No Operation Blau May/June 1942

The poster who suggested a B=L style peace was. I think a little too hopeful. In reality any peace deal reality would be far more of a compromise. Maybe the Germans get to keep some territory. Whether this happens depends on the situation at the end if hostilities. Have either Hitler or Stalin been "replaced by a subordinate for example. What state are the armies in at this point?
There are no possible compromises after winter 41/42. By then it was clear that Nazi ideas about the future of Europe had to be taken literally and that meant that for Russia it was a fight to the death.
Any process of de-nazification of Germany after 41 was going to be so divisive and brutal that the country would be defenseless (much like Russia in 1918).
Totalitarian regimes fight total wars.
 
Just a nitpick, but by this time the General Staff was just a Staff. As I see it the last real strategic decision for operations Halder & Co made was for the form of the offensive in May 1940. After that it was pretty much genius Hitlers show. It looks like everyone was following his core decisions from 1941 on.
But the "mind set" of the General Staff had by then become the dominant perception of war in Germany, it's influence being felt at every level.
 
Maybe use the resources and troops that went towards Blau to take Leningrad? While it doesn't net you any resources, taking the city would free most of Army Group North while proving a massive blow to the Soviets.
 
I'm noticing a lot of automatic assumptions about German success despite the fact that attacking in the Moscow or Leningrad directions means going up against much tougher defenses then were facing AGS, that the Soviets would have even more military resources to respond to them without them having to desperately try and counter-Blau, and that the lack of industrial disruption to southern Russia from Blau would result in greater Soviet war production and manpower reserves during the course of the year. Reminds me of the mythologizing around the odds of German success from adopting a defensive posture in mid-1943.

I've never been able to see that. The Nazi, or Hitlers PoV prevailed or dominated by 1941.

How do you explain the prolonged struggle between OKH and Hitler on whether to move on Moscow or Kiev then in July-August then?
 
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I'm noticing a lot of automatic assumptions about German success despite the fact that attacking in the Moscow or Leningrad directions means going up against much tougher defenses then were facing AGS, that the Soviets would have even more military resources to respond to them without them having to desperately try and counter-Blau, and that the lack of industrial disruption to southern Russia from Blau would result in greater Soviet war production and manpower reserves during the course of the year. Reminds me of the mythologizing around the odds of German success from adopting a defensive posture in mid-1943.?

This is all true, but it is also true that the consequences for Germany if they failed would be less severe, since they were not offering such long vulnerable fans for counterattack. They may start 1943 as in OTL but with the Sixth Army and the satellite forces still in existence.
 
This is all true, but it is also true that the consequences for Germany if they failed would be less severe, since they were not offering such long vulnerable fans for counterattack. They may start 1943 as in OTL but with the Sixth Army and the satellite forces still in existence.

That’s true. It’s possible, maybe even probable, that we see both the Red Army and the Wehrmacht enter 1943 in a stronger state.
 
Very unlikely the Germans don't try to invade the Caucusus given that Moscow is impenetrable at this point and they need the oil... but if they just fight a defensive war, they maybe last another 6 months or so longer than OTL.
 

Babatus

Donor
There are no possible compromises after winter 41/42. By then it was clear that Nazi ideas about the future of Europe had to be taken literally and that meant that for Russia it was a fight to the death.
Any process of de-nazification of Germany after 41 was going to be so divisive and brutal that the country would be defenseless (much like Russia in 1918).
Totalitarian regimes fight total wars.

It’s after Kursk and the following advance to the Dniepr that it became obvious that allied tanks would probably be able to roll up until Germany.

In spring 42, you have a large swat of the industrial parts of Russia occupied, the Moscow defeat could have been a temporary setback for the Werhmacht, the Japanese series of victory in the Pacific made a “western front” perspective pretty thin etc… Stalin was pretty concerned about the possibilities of a separate peace deal between the western allied and the 3rd Reich until 1943.

My point was that the blocking part of any “2nd Brest-Litovsk” (aka "comprimise peace with german gains) were the nazis themselves. It’s pretty hard to know exactly what Hitler was thinking at this time, but apparently, he was still believing in a possibilities of knocking down the Soviet Union and that a few additional Kessel would definitely neutralize the Red Army. Plus the fact that, well, the Reich policies made it clear that they were aiming for the destruction of the Slavic peoples, thus my use of not-zis.
 
It’s after Kursk and the following advance to the Dniepr that it became obvious that allied tanks would probably be able to roll up until Germany.

In spring 42, you have a large swat of the industrial parts of Russia occupied, the Moscow defeat could have been a temporary setback for the Werhmacht, the Japanese series of victory in the Pacific made a “western front” perspective pretty thin etc… Stalin was pretty concerned about the possibilities of a separate peace deal between the western allied and the 3rd Reich until 1943.

My point was that the blocking part of any “2nd Brest-Litovsk” (aka "comprimise peace with german gains) were the nazis themselves. It’s pretty hard to know exactly what Hitler was thinking at this time, but apparently, he was still believing in a possibilities of knocking down the Soviet Union and that a few additional Kessel would definitely neutralize the Red Army. Plus the fact that, well, the Reich policies made it clear that they were aiming for the destruction of the Slavic peoples, thus my use of not-zis.
It’s after Kursk and the following advance to the Dniepr that it became obvious that allied tanks would probably be able to roll up until Germany.

In spring 42, you have a large swat of the industrial parts of Russia occupied, the Moscow defeat could have been a temporary setback for the Werhmacht, the Japanese series of victory in the Pacific made a “western front” perspective pretty thin etc… Stalin was pretty concerned about the possibilities of a separate peace deal between the western allied and the 3rd Reich until 1943.

My point was that the blocking part of any “2nd Brest-Litovsk” (aka "comprimise peace with german gains) were the nazis themselves. It’s pretty hard to know exactly what Hitler was thinking at this time, but apparently, he was still believing in a possibilities of knocking down the Soviet Union and that a few additional Kessel would definitely neutralize the Red Army. Plus the fact that, well, the Reich policies made it clear that they were aiming for the destruction of the Slavic peoples, thus my use of not-zis.
It takes two to compromise.
Hitler could think, or daydream, whatever he wanted. He was fighting against more rational creatures that had no ilusions that nobody in 1942 could beat the USA in a conventional war.
If there ever was a chance of the Axis winning WW2 it went away when the USA joined the war.
At that point, nobody in the allied camp had any ilusions about the possibility of a peaceful co-exixtence with nazi Germany.
So it would be impossible to have a compromise in 1942 or after.
 
I've never been able to see that. The Nazi, or Hitlers PoV prevailed or dominated by 1941.
That is an argument about the "where" to strike. Regarding the "how" to strike Hitler and the OKW shared the same tendency for maneuvre based "decisive battles". German strategic concepts for WW2 were based on the assumption that mechanization could bring back XIX century style fast/decisive campaigns in the style of the Elder Moltke or Napoleon. Events in 1940 seemed to validate that, mostly because they didn't take into account that they had been fighting an incompetent opponent.
 
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