No more fighting the last war - France deploys into Belgium in 1914

Well, if your not familiar with something you could do some research or ask before making judgments and posting

I agree.

For instance, both you and the OP assert that Michel's plan was defensive in nature and would not involve "bonsai" attacks.

Yet Strachan says that contemporary criticism of Michel's plan as "defensive" was incorrect, since Michel's plan actually called for attacks "both in Belgium and in Lorraine". In fact, it appears that Michel accepted the offensively-oriented doctrine, he just wanted larger herds of ill-trained, poorly led, insufficiently equipped reservists to take part, and to relocate the main offensive to deeper inside Belgium. Strachan references French Ministry of War publications as his sources for his assertions about Michel's plan.

So, where do you get the idea that Michel called for a defensive battle?
 
The French who fought at the Battle of the Marne are largely reservists and territorials plus men culled from the depots to make good the horrendous casualties that Plan XVII inflicted on the French

True. Of course, the Germans were by this point dog-tired and very poorly supplied, while many French troops were fresh, and were operating close to their supply centers. The French had learned at least some lessons from their earlier catastrophes. And the French had huge masses reserves to throw in because they hadn't exposed most of them to defeat in the initial battles (unlike in the Michel plan).
All of these things are known, relevant, significant factors in military affairs.
 
As for logistics- most of the men aren't being moved forward. Michel's plan makes use of the Fortress troops- who wouldn't need any additional logistical support. The plan adds about 500,000 men to the forward field forces. Even here, there wouldn't be that much need for added logistics- the Lorraine armies wouldn't be moving into Germany but standing on the fortress line as well. 200,000 men are the strategic reserve of Paris. The men moving into Belgium are moving into friendly territory and can expect cooperation from the locals

Okay. But you cannot add 500,000 reservists, who presumably have a much smaller scale of transport and logistical echelons (as they had a much smaller scale of everything else), to the field armies without badly overloading their logistical system. Were the army remaining on the defensive (which Strachan, referencing French War Ministry documents, asserts that they would not under Michel's plan), and could use nice, stationary railheads and field dumps, this would probably be little problem. Unfortunately, Michel did intend attacks. Further, should the French have to retire, the problem of supporting twice as many men as the field army's logistical structure was designed to handle will become acute.

Or did Michel's plan include some means of doubling the logistical elements of the active duty units in just three years (1911-1914)?

Oh, a last note about the French lack of staff officers. Since there is now reason to believe that Michel intended attacks, not just defense, the extreme shortage of staff officers will be far more of a problem (though as I have shown, even conducting a static defense is still quite demanding of staff work). OTL shows what happened when French offensives were conducted with poor staff work, even without doubling the forces that those same staffs have to control. Further, should the Germans break through at any point, there will be meeting engagements, which OTL showed that early war French staffs handled very poorly even without doubling their span of control by adding reservists. Finally, if the French are forced to retire, the lack of good staff officers will encourage catastrophe, as a long retreat under pressure is tremendously demanding, even without doubling the forces that the staffs have to control.
 
Again, you are assuming that the French retain the idiotic tactics of Joffre. The plan doesn't call for that. There are no frontal charges. Furthermore, the units aren't being used in the same fashion. The reservists are merging with the Regulars to form new units. Instead of having the poor equipment of the reserve units, they would have cover from the regular armies

What is the basis for claiming that Michel intended a purely defensive battle (Strachan says otherwise), or intended to completely revamp the French methods of attacking (which apparently were still being conducted per the 1904 regulation, not the very recent 1913-14 version)? Where is your supporting documents showing that no frontal charges would be used (though, as I've shown, the problem wasn't frontal charges so much as being horribly incapable of conducting meeting engagements)?

Further, consider bread and butter. If you have only one teaspoon of butter, and spread it over two slices of bread, you've got two fairly well-buttered slices. Now spread the same amount of butter over four slices. Did the butter cover all four as adequately? No, because spreading something more widely doesn't magically make more of that something appear.
So, double the number of soldiers in a regular division without adding more guns (which is exactly what Michel intended), and you don't get good coverage for the reservists -- you get lousy coverage for both the reservists and the formerly well-equipped regulars.
 
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Deleted member 1487

Um no your not. The border fort area isn't being abandoned- its being relied upon which Joffre didn't. Joffre sends his army in a sorty from Nancy and Verdun instead of allowing the Germans to break on the fortresses like Micheal did. There's no denuding of the fortress line at all
Where are the French armies coming from to move to Belgium? They have 5 armies and as it was they were all needed to hold the line between Switzerland and Mons where the BEF was. If you remove the 3rd and 4th French armies and send them north there is a huge gap in the French line in the center for the Germans to walk through. If you just stretched other armies to cover that gap the German 4th-7th armies just plow through them and the forts cannot hold on their own. The French 1st and 2nd armies and the army of Alsace (which was just a detached part of 1st army) cannot stand up to the German 4th, 5th, 6th, and 7th on their own even with forts.

maps_05_frontiers1914_1_(1600).jpg
 

Deleted member 1487

I would like to commend Tallil2long for his excellent series of posts.
 
Where are the French armies coming from to move to Belgium? They have 5 armies and as it was they were all needed to hold the line between Switzerland and Mons where the BEF was. If you remove the 3rd and 4th French armies and send them north there is a huge gap in the French line in the center for the Germans to walk through. If you just stretched other armies to cover that gap the German 4th-7th armies just plow through them and the forts cannot hold on their own. The French 1st and 2nd armies and the army of Alsace (which was just a detached part of 1st army) cannot stand up to the German 4th, 5th, 6th, and 7th on their own even with forts.

maps_05_frontiers1914_1_(1600).jpg

Yup. And consider this: under Michel's plan, divisions (and therefore corps and armies) will have their infantry strengths doubled. Yet, they will receive no additional staff to control the extra subunits, nor were additional corps or army headquarters to be created (crucial shortage of staff officers, remember?).

This all points to divisions being unable to control their doubled-contingent sufficiently well to double their divisional frontage. They will have to keep all those regiments tightly to hand if they are to be controlled. If the divisions cannot expand their frontage, and no new divisions are created, then corps and armies can also not expand their frontages.
The French will, under the pressure of events, quickly form new army headquarters (as they did OTL); but until they do, they are in rather a bind. And if the majority of reservists are already at the front, then creating these new armies will entail a certain amount of upheaval, as units lose their extra reserve regiments and these have to be railed to concentration centers.

Incidentally, when the overriding doctrine favors the offense, and divisions have lots of poorly-officered soldiers operating on narrow frontages, with insufficient provision of artillery, what sort of tactics does this encourage? (hint, it rhymes with "human wave")
 
At this point I figure I'm just beating a dead horse. So let's talk about what the French needed to do.

First and foremost, they needed to train their reserves much, much better.
Then they needed to find a way to field much greater numbers of properly trained NCOs, officers, and staff.
Then they need to produce larger numbers of artillery and logistical equipment.

Once these things are done, they can form their reservists into additional, complete, decently-equipped divisions, grouping these under new corps headquarters where they can be properly used.

All of which sounds a lot like German practice, doesn't it? Hmm.

The problem is that this will take years to accomplish, will require tremendous spending, and doesn't seem likely of accomplishment under the political and financial circumstances of France during the period. Just as one example, if the French do this, they will have vastly less ready money to loan to Russia, so expect a less effective, less well-armed, less mobile and MUCH slower mobilizing Russian army in 1914.
Also, expect the Germans to take notice and to counter in some manner (perhaps by trying harder to avoid war, perhaps through military reforms of their own).

Note that the improvements described would result in the French having much more of a fighting chance, even without going contrary to the wisdom of the time which emphasized the offense.

The other main possibility would be for France to reject the primacy of the offense altogether and uncompromisingly organize and arm for defensive operations. But why would they do this contrary to the European mainstream view? Would they accept the implication of a very long war, which is inherent in this approach? And would not the Germans notice such a sweeping change and reevaluate their own plans and methods?

Realistically, the Michel plan (in addition to being rubbish) is too radical to be accepted without a revolution in French military thinking occurring, and doesn't go anywhere near far enough to satisfy the leaders if such a revolutionary change in French military thinking actually occurs. Which is why it wasn't implemented in the first place.
 
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