No MV22 Osprey

TFSmith121

Banned
CH-47 or CH-53

Given that other 60s helicopters such as the CH47F, UH1Y and CH53K are still in production with massive and fundamental upgrades what if the USMC workhorse CH46 was given a similar upgrade? Would it produce a helicopter good enough to avoid the costly and delayed Osprey programme?

CH-47 or CH-53 would make more sense than the CH-46 being run-on.

One option is drop the medium lift requirement entirely and go for a purely CH-53 and UH-60 fleet, which given both airframes are/were already in service with the Navy, would make a lot more sense than keeping the UH-1 running...

And the V-22, although a very impressive aircraft in a lot of ways, took forever to get to IOC and is extremely expensive for the capabilities it brings; not unlike the AV-8.

Best,
 
CV-22 Osprey cruises much faster than helicopters and has much longer range both of which allow it to insert troops much farther inland than any helicopter. No conventional helicopter can compete with CV-22's range or speed.

Boeing-Vertol-Piaseki did build an all-composite prototype during the early 1980s. It looked like a modernized CH-46 Sky Knight, but never flew beyond the prototype stage.
The primary reason that the Boeing-Vertol-Piaseki CH-47 Chinook remains so popular is its massive horsepower reserves which allow it to fly hot and heavy, higher in the Afghan mountains than any other western helicopter. Only Russian-made helicopters, with much larger rotor diameters (and much lighter disc-loadings) can compete up in the Afghan mountains.
However, I never seen a Chinook variant that could fold its rotors small enough to stow in a ship's hangar deck.

CV-22's greatest disadvantage is that it was the first tilt-rotor to enter production which entailed an expensive learning curve, cross training crews, etc.
For example, there was a well-publicized crash at Marana, Arizona when a pilot (who had recently cross-trained from fixed wing) made a classic error and descended into his own vortex ring.
CV-22 also suffered numerous developmental delays caused by the need to fold it into aircraft carriers. They wasted millions of dollars worth of development money on bed-stead versus rotissary folding methods. Personally, I would have added a jury strut and swung the entire wing off to one side.
Far wiser would have been to build the first (small) batch of CV-22A without folding mechanisms, then progressively add folding mechanisms to batch B and batch C. Non-folding versions would be limited to land-based (e.g. search and rescue or inserting Special Operators) but hopefully A models would be worn out or retired before a major war broke out.
As an aside, I forecast that (non-folding) Augusta-Bell 409 tilt-rotors will sell to dozens of foreign operators while CV-22s will be too expensive for any foreign Air Force.

A third developmental delay was caused by decisions to incorporate more composite airframe components than any previous design. The CV-22 wing box was the largest composite structure when it was introduced.
Yes, composites shaved ten or twenty percent off the empty weight, but they also slowed development.
 
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The USMC already had a heavy lift helo. What was wanted was a medium lift vehicle. More robust & better ranged than the overaged CH46. If you trace back through the literature the requirement leads around to a new aircraft, or something existing so heavily modified it may as well be new. The MV22 was one route to this. A completely new helo design to achieve the capacity and range requirements was looking like the most likely alternative. That was certainly the most attractive in economic terms. The MV22 certainly has capability, but the USMC had to give up bits of many other important things to pay for it. ie: a modern cutting edge attack helo. The aged AH1 Cobra design is still used. The many upgrades are useful, but of declining value in the 21st Century.

I'm aware of what they wanted, in particular they wanted something for the dispersed, over-the-horizon assault doctrine for which the LCAC and failed EFV were key components. Thus the LHA/D would be 300 miles from the coast with the Osprey, the LSD 100 miles off the coast with most of the LCACs and the LPD 25 miles of the coast with the EFV Amtracks and all would leave at -1 H hour and arrive at the at beach at the same time.

However the EFV fell over which threw a spanner in the works of the OTH assault doctrine which I think has since been abandoned. I think that the OTH doctrine could still work with a 22 troop helicopter doing 180mph operating from the LHA/D 180 miles offshore. Perhaps if this was the case the EFV might not have been cancelled.
 
CV-22 Osprey cruises much faster than helicopters and has much longer range both of which allow it to insert troops much farther inland than any helicopter. No conventional helicopter can compete with CV-22's range or speed.

Unfortunately this means conventional helos like the AH1 Cobra cant provide close escort when the MV22 uses its speed. If close escort is necessary then the speed advantage is lost. It takes a USMC Captain on a planing staff about two minutes to find this problem when planning a operation. I sat in on some of those sessions or conversations back in the 1990s. Fixed wing can provide far escort or cover, but there are the expected response issues and coordination issues multiply as distance/time factors enlarge. In some cases you can send helo gunships ahead for a coordinated or simultaneous arrival at a location, but the coordination difficulty again expands with the time/space factors, and that limits close cooperation between the helo gunships & Ospreys. 'A' solution is build more MV type airframes for finishing as gunships to operate closely with the MV22. That is the route of accumulating expenses, duplications and perhaps to the replacement of helo gunships in the USMC. I'll leave the debate for that effort to some other time.

Boeing-Vertol-Piaseki did build an all-composite prototype during the early 1980s. It looked like a modernized CH-46 Sky Knight, but never flew beyond the prototype stage.

It may have been a lot heavier/larger. I cant recall the details.

The primary reason that the Boeing-Vertol-Piaseki CH-47 Chinook remains so popular is its massive horsepower reserves which allow it to fly hot and heavy, higher in the Afghan mountains than any other western helicopter. Only Russian-made helicopters, with much larger rotor diameters (and much lighter disc-loadings) can compete up in the Afghan mountains.
However, I never seen a Chinook variant that could fold its rotors small enough to stow in a ship's hangar deck.

CH47 Chinooks are better thought of as heavy lift, & adapting them to USMC use is reproducing the deck space and other limits of the CH53.

CV-22's greatest disadvantage is that it was the first tilt-rotor to enter production which entailed an expensive learning curve, cross training crews, etc.

Something the critics, amatures, and a few professionals forget or ignore.

CV-22 also suffered numerous developmental delays caused by the need to fold it into aircraft carriers.

The same problem faced by any other new and large aircraft. Also it had to be made corrosion resistant to salt air, and made serviceable aboard ship, all further complications in the development.

Far wiser would have been to build the first (small) batch of CV-22A without folding mechanisms, then progressively add folding mechanisms to batch B and batch C.

Proposed, planned even, but abandoned by the need of its fans to keep the project rolling ahead faster than the efforts to kill it. To put it another way no one wanted to fund a interm production aircraft that could not execute the mission that justified the over all development. The secondary market was looked at by the manufactor, but they were not willing or able to finance two development projects. Maybe the right sales pitch would have brought in the massive high risk captiol needed, I dont know.

A third developmental delay was caused by decisions to incorporate more composite airframe components than any previous design. The CV-22 wing box was the largest composite structure when it was introduced.
Yes, composites shaved ten or twenty percent off the empty weight, but they also slowed development.

Probablly something that would have delayed a modern helo design. Maybe there would have been some carryover from other late 20th Century helo designs, but it still would have required extra time to work out the problems.
 
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However the EFV fell over which threw a spanner in the works of the OTH assault doctrine which I think has since been abandoned. I think that the OTH doctrine could still work with a 22 troop helicopter doing 180mph operating from the LHA/D 180 miles offshore. Perhaps if this was the case the EFV might not have been cancelled.

"Abandoned" is one definition. Another might be 'less needed'. The extreme range or OTH assault proved unecessary in so many of the real world planning we engaged in post 1990, or arguablly earlier. The extreme dispersal/range capability offered by the MV22 & EFV routinely proved unecessary vs the probable situations we planned for. It was nice to have, but not essential. that cals into question the extra cost for that capability.

In the case of the MV22 the extra cost may have been worth it since this vehicle has a broader use or mission coverage. The EFV less so. It was a pony with far fewer tricks. The cost to trick ratio seems to have been a lot loser for the EFV than the MV22. I never delved into the details, but it bothered me the EFV was to be provided on a 1-3 ratio to the AV7 Amtrac. The EFV was to be provided in companies vs the battalions of the AV7. Not good in my judgement. Conversely the MV22 had a more favorable provision ratio to the old CH46 it replaced, so less loss in net lift capability.
 
And the Osprey's turning out to be pretty good. It's been in combat, and in very hostile environments, and has attracted some export customers: Israel and Japan have ordered the Osprey, and India, South Korea, and the UAE are also interested.
 
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One option is drop the medium lift requirement entirely and go for a purely CH-53 and UH-60 fleet, which given both airframes are/were already in service with the Navy, ...

Proposed as well. I probablly knew something of the reason why this was not chosen, but cant recall. May have had something to do with the number of manpac payload per deck spot required by the vehicle? maybe a review of the UH60 specs would refresh my memory.
 
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