No Operation Barbarossa impact on the war

not blowing thru fuel and losing scores of aircraft in USSR they might build proper transport aircraft? more Condors and JU-252s/352s that could fly from Germany to North Africa. not send 60 u-boats past Gibraltar but proper Type II overland or in sections?

does the Ar232 not count?

that Arado is a great design, mentioned the few that were placed in production though as likely candidates, avoiding the Gigant short ranged converted glider design.
 

Deleted member 1487

USSR wins that war without a doubt, we can argue about it being a steamroller or not but Soviet position in 1942 on attack would be vastly superior to 1941 on defense.
Eh...I'd say their defense in 1942 would be superior to that of 1941. 11-12 months isn't going to fix the OOB/doctrinal/lack of radio issues the Red Army had, which would cripple the attack, as would their over promotion problem and lack of leader experience. 1943 would be the earliest date of a chance of offensive success. Still in 1942 they could take Romania easily if it were fighting on it's own.
 
If the soviets attacked Germany first then the biggest problem would probably be troop morale. Since Germany didn’t push towards Moscow, Stalingrad, etc. the soldiers would be less enthusiastic to fight a war which would cost millions especially if they knew of the non-aggression pact. They would still mobilize and fight, most likely due to fear of execution or the gulags, but would be less efficient. Ultimately if the German defense was good enough and the soldiers pushed hard enough there might be mass mutinies. That’s just what I infer
 
Germany could through application of extra air power, take Malta, Tobruk, Siebel Ferries and MFPs, those not used in the Black Sea, Lake Ladoga OTL could be used to ferry extra supplies to the Med, along with some freed up Ju52s. More fuel for the Italian navy to convoy supplies as well. The British will be forced back from the Egyptian frontier, toward Alexandria. With an extra Panzer division supplied in North Africa this manner, the Germans would likely take Alexandria, but it would be a year before all that winds up to make that happen.

Japan enters, USA enters just the same as Japan is already on that path. Soviet Union neutral and willing to allow some trade across her with Germany is an advantage for both Germany and Japan.

Soviet Union would wait until there is a significant Allied force on the ground in France before antagonizing Germany or Japan.

A knock the Axis out of Africa, then Japan, then Europe seems a likely America+Brits+Commonwealth+FF strategy.
 

Deleted member 1487

A knock the Axis out of Africa, then Japan, then Europe seems a likely America+Brits+Commonwealth+FF strategy.
Assuming that is possible. IOTL the Allies feared not being able to if the Soviets dropped out of the war; how would they feel if the USSR is neutral, Axis favorable?
 

FBKampfer

Banned
After comming off literal miracle-like victories in Poland, the Low Countries, Norway, France, the Balkans, and Rommel's rampage as "The Desert Fox" in Africa, Germany is looking pretty undefeated.

Without Barbarossa, the Germans could likely support a proper-equipped tank corps in Africa, not to mention Rommel gets top pick on the Panzer III's and IV's, and the Tigers when they come out.

North Africa is going to be a much different game this time around. And without North Africa and Barbarossa, there's nothing really to support the idea that invading Europe would be anything but a disaster.

We have the benefit of knowing how dumb the Nazis behaved OTL, they didn't at the time.
 
If Hitler had announced a 'ceasefire' outside Dunkirk (instead of stopping anyway) and told Mussolini where to go (when the Italians mucked up in North Africa), the British would have sat down to talk.

Following 'negotiations' - say French 'overseas territories' become part of the British Empire, France is 100% Vichy, Poland gets a 'transitional' puppet (Nazi) Government and the same for the Low Countries, chances are UK (Chamberlain) will sign a peace treaty. ..

The big Q is, when does Stalin try to grab the rest of Poland off Hitler ? I'm betting sooner rather than later ... and I'm betting the Nazi's will 'win' i.e. push the Soviets back -- and maybe even take Ukraine (of course that pre-supposes that Hitler decides the Poles/Ukrainians are really 'Arian' after all == if he continues with his historical policies he will push them back into Soviet hands and could even end up loosing ...)

Then in Aug 1945, when the US gains the Atomic bomb, a new UK Government (led by Churchill) will gets to do a bit of nuclear blackmail == so maybe force the Nazi's to withdraw from France ...
 
Assuming that is possible. IOTL the Allies feared not being able to if the Soviets dropped out of the war; how would they feel if the USSR is neutral, Axis favorable?

The US did have a warplan for mobilizing an army required to bring down Germany if the Soviets dropped out. Whether they’d have the political will to do it is, of course, a open question and something of an unknown.
 
The US did have a warplan for mobilizing an army required to bring down Germany if the Soviets dropped out. Whether they’d have the political will to do it is, of course, a open question and something of an unknown.

Again, I know I'm coming from a broader perspective on the situation of 1940-1941 that is far from unanimous here, but this wouldn't be a situation where the Soviets dropped out. It would be a situation where the Soviets were never in the war at all, wouldn't it?

In that scenario I'm actually having a harder and harder time, the more I think about it, believing that Roosevelt would ever have the political capital for committing to a "Europe first" strategy. I mean, there isn't truly any Europe anymore, just Nazis, Brits, and Communists, all glaring at each other and waiting for someone to show a weakness. Not that Americans cared in the slightest about riding to Stalin's rescue, but if the situation in Europe seems more or less stabilized, however unhappily from a democratic perspective, it seems to me that Roosevelt will have no political option but to focus even more heavily on the one power that has actually attacked American soil, Japan.

Of course this assumes Pearl Harbor happens in the altered timeline, but maybe it would, because the Japanese strategic logic that led to it wasn't completely linked to Barbarossa.
 
Again, I know I'm coming from a broader perspective on the situation of 1940-1941 that is far from unanimous here, but this wouldn't be a situation where the Soviets dropped out. It would be a situation where the Soviets were never in the war at all, wouldn't it?

In practical terms, the two scenarios are pretty identical.

In that scenario I'm actually having a harder and harder time, the more I think about it, believing that Roosevelt would ever have the political capital for committing to a "Europe first" strategy.

Europe First was not Roosevelt's idea though, it was the military's. US warplanners under the Rainbow Plans had decided well before either Pearl Harbour or Barbarossa that in the event of war with both Japan and Germany, the European theater would receive priority. This was in part because Germany was the more intrinsically powerful of the two and in part since the latest revisions of War Plan Orange showed that the US could not undertake truly major offensive action in the Pacific for the first 1-2 years of war after the loss of bases in the Western/Central Pacific in the opening phase. In the end, Europe First was a military decision and not a political one.

I mean, there isn't truly any Europe anymore, just Nazis, Brits, and Communists, all glaring at each other and waiting for someone to show a weakness.

Barring outlier scenarios like the Germans pulling off a successful Mediterranean Strategy or prior to PH going down, the British and Germans would not be "glaring at each other". Rather, they would be engaged in active combat in North Africa and the North Atlantic. The latter would invariably lead to US warships and German U-Boats shooting at each other even before Pearl Harbor, as it did IOTL, and after Pearl Harbor would likely invariably provide an adequate casus belli even if Hitler does refrain from DoWing the US.

Of course this assumes Pearl Harbor happens in the altered timeline, but maybe it would, because the Japanese strategic logic that led to it wasn't completely linked to Barbarossa.

It probably would. Japan never seems to have entertained the idea of trading with the Soviets and the adoption of the southern strategy which would lead to actions and reaction that made war with the US pretty much inevitable from the Japanese viewpoint all occurred independently of the developments in Soviet-German relations.
 
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In practical terms, the two scenarios are pretty identical.

Maybe. It seems to me the situation is different if the U.S. is already committed to the war and then the Soviets leave compared to a situation where the U.S. is joining a war effort that the Soviets were never a part of to begin with.

If nothing else, the longer the Soviets in the war, the longer the Germans must suffer the horrendous personnel and equipment drain from the eastern front.

On second thought I will agree it's not a complete wash: even if the Soviets remain on the sidelines, the Germans would still have to maintain considerable forces on their eastern border to prevent Stalin from trying to seize any opportunities that might arise.

Barring outlier scenarios like the Germans pulling off a successful Mediterranean Strategy or prior to PH going down, the British and Germans would not be "glaring at each other". Rather, they would be engaged in active combat in North Africa and the North Atlantic. The latter would invariably lead to US warships and German U-Boats shooting at each other even before Pearl Harbor, as it did IOTL, and after Pearl Harbor would likely invariably provide an adequate casus belli even if Hitler does refrain from DoWing the US.

Frankly this was why I suggested earlier on that it would be smarter for the Germans just to declare the war over after the fall of France.
 
And we have to keep in mind that the Wehrmacht would use a "relatively" peaceful 1941-43 (when the Soviets attack) to develop new weapons too.
but... wasn't a part of that new weapon development driven by the shock when German forces ran into the Russian T-34 and KV tanks? So, for tanks at least, it seems like the Germans might not develop much more, since the ones they already have are doing a fine job against the Brits. For that matter, it seems like German weapon development is going to be driven by their tussle with the Brits. So... improvements to naval and air forces, not so much the land ones?
 

Redbeard

Banned
When Hitler attacked in 1941 the Red Army was in the midst of a huge expansion programme which by mid 1943 would have provided in the region of 500 Divisions incl. tens of thousands of modern tanks and bristling with weapons of all kinds and generally of high quality.

On paper an extremely impressive force challenging the combined forces of the rest of the planet.

The problem with the Red Army before it got baptised in Barbarossa was however, that its units had way too little backup structure to last beyond the initial clashes. Even those Armoured Divisions/Corps in 1941 being very close to full complement - on paper the strongest military units on the planet - rarely lasted beyond a few days of combat and made remarkably little impression on their enemies. Add to that a logistic capacity and doctrine making the Wehrmacht a high-tech wonder in comparison.

In OTL the secrets of big scale campaigning was learned the hard way, but seen from a no-Barbarossa 1943 Stalin I think the temptation of slinging those 500 Divisions with their 20.000 tanks westward will be very big. With a starting point at the border agreed by Molotov and Rippentrop in 1939 I guess the Red Army will soon roll over East Prussia, Silesia and Posen, but hardly cross the Oder before it is grinded down by attrition and bad logistics.

But before that the Wallies will be in a dilemma: Can we risk Stalin taking continental Europe, can we risk aiding Hitler or can we just sit it out until the two bullies have bled each other white? Hitler suddenly choking in his Apfelstrudel might change the equation and I guess there will be influential Germans looking for Apfelstrudel recipes.
 
Its just hard to imagine Stalin one July morning in 1943 deciding to commit to invasion of Germany that has a fearsome warlike reputation. Especially when Germany is unoccupied with an Allied invasion.

It might work for a while like Redbeard says above. The risk/reward for Stalin doesn't seem right for a cautious guy like him.

While you wait, Stalin makes money and both Fascists and Capitalists are dying.

Easier would be for the Soviets to attack Japan (only).
 
Eh...I'd say their defense in 1942 would be superior to that of 1941. 11-12 months isn't going to fix the OOB/doctrinal/lack of radio issues the Red Army had, which would cripple the attack, as would their over promotion problem and lack of leader experience. 1943 would be the earliest date of a chance of offensive success. Still in 1942 they could take Romania easily if it were fighting on it's own.

lack of radio was a non-issue, they had some radios in their tank-mechanized units, and their was nothing wrong with using telephone lines anyways. The Germans did. Even the Iraqi army did during the first Gulf war. Unless you are talking about a battle where the rare command tank with a radio gets knocked out, as the Germans specifically tried to do, then this is not an impediment. And using radios presents challenges, as for operational security the Soviets needed the people to encrypt and decrypt the messages, which took time and they might not even have those people. Their army was not fully mobilized. They didn't have the trucks and logistics people they needed at Barbarossa, or the communications people.

The Soviet order of battle, ORBAT, was well done during Barbarossa except they (Stalin) thought the Germans would emphasize the south rather than the north of the Pripet marshes. Not sure what was so wrong with it, except that they were far to outnumbered by the Germans

The Soviets showed what it could do at the Soviet counterattack at Moscow--as early as 1941. They were almost on the same page as the Germans in doctrinal terms, except while the Germans concentrated on a dynamic package of armoured forces, high tempo and auftragstaktik (as opposed to befehlstaktik, or some hybrid command paradigm), the Soviets apparently didn't realize these last two things quite as firmly as the Germans did (they did later on in the cold war that is for sure). But, they realized the importance of combined-arms, tank-mechanized units, as the Germans did. Something the French, Gamelin, apparently completely failed to grasp. However, the Germans were very infantry, anti-tank heavy. The Soviets needed to follow that example, or concentrate more on regular artillery and mortars for overcoming antitank defenses that the Germans championed. Sending endless bunches of obsolete tanks into the slaughter was not a recipe for success--something the Americans found out the hard way in North Africa. Germans specifically wanted this to happen, so they could lure the tanks into a anti tank kill zone. All the stuff during this time was maintenance prone anyways, though, including their gun tractors that was entirely unsuitable for war in the vast space of the USSR. And especially their gun transports (which meant the infantry were consistently not where they needed to be). If they had a fault it was that they were far to aggressive given their forces and means.

The Soviet command network were in some cases not perfect by no means (they could be understaffed and may not have inspired a lot of trust with subordinates and higher ups unlike the Germans who had units and formations cohered through the fire of previous wars) but the same people that lost in 1941 crushed the Germans in 1943 at Kursk. The behavioral science side of this that encompasses battle related experience (like coup d'oeil), why is there any reason to believe that matters really? (unless you mean something other than combat experience like experience in general) Despite the purges the officers that died (or survived), their replacements were still going to almost always be career professionals with decades in the army, not some green officers rushed into their positions anyways. They had experience, and they put up a good showing even during Barbarossa in the Ukraine and White Russia despite their failures in terms of showing that they were indeed consummate military professionals. They came up with a defense plan on the drop of a hat, and carried it out. They had bad situational awareness about where the Germans were, though, and really struggled to decide where to have their forces go with disastrous results because the Germans were moving through the Soviet defense at an incredible rate (Manstein was an extreme example) beyond the abilities of Soviet adaptive decision making to estimate how fast the Germans were moving.

The first obstacle is the bug river, then whatever the Germans have in the way of defense line (the Germans may be surprised the way the Soviets were). The chance is much better that the Soviet attack is properly coordinated, than their actions during OTL Barbarossa. And with large amounts of T-34s, and their gun transports not breaking down (and the exact logistical nightmare of OTL Barbarossa), they could actually attrite the Germans in the resulting tank battles like what happened at Kursk, and as long as the Soviets are forcing the Germans into battles of attrition they are winning, and forcing them from having the initiative. These are much more favorable conditions than OTL Barbarossa. The Germans fighting a reverse Kursk, except there is the chance that they are completely blind sided by this attack. This way the Soviets dictate how the war is to be fought, not the Germans. The Germans conducting an area defense like Kursk as would probably happen means that they could be fighting solitary battles and losing them because of the superiority of the T-34, because the Soviets are going to have an easier time in using their tanks correctly with infantry and artillery, but most of all because of the overwhelming numbers. It is not at all an ideal situation for the Germans. By the time the Soviets are done with their offensive the Germans may have won a Pyhrric victory, if indeed they even win won at all. Time is now not something working in favor for the Germans, it is on the Soviets side now, simply because the stole the initiative and the Germans are now forced to react to what the Soviets are doing and not the other way around. Blitzkrieg required the French or Soviets to do what the Germans wanted, allow the Germans to shape the battlefield how they wanted. By preempting this and going on the offensive, the Soviets can force them into a battle of attrition, and potentially attrite the German army like they did at Kursk, so that a Barbarossa scale offensive is no longer an option for the Germans. Strategic stalemate at the border. Something much much worse for the Germans. Either way it ends with either the Soviets or Americans defeating the Germans.

And if Stalin wasn't a fool he would have put the USSR economy on a war footing before Poland even fell. And he wouldn't attack anyways unless the whole might of the Red Army was there, fully mobilized, and expanded to a inane degree that gives the USSR and unquestionable advantage.
 
Its just hard to imagine Stalin one July morning in 1943 deciding to commit to invasion of Germany that has a fearsome warlike reputation. Especially when Germany is unoccupied with an Allied invasion.

While you wait, Stalin makes money and both Fascists and Capitalists are dying.

Easier would be for the Soviets to attack Japan (only).

one of effects of No Barbarossa might be return to German-Sino relations as German-Japanese trade was lackluster? Japan might be considered "free agent" and attacked by Soviets even earlier than 1943. (Mengjiang added to Mongolia buffer state? https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mengjiang)
 

Deleted member 1487

Wow. There is a lot to critique here, I'll start with the most glaring issues up top and see if I want to continue with the rest.
lack of radio was a non-issue, they had some radios in their tank-mechanized units, and their was nothing wrong with using telephone lines anyways. The Germans did. Even the Iraqi army did during the first Gulf war. Unless you are talking about a battle where the rare command tank with a radio gets knocked out, as the Germans specifically tried to do, then this is not an impediment. And using radios presents challenges, as for operational security the Soviets needed the people to encrypt and decrypt the messages, which took time and they might not even have those people. Their army was not fully mobilized. They didn't have the trucks and logistics people they needed at Barbarossa, or the communications people.
Read about 1941 and Soviet communication issues. Land lines were constantly cut from the air, fast moving mobile units, and saboteur units. Radio was a key weakness of Soviet forces until they got enough US ones to make up for their deficit. Besides logistics and organization, communication issues were perhaps one of the greatest problems the Soviets had in 1941-42. Start with "Stumbling Colossus" for some hints at that.

The Soviet order of battle, ORBAT, was well done during Barbarossa except they (Stalin) thought the Germans would emphasize the south rather than the north of the Pripet marshes. Not sure what was so wrong with it, except that they were far to outnumbered by the Germans
I have no idea how you can make that claim since within Mechanized Corps there were no where near enough trucks to supply units for mobile operations even on the defensive on their own territory, assuming they even had full TOE. That directly led to numerous Soviet revisions of their unit organization until 1942, revisions only gained with combat experience. In the south the Soviets had the bulk of their armor strength against a smaller part of German strength. How did that turn out for them?
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Brody_(1941)
BTW they massively outnumbered the Germans there.
 
Wow. There is a lot to critique here, I'll start with the most glaring issues up top and see if I want to continue with the rest.

If it is the best you can do, then it is the best you can do

Read about 1941 and Soviet communication issues.

If the Soviets mobilized, communications and logistics would have improved. More trucks, more communications and logistics people etc

Land lines were constantly cut from the air, fast moving mobile units, and saboteur units. Radio was a key weakness of Soviet forces until they got enough US ones to make up for their deficit.

German special forces/Ukranian nationalists did cut land lines, and aircraft bombers hit cities and the communications. And yes, it was incidentally German practice to cut the telephone lines once they passed through. However, to say they were "constantly" cut is arbitrary, it is vague, and it is unhelpful

Dimitri Pavlov for example wasn't blacked out in terms of land line communications until the Germans reached their objective and completed the encirclement, blocking their retreat.

Besides logistics and organization, communication issues were perhaps one of the greatest problems the Soviets had in 1941-42. Start with "Stumbling Colossus" for some hints at that.

I have sometime ago after another member suggested I read this book, and just like you failed to cite anything from it. Dubno 1941: The Greatest Tank Battle of the Second World War by Aleksei Isaev and The Red Army and the Second World War by Alexander Hill can be added to the list as well as a myriad other books.

There were communication issues, such as senior officers getting separated from their commands and not being able to contact them, sure. It says it in your own article you linked, fronts and armies were in good communications

Conditions were difficult for the Soviet Corps commanders: loss of communications, constant harassment by the Luftwaffe, lack of transportation, and the movement of large numbers of refugees and retreating soldiers on the roads [and traffic jams by the large number of tanks] made it difficult for the counter-attacking forces to assemble at their jumping off points. While communication between the Front headquarters and the individual army commands was generally good, communication to the front-line units was seriously flawed, because it was dependent on the civilian telephone and telegraph network

[The wikipeida person leaves out the most important reason. The Soviets seriously miscalculated where to send the counter-attacking forces which had nothing to do with communications]

However, I can produce examples of front-line units having radios as seen here, taken from your example of Brody

German reconnaissance aircraft had been observing the mass of Soviet armour around Brody all day and they had spotted the GAZ-AAA radio trucks belonging to both the 8th and 15th Mechanized Corps command posts. Around 1800 hours, several groups of lowpflying Ju-88 bombers from Fliegerkorps V came in and bombed both command posts. Karpezo was badly wounded but Ryabyshev survived, minus his radio truck, which was left burning. This one air strike - which was a result of poor opsec in the Red Army - seriously degraded Soviet C2 in the armoured battles around Dubno.
Tank Warfare on the Eastern Front: 1941-42

I have no idea how you can make that claim since within Mechanized Corps there were no where near enough trucks to supply units for mobile operations even on the defensive on their own territory, assuming they even had full TOE.

The one thing that needed to change was the tank divisions needed to dump a tank regiment, but because the Soviets had so many tanks crammed into their units, the trucks they had in those units were overwhelmed with the logistics for the tanks. They didn't have enough for the infantry because of this.

That directly led to numerous Soviet revisions of their unit organization until 1942, revisions only gained with combat experience. In the south the Soviets had the bulk of their armor strength against a smaller part of German strength. How did that turn out for them?
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Brody_(1941)

And immediately after WWII, they switched back over to tank divisions, although, I guess the tank corps was kind of a pseudo tank division

they needed standardization. Large fractions of their vehicles never even made it battle. And the Soviets did not have massive numbers of T-34s at Brody either

BTW they massively outnumbered the Germans there.

In terms of tanks, not infantry, which is what really mattered. Wherever Soviet infantry was it was not there. Notice wikipedia doesn't have infantry or artillery numbers. The Germans won those battles with infantry and artillery, not tanks. That is how they liked to operate

It may be optimistic to say that the Soviets would outright win their first offensive just because they would assuredly keep all the non-T-34 junk which would play havoic with their logistics. And ideally they would have lots of conventional artillery to accompany those T-34s to help break anti tank defenses
 
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"That said, I'm not sure Stalin has the capacity to maintain that kind of balancing act very effectively and he certainly doesn't have an impartial, objective foreign and intelligence service to help him in making the calculations."

This is a nitpick to a much earlier comment, but the Soviet intelligence service is generally regarded to have been excellent.

It also warned Stalin about Barbarossa. Its debatable why Stalin did not mobilize, but it seems that the Red Army was undergoing an overhaul and was vulnerable, and they really needed another year of peace, so Stalin put all his chips on appeasement. So the balancing act part of the comment is accurate, IOTL Stalin was unable to maintain it. But that is because of Hitler insanity/ unpredictability. Here was are postulating a restrained Hitler, or maybe the situation is that Hitler has died suddenly and Goering/ the Nazi junta gets cold feet on Barbarossa. In this case Stalin's foreign policy works without him having to do anything un-Stalin like.
 
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