No Operation Torch - What happens Nov '42 to Nov '43 in Africa?

[raharris1973]

Presuppose there is no Operation Torch, for any of a variety of reasons.* The allies never invade French North Africa from the Atlantic of western Mediterranean sides. (so no Operation Gymnast landing in Morrocco either).

How does this play out, in North Africa in particular, but also in other theaters and in the shipping lanes. -

I'll put forth an initial hypothesis and set of assumptions you can feel free to reject or modify as you wish:

First I assume-

A) Regardless of the lack of Operation Torch, the 8th Army is going to drive the Afrika Korps all the way out of Libya in the month or two after El Alamein. The 8th Army was built up to unprecedented strength by this point and Rommel was at the end of his logistical rope.

B) The Germans will neither withdraw Afrika Korps nor allow it to surrender or allow it be overrun without committing considerably more effort to rescue it.


From there I hypothesize-

The Germans will probably send forces to occupy French North Africa to give Rommel a line of retreat and/or secure base as he is pushed from Libya.

Like OTL, the Germans will occupy Tunisia, but in the ATL, they will also occupy key points in Algeria and Morrocco. They might also occupy Corsica and Vichy France, but probably will not, especially if the Vichy forces are as acquiescent as I think they are likel to be.

The result from December 1942 will be that:

The Libyan-Tunisian border will be the main arena for tough Commonwealth-Axis fighting, especially as the battle moves to hill country.

Germany will have access to airbases in Morrocco and Algeria to more effectively harass allied convoys in the western Mediterranean, increasing losses to convoys heading in to the Med through Gibraltar. This will make it very difficult for British forces in the Mediterranean to do any amphibious operations, and compel west Med convoys to have more escort protection for longer than OTL.

Germany will get a chance to implement more thorough anti-semitic policies for longer in the Maghreb, although large-scale deportations to Europe are likely to be prohibitively expensive.

The Germans will still have a presence in North Africa in November 1943, even if they have lost most or all of Tunisia by this point.

thoughts?

 

[Hyperion]

The only way Torch would be cancelled would be if the US doesn't enter the war, or at least events result in a delayed entry and buildup for the European theater. Maybe Hitler doesn't declare war after Pearl Harbor and buys Germany another two or three months or so.

 

[jmc247]

The only way Torch would be cancelled would be if the US doesn't enter the war, or at least events result in a delayed entry and buildup for the European theater. Maybe Hitler doesn't declare war after Pearl Harbor and buys Germany another two or three months or so.

That is one way, the other would be Rommel follows the victory or death order and German and Italian forces end up like the 6th Army in Stalingrad.

Germany by the way might get more then 2-3 months before the U.S. entering the European war assuming no DoW in December. I think by the end of the 1942 or early 43 though there will be a u-boat attack on a Lend Lease ship that FDR can use to rally the U.S. into the European war.

If the U.S. does not enter the war until late 1942/early 43 it could change a fair bit in Africa. In mid 1942 as we all know Rommel made his lunge for Egypt and even he knew it was a dangerous gamble that had a good chance of failing, but the calculation he had at the time was if he sat still the British would be able to keep building up faster then his forces thanks to the size of the Port of Alexandra and that the U.S. would likely soon be landing its Army to his West boxing him into a two front war in a very bad place to fight a two front war. Egypt would have been a far better place for German and Italian forces to wage a serious two front war then Libya.

But, to get back to my first point Rommel is not going to feel so pushed to lunge for Egypt after the fall of Tobruk. He certainly would still want the port of Alex and the Suez, but I suspect the attack might not come at the same time as it did OTL as its not like he is facing a two front war that he believed could come in a matter of weeks in mid 1942. He might go for taking Malta first and try to plan a attack on Egypt with coordinated and planned Arab nationalists uprising in the region.

 

[ivanotter]

The US generals were not keen on the Med initiative at all.

Marshall saw it a a dead-end and was only focused on France.

The admirals did not like the Med: too Shallow, Narrow, dominted by air power, etc etc.

It might have been a dclose run thing to get a decision to do North Africa, so the OP is right: It might not have happened.

Timewise it was not great for Germany, I think. Hitler was a bit busy with Eastern front in 1943 and the focus on providing additional forces for Rommel turned into disaster and just throwing away what was left.

So, could Monty have pushed Germany as hard without any "2nd front" in Africa? Maybe not. If Rommel had clear indications that there would be no forces in his back, he might have managed to turn the tables on Monty or at least slowing it down dramatically.

The bigger picture is probably that if there would be no Torch, there would be no invasion of Sicily either. The Med strategy would not have been carried out at all until 1944 or later in which instance it might have been a total wast anyway?

That would have released the pressure on Mussolini and surely have provided a basis for the Germany build-up of a strategic reserve.

The freeing up of transport would not have happened either. Brooke estimated that the opening up of the Med would equate to 1 million tons of shipping, which is rather big.

Ivan

 

[King Augeas]

Germany will have access to airbases in Morrocco and Algeria to more effectively harass allied convoys in the western Mediterranean, increasing losses to convoys heading in to the Med through Gibraltar. This will make it very difficult for British forces in the Mediterranean to do any amphibious operations, and compel west Med convoys to have more escort protection for longer than OTL.

I don't think there'll be any western Med convoys - in 1942, the British only tried to force a convoy past Sicily when it was absolutely necessary, such as Pedestal and Harpoon, both of which took severe losses. Convoys to Egypt will continue to go round the Cape; convoys to Malta will leave from Alexandria with air cover from freshly-recaptured Cyrenaica. The shipping freed up from the shorter Med route won't be available until Axis airpower in the western Med can be suppressed - that will require bases around Cape Bon to control the Sicilian Narrows and probably the suppression or Algiers and Oran too.

 

[Dathi THorfinnsson]

The thing is that there wasnt a good alternative, really.

Marshall really wanted a landing in france, the allies really really werent ready for it, and the brits knew it.

If churchill says 'be my guest, go ahead use our ports, but we arent ready, youre on your own'. Then nothings going to happen, and i dont see fdr allowing that.

As it happens, the us really needed north africa as a training ground. Without it, green us troops invading normandy would ... not do so well.

Also, if the brits clear out all of north africa themselves, thats really going to add to the strain between the us and the commonwealth. Its also going to make for even relations between the brits and the french.

 

[FlyingDutchman]

The only way Torch would be cancelled would be if the US doesn't enter the war, or at least events result in a delayed entry and buildup for the European theater. Maybe Hitler doesn't declare war after Pearl Harbor and buys Germany another two or three months or so.

Considering that the manpower for Torch was for a large part british/commonwealth I'd expect that without the americans there would probably still be a Torch light.

As it were the americans who wanted the more western landings in marocco, there is a possibility of less hassle in tunisia.

 

[Alex Richards]

Could that lead to de Gualle being more open to Brtain joining any sort of alt-EEC after the war? Or slightly earlier to the concept of France joining the Commonwealth going through?

 

[Devolved]

For political as well as military reasons Roosevelt was anxious to have US forces involved in ground fighting against the Germans during 1942. There were many arguments between the British and Americans at this time about the best way to do this.

George Marshall displayed little military knowledge and had nothing to offer as a strategy except for the British Army supported by a few Amercans to land in France and establish a bridgehead.

Everyone knew that such a landing would be slaughtered and the casualties would be mostly British.

For some strange reason the British resisted this plan. That left two options, Torch or an invasion of northern Norway (one of Churchills pet loves).

No Torch leaves Roosevelt's Germany first policy look empty and worse still Stalin would express anger and there was a fear Stalin would make peace with Hitler.

Without Torch the British 8th Army still kicks the Axis out of Egypt and Libya. The Germans may ask Vichy to alter it's official neutrality and allow the Afrika Korps to move into Tunisa and continue fighting. If Vichy refuse the Germans will occupy and so French units in North Africa are faced with the choice of disarm or resist. Most would disarm but some would fight and join the Allies. Occupying the whole of French North Africa was beyond the effective power of the Axis as they still have to face Mongomery.

I think the troops for Torch including Americans are directed to the 8th Army during the early months of 1943. Tunisia falls close to OTL and the Axis in the rest of North Africa are strung out and unable to avoid being mopped up.

 

[DaleCoz]

There are actually a couple of options for getting to no Operation Torch or a delayed one:

1) A major Japanese victory in early-to-mid 1942, probably at Midway. In the short-term that would force the US to shift naval power to the Pacific, and more importantly, merchant shipping. In reality the Japanese weren't capable of exploiting a Midway victory to make additional major advances, and they would probably find that winning there was a Pyrrhic victory, but if they took Midway Island, or even landed there and weren't immediately pushed back off, the struggle there would pull in Allied naval power and merchant shipping. US reinforcements for Hawaii wouldn't be militarily necessary. The Japanese had zero chance of taking the islands by mid-1942. But politically, the US would have to reinforce, taking away scarce resources for other adventures, probably including Operation Torch.

2) More successful U-boat operations in early 1942. The biggest limitation for the western Allies was always a shortage of shipping. The Torch landings and the continuing flow of supplies to them were a major factor in the Allied shipping crisis of late 1942/early 1943. If, for example, the Germans had the bulk of their u-boats headed to US waters or already there by the time they declared war, they could have caused even more havoc than they did historically, and probably aborted or postponed Torch.

 

[BlairWitch749]

gigantic butterflies for stalingrad happen as the entire LW transport force, the 2nd parachute, HG panzer bridgade and the 10th panzer div don't get sucked into tunisia

liebstandart and 24th panzer don't get sucked out of position by having case anton either

 

[DaleCoz]

As to what would have happened in North Africa with no Torch: I suspect that the Axis would have demanded port facilities and airbases in French North Africa. The Vichy French would have stalled and given up the bare minimum they had to because North Africa and the French fleet were the only cards they had against complete German domination.

This was a balancing act. If the Germans pushed too hard, Vichy would have nothing to lose and North Africa would go over to the Allies. If Vichy dug their heels in too hard, the Germans would try to seize North Africa and end the remnants of French autonomy in Vichy. My guess: Vichy allows the Germans access to ports and airbases in Tunisia if it becomes vital to the Germans early enough--before the Soviet offensive at Stalingrad.

Once 6th Army is surrounded at Stalingrad (around Nov 23rd), German options narrow, and the French know it. Given the need for all available cargo planes at Stalingrad, using an air bridge to take Tunisia (as they did historically) is no longer an option for the Germans. Any reinforcements for North Africa and any force to occupy Vichy France reduces forces available to attempt to rescue 6th army. That gives the French increased leverage in any negotiations.

The crisis point for the Germans to retreat into Tunisia would probably hit in December 1942 or January 1943. If Stalingrad held to its historic course (not a given if the Germans have additional cargo planes and additional mobile forces available due to them not being in use in North Africa) the Germans have little to spare for North Africa and probably get pushed off the continent before the Stalingrad crisis is over.

At that point, North Africa becomes a strategic backwater. The Brits will want to take Sicily and southern Italy to open up the Mediterranean to their shipping. Without US forces already in the area, the US won't go for it. The US insists on building up for an invasion through Northern France in 1943. The build-up could happen, but I doubt that the Allies could mount a successful invasion in 1943. They are probably forced to wait until 1944. That leaves the Soviets alone on the ground to fight the Germans all through 1943 and early 1944. The results of that are a controversy onto itself, and one we've argued here to the point there isn't a lot new left to say.

 

[DaleCoz]

One unlikely but kind of ironically fun possibility from this: Mussolini as the last Axis dictator standing. He would probably get overthrown after the loss of North Africa, but without a Sicily invasion it's possible he might hang onto power in Italy. With little active fighting in the area, other than occupation duty in the Balkans, the Italians try to do just enough to justify continued German coal shipments without pushing the Allies hard enough that they'll crush Italy like a bug.

The Allies and Soviet crush the Germans, probably three or four months later than they did historically, putting it into early August, nuke the Japanese into submission a few days later, and suddenly Mussolini's Italy, essentially intact, is the only remaining Axis power, probably only for a few days before the Italian armed forces decide that they want no part of what would happen next and overthrow him.

 

[Catspoke]

Without Torch Rommel will have the reinforcments that were sent to Tunisia OTL to make a stand. There are a couple of good defensive positions left before Tripoli to setup a blocking position. If none of the Allied troops / air power that were committed to Nov 42- May 43 Tunisia OTL are sent and all the Axis reinforcements that were sent in the same time period were sent, I think the Axis would hold against the 8th army alone.

from this site:

http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/cgsc/carl/resources/csi/Toppe/toppe.asp

The Marsa el Brega position was the first to offer good opportunities for defense again. Here, the area of steppes and desert south of the coast contains many salt marshes and dunes so that only narrow zones have to be guarded by field fortifications.

The Tarhuna-Homs position east and south of Tripoli is flanked by the Djebel Nefusa in Tripolitania and takes advantage of the mountainous terrain, which is not easily covered by motor vehicles.

However if the Allies wern't doing Torch they would be doing something else in Europe, they had make promises to Stalin and this is November 8th 1942, Stalingrad counterattack hadn't happened yet, the Soviets appear to be in trouble.

 

[jmc247]

Without Torch Rommel will have the reinforcments that were sent to Tunisia OTL to make a stand. There are a couple of good defensive positions left before Tripoli to setup a blocking position. If none of the Allied troops / air power that were committed to Nov 42- May 43 Tunisia OTL are sent and all the Axis reinforcements that were sent in the same time period were sent, I think the Axis would hold against the 8th army alone.

from this site:

http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/cgsc/carl/resources/csi/Toppe/toppe.asp

The Marsa el Brega position was the first to offer good opportunities for defense again. Here, the area of steppes and desert south of the coast contains many salt marshes and dunes so that only narrow zones have to be guarded by field fortifications.

The Tarhuna-Homs position east and south of Tripoli is flanked by the Djebel Nefusa in Tripolitania and takes advantage of the mountainous terrain, which is not easily covered by motor vehicles.

I agree with a one front war the Africa Korps could hold out for a long time, longer then most believe. But, their ability to do much of anything other then defend would be quite limited.

However if the Allies wern't doing Torch they would be doing something else in Europe, they had make promises to Stalin and this is November 8th 1942, Stalingrad counterattack hadn't happened yet, the Soviets appear to be in trouble.

Torch was the cautious choice. Something akin to Operation Sledgehammer would be the complete opposite. But, there are a few things they could have done which would have been middle ground options between the two extremes.

 

[Dathi THorfinnsson]

Torch was the cautious choice. Something akin to Operation Sledgehammer would be the complete opposite. But, there are a few things they could have done which would have been middle ground options between the two extremes.

Such as?
Invading Greece? US would be desperately opposed.
Taking the Dodecanese? Ditto.
Norway? Total waste of resources.

? What targets do you have in mind that the military planners of the allies missed?

 

[jmc247]

Such as?
Invading Greece? US would be desperately opposed.
Taking the Dodecanese? Ditto.
Norway? Total waste of resources.

? What targets do you have in mind that the military planners of the allies missed?

With Germany and Italy expecting a landing in North Africa what happens if the U.S. bipassed Tunisia in 1942 and gone for Sicily? Like I said more risky then Torch, but less then Sledgehammer.

 

[Dathi THorfinnsson]

With Germany and Italy expecting a landing in North Africa what happens if the U.S. bipassed Tunisia in 1942 and gone for Sicily? Like I said more risky then Torch, but less then Sledgehammer.

With no air cover !!? Without control of the med? Sledgehammer might be less risky.

 

[jmc247]

With no air cover !!? Without control of the med? Sledgehammer might be less risky.

No Sledgehammer still wouldn't be less risky.

But, really from a military standpoint U.S. forces in North Africa were so green lets just say it was really bad at times like charging a German division with fixed bayonets who they heard was a demoralized Italian division ready to surrender. Suffice it to say the right military choice for the U.S. Army was North Africa.

 

[Dathi THorfinnsson]

No Sledgehammer still wouldn't be less risky.

Ah, sorry, you are right. Confused sledgehammer and roundup.