No MG34, instead a 'machine carbine'?

  • Thread starter Deleted member 1487
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Deleted member 1487

Thats correct as far as they go. What I take away from those is the capability of that weapons mix limited the company/battalions weapons area of influence. Second, looking at the numbers its argument for increasing the number of LMG. Your MG are influencing the battlefield at a average range of 400-500 meters, the Garands only out to 300. Later the use of full volume or automatic fires from the M16 reduced the rifle squads influence to under 300 meters. When we returned training for other battlefields in the 1970s a effective squad range of 250 meters was ok for a assault but inadequate. It was also clear that even with a bipod the M16 and M14 were not worth much as a platoon or squad automatic weapon. They were too light for sustained fire & like the BAR magazine capacity reduces volume significantly.
I see it as the dominance of automatic weapons in general, which in WW2, given the lack of an assault rifle for most armies (the Soviets effectively had a proto-version with their PPSH companies), meant that they had to rely on some version of an MG or auto-rifle to give them the necessary weight of fire.

Theoretically platoon level MGs were firing out to 500m, but squad level ones, such that they existed, were mostly 300m or less because the rate of hits even at that range was low, hence the switch to small caliber, high velocity weapons with a theoretical range of 500m, but a more practical one out to 300m. Even then the US added the M60 into squads for Vietnam, but already in the mid-'60s saw that they needed something like the M249 instead, which combat in Vietnam confirmed.

As to training post-Vietnam, that was largely theoretical based on assumptions from Middle East fighting, and ideas about what the Soviets would be capable of; the WW2 situation was something altogether different due to lack of body army, lack of scopes for the average rifleman (which is a large part of range limitations on infantry; you can't hit or suppress what you cannot see), the impact of less mechanization for European armies compared to the 1970s, the impact of large numbers of conscripts with limited marksmanship training, etc. Plus ITTL we are talking about a 7.92 intermediate cartridge rather than a 5.56, which had greater effective range (going by German reports it was effective in single shot out to 400m for the average rifleman).
All I'm talking about for the OP TL is that the use of a somewhat less advanced LMG and one grouped differently in a weapons squad at the platoon level rather than in the squad as it's base of fire. Given the use of bolt action rifles, maybe an SMG, and perhaps a magazine fed LMG in most Allied rifle squads through at least 1943, an assault rifle only squad (besides the rifle grenadier) backed by a platoon level LMG squad would dominate at normal WW2 combat ranges.

A lot more than the Army infantry company, they went through the war with nine BAR & two MMG in the company. A couple more MMG could be typically seconded from the battalion MG group. The Armored Infatry Company had a lot more MG, roughly ten - twelve or one per vehicle in the company.

In WWII the Marines doctrine/equipment mix was driven more from the bottom up, vs the top down dominance imposed by Army Ground Forces. In part this was because of the large number of 1942 veterans rotated to support units back in the US, in part because of the much higher portion of combat veterans among the USMC officers prewar, & in part because the colonels at battalio, regiment, and the division/corps staff were given more responsibility or flexibility in arming the rifle battalions.
Perhaps that might have had something to do with not having access to Army level of artillery fire support?
Mechanized infantry is a different situation altogether than a comparable foot infantry unit in any military.
 
great track keep it going!!!

Just want to clarify something from the OP.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MG_34

This article seems to be suggesting the Wehrmacht built the following automatic weapons during the war....

While the Americans had standardized a semi-automatic rifle in 1936 (the M1 Garand), the German military kept issuing Karabiner 98k bolt-action rifles due to their tactical doctrine of basing a squad's firepower on the general-purpose machine gun in the light machine gun role so that the role of the rifleman was largely to carry ammunition and provide covering fire for the machine gunners. The advantage of the general purpose machine gun concept was that it added greatly to the overall volume of fire that could be put out by a squad-sized unit.[15][16] The German military did experiment with semi-automatic rifles throughout World War 2 and fielded the Gewehr 41 series of which less than 150,000 were built, the Gewehr 43/Karabiner 43 series of which 402,713 were built, and introduced the first assault rifle in 1943 – the MP43 / MP44 / StG 44 series, of which 425,977 were built. Due to the relatively limited production of semi-automatic and assault rifles, the Karabiner 98k of which over 14,600,000 were built remained the primary service weapon until the last days of World War 2, and was manufactured until Germany's surrender in May 1945.

That's in addition to the 14,600,000 * 98k rifle.
150,000 GW-41
402,713 GW-43
425,977 STG44

is this true?
 

Deleted member 1487

great track keep it going!!!

Just want to clarify something from the OP.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MG_34

This article seems to be suggesting the Wehrmacht built the following automatic weapons during the war....



That's in addition to the 14,600,000 * 98k rifle.
150,000 GW-41
402,713 GW-43
425,977 STG44

is this true?
AFAIK. Those numbers match what I've seen in other sources.
 

Deleted member 1487

That's almost a million guns.

roughly million M-38/40 where built and that supported inventory of 100-200k 40-42 and 400-300k 43-45.

How much more do they need?
IIRC they wanted 3.5 million stg44s to fit their 1944 TOE
 
Thats correct as far as they go. What I take away from those is the capability of that weapons mix limited the company/battalions weapons area of influence. Second, looking at the numbers its argument for increasing the number of LMG. Your MG are influencing the battlefield at a average range of 400-500 meters, the Garands only out to 300. Later the use of full volume or automatic fires from the M16 reduced the rifle squads influence to under 300 meters. When we returned training for other battlefields in the 1970s a effective squad range of 250 meters was ok for a assault but inadequate. It was also clear that even with a bipod the M16 and M14 were not worth much as a platoon or squad automatic weapon. They were too light for sustained fire & like the BAR magazine capacity reduces volume significantly.



A lot more than the Army infantry company, they went through the war with nine BAR & two MMG in the company. A couple more MMG could be typically seconded from the battalion MG group. The Armored Infatry Company had a lot more MG, roughly ten - twelve or one per vehicle in the company.

In WWII the Marines doctrine/equipment mix was driven more from the bottom up, vs the top down dominance imposed by Army Ground Forces. In part this was because of the large number of 1942 veterans rotated to support units back in the US, in part because of the much higher portion of combat veterans among the USMC officers prewar, & in part because the colonels at battalio, regiment, and the division/corps staff were given more responsibility or flexibility in arming the rifle battalions.
It is notable that Airborne Companies carried more Machine Guns than the Army Infantry Company TOE, especially after General Ridgeway pushed through his reorganisation, as many as 9 BAR and 9-17 LMG.
(A Heer Infantry Company could have 16 MG34/42 on its TOE, the TOE for a British Infantry company had a seemingly anaemic 9 Bren Guns)
 
I see it as the dominance of automatic weapons in general, which in WW2, given the lack of an assault rifle for most armies (the Soviets effectively had a proto-version with their PPSH companies), meant that they had to rely on some version of an MG or auto-rifle to give them the necessary weight of fire.

Theoretically platoon level MGs were firing out to 500m, but squad level ones, such that they existed, were mostly 300m or less because the rate of hits even at that range was low, hence the switch to small caliber, high velocity weapons with a theoretical range of 500m, but a more practical one out to 300m. Even then the US added the M60 into squads for Vietnam, but already in the mid-'60s saw that they needed something like the M249 instead, which combat in Vietnam confirmed.

Yes, that experience showed the assault rifle was not a substitute for a weapon that could deliver sustained automatic fire at longer ranges. Even with a heavy barrel a bipod equipped M14 was inadequate, and the M16 & M16A1 with or without a bipod and with 30 round magazines were not capable of dominating the midrange battle zone. Perhaps that was in part due to infantry doctrine and training, but bottom line is once the money became available the MG & LMG in the platoon & squad increased

As to training post-Vietnam, that was largely theoretical..

Eh? I hesitate to label the conclusions of combat veterans "theoretical". I not 100% sure about the US Army, but the people making the decisions to heavy up the squad-platoon-company fire power in the 1975-85 were the same guys who were leading squads thru battalions in Vietnam. They did the same thing their counterparts had done forty years earlier, moving the full auto weapons further forward & down in the battalion/company/squad. In the 1950s & 60s the trend went to a assault weapon squad & the leaders trying to fight with that 1965-71 did not like it.

Perhaps that might have had something to do with not having access to Army level of artillery fire support? ...

The Amphibious Corps the USN deployed had plenty of fire support. Aside from the heavy howitzer & gun battalions they had the naval fire support. Having 13cm, 15cm, or 20cm cannon, with extra length projectiles in direct support of the infantry battalions, vs 10cm howitzers, is a whole different level in killing power.
 

Deleted member 1487

Yes, that experience showed the assault rifle was not a substitute for a weapon that could deliver sustained automatic fire at longer ranges. Even with a heavy barrel a bipod equipped M14 was inadequate, and the M16 & M16A1 with or without a bipod and with 30 round magazines were not capable of dominating the midrange battle zone. Perhaps that was in part due to infantry doctrine and training, but bottom line is once the money became available the MG & LMG in the platoon & squad increased
Again in what context? WW2 was different from Korea, which was different from Vietnam or any of the later wars due to technological changes and different kinds of enemies using different strategies. In WW2 what would have been optimal or workable was different than what was necessary in the 1980s or beyond for those reasons.
The Brits and US got away with a single magazine fed, full powered automatic weapons as their base of fire for a squad during WW2, but that would be unworkable now. The M14 didn't work because it was terribly inaccurate in automatic fire more than anything. Doctrine changed by political fiat though, when McNamara forced the M16 on the army.
As to the mid-range combat how much of that was happening in the jungles of Vietnam? If anything they needed something with greater cover penetration.

Eh? I hesitate to label the conclusions of combat veterans "theoretical". I not 100% sure about the US Army, but the people making the decisions to heavy up the squad-platoon-company fire power in the 1975-85 were the same guys who were leading squads thru battalions in Vietnam. They did the same thing their counterparts had done forty years earlier, moving the full auto weapons further forward & down in the battalion/company/squad. In the 1950s & 60s the trend went to a assault weapon squad & the leaders trying to fight with that 1965-71 did not like it.
I mean combat vets have gotten future doctrine wrong before. See the French and British armies in 1940.
Plus Vietnam wasn't necessarily the type of combat that would have occurred in Europe in the 1980s and beyond or as we've seen not the same as what has happened in Iraq and Afghanistan...which has led to the Marines restricting M249 use and adopting the IAR M27 as the SAW.

Also the Marines weren't interested in the M16/SCHV weapons based on WW2 and Korean war experience, they had it forced on them, same as the Army.

The Amphibious Corps the USN deployed had plenty of fire support. Aside from the heavy howitzer & gun battalions they had the naval fire support. Having 13cm, 15cm, or 20cm cannon, with extra length projectiles in direct support of the infantry battalions, vs 10cm howitzers, is a whole different level in killing power.
Part of the issue during WW2 for the Marines was the Japanese habit of 'hugging' and being dug in so well that naval fire support wasn't digging them out. Or that for whatever reason naval fire support couldn't be used. Then fire as far forward as possible was pretty critical.
 
Quantity can have a quality of it's own. Which would you rather have, one or two Thompsons in your company or 20/40 Sten Guns. I know what I would choose.
 
Quantity can have a quality of it's own. Which would you rather have, one or two Thompsons in your company or 20/40 Sten Guns. I know what I would choose.

But in 1940, M1928s were available for immediate delivery, the STEN was not.

Better to have an overly complicated, expensive weapon than none at all?
 

Deleted member 1487

I concede that is correct but why continue to buy them at vast expense when the Sten became available in bulk?
The Sten was cheap, but crappy. That and it wasn't in the standard US .45 caliber, hence the M3.

BTW pre-war the Brits were given the chance to make the Danuvia 39M, which was the lever delayed 9x25mm SMG the Hungarians eventually adopted and if the system was borrowed for other designs could have been turned into all sorts of interesting weapons. It would have cost only £5 to make IIRC. The Brits felt it was too much of a 'gangster weapon' however.
 
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Because the sten was hands down the single worst SMG in terms of handling in the entire war.
Try firing an M3 or 39M prone under fire. What the Sten allowed was outsourced production outside the existing stretched armaments industry and in huge quantities; fast. Myself I would have preferred to use the Czech ZK383 in 9mm Mauser Export but better a Sten that I have and all my colleagues have than a ZK383 just for me. Of course none of these are quite machine carbines but can come close at actual normal combat ranges other than those at which the job is for an LMG or MMG.
 

Deleted member 1487

Try firing an M3 or 39M prone under fire. What the Sten allowed was outsourced production outside the existing stretched armaments industry and in huge quantities; fast. Myself I would have preferred to use the Czech ZK383 in 9mm Mauser Export but better a Sten that I have and all my colleagues have than a ZK383 just for me. Of course none of these are quite machine carbines but can come close at actual normal combat ranges other than those at which the job is for an LMG or MMG.
You realize that you're claiming the vast majority of all fire arms weapons ever made have magazines placed just like the M3 or 39M, right? If it was such a problem nearly all would be laid out like the Sten...but they aren't.
 
Horses for courses many years ago I fired a MKIII Sten and a Sterling on a range and the Sten was not that bad compared to .45 calibre grease gun that I found almost impossible to keep on target. But then I'm a wimpy Brit.
 
Horses for courses many years ago I fired a MKIII Sten and a Sterling on a range and the Sten was not that bad compared to .45 calibre grease gun that I found almost impossible to keep on target. But then I'm a wimpy Brit.

Having fired both the Thompson and M3A1, the Grease Gun was far more controllable of the two, from the far lower RoF.

But for the best FA behavior, hard to beat the M2 Carbine
 
You realize that you're claiming the vast majority of all fire arms weapons ever made have magazines placed just like the M3 or 39M, right? If it was such a problem nearly all would be laid out like the Sten...but they aren't.
The L2A3 was my personal infantry weapon for some years and I was happy to be able to fire prone from low cover.
 
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