Eh...I'd say their defense in 1942 would be superior to that of 1941. 11-12 months isn't going to fix the OOB/doctrinal/lack of radio issues the Red Army had, which would cripple the attack, as would their over promotion problem and lack of leader experience. 1943 would be the earliest date of a chance of offensive success. Still in 1942 they could take Romania easily if it were fighting on it's own.
lack of radio was a non-issue, they had some radios in their tank-mechanized units, and their was nothing wrong with using telephone lines anyways. The Germans did. Even the Iraqi army did during the first Gulf war. Unless you are talking about a battle where the rare command tank with a radio gets knocked out, as the Germans specifically tried to do, then this is not an impediment. And using radios presents challenges, as for operational security the Soviets needed the people to encrypt and decrypt the messages, which took time and they might not even have those people. Their army was not fully mobilized. They didn't have the trucks and logistics people they needed at Barbarossa, or the communications people.
The Soviet order of battle, ORBAT, was well done during Barbarossa except they (Stalin) thought the Germans would emphasize the south rather than the north of the Pripet marshes. Not sure what was so wrong with it, except that they were far to outnumbered by the Germans
The Soviets showed what it could do at the Soviet counterattack at Moscow--as early as 1941. They were almost on the same page as the Germans in doctrinal terms, except while the Germans concentrated on a dynamic package of armoured forces, high tempo and auftragstaktik (as opposed to befehlstaktik, or some hybrid command paradigm), the Soviets apparently didn't realize these last two things quite as firmly as the Germans did (they did later on in the cold war that is for sure). But, they realized the importance of combined-arms, tank-mechanized units, as the Germans did. Something the French, Gamelin, apparently completely failed to grasp. However, the Germans were very infantry, anti-tank heavy. The Soviets needed to follow that example, or concentrate more on regular artillery and mortars for overcoming antitank defenses that the Germans championed. Sending endless bunches of obsolete tanks into the slaughter was not a recipe for success--something the Americans found out the hard way in North Africa. Germans specifically wanted this to happen, so they could lure the tanks into a anti tank kill zone. All the stuff during this time was maintenance prone anyways, though, including their gun tractors that was entirely unsuitable for war in the vast space of the USSR. And especially their gun transports (which meant the infantry were consistently not where they needed to be). If they had a fault it was that they were far to aggressive given their forces and means.
The Soviet command network were in some cases not perfect by no means (they could be understaffed and may not have inspired a lot of trust with subordinates and higher ups unlike the Germans who had units and formations cohered through the fire of previous wars) but the same people that lost in 1941 crushed the Germans in 1943 at Kursk. The behavioral science side of this that encompasses battle related experience (like coup d'oeil), why is there any reason to believe that matters really? (unless you mean something other than combat experience like experience in general) Despite the purges the officers that died (or survived), their replacements were still going to almost always be career professionals with decades in the army, not some green officers rushed into their positions anyways. They had experience, and they put up a good showing even during Barbarossa in the Ukraine and White Russia despite their failures in terms of showing that they were indeed consummate military professionals. They came up with a defense plan on the drop of a hat, and carried it out. They had bad situational awareness about where the Germans were, though, and really struggled to decide where to have their forces go with disastrous results because the Germans were moving through the Soviet defense at an incredible rate (Manstein was an extreme example) beyond the abilities of Soviet adaptive decision making to estimate how fast the Germans were moving.
The first obstacle is the bug river, then whatever the Germans have in the way of defense line (the Germans may be surprised the way the Soviets were). The chance is much better that the Soviet attack is properly coordinated, than their actions during OTL Barbarossa. And with large amounts of T-34s, and their gun transports not breaking down (and the exact logistical nightmare of OTL Barbarossa), they could actually attrite the Germans in the resulting tank battles like what happened at Kursk, and as long as the Soviets are forcing the Germans into battles of attrition they are winning, and forcing them from having the initiative. These are much more favorable conditions than OTL Barbarossa. The Germans fighting a reverse Kursk, except there is the chance that they are completely blind sided by this attack. This way the Soviets dictate how the war is to be fought, not the Germans. The Germans conducting an area defense like Kursk as would probably happen means that they could be fighting solitary battles and losing them because of the superiority of the T-34, because the Soviets are going to have an easier time in using their tanks correctly with infantry and artillery, but most of all because of the overwhelming numbers. It is not at all an ideal situation for the Germans. By the time the Soviets are done with their offensive the Germans may have won a Pyhrric victory, if indeed they even win won at all. Time is now not something working in favor for the Germans, it is on the Soviets side now, simply because the stole the initiative and the Germans are now forced to react to what the Soviets are doing and not the other way around. Blitzkrieg required the French or Soviets to do what the Germans wanted, allow the Germans to shape the battlefield how they wanted. By preempting this and going on the offensive, the Soviets can force them into a battle of attrition, and potentially attrite the German army like they did at Kursk, so that a Barbarossa scale offensive is no longer an option for the Germans. Strategic stalemate at the border. Something much much worse for the Germans. Either way it ends with either the Soviets or Americans defeating the Germans.
And if Stalin wasn't a fool he would have put the USSR economy on a war footing before Poland even fell. And he wouldn't attack anyways unless the whole might of the Red Army was there, fully mobilized, and expanded to a inane degree that gives the USSR and unquestionable advantage.