MattII said:
So torpedoes will be, and captains will be ordered to fire only on carriers and unescorted merchantmen


That's both a bad idea & extremely unlikely. If anything, higher priority on DDs makes more sense.
MattII said:
some submarines may be pulled temporarily


Not going to happen. Ceding the initiative to Japan? No chance.
MattII said:
I mean it's not like there's any use for them.



Get a clue, won't you? Subs would've been turned over to mining or supply runs for MacArthur's P.I. guerrillas. S-boats would've been retired. Subs in Europe might've been recalled, & their torpedoes turned over to PacFleet. If nothing else, they'd have been fitted with better deck guns (4"/50cal, my preference, or 5"/25cal) & (maybe) even moved TBTs, & given orders to conserve torpedoes as far as possible. Measures to keep subs in the fight would have been found.
Bet on it.
MattII said:
Besides, how much of that low production was due to the overly complex exploder, how much could you have improved production with a simpler, cheaper exploder.
Not a lot. It wasn't an
exploder production problem, it was a
torpedo production problem. The Mk14 was never designed with ease of mass production in mind. It was never conceived to be produced in geniune volume in wartime. Had it been, like the Model T was, even like a typewriter or wristwatch was (I can't think of anything comparably complicated & requiring such precision that was genuinely mass-produced), the 2.5/day rate could readily have been surpassed. The Mk18
was designed for mass-production, & Westinghouse (after dealing with teething trouble early in the program) rapidly outpaced BuOrd. That could have been done prewar, but to change the
design really requires a POD very early in the Mk14's design phase, so around 1930-1.
Johnrankins said:
OTOH with more transports taken out so early Japan won't be as widespread as it has slowed Japan down and the islands they take won't be held as tightly. You may well wind up with the war ending in the Pacific much faster as the Japanese have a harder time holding their islands.
Unquestionably. It wasn't all about the Mk 6, tho. Before 1/43, there was a serious lack of good intel on convoys.

(The
maru code wasn't broken til then, thanks to some criminal stupidity prewar.


) Basing in Oz inhibited effectiveness. Doctrine was bad. Main diesels in a lot of boats were a maintenance nightmare.

Skippers were too timid. Surface-search radar wasn't standard, nor as reliable as it would later be. Tactics needed work...
The impact would be felt, to be sure, but it would tend to be felt at the end, not the beginning. How much? You'd need to examine the movement of every IJA infantry outfit against the patrol areas of subs, know what boat it was & who the skipper was, & judge the impact. Who wants to re-examine all 1300-odd war patrols?

It ain't gonna be me.
