the attack by themselves they have more than enough time to wait for the Japanese fleet to leave and then hit it with the full strength of the Pacific Fleet and Hawaii-based B-17s.
There was a second wave. There was a third wage as a possibility, but it was not ordered in. This is mostly because sending the Third Wave in would have taken much longer (Wave 2 was in the air and well on its way before Wave 1 attacked, but Wave 3 would have required returning planes to be refueled, rearmed, and their pilots rested and fed. Hours of work, and as Midway demonstrated not exactly quick either. There would be a gap of hours, and then the wave would hit the base which was now at full alert, and would have suffered severe losses for questionable gains.
Once the war is actually being fought attacking at a later date is suicide. The Japanese attack succeeded OTL largely because it was a surprise attack against an opponent who they were not at war with.
Ok, so time for some facts:
First, about Guam, wiki says that...
This table is taken directly from the mentioned article, for the express purpose of making clear the disparity of forces involved. The US forces on Guam, which lacked submarines and long ranged flying boats (NO AIRFIELD, remember, so no way for land based air to stage through to the Philippines and thus threaten Japan's SLOC).
So much for Guam being an (immediate) threat to the Japanese.
Now, let us take a look at the actual facts of the second attack on wake:
Again from the Wiki
So, when I read things like:
In this thread, we are looking at 3 Scenarios, the first one Midway gets hit by the PH force + the Guam force. I put my money on Midway falling within 12-15 hours tops, just like Wake did in OTL, so no, there will not be any "Holding out until the IJN has to depart", nor will there be any intervention in the invasion, as it will be over long before a relief force can sail the 3 day voyage from Pearl Harbor to Midway. In Scenario #1, Wake probably goes like in OTL, what with the first try being a slipshod effort that is defeated as historically, followed by the second attempt, but this time backed up by all 6 carriers, rather than just 2.
Scenario #2 has the carriers being divided up, 4 at Midway, and 2 at Wake, which means that both attacks succeed on day one, and if we take the time to look at a map, we can see that US efforts to {somehow} use Guam to threaten Japan's SLOC are not going to amount to anything.
Scenario #3 has Midway being the same as in #2, but the Wake force instead being used to take Kiska island instead, and given that Kiska in OTL June 1942 had just a 10 man weather station, including carriers in that operation wouldn't be needed.
And just to be clear, the Guam invasion force of some ~5,900 is what we are proposing to hit Midway, with it's what, ~750 marines + assorted non-infantry personnel?
First, about Guam, wiki says that...
and reading up on the full wiki article here Battle of Guam, we get some additional info.
| Land: 547 marines and sailors Sea: 1 minesweeper 2 patrol boats 1 freighter | Land: 5,900 infantry and marines Sea: 4 heavy cruisers 4 destroyers 2 gunboats 6 submarine chasers 2 minesweepers 2 tenders Air: unknown air forces |
So much for Guam being an (immediate) threat to the Japanese.
Now, let us take a look at the actual facts of the second attack on wake:
Again from the Wiki
So, when I read things like:
I have to object, as the actual second attack took well less than 24 hours. Note that Wake had about 400 infantry, +50 guys in the 12 fighter plane defense force. Stating that the second attack took 15 days is very misleading to those that don't bother to read up on the actual facts, yes, the second attack took 15 days to start, but the actual fighting lasted less than a day (12-15 hours).
If these two partial responses of yours are accurately displaying your thinking, that somehow TTL Midway is going to be worse than OTL Wake island, and that there will be time before the fall of the island, to where reinforcements can possibly be a factor, or the IJN MUST withdraw, think again.
In this thread, we are looking at 3 Scenarios, the first one Midway gets hit by the PH force + the Guam force. I put my money on Midway falling within 12-15 hours tops, just like Wake did in OTL, so no, there will not be any "Holding out until the IJN has to depart", nor will there be any intervention in the invasion, as it will be over long before a relief force can sail the 3 day voyage from Pearl Harbor to Midway. In Scenario #1, Wake probably goes like in OTL, what with the first try being a slipshod effort that is defeated as historically, followed by the second attempt, but this time backed up by all 6 carriers, rather than just 2.
Scenario #2 has the carriers being divided up, 4 at Midway, and 2 at Wake, which means that both attacks succeed on day one, and if we take the time to look at a map, we can see that US efforts to {somehow} use Guam to threaten Japan's SLOC are not going to amount to anything.
Scenario #3 has Midway being the same as in #2, but the Wake force instead being used to take Kiska island instead, and given that Kiska in OTL June 1942 had just a 10 man weather station, including carriers in that operation wouldn't be needed.
And just to be clear, the Guam invasion force of some ~5,900 is what we are proposing to hit Midway, with it's what, ~750 marines + assorted non-infantry personnel?
Any further arguments that, in Scenario #2, both Wake and Midway are going to be in Japanese hands within 12-15 hours of the beginning of the landings?
Garrison
Donor
Which I am pretty sure is exactly what was meant, so I don't think anyone was being mislead. Again if the Japanese don't go after the Pacific Fleet day one they are committing themselves to a war of attrition, the very thing they wanted to avoid, why would they do that?