No, they had already achieved their goals from the Winter War.
I am amazed how persistent this old argument is. The Soviet historians liked it because it could be used to reduce the stinging of the Red Army's abject failure in the war, to airbrush away the mistake Stalin made with underestimating the Finns, and the same argument then somehow crept into Western historiography as well. When we look at the matter from a larger perspective and factor in all the relevant historical data, though, I'd say that on balance the better argument is that Stalin's goal in late November 1939 was to conquer Finland in its entirety, to be either joined into the USSR directly or made into a Soviet-controlled puppet people's republic. If you want, I can provide you links to older discussions on the forum where we go through the specifics of this argument.
They did appear to be sounding out the Germans for *permission* to do this during the talks about joining the axis.
The discussions between Molotov and the Nazi leaders in late 1940 indeed show that the Soviet leadership exhibited a lot of interest into "the Finnish question" as it was the only thing that had not been resolved in the way the USSR and Nazi Germany had outlined in the secret protocol to the M-R pact. Had not been resolved because of the Red Army's failure to conquer Finland in the Winter War.
Now, there are two transcripts of the discussion between Hitler and Molotov. To read the German transcripts alone, it is plausible to argue that what Molotov was demanding was the possibility to annex Finland just like the Baltics in the near future, without the Germans meddling in the matter. But then when we look at the Soviet transcripts, we can also claim that what Molotov was mainly on about was Finland being
generally in the Soviet sphere and under Soviet influence, without German presence in the area. The immediate context to the discussion was of course the recently signed military transit agreement between Finland and Germany that practically allowed German troops onto Finnish territory. From the Soviet perspective this naturally went against letter and the spirit of the secret protocol. The discussions do include Molotov asking whether the Germans still see Finland as being in the Soviet sphere "in the same way as the Baltics/as Estonia and Bessarabia" (the transcripts differ here). These were rather obviously all areas the USSR had already annexed by late 1940.
My own reading at the moment is that in 1940-41 Stalin did have a medium-to-long-term plan to eventually join Finland into the USSR, or at least to make it a Socialist puppet with Red Army bases on Finnish soil. After the sad debacle of the Winter War, and the bloody nose and bad prestige problems it caused to the USSR, though, at this point Stalin was more careful with Finland, taking the Finnish state and military much more seriously as opponents than still in 1939. On the face of it, what happened in the Winter War made Stalin maybe even
too careful with Finland - a shift from sorely underestimating the Finns to even overestimating them.
So, even if Stalin had plans for a new invasion of Finland in 41-42, now he would try to stack the deck in the Soviet favor in different ways first to ensure the least painful (for the USSR) takeover. Trying to degrade Finland's ability to defend itself, by diplomatic, political, economic and intelligence means would form the groundwork for an eventual takeover at an opportune time. There are several indications of ground being prepared in this way with Finland in 40-41, and the same policies to chip away at Finnish sovereignty and will to fight would have continued through 1941 had Barbarossa not started. It is hard to say, on available evidence and without being able to delve freely into the Russian archives, whether a new invasion would have practically been in the cards by mid-1942: this also depended a lot on how Soviet-German relations would develop and how the general events of the wider war would progress in Europe and the world.