No Mk 6 exploder

What if the Mk 6 exploder was never developed for the USN and the USN started WWII with torpedos that worked most of the time?
 
Lieutenant Commander John A. Scott becomes an overnight sensation when, in April of 1943, he manages to sink the Japanese carriers Hiyo, Junyo, and Taiyo. The war ends a lot sooner.
 
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What if the Mk 6 exploder was never developed for the USN and the USN started WWII with torpedos that worked most of the time?

Japan learns the effects of overextended and exposed supply lines that much earlier. Once the Americans correct the command and control issues that also existed, they'd have a field day.
 
If the Japanese lose key early battles and win the ones they do by narrower margins, they might not develop "victory disease."

That could lead to them being more cautious and less inclined to overextend themselves.
 
The Japanese kind of have to hang on to the DEI though don't they, wouldn't that limit the distance they can pull back.
 
Now, what are some battles that would be changed as a result of American torpedoes actually working?

I can't think of any that would change off the top of my head, but I'm fairly certain the Renown and Repulse are still going down, since they were killed by aircraft. That's going to make things unpleasant for the British.
 
Now, what are some battles that would be changed as a result of American torpedoes actually working?

I can't think of any that would change off the top of my head, but I'm fairly certain the Renown and Repulse are still going down, since they were killed by aircraft. That's going to make things unpleasant for the British.

Some of the troop transports would have went down which slows things quite a bit.
 
They BEGAN the war that way. Draw lines from Tokyo to major oil fields of the time, for example. Long lines, lots of water.

Okay, "overextended" vs. "really overextended."

IIRC they had a plan to establish a defensive perimeter and after their early victories, got overconfident and waged war farther afield, culminating in Midway.

In your opinion, what's the "least overextended" they can get while maintaining their overall strategic focus?
 
Now, what are some battles that would be changed as a result of American torpedoes actually working?

I can't think of any that would change off the top of my head, but I'm fairly certain the Renown and Repulse are still going down, since they were killed by aircraft. That's going to make things unpleasant for the British.


The effect was in the crippling of Japan's logistics, which depended on their merchant fleet. It wasn't so much that any individual battle was ever decided by submarine torpedoes.
 
The effect was in the crippling of Japan's logistics, which depended on their merchant fleet. It wasn't so much that any individual battle was ever decided by submarine torpedoes.

Ah.

However, if one or two extra ships are lost or mission-killed each battle, things will start adding up.
 
Ah.

However, if one or two extra ships are lost or mission-killed each battle, things will start adding up.

What the Americans discovered in the course of the war was that a 10,000 ton tanker sinking hurt the Japanese far more than an equivalent or even greater tonnage of military vessels. A 60,000+ ton carrier or BB is worthless if there's no oil to fuel it. So a few more military sinkings would make for great press, but wouldn't change the big picture much.
 
MattII said:
Lieutenant Commander John A. Scott becomes an overnight sensation when, in April of 1943, he manages to sink the Japanese carriers Hiyo, Junyo, and Taiyo.
Looking at Blair, Scott didn't get an ideal setup. He'd have scored damage on all three, for sure, but sinking any, let alone all three, isn't certain. The Mk 14 warhead wasn't huge...
MattII said:
The war ends a lot sooner.
That's a very common belief. The impact is actually smaller than most people realize. Breaking the maru code & patrols in the Luzon/Formosa Straits (impossible thanks to basing boats in Oz) were more important.

Also, if the Mk 14 worked correctly, there could be a serious torpedo shortage by 1943...:eek: (Something I've frequently neglected to take account of.:eek:) Why? Based on OTL experience, when the fish worked, the number fired went up. As the war progresses & the value of targets rises, the number also goes up. In '42, NTS couldn't keep up as it was OTL;:eek: fire more fish...:eek: (That this could be beneficial in the long run is another matter, if it forces Nimitz {or ComSubPac English} to rely more on minelaying...:cool:)

One other good thing: the boats lost to circulars might be avoided, if BuOrd, without the Mk 6 problem to fight about, could be persuaded to fit an anti-circular mechanism like the one on Mk 15s, & if the problem with the Mk 6 wasn't distracting attention.
MerryPrankster said:
In your opinion, what's the "least overextended" they can get while maintaining their overall strategic focus?
Formosa? Starting a war in the Pacific is suicidal.:eek::eek::eek: Neither IJN nor IJA grasped just how much different it was going to be than fighting Russia or China.:eek:
hairysamarian said:
The effect was in the crippling of Japan's logistics, which depended on their merchant fleet. It wasn't so much that any individual battle was ever decided by submarine torpedoes.
Word. The war will be shortened, make no mistake, but it would be more like 3-4mo than a year or more. That shortening may save Bullhead, Bonefish, Lagarto, Snook, & Trigger. It might save Tang, too, if Mk 18s are debugged sooner because the supply of Mk 14s is low sooner (or because minelaying changes supply, or the S-boats get retired sooner & free up Mk 10s, or just for butterflies' sake because I like the idea:p). It's also possible boats lost to fresh minefields aren't, either.

One impact: a few people don't get interested in subs or WW2, because Ned Beach doesn't write Submarine! (which was an ode to Trigger). Me, for one.:p And Tom Clancy, too, IIRC.:eek:
hairysamarian said:
What the Americans discovered in the course of the war was that a 10,000 ton tanker sinking hurt the Japanese far more than an equivalent or even greater tonnage of military vessels. A 60,000+ ton carrier or BB is worthless if there's no oil to fuel it. So a few more military sinkings would make for great press, but wouldn't change the big picture much.
The single change of making tankers #1 priority would have had more impact than any other single decision English or Nimitz could have made. When it was made, very late in the war, it shortly paralyzed IJN. (HQ helped with that with the stupid destroyer supply runs to Guadalcanal.:eek::eek: They burned more fuel than you want to imagine, for so damn little gain...:eek::rolleyes:)
 
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That's a very common belief. The impact is actually smaller than most people realize. Breaking the maru code & patrols in the Luzon/Formosa Straits (impossible thanks to basing boats in Oz) were more important.

Also, if the Mk 14 worked correctly, there could be a serious torpedo shortage by 1943...:eek: (Something I've frequently neglected to take account of.:eek:) Why? Based on OTL experience, when the fish worked, the number fired went up. As the war progresses & the value of targets rises, the number also goes up. In '42, NTS couldn't keep up as it was OTL;:eek: fire more fish...:eek: (That this could be beneficial in the long run is another matter, if it forces Nimitz {or ComSubPac English} to rely more on minelaying...:cool:)
More successful torpedoes early on means that the Japanese don't have nearly as many ships at the end of the war because the Americans have sunk them all, plus the earlier loss of those ships stymies Japanese expansion, thus making their inevitable dislodging easier because they can't support as many troops. Also, several times the subs fired off their whole load, and achieved nothing, so I don't see what fault there would be with firing off a half-dozen torpedoes for a definite kill (on a big ship, a smaller one would take less to sink).
 
In your opinion, what's the "least overextended" they can get while maintaining their overall strategic focus?

About the only sea lanes they had a realistic chance of defending were the short and sheltered routes to Korea and Manchuria, areas that weren't going to fuel the war machine. Once the USN has resolved the technical, organizational and doctrinal (is that a word?) issues that initially held them back, Japan's merchant fleet is toast anywhere else. In an alternate time line where the USN learns earlier, Japan gets hosed earlier.
 
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