No Mk 6 exploder

I can't think of any that would change off the top of my head, but I'm fairly certain the Renown and Repulse are still going down, since they were killed by aircraft. That's going to make things unpleasant for the British.

I think you mean the Repulse and Prince of Wales.
 
MattII said:
More successful torpedoes early on means that the Japanese don't have nearly as many ships at the end of the war because the Americans have sunk them all
Actually, Japan will be in a resource crisis before that happens with the OTL numbers of sinkings. (By Jan '45 OTL, there were virtually no ships worth shooting at.) What will change isn't the number sunk, it's the duration of war.
MattII said:
earlier loss of those ships stymies Japanese expansion, thus making their inevitable dislodging easier because they can't support as many troops.
Entirely true.
MattII said:
Also, several times the subs fired off their whole load, and achieved nothing
Also true. Not always because the torpedo, or exploder, was faulty, however.
MattII said:
I don't see what fault there would be with firing off a half-dozen torpedoes for a definite kill (on a big ship, a smaller one would take less to sink).
It appears you've misunderstood me. It's exactly that proposition causing problems for the Sub Force. More targets that are more valuable leads to greater expenditures. (OTL, they went from an average 8/target to over 11; TTL, the number would likely be under 8 {more like 6}, but would still rise.) Greater expenditures means there will be torpedo shortages until NTS (& Alexandria & Keyport, & possibly private contractors) ramp up production, which is likely to be a slow process...because in '42, NTS had 3 shifts on & was still only delivering 2.5 fish/day.:eek:
 
It appears you've misunderstood me. It's exactly that proposition causing problems for the Sub Force. More targets that are more valuable leads to greater expenditures. (OTL, they went from an average 8/target to over 11; TTL, the number would likely be under 8 {more like 6}, but would still rise.) Greater expenditures means there will be torpedo shortages until NTS (& Alexandria & Keyport, & possibly private contractors) ramp up production, which is likely to be a slow process...because in '42, NTS had 3 shifts on & was still only delivering 2.5 fish/day.:eek:
So torpedoes will be, and captains will be ordered to fire only on carriers and unescorted merchantmen, and some submarines may be pulled temporarily, I mean it's not like there's any use for them. Besides, how much of that low production was due to the overly complex exploder, how much could you have improved production with a simpler, cheaper exploder.
 
Actually, Japan will be in a resource crisis before that happens with the OTL numbers of sinkings. (By Jan '45 OTL, there were virtually no ships worth shooting at.) What will change isn't the number sunk, it's the duration of war.

Entirely true.

Also true. Not always because the torpedo, or exploder, was faulty, however.

It appears you've misunderstood me. It's exactly that proposition causing problems for the Sub Force. More targets that are more valuable leads to greater expenditures. (OTL, they went from an average 8/target to over 11; TTL, the number would likely be under 8 {more like 6}, but would still rise.) Greater expenditures means there will be torpedo shortages until NTS (& Alexandria & Keyport, & possibly private contractors) ramp up production, which is likely to be a slow process...because in '42, NTS had 3 shifts on & was still only delivering 2.5 fish/day.:eek:

OTOH with more transports taken out so early Japan won't be as widespread as it has slowed Japan down and the islands they take won't be held as tightly. You may well wind up with the war ending in the Pacific much faster as the Japanese have a harder time holding their islands.
 
MattII said:
So torpedoes will be, and captains will be ordered to fire only on carriers and unescorted merchantmen
:confused::confused: That's both a bad idea & extremely unlikely. If anything, higher priority on DDs makes more sense.
MattII said:
some submarines may be pulled temporarily
:eek::confused::confused: Not going to happen. Ceding the initiative to Japan? No chance.
MattII said:
I mean it's not like there's any use for them.
:confused::confused::confused: Get a clue, won't you? Subs would've been turned over to mining or supply runs for MacArthur's P.I. guerrillas. S-boats would've been retired. Subs in Europe might've been recalled, & their torpedoes turned over to PacFleet. If nothing else, they'd have been fitted with better deck guns (4"/50cal, my preference, or 5"/25cal) & (maybe) even moved TBTs, & given orders to conserve torpedoes as far as possible. Measures to keep subs in the fight would have been found. Bet on it.
MattII said:
Besides, how much of that low production was due to the overly complex exploder, how much could you have improved production with a simpler, cheaper exploder.
Not a lot. It wasn't an exploder production problem, it was a torpedo production problem. The Mk14 was never designed with ease of mass production in mind. It was never conceived to be produced in geniune volume in wartime. Had it been, like the Model T was, even like a typewriter or wristwatch was (I can't think of anything comparably complicated & requiring such precision that was genuinely mass-produced), the 2.5/day rate could readily have been surpassed. The Mk18 was designed for mass-production, & Westinghouse (after dealing with teething trouble early in the program) rapidly outpaced BuOrd. That could have been done prewar, but to change the design really requires a POD very early in the Mk14's design phase, so around 1930-1.
Johnrankins said:
OTOH with more transports taken out so early Japan won't be as widespread as it has slowed Japan down and the islands they take won't be held as tightly. You may well wind up with the war ending in the Pacific much faster as the Japanese have a harder time holding their islands.
Unquestionably. It wasn't all about the Mk 6, tho. Before 1/43, there was a serious lack of good intel on convoys.:( (The maru code wasn't broken til then, thanks to some criminal stupidity prewar.:eek::eek:) Basing in Oz inhibited effectiveness. Doctrine was bad. Main diesels in a lot of boats were a maintenance nightmare.:eek: Skippers were too timid. Surface-search radar wasn't standard, nor as reliable as it would later be. Tactics needed work...

The impact would be felt, to be sure, but it would tend to be felt at the end, not the beginning. How much? You'd need to examine the movement of every IJA infantry outfit against the patrol areas of subs, know what boat it was & who the skipper was, & judge the impact. Who wants to re-examine all 1300-odd war patrols?:eek: It ain't gonna be me.:rolleyes:
 
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