What if the Mk 6 exploder was never developed for the USN and the USN started WWII with torpedos that worked most of the time?
What if the Mk 6 exploder was never developed for the USN and the USN started WWII with torpedos that worked most of the time?
The Japanese kind of have to hang on to the DEI though don't they, wouldn't that limit the distance they can pull back.
Now, what are some battles that would be changed as a result of American torpedoes actually working?
I can't think of any that would change off the top of my head, but I'm fairly certain the Renown and Repulse are still going down, since they were killed by aircraft. That's going to make things unpleasant for the British.
That could lead to them being more cautious and less inclined to overextend themselves.
At the very least any battles after April 1943 which OTL involved Hiyo, Junyo, and Taiyo.Now, what are some battles that would be changed as a result of American torpedoes actually working?
They BEGAN the war that way. Draw lines from Tokyo to major oil fields of the time, for example. Long lines, lots of water.
Now, what are some battles that would be changed as a result of American torpedoes actually working?
I can't think of any that would change off the top of my head, but I'm fairly certain the Renown and Repulse are still going down, since they were killed by aircraft. That's going to make things unpleasant for the British.
At the very least any battles after April 1943 which OTL involved Hiyo, Junyo, and Taiyo.
The effect was in the crippling of Japan's logistics, which depended on their merchant fleet. It wasn't so much that any individual battle was ever decided by submarine torpedoes.
Ah.
However, if one or two extra ships are lost or mission-killed each battle, things will start adding up.
Looking at Blair, Scott didn't get an ideal setup. He'd have scored damage on all three, for sure, but sinking any, let alone all three, isn't certain. The Mk 14 warhead wasn't huge...MattII said:Lieutenant Commander John A. Scott becomes an overnight sensation when, in April of 1943, he manages to sink the Japanese carriers Hiyo, Junyo, and Taiyo.
That's a very common belief. The impact is actually smaller than most people realize. Breaking the maru code & patrols in the Luzon/Formosa Straits (impossible thanks to basing boats in Oz) were more important.MattII said:The war ends a lot sooner.
Formosa? Starting a war in the Pacific is suicidal.MerryPrankster said:In your opinion, what's the "least overextended" they can get while maintaining their overall strategic focus?
Word. The war will be shortened, make no mistake, but it would be more like 3-4mo than a year or more. That shortening may save Bullhead, Bonefish, Lagarto, Snook, & Trigger. It might save Tang, too, if Mk 18s are debugged sooner because the supply of Mk 14s is low sooner (or because minelaying changes supply, or the S-boats get retired sooner & free up Mk 10s, or just for butterflies' sake because I like the ideahairysamarian said:The effect was in the crippling of Japan's logistics, which depended on their merchant fleet. It wasn't so much that any individual battle was ever decided by submarine torpedoes.
The single change of making tankers #1 priority would have had more impact than any other single decision English or Nimitz could have made. When it was made, very late in the war, it shortly paralyzed IJN. (HQ helped with that with the stupid destroyer supply runs to Guadalcanal.hairysamarian said:What the Americans discovered in the course of the war was that a 10,000 ton tanker sinking hurt the Japanese far more than an equivalent or even greater tonnage of military vessels. A 60,000+ ton carrier or BB is worthless if there's no oil to fuel it. So a few more military sinkings would make for great press, but wouldn't change the big picture much.
More successful torpedoes early on means that the Japanese don't have nearly as many ships at the end of the war because the Americans have sunk them all, plus the earlier loss of those ships stymies Japanese expansion, thus making their inevitable dislodging easier because they can't support as many troops. Also, several times the subs fired off their whole load, and achieved nothing, so I don't see what fault there would be with firing off a half-dozen torpedoes for a definite kill (on a big ship, a smaller one would take less to sink).That's a very common belief. The impact is actually smaller than most people realize. Breaking the maru code & patrols in the Luzon/Formosa Straits (impossible thanks to basing boats in Oz) were more important.
Also, if the Mk 14 worked correctly, there could be a serious torpedo shortage by 1943...(Something I've frequently neglected to take account of.
) Why? Based on OTL experience, when the fish worked, the number fired went up. As the war progresses & the value of targets rises, the number also goes up. In '42, NTS couldn't keep up as it was OTL;
fire more fish...
(That this could be beneficial in the long run is another matter, if it forces Nimitz {or ComSubPac English} to rely more on minelaying...
)
In your opinion, what's the "least overextended" they can get while maintaining their overall strategic focus?