No Operation Torch - What happens Nov '42 to Nov '43 in Africa?

[Rich Rostrom]

Presuppose there is no Operation Torch, for any of a variety of reasons.* The allies never invade French North Africa from the Atlantic of western Mediterranean sides. (so no Operation Gymnast landing in Morrocco either).

What do the US/UK do instead? The most likely alternate plan is maximum reinforcement of 8th Army. This is awkward, because of the distance, but it could work.

I'll put forth an initial hypothesis and set of assumptions you can feel free to reject or modify as you wish:

First I assume-

A) Regardless of the lack of Operation Torch, the 8th Army is going to drive the Afrika Korps all the way out of Libya in the month or two after El Alamein.

Presumably Second El Alamein, i.e. Operation SUPERCHARGE. BTW it took Eighth Army three months to reach Tripoli from the start of SUPERCHARGE (10/23/42 - 1/23/43).

The 8th Army was built up to unprecedented strength by this point and Rommel was at the end of his logistical rope.

Fair enough. And with no TORCH, Eighth Army will be built up faster and attack sooner.

B) The Germans will neither withdraw Afrika Korps...

The Deutsches Afrika Korps (DAK) was only a small part of the Panzer Armee Afrika (PAA) under Rommel's command.

nor allow it to surrender or allow it be overrun without committing considerably more effort to rescue it.

Not clear. There was no commitment to reinforce PAA after Second Alamein that I know of. Hitler responded to TORCH by occupying Tunisia.

From there I hypothesize-

The Germans will probably send forces to occupy French North Africa to give Rommel a line of retreat and/or secure base as he is pushed from Libya.

Extremely dubious. Such a move would drive all French colonies over to the Allies. The Germans could not occupy Morocco or even Algeria before the Allies could get troops there. And with Rommel in full retreat, being driven out of Libya, the French commanders in North Africa are not likely to roll over for the Axis. Opportunists jump on winning bandwagons, not losing bandwagons.

The French in North Africa were divided. The main body wanted to remain neutral and avoid any fighting. They would oppose Axis invasion, but some might not dare to resist (such as Esteva in Tunisia). Others were covertly pro-Allied, and were organizing for a coup d'état in Algeria.

If Axis forces invaded French North Africa without US/UK provocation, most of the neutralists would join the pro-Allied side, and there would be substantial resistance to the Axis. Within a day Allied forces would be on the ground in Morocco and Algeria (by air; in a week by sea).

Axis movements into North Africa would be far more difficult than OTL. One assumes that the Axis does not invade Tunisia until 8th Army is closing in on Tripoli. By that time, the Allies will have easy communication with Malta, and built up air and sea power there to interdict Axis communications to Africa.

(OTL, the Axis move was in November 1942, with Eighth Army still deep in Egypt, First Army newly landed in Morocco and Algeria, and Malta still under siege.)

Considering these factors, IMO Hitler would have lost any taste for further African ventures. So the remnants of the PAA would be evacuated. The French would probably agree to letting PAA's personnel pass through French territory, and maybe even some equipment, but only for transit home, probably in January 1943.

In the next several weeks there would be a complicated dance, as the Allies conspired with the pro-Allied faction in Algeria (who were not affiliated with De Gaulle and Free France). De Gaulle would try to get involved. Opportunists in French Africa would skew toward the victorious Allies. At some point in early 1943 there would be a coup d'état combined with a US/UK landing and invasion (from Libya). That's what TORCH was supposed to be, but the coupsters weren't ready. Three months later, with the Allies much more strongly posted, there won't be any resistance.

So overall, the Allied victory in North Africa is moved up by three months; but Axis losses are far smaller. (No 275,000 prisoners in Tunisia.)

The Allies invade Sicily in early May. There will be more Germans and front-line Italian troops there, and First Army will be almost entirely green. So the campaign lasts twice as long as OTL

 

[jmc247]

Presumably Second El Alamein, i.e. Operation SUPERCHARGE. BTW it took Eighth Army three months to reach Tripoli from the start of SUPERCHARGE (10/23/42 - 1/23/43).

Keep in mind that as part of the U.S. plan in North Africa to defeat the Axis forces there after it was agreed we were going to land we gave the British alot more goodies including a few hundred American tanks. If the U.S. isn't about to do Torch and is trying something elsewhere that very well might not have happened and it would have taken longer perhaps into early 1943 before Monty builds up enough where he feels he can knock Axis forces back with a high degree of certainty and gives the order to attack.

Tripoli would have been a good place for Rommel to make a stand against the British 8th Army alone, but not the U.S. Army and the 8th Army. The only good place in Africa to fight a two front war is Egypt... if there is ever such a thing as a 'good place to fight a two front war'. I would think the better term would be the least bad place in North Africa to fight a two front war.

 

[MUC]

Norway is not such a crazy idea. The Allies have a lot to gain if they manage to ctake Norway:

1. The supply route to the Sovietsis open.
2. German ore imprts from Sweden are hampered.
3. The Baltic Sea is not safe for the Germans (alot of the logistics for Army Group North went through the Baltic).
4. Nice bomber bases.
5. U-boats lose safe training grounds.
6. Liberating a nazi occupied part of Europe is poitically more valuable than attacking the Vichy.

 

[Rich Rostrom]

Norway is not such a crazy idea. The Allies have a lot to gain if they manage to take Norway:

1. The supply route to the Soviets is open.

The Murmansk run? More or less, but it was never a preferred route, even with the Germans suppressed. Murmansk is really a small port.

2. German ore imports from Sweden are hampered.

The Kiruna iron ore mine is very near the Norwegian border. If the Allies hold Norway, they can buy all the ore from the Swedes. However the Germans have alternate supplies, such as the Briey mines in France.

3. The Baltic Sea is not safe for the Germans ...

Why? Allied forces cannot cross Sweden to attack ships in the Baltic, and forces in Norway have no real edge in getting through the Danish islands to the Baltic over forces from Britain.

4. Nice bomber bases.

Not especially. Norway is almost as far from Germany as Britain. Check it on a map if you don't believe me.

5. U-boats lose safe training grounds.

See above about the Baltic.

So... on the one hand, no real advantages, and on the other hand dreadful terrain, defended by German troops with fortifications. Sounds crazy enough to me.

 

[raharris1973]

Norway & Finland

It strikes me that Scandinavian operations can achieve results comparable to Mediterranean operations, while involving much shorter distances from North America and and the UK.

North Africa was going to "ripen" and fall under allied influence by late summer 1943, at the very latest, according to most

1. Unless the Allies suffer catastrophic defeat at the outset, the result is seizure of northern Norway, and more importantly, the knocking of Finland out of the war by May 1943. This relieves the Soviets of any front at all on their northern flank, and takes the German arctic front, and 530,000 Finns out of the battle line.

(the Mediterranean campaigns, supplementing Russian offensives in Stalingrad, played some role in causing the pullout of the 235,000 strong Italian force from Russia, but we still had more Finnish troops (as well as territory of course) in the east than Italians.)


2. After the invasion of northern Norway, even if the Germans cannot and do not reinforce their ground forces in Norway or Finland, they'll have to commit air, air transport and naval units unless they want to write off their garrisons to piecemeal destruction.

3. With the Allied seizure of Narvik, not only do the Germans lose access to Swedish ore for the winter of 1942-1943, Sweden will become much more strict in its neutrality, just when Germany can most use Swedish transit facilities.

4. Hitler can react two ways to stricter Swedish neutrality. A) tolerate it and deal with the consequences of no GLOCs to the north (having to substitute air and and naval for ground reinforcement, see # 2 above), or B) Invade Sweden in the winter, to reestablish GLOCs with minimal water crossing from Denmark to the north. In the short term it is probably doable, but it also transforms Scandinavia into a more maneuverable front. Neither of these options is good for the Germans.

5. If an objective of the Med campaigns was to get American troops trained fighting Germans, that's guaranteed in Norway, more so than in North Africa and Sicily. Plus its easier to call a halt in Norway (especially if Sweden remains neutral) and switch resources between Scandinavia and the channel than between the mediterranean and the channel.

 

[raharris1973]

Going straight to Sicily- there is air cover -

Upthread somebody mentioned that allied forces going straight to Sicily and skipping North Africa are way outside the range of allied air cover in late 1942.

Strictly speaking, that's not true.

Allied forces assaulting Sicily would have had land-based air coverage over the whole island (and the tip of Calabria), from bases in Malta.

For Torch, I'm not sure how much better allied land-based air support actually was.

The only base for Allied land-based air support for Torch was Gibraltar, and that only covered northern Morrocco coast and the western third of the Algerian coast. The easternmost task force, which had the easiest time, landed beyond the allied land-based air cover. IE, they were east of where Gibraltar bases could support, but too far west for Malta to support.

So strictly speaking, a leap to Sicily would not have been beyond allied land-based air cover.

I do not know the state of Axis defenses in Sicily on 8 November 1942, but it certainly would have been less formidable at least in #s and fortifications than it was compared to OTL July 1943.

Now the quality and sustainability of allied land-based air support could be a problem, and the German and Italian ability to react and amass air power and ground reinforcement in Sicily would have been greater than in North Africa, but I don't know if it would be enough to change allied odds drastically. If so, I'd like to discuss specifically how.

(hmm, limited and isolated airstrip space in MAlta getting more pummelled, reducing the allied sortie rate, while the axis quickly expands its in theater aircraft in southern Italy and axis Sicily to try to seize superiority, while Arnim's force gets thrown in to Sicily instead of Tunisia? Might be enough to counter the initial advantages of surprise against a weaker initial defense that the allies could have).

 

[Dathi THorfinnsson]

Upthread somebody mentioned that allied forces going straight to Sicily and skipping North Africa are way outside the range of allied air cover in late 1942.

Strictly speaking, that's not true.

Allied forces assaulting Sicily would have had land-based air coverage over the whole island (and the tip of Calabria), from bases in Malta.

For Torch, I'm not sure how much better allied land-based air support actually was.

The only base for Allied land-based air support for Torch was Gibraltar, and that only covered northern Morrocco coast and the western third of the Algerian coast. The easternmost task force, which had the easiest time, landed beyond the allied land-based air cover. IE, they were east of where Gibraltar bases could support, but too far west for Malta to support.

So strictly speaking, a leap to Sicily would not have been beyond allied land-based air cover.

I do not know the state of Axis defenses in Sicily on 8 November 1942, but it certainly would have been less formidable at least in #s and fortifications than it was compared to OTL July 1943.

Now the quality and sustainability of allied land-based air support could be a problem, and the German and Italian ability to react and amass air power and ground reinforcement in Sicily would have been greater than in North Africa, but I don't know if it would be enough to change allied odds drastically. If so, I'd like to discuss specifically how.

(hmm, limited and isolated airstrip space in MAlta getting more pummelled, reducing the allied sortie rate, while the axis quickly expands its in theater aircraft in southern Italy and axis Sicily to try to seize superiority, while Arnim's force gets thrown in to Sicily instead of Tunisia? Might be enough to counter the initial advantages of surprise against a weaker initial defense that the allies could have).

Except that...
Look how expensive in terms of ships and lives simply defending Malta was. Now you want to build up and supply a force big enough to take Sicily?

Otl, it wasnt until the allies had airbases in algeria and tunis that supplying Malta was anything more than a gamble, and it wasnt until Sicily was taken that it was really safe.

So, no, i dont think that will work.

 

[Rich Rostrom]

Upthread somebody mentioned that allied forces going straight to Sicily and skipping North Africa are way outside the range of allied air cover in late 1942.

Strictly speaking, that's not true.

Allied forces assaulting Sicily would have had land-based air coverage over the whole island (and the tip of Calabria), from bases in Malta.

Malta at this time is under siege and can maintain only a handful of aircraft.

For Torch, I'm not sure how much better allied land-based air support actually was.

Not much, but there was no Axis air opposition.

I do not know the state of Axis defenses in Sicily on 8 November 1942, but it certainly would have been less formidable at least in #s and fortifications than it was compared to OTL July 1943.

Look up Operation PEDESTAL, the last Allied convoy to reach Malta. The PEDESTAL force was bombed continuously from well west of Sardinia right into Valetta harbor. Only 5 of 14 merchant ships reached Malta, and one of those (the tanker Ohio) had to be towed the last 100 miles.

An Allied invasion of Sicily in November 1942 would be a himmelsfahrkommando to rival SEELOWE.

 

[Catspoke]

Torch just made so much sense.

1) American leadership was worried about Franch Africa, especially Dakar, its short distance to Brazil, the railway the French wanted to build from North Africa, German aircraft and submarines basing there. Torch handled that.

2) When Churchill visited Moscow in 1942, he revealed Torch plans to the Soviets and Stalin seemed pleased. Keeping Stalin happy and in the war was important.

3) It was a low risk affair against a half motivated, poorly equipped enemy. The Allies just have to not lose early and they will win in the end.

4) The more the Germans poured in to Africa the less was on the eastern front. (the 1st SS Panzer used to occupy Vichy would have been useful in the drive to relieve Stalingrad)

5) It forces things politically on Vichy, and the United States thought the likely result not unfavorable to them.

Other options like Northern Norway could yield significant political advantages vis Finland and Sweeden, its just tricky to do, Norway is heavily garrisoned and German fleet units are present.

France is too easy for the Germans to reinforce and defeat.

 

[Gremlin]

With no threat to his rear then Rommel is able to impose some checks on the 8th Army but Monty is able to systematically build-up and crack each defensive line.

With the Eastern Front in crisis, reinforcements for DAK are sparse and before the end of 1943 Rommel is recalled and the remains of his army cross the border into Tunisia and internment.

The presence of a large body of German troops in N.Africa gives pause to the pro-allied lobby at least until those troops can be shipped out (minus any heavy equipment) to mainland France where they are 'exchanged' for a number of the million French POWs taken in 1940.



With British forces tied-up in the desert the Americans (having passed up Torch) realize the manpower and shipping for a '43 invasion into the teeth of the Wehrmacht doesn't exsist and if they want to 'get at the Germans' then the only option is Norway.

As already mentioned a succesful operation there;
1. Bloods US troops
2. Tests 'opposed landing' tactics
3. Allows allies to apply leverage on Sweden and Finland which in turn could lead to;
+ Sweden joining allies (closer airbases for 8th Airforce, Kiruna fields, Baltic blockade, extends the potential front for overlord)
+ Finland switching camps (Siege of Leningrad lifted, potential rail route from Narvik to Leningrad for lend lease, trapped German divisions)
4. Would force the remaining Kreigsmarine surface assets to fight and die, allowing for major allied fleet units to be switched to the Pacific minus cover for Regia Marina.

 

[Catspoke]

With British forces tied-up in the desert the Americans (having passed up Torch) realize the manpower and shipping for a '43 invasion into the teeth of the Wehrmacht doesn't exsist and if they want to 'get at the Germans' then the only option is Norway.

As already mentioned a succesful operation there;
1. Bloods US troops
2. Tests 'opposed landing' tactics
3. Allows allies to apply leverage on Sweden and Finland which in turn could lead to;
+ Sweden joining allies (closer airbases for 8th Airforce, Kiruna fields, Baltic blockade, extends the potential front for overlord)
+ Finland switching camps (Siege of Leningrad lifted, potential rail route from Narvik to Leningrad for lend lease, trapped German divisions)
4. Would force the remaining Kreigsmarine surface assets to fight and die, allowing for major allied fleet units to be switched to the Pacific minus cover for Regia Marina.

The results you give for the Norway invasion seem true. I am wondering about the invasion of Norway in practice. You would want to do it anywhere from Petasmo to Tromso. Its hard to deal with fiords and Moutains and strong German garrisons and submarines and such, could be messy. Could end up like Narvik 40 where the German are holed up in some town at the end of a fiord and the Allies trying to get at through the moutains. Initail air cover from air craft carriers is spotty. Almost be better to do it at Petasmo where you can link up with the Soviets.

OTL Torch is just so easy against a half motivated, ill equipped enemy vs the risks of Norway.

 

[Rich Rostrom]

With no threat to his rear then Rommel is able to impose some checks on the 8th Army

OTL there was no threat to his rear, as German 15th Army occupied Tunisia and blocked any Allied movement further east. Rommel retreats just as fast as OTL.

but Monty is able to systematically build-up and crack each defensive line.

With the Eastern Front in crisis, reinforcements for DAK are sparse and before the end of 1943 Rommel is recalled and the remains of his army cross the border into Tunisia and internment.

Well before the end of 1943. Certainly no later than June, and probably no later than April.

The presence of a large body of German troops in N.Africa gives pause to the pro-allied lobby

If they have been interned, they have been disarmed and are no political factor. The complete defeat of Axis forces in Africa and the presence of a large body of Allied troops on the Tunisian border are rather more persuasive. The pro-Allied faction in North Africa will gain adherents and stage a coup d'état soon after Allied troops reach the border.

at least until those troops can be shipped out (minus any heavy equipment) to mainland France where they are 'exchanged' for a number of the million French POWs taken in 1940.

An interesting thought - if the deal was made, it would happen immediately.

With British forces tied-up in the desert the Americans (having passed up Torch) realize the manpower and shipping for a '43 invasion into the teeth of the Wehrmacht doesn't exsist and if they want to 'get at the Germans' then the only option is Norway.

Except that with French Africa having joined the Allies, there are many possibilities in the Mediterranean.

... a succesful operation [in Norway] ...

is highly unlikely. The terrain is awful, there are large German garrisons, and the Germans have built up lots of fortifications. Norway has many German airbases, and there are no Allied airbases close enough to provide fighter cover.