No Pearl Harbor attack, instead...

[Naval Aviation Fan]

So, taking a look at Japan's opening moves in WWII (after the attack on the USA, all the separate wars became one big war), what if they had done something different from OTL? For the purposes of discussion, let us suppose that everything is as close to historical as reasonably possible, within the constraints of the changes mentioned here. To keep things simple, here are the choices for discussion in this thread:

1) Guam, Wake, Midway islands can be done differently, and the forces historically allocated to those operations need to come from the pool of forces that were historically used for those three (potential) operations, along with the Pearl Harbor attack force, as Pearl Harbor isn't happening in this ATL.

2) The dates can be a few days different, if absolutely needed, but try not to change things too much, to keep the butterflies in check.

3) We probably don't need to go further than 6 months with our various ideas, so what in OTL was the PH-MW time frame of Dec 1941 to June, 1942.

Ok, so my own contribution for what might have been are as follows,

Scenario #1
Hit Midway instead of PH, using the entire PH attack force, plus the historical forces that attacked Guam, on Dec 7th, 1941. Wake island attack invasion is unaltered, Guam attack invasion is delayed until Midway & Wake is solidly in Japanese hands. This seems to me to be a bit of an overkill on poor Midway, but it does Give the IJN the best possible chance to conquer Midway on the first day of the war, while minimizing the likely hood of running into the US Pacific fleet carriers and suffering unexpected losses at TTL battle of Midway. If this seems to much of a one sided overkill situation...

Scenario #2
Hit Wake as historically, and Midway as above, but break up the KB to cover both of these invasions instead of hitting PH. Say that 4 carriers cover Midway, while the remaining 2 cover Wake. This seems to me a better option than Scenario #1, so this gives both invasions carrier support, and secures Japan's defensive perimeter/reduces the US perimeter in the central Pacific.

Scenario #3
If we want to be more historically aggressive than either of these first two alternatives, while disallowing the PH attack, what if the Japanese take midway as in #2, but instead divert the ALT Wake island arrack invasion to the far Western Aleutian Islands? This puts Japan in the best position to keep the USA and the USSR from being able to collaborate/coordinate actions against Japan, but leave Wake and Guam both for later.

So folks, what are your thoughts? One of the three options I listed, or something else? Keep in mind, that historically the Japanese pretty much hit the Allies with everything they had, and in this ATL, are still doing everything else historically.

 

[EagleKeeper]

What is the purpose of hitting Midway? It is a small remote base. There is nothing there worth attacking. And what would be the purpose for attacking the Aleutians and what are you going to target? There are few if any military targets there.

The purpose of attacking PH was to cripple the Pacific fleet. None of your options do that.

 

[David Floyd]

This makes zero sense. Occupying the Aleutians or Midway is a logistical nightmare for Japan, and forgoing Pearl Harbor for this simply means the US retains all the ships originally knocked out and still has the Essex Pez Dispenser which was already in operation.

What good does this do Japan?

 

[Monk78]

Conduct an invasion of Philippines And when the entire American fleet mobilizes to respond ambush them by submarines

 

[CV12Hornet]

None of this makes any sense whatsoever.

So no Pearl Harbor makes some sense - it was a serious position with in the Navy's senior leadership, which is impressive intestinal fortitude given their light and aviation forces were expected to be tied up for months and they needed those forces for the Night Battle and Scouting phases of their Kantai Kessen plan.

However, it makes no sense whatsoever in conjunction with an invasion of Midway or the Aleutians. The strategic choice, as the Japanese admiralty understood it, was fairly binary: get initiative on their side by attacking Pearl Harbor, thereby putting the Pacific Fleet out of commission long enough to finish their conquests but also throwing their prewar strategic plan out the window; or stick with the plan, finish the conquests, and wait for the Americans to come to them and their prepared defenses, with the risk that the Americans would steam west before they were ready.

Attacking and conquering Midway and/or the Aleutians does not help either strategic goal. It does nothing to damage the Pacific Fleet, and it sticks the Kido Butai's neck out beyond their ability to support it. More to the point, it hampers their broader strategic goals by diverting precious ground forces from taking Guam and/or Wake. Guam and Wake are vastly more important for Japan's strategic position than Midway or the Western Aleutians. Both Guam and Wake are well-positioned to interdict Japanese SLOCs and they know it, hence why they were on the target list. Midway and the Western Aleutians are too far away for that to work, and more to the point don't help as offensive springboards, either. They're too far away from anything important and too small and lacking in resources.

Need I remind you, @Naval Aviation Fan, that the goal of the Midway operation, from the Japanese perspective, was not to actually take Midway. It was to present a threat to Midway in order to draw the Pacific Fleet into battle where it could be destroyed. It's a stratagem as old as warfare: if you wish to bring the enemy to battle and they're not cooperating, attack something they're obligated to defend.

In any case, to answer the question in the OP, if Japan does not conduct the Pearl Harbor op they'll just start using the First Air Fleet as their firefighting team earlier, with the intent of wrapping up the conquest of the Southern Resource Area ASAP and then prep to fight the Americans in the Central Pacific as originally planned.

 

[Naval Aviation Fan]

What is the purpose of hitting Midway? It is a small remote base. There is nothing there worth attacking.

Midway in US hands is no great threat to Japan, true enough, and while Midway in Japanese hands is no great threat to the USA, it does give the Japanese something that they couldn't do easily in OTL, and that is recon flights of PH.

And what would be the purpose for attacking the Aleutians and what are you going to target? There are few if any military targets there.

The (far western) Aleutians are all but undefended in June of 1942, so taking them in Dec 1941 is as simple as landing your troops. In Japanese hands, they can keep an eye on US/USSR trade, watch out for US build up there, and force the US to deploy forces there rather than someplace more useful.

The purpose of attacking PH was to cripple the Pacific fleet. None of your options do that.

Granted, but this thread isn't about that, but rather what else could have been done rather than that.

@Marshmallow Waffles had an earlier thread with the premise of the Japanese not attacking PH, but he was more concerned with what the USA was going to do in that case, rather than what else the IJN was going to be doing with it's most powerful force, so that is why I am asking this question here.

This makes zero sense. Occupying the Aleutians or Midway is a logistical nightmare for Japan, and forgoing Pearl Harbor for this simply means the US retains all the ships originally knocked out and still has the Essex Pez Dispenser which was already in operation.

What good does this do Japan?

None really that I can see, as I agree that the PH strike makes much more sense than anything here, but I wanted to see some thoughts on what else could have been done, had the Japanese decided not to risk PH, but were still going to go to war.

Conduct an invasion of Philippines And when the entire American fleet mobilizes to respond ambush them by submarines

I think that that is going to take more than the 6 months, though.

 

[marathag]

Do any of these actually have a real Declaration of War sent to DC before any bombs are dropped?
OTL, the diplomatic note that wasn't sent ahead of the Attack, wasn't a DoW, but just breaking off of relations

 

[alspug]

Honestly what Japan needed was the Carriers to be in Pearl Harbour and sink them. The entire operation required the US Navy to have it's teeth pulled for 6 months to 12 months. Instead the US Navy was given the time and space to develope Carrier tactics before midway that turned the Battle. After Midway even if not one Japanese Carrier sank the losses of pilots meant a 6 month delay in operations.

 

[Naval Aviation Fan]

So, if this help folks...

Above are the locations under discussion, and below is a crude attempt to illustrate a 1,000 mile search radius, which is within the range capabilities of an H6K flying boat, not to mention the H8K.

As we can see, even through the crappy second image, having Kiska and Midway islands in Japanese hand's in early December, 1941 gives the US worries that in OTL were only partially realized. We should also understand that the Rufe is coming soon, and historically did operate from Kiska island during the Aleutian islands campaign.

Midway offers the Japanese an already existent pair of airfields for use by Japanese land based aircraft, and keep in mind that the US was able to operate B-17's off these fields, so they will be capable of operation of pretty much anything in the Japanese air forces of the time?

As I understand things...
The OTL plan was to take Midway, stage long range flying boats there, before the USN had a chance to arrive on the scene. Land based aircraft might have to wait, depending on the condition of the runways after the invasion. I have no information about Midways differing capabilities from Dec '41 to June '42 in regards to the facilities for the PBY's, unfortunately, nor can I, at this point, give a source for the Japanese planning to rapidly stage their own aircraft out of Midway in the historical battle. Does anyone have such a link?

 

[Resurgam]

If you're going to strike at America in a way that cripples it and lets you have a full range of operation for a while - which was the point of the attack - you go for the heart, not a limb or a graze.

Only Pearl does that.

 

[Dorknought]

Hit Midway instead of PH, using the entire PH attack force, plus the historical forces that attacked Guam, on Dec 7th, 1941.

Be interesting. Land on the island at the other end of the Hawaiian Island chain, the Big one that grows all the food and has 50,000 ethnic Japanese living there (3/4 of population) and held by only a Battalion of local troops.

 

[Naval Aviation Fan]

None of this makes any sense whatsoever.

So no Pearl Harbor makes some sense - it was a serious position with in the Navy's senior leadership, which is impressive intestinal fortitude given their light and aviation forces were expected to be tied up for months and they needed those forces for the Night Battle and Scouting phases of their Kantai Kessen plan.

Historically we know that they did risk the attack on Pearl Harbor, and their was dissention within their leadership on doing so, but it never the less went forward.

However, it makes no sense whatsoever in conjunction with an invasion of Midway or the Aleutians. The strategic choice, as the Japanese admiralty understood it, was fairly binary: get initiative on their side by attacking Pearl Harbor, thereby putting the Pacific Fleet out of commission long enough to finish their conquests but also throwing their prewar strategic plan out the window; or stick with the plan, finish the conquests, and wait for the Americans to come to them and their prepared defenses, with the risk that the Americans would steam west before they were ready.

That pretty well sums up OTL, but in this thread we are looking at a different opening set of moves. What I am looking for here is folks opinions on how the various presented Scenario's would play out for 6 months or so.

Attacking and conquering Midway and/or the Aleutians does not help either strategic goal. It does nothing to damage the Pacific Fleet, and it sticks the Kido Butai's neck out beyond their ability to support it. More to the point, it hampers their broader strategic goals by diverting precious ground forces from taking Guam and/or Wake. Guam and Wake are vastly more important for Japan's strategic position than Midway or the Western Aleutians.

Yes, such wasted attacks would certainly Doolittle for the Japanese war effort.
Of course, if we look at what the US sent into the Alaskan/Aleutian's campaign in response to the OTL invasion, we can start to see what that cost the US in terms of forces better deployed elsewhere. It isn't what is there on those islands that matters, it is what the enemy is afraid the other guys can do from there. We need only look at what the Japanese did in response to the only two bombing raids conducted from the Aleutians to realize that there is indeed benefits beyond the obvious.

Both Guam and Wake are well-positioned to interdict Japanese SLOCs and they know it, hence why they were on the target list. Midway and the Western Aleutians are too far away for that to work, and more to the point don't help as offensive springboards, either. They're too far away from anything important and too small and lacking in resources.

While it is true, that Guam is well positioned as a potential staging point for US attempts to interfere with Japan's plans, AFAIK there was no airfield on Guam, just some seaplane facilities for Pan AM flying boats, and the ground forces stationed there were well less than 1,000 in number. If we look at Scenario #3, are the USN going to ignore Midway and Kiska in Japanese hands? I think not, rather, they will initially be trying to defend against further advances by Japan (which we all know, with hindsight, are NOT going to happen), but the perception of the US leaders of the times are that, the threat is real, and must be guarded against.

Need I remind you, @Naval Aviation Fan, that the goal of the Midway operation, from the Japanese perspective, was not to actually take Midway. It was to present a threat to Midway in order to draw the Pacific Fleet into battle where it could be destroyed. It's a stratagem as old as warfare: if you wish to bring the enemy to battle and they're not cooperating, attack something they're obligated to defend.

I'm not aware of any such thing. When I read up on this some time ago, I remember being impressed by the part where the Japanese planned to turn Midway into a forward Japanese airbase in just days (and my understanding was not in terms of weeks, but in less time than they expected the US fleet to arrive from PH), so that when the USN did come calling, it would be the Japanese that would be being supported by aircraft based on Midway.

In any case, to answer the question in the OP, if Japan does not conduct the Pearl Harbor op they'll just start using the First Air Fleet as their firefighting team earlier, with the intent of wrapping up the conquest of the Southern Resource Area ASAP and then prep to fight the Americans in the Central Pacific as originally planned.

Hmmm. I doubt that, frankly. If the Japanese are going with any of the three proposed Scenario's, you are saying that they wouldn't use their carriers to support these attacks/invasions?

Do any of these actually have a real Declaration of War sent to DC before any bombs are dropped?
OTL, the diplomatic note that wasn't sent ahead of the Attack, wasn't a DoW, but just breaking off of relations

I don't see why they would have any more or less than OTL. On point I overlooked, without the outrage of the OTL PH attack, what effect on US public opinion would any of these hypothetical options have had? Of course there will be war, but will the lack/less of an outraged US public have any butterflies?

Honestly what Japan needed was the Carriers to be in Pearl Harbour and sink them. The entire operation required the US Navy to have it's teeth pulled for 6 months to 12 months. Instead the US Navy was given the time and space to develope Carrier tactics before midway that turned the Battle. After Midway even if not one Japanese Carrier sank the losses of pilots meant a 6 month delay in operations.

Oh, I agree with you, PH should definitely have been tried, but in this thread we are trying to explore less initially aggressive uses of the IJN, but keeping almost everything else as historical.

So, in the unlikely (and less than OTL's initial stages of Japan's entry into WWII) event, which of the presented plans would have pro's and con's, and what would they be?

Sorry folks, health is making me take a nap. Pain from the fall I took yesterday is also requiring some meds, and I have to talk to my doctor about re-starting physical therapy, so might not be posting any thing much for the rest of today.

 

[tonycat77]

No pearl harbor would probably mean the pre-war battleplan, which was to send the entire fleet to a decisive battle in the Philippine Sea.
Sad that @McPherson was a ahole to the mods and anyone who disagreed with him, i truly miss him in those threads.

 

[wcv215]

Conduct an invasion of Philippines And when the entire American fleet mobilizes to respond ambush them by submarines

The problem there is the USN has no intention of doing any such thing.

 

[ric350]

No pearl harbor would probably mean the pre-war battleplan, which was to send the entire fleet to a decisive battle in the Philippine Sea.

I’ve always wondered how the US pacific fleet would have faired going up against the Japanese. The IJN air groups are in much better shape training/weapons wise, and they have enough carriers, but how do their other ships compare with the existing US forces? Would an all out attack on the Philippines, to draw out the PH naval forces, give Japan the knock out blow that it was hoping for at OTL Midway?

ric350

 

[CV12Hornet]

Hmmm. I doubt that, frankly. If the Japanese are going with any of the three proposed Scenario's, you are saying that they wouldn't use their carriers to support these attacks/invasions?

I think all three scenarios are terrible ideas, so I’ve elected to ignore them and go with the fourth option you’ve floated, which is “something else”.

I’ll elaborate more on why I think they’re terrible ideas once I’m not phoneposting.

 

[e of pi]

No pearl harbor would probably mean the pre-war battleplan, which was to send the entire fleet to a decisive battle in the Philippine Sea.
Sad that @McPherson was a ahole to the mods and anyone who disagreed with him, i truly miss him in those threads.

That was no longer the plan by the late 30s and pre-war 40s. Below is a link to WPPac-46, which was the Pacific Fleet's latest anti-Japan battleplan as of July 25, 1941.

WPPac-46

Of note, the tasks planned for the US Pacific Fleet in the event of a war are primarily around raiding, seizing forward operating bases to enable further operations forward (in other words, much the same campaign of island-hopping actually carried out), and pulling Japanese fleet strength away from actions in the South Pacific areas:. This was because they recognized without those built up fleet bases and logistics ships still on the slipways and budget approval lists, they couldn't operate the fleet's main strength effectively as far as the Philippines.

[24] PART II. OUTLINE OF TASKS
CHAPTER I. TASKS ASSIGNED BY NAVY BASIC PLAN-MISSION

2101. The Navy Basic War Plan (Rainbow Five) assigns the following tasks
within the Pacific Area to the U. S. Pacific Fleet:

a. Support the forces of the associated powers in the Far East by
diverting enemy strength away from the Malay Barrier, through the denial
and capture of positions in the Marshalls, and through raids on enemy
sea communications and positions;

b. Prepare to capture and establish control over the Caroline and
Marshall Island area, and to establish an advanced fleet base in Truk;

c. Destroy axis sea communications by capturing or destroying vessels
trading directly or indirectly with the enemy;

d. Support British naval forces in the area south of the equator as far
west as longitude 155 east;

e. Defend Samoa in category "D";

f. Defend Guam in category "F";

g. Protect the sea communications of the associated powers by escorting,
covering, and patrolling as required by circumstances, and by destroying
enemy raiding forces;

h. Protect the territory of the associated powers in the Pacific area
and prevent the extension of enemy military power into the Western
Hemisphere by destroying hostile expeditions and by supporting land and
air forces in denying the enemy the use of land positions in that
hemisphere;

i. Cover the operations of the naval coastal frontier forces;

j. Establish fleet control zones, defining their limits from time to
time as circumstances require;

k. Route shipping of associated powers within the fleet control zones.

 

[e of pi]

I’ve always wondered how the US pacific fleet would have faired going up against the Japanese. The IJN air groups are in much better shape training/weapons wise, and they have enough carriers, but how do their other ships compare with the existing US forces? Would an all out attack on the Philippines, to draw out the PH naval forces, give Japan the knock out blow that it was hoping for at OTL Midway?

ric350

It would have gone very badly for the US, which the US evaluated in their 1933 war games. They evaluated even if they won initial engagements, underwater damage and other attrition (the same things Japan was relying on to shape a Decisive Battle in their favor) would require detaching at least some forces for repair at Pearl, which effectively took them off the board and left the remaining fleet for a fleet action more equal than the US Navy preferred to fight. Which is why the US strategy changed for War Plan Orange changed in the mid-30s from a direct thrust towards the Philippines to a "leapfrogging" campaign of building up forward bases and a fleet train able to repair ships in forward areas, while also whittling away Orange's (which is to say Japan's) air, submarine, and destroyer force ability to shape the battle through attrition before a climactic engagement.

See the discussion here of the 1933 Operations IV Wargame, and resulting strategy changes. Note that this change was still guiding decision making and fleet acquisitions up to immediately pre-war, and then an adapted WPPac-46 basically became the way the war was run in its initial six to eight months, with the general war-long strategy reflecting the leapfrog buildup of bases and attrition of enemy forces over a series of small campaigns...which in the end meant there was no single one climactic battle that decided the war.

 

[GuildedAgeNostalgia]

Taking Midway doesn't make sense but taking the Aleutians does .

Otl, the Aleutians Campaign tied down over 100k American troops and protects the Home Islands northern flank.

Taking it earlier gives Japan more time to fortify it so they can bleed the US even more.

 

[wcv215]

I'm not aware of any such thing. When I read up on this some time ago, I remember being impressed by the part where the Japanese planned to turn Midway into a forward Japanese airbase in just days (and my understanding was not in terms of weeks, but in less time than they expected the US fleet to arrive from PH), so that when the USN did come calling, it would be the Japanese that would be being supported by aircraft based on Midway.

He’s half-right, but the Japanese were absolutely intent on taking Midway OTL. Even after the battle turned into a disaster for Japan Yamamoto was insisting on being told whether Midway would be able to land friendly (that is to say Japanese) planes the next day. This despite three carriers being on fire and Hiryu about an hour from that state. Japan’s intent was to take Midway, and that doing so would force the Americans out of Pearl to fight.