At this point I figure I'm just beating a dead horse. So let's talk about what the French needed to do.
First and foremost, they needed to train their reserves much, much better.
Then they needed to find a way to field much greater numbers of properly trained NCOs, officers, and staff.
Then they need to produce larger numbers of artillery and logistical equipment.
Once these things are done, they can form their reservists into additional, complete, decently-equipped divisions, grouping these under new corps headquarters where they can be properly used.
All of which sounds a lot like German practice, doesn't it? Hmm.
The problem is that this will take years to accomplish, will require tremendous spending, and doesn't seem likely of accomplishment under the political and financial circumstances of France during the period. Just as one example, if the French do this, they will have vastly less ready money to loan to Russia, so expect a less effective, less well-armed, less mobile and MUCH slower mobilizing Russian army in 1914.
Also, expect the Germans to take notice and to counter in some manner (perhaps by trying harder to avoid war, perhaps through military reforms of their own).
Note that the improvements described would result in the French having much more of a fighting chance, even without going contrary to the wisdom of the time which emphasized the offense.
The other main possibility would be for France to reject the primacy of the offense altogether and uncompromisingly organize and arm for defensive operations. But why would they do this contrary to the European mainstream view? Would they accept the implication of a very long war, which is inherent in this approach? And would not the Germans notice such a sweeping change and reevaluate their own plans and methods?
Realistically, the Michel plan (in addition to being rubbish) is too radical to be accepted without a revolution in French military thinking occurring, and doesn't go anywhere near far enough to satisfy the leaders if such a revolutionary change in French military thinking actually occurs. Which is why it wasn't implemented in the first place.