No MG34, instead a 'machine carbine'?

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So an interesting What If came up on the Forgotten Weapons channel Q&A a day or two ago:
Given that the Germans started to move away from the LMG as a squad weapon as WW2 went on, removing part of the point of a GPMG in favor of the assault rifle, what if instead of investing in a GPMG pre-war they instead invested in Vollmer's M35 and later a SAW version of that weapon? ITTL the Germans would keep the MG13 and equip their infantry with the 'machine carbine', so that by the start of WW2 the Vollmer M35 (in intermediate 7.92 to avoid the cost of recalibering) is the primary infantry weapon instead of the K98k. They would keep the MG13 as a platoon/company/battalion weapon, but basically have squads equipped with only an assault rifle and a K98k for rifle grenades or perhaps marksman work. How does this impact infantry tactics going forward and ideas about light machine guns.

Getting back to the OP it really depends on how many of the automatic weapons there are & how aggressive the company leaders are in using them. With the number of MMG/LMG in the German company the leaders could dominate the small arms battle both inside and beyond the 500 meter zone. Reducing the volume of fire from the longer ranged weapons gives up a proportionate capability to nuetralize and suppress out at 700 meters or 1,100 meters.
 

Deleted member 1487

Getting back to the OP it really depends on how many of the automatic weapons there are & how aggressive the company leaders are in using them. With the number of MMG/LMG in the German company the leaders could dominate the small arms battle both inside and beyond the 500 meter zone. Reducing the volume of fire from the longer ranged weapons gives up a proportionate capability to nuetralize and suppress out at 700 meters or 1,100 meters.
How often were German squads engaging targets out to 700-1100m in the early war period? By removing LMGs from the squad, they can be organized at the platoon level to actually do that, which is why militaries moved to a SAW for squads and have actual crew served MGs in the weapons squad of the platoon for longer range fire support. Bogging down infantry squads with an crew served was a problem in the functioning of the squad, which led to the evolution of the SAW. Ironically it was the Soviets to recognized that first and developed the RPD during the war.
 
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Great article , but we need 10 times as many articles to start crunching numbers. These could be exceptional results and without more data that can't be evaluated. Complex mass/mob human behaviour typified by organized battles are horribly difficult to study. This always requires an order of magnitude more data to even approximate results to say nothing of weapon effectiveness.
 

Deleted member 1487

Great article , but we need 10 times as many articles to start crunching numbers. These could be exceptional results and without more data that can't be evaluated. Complex mass/mob human behaviour typified by organized battles are horribly difficult to study. This always requires an order of magnitude more data to even approximate results to say nothing of weapon effectiveness.
These threads have some info:
https://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?f=71&t=229192&hilit=stg44

https://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?f=19&t=231671&p=2107405&hilit=stg44#p2107405
Early 1944 the GendInf did a survey on how the Stg performs. Here he book provides a table of where the Stgs went until April 44

The questions are also interesting.

Read like this

number = infantry division / number: number of Stg used

Hgr South Ukraine: 240

15. / 120
6. / 120

Hgr Northern Ukraine: 612

1. / 612


Hgr Mitte:

6. / 41
12. / 49
31. / 88
35. / 114
36. / 88
45. / 17
110. / 58
129. / 18
131. / 60
221. / 18
260. / 42
267. / 35
337. / 112
383. / 49

other units Hgr Mitte: 3.845

78. StDiv: 120
KAbt E: 143
AOK 9: 200
5.JgDiv: 220
SkiJgBrig 1: 1488
KavRgt Mitte: 770
25 PzGrenDiv: 115

Hgr Nord: 2.325

11. / 1140
93. / 174
122. / 861

28.JgDiv: 150


All data are from march 1 - 28th of april 1944

The answers to the servey are interesting:

1) can the STG replace the MP40 & K98? All but 5th Jaeger Division of Hgr Mitte answered with yes. 5th JgDiv answered 80% MP40
2) what was the experienced effective range in semi auto and full auto?
All gave the effective ranges of semi auto at 400-600 meter for both semi&full, but the 5th JgDiv again, who answered with 200 meters
3) Can the Stg reduce the number of LeMG required?
Answers differed. 19 units answered "yes", 5 answered "No"
4) How much ammo is suggested per rifleman? 21 units answered "720", one answered 540, other answered rabged between 1000 and 1500
5) How much ammo is necessary? Answers ranged from 180-360

https://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?f=50&t=217652&hilit=stg44
'Hinweise für die Führung des Grenadier-Regiments einer Volks-Grenadier-Division', OKH, 5.9.44

"Die Feuer- und Stoßkraft ist wesentlich verstärkt worden. Dies wurde erreicht;

a) Durch Eingliederung von 2 MP.-Zügen (Stoßzüge). Diese Züge sind durch die hohe Feuerkraft und Feuerbereitschaft ihrer Waffen besonders geeignet zur stoßtrupp-artigen Kampfführung im Angriff und in der Verteidigung (Einbruch, Gegenstoß). Ihr Einsatz erfolgt an Brennpunkten der Abwehr, besonders in solchem Gelände, das infolge seiner Unübersichtlichkeit weittragende Waffen (le. und s. MG., m. und s. Gr.W., le. I.G.) nicht voll zur Wirkung kommen lässt.

Die MP.44 verfügt bis zu 400 m über etwa gleiche Treffgenauigkeit wie das Gewehr. Der Wert dieser vollautomatischen Waffe liegt in ihrer hohen Feuergeschwindigkeit und Treffsicherheit im Einzelfeuer (22-28 Schuß/Min.) sowie in der Möglichkeit der Feuersteigerung zu Feuerstößen von 2-3 Schuß. Im allgemeinen wird Einzelfeuer abgegeben. Vom Feuerstoß ist nur im Nahkampf (Einbruch, Gegenstoß, Nachtkampf) Gebrauch zu machen.Auf straffe Feuerzucht und Munitionstaktikist zu achten,da die Kurzpatrone nicht durch die normale Gewehr- und MG.-Munition ersetzt werden kann.[...]"

"The fire and impact force has been significantly strengthened. This has been achieved;

a) Through inclusion of 2 MP. platoons (assault). These features are particularly useful due to the high firepower and overwatch their weapons for combat patrol-type warfare in attack and in defence (raid(?), counter-attack). They are used at focal points of defence, particularly in such terrain, the result of its complexity far-reaching weapon (light & heavy MG., medium and heavy mortars, light IG) can not be fully effective.

The MP.44 offers up to 400 m over approximately the same accuracy as the rifle. The value of this fully automatic weapon is its high rate of fire and accuracy in single shots (22-28 rounds / min.) As well as in the possibility of increasing to fire bursts of 2-3 shot. In general, single shots [are] discharged. From burst only in close combat (raid, counter-attack, nightfighting) is to exercise. In strict fire discipline and ammunition staktikist (expenditure?) [be]respected, because the short cartridge cannot be replaced by the normal rifle and machine-gun ammunition. [...] "
 
I
How often were German squads engaging targets out to 700-1100m in the early war period? By removing LMGs from the squad, they can be organized at the platoon level to actually do that, which is why militaries moved to a SAW for squads and have actual crew served MGs in the weapons squad of the platoon for longer range fire support. Bogging down infantry squads with an crew served was a problem in the functioning of the squad, which led to the evolution of the SAW. Ironically it was the Soviets to recognized that first and developed the RPD during the war.


It isn't just range that is important, there are other imponderables to consider such as barrier penetration. At under 300m which is where most WW2 combat took place, just as important as range is the ability of infantry to fire through cover and get through so things like car body work, wooden buildings, brick structures, earthen berms/sandbags etc are all going to be easier for a full power round like 7.62x54R, .303 British and 7.92x57 to penetrate and they are going to tear through light cover in a way that 9mm, .30 carbine or 7.92 Kurz won't. There is also the fact that high powered rounds have a larger acoustic suppressive effect than lighter rounds close up.
 
I
It isn't just range that is important, there are other imponderables to consider such as barrier penetration. At under 300m which is where most WW2 combat took place, just as important as range is the ability of infantry to fire through cover and get through so things like car body work, wooden buildings, brick structures, earthen berms/sandbags etc are all going to be easier for a full power round like 7.62x54R, .303 British and 7.92x57 to penetrate and they are going to tear through light cover in a way that 9mm, .30 carbine or 7.92 Kurz won't.

Not all that much difference between Intermediate Rounds and Full Rifle, bullet type is important.

Steel-plate-with-comments.jpg


I've done similar tests, and surprisingly, .243 FMJ did better than 30-06AP on 5/16 T1 plate, used on bulldozer blades. Slightly better than AR400

But to truly turn Cover into Concealment, you need 12.7-15mm HMG. Sandbags, vehicles, trees, stone walls, doesn't matter. They will punch thru
 

Deleted member 1487

I've done similar tests, and surprisingly, .243 FMJ did better than 30-06AP on 5/16 T1 plate, used on bulldozer blades. Slightly better than AR400

But to truly turn Cover into Concealment, you need 12.7-15mm HMG. Sandbags, vehicles, trees, stone walls, doesn't matter. They will punch thru
Sectional density is crucial and is better with some of the lower calibers than the larger ones due to how long they could be made relatively.

True cover 'penetration' is for the rifle grenades. Suppression and maneuver to eliminate at target also works, which is easier with an intermediate caliber weapon.
 
How often were German squads engaging targets out to 700-1100m in the early war period?

More often than you might think. This is a function of terrain. Its really important on the Belgian Plain vs the woods of the Ardennes or Argonne.

By removing LMGs from the squad, they can be organized at the platoon level to actually do that, which is why militaries moved to a SAW for squads and have actual crew served MGs in the weapons squad of the platoon for longer range fire support. Bogging down infantry squads with an crew served was a problem in the functioning of the squad, which led to the evolution of the SAW. Ironically it was the Soviets to recognized that first and developed the RPD during the war.

In the Pacific the US Marines started with a infantry company of high fire power rifles. 16 BAR & 120+ Garands, & a handful of SMG. After a year of combat experience the SAW strength was boosted to 18 per company, the number of Garands in the squad/platoon boosted, AND MMG were added to the company at the demand of the commanders from company through battalion. By early 1944 the rifle fire power in Garands and SAW were boosted again (27 BAR per rifle company) and the number of MMG were tripled by TE in the company. Further the battalion/regiment commanders increased the MMG and HMG within the company by pushing the battalion weapons, and the AA weapons down to the company commanders. It was not unusual to have eight or ten MG under direct control of the company commander, & those used as aggressively forward as the skill of the crews and squad leaders allowed. Further the infantry leaders also demanded the LMG versions of the Browning MG. These could be better maneuvered with the assault elements (squads) & add weight of fire to the three automatic rifles already present in the 1944/45 squad.

Not all that much difference between Intermediate Rounds and Full Rifle, bullet type is important.

Steel-plate-with-comments.jpg


I've done similar tests, and surprisingly, .243 FMJ did better than 30-06AP on 5/16 T1 plate, used on bulldozer blades. Slightly better than AR400

But to truly turn Cover into Concealment, you need 12.7-15mm HMG. Sandbags, vehicles, trees, stone walls, doesn't matter. They will punch thru

Back in 1984 some bored NCOs & myself tested several weapons against sandbags and lumber. At 200 - 500 meters four sandbags with compacted contents could stop a M60 round, as advertised in the books. A M16 round from a A3 did nearly as well, except... the light weight rounds were much more likely to ricochette through the material. The M60 rounds followed a straighter trajectory through the sandbags & passing through 1-3 sandbags would usually enter the fighting position & the paper targets in them. The M16 rounds went right, left, up, or down depending on the density of the material. We also popped some 45 caliber rounds from our M1911 pistols into the sandbags and lumber. Those seldom made it into the second bag. they'd shatter the 2 - 5 cm thick lumber but be effectively stopped by anything behind it.

For the artillery the definition of Suppresion we used in fire planning was 'the enemy would be unable to effectively fire or maneuver while being fired on'. the key here is while fired on. As soon as you stopped shooting you expected the suppresion too cease. Few casualties were expected well under 2%, perhaps none. Nuetralizing fires were expected to inflict casualties from 4-5% & up. It was also expected the personnel in the target area would be unable to effectively fire or maneuver for some time after the incoming fire ceased. How long depended on the size of the target & volume of fire used relative to the target size. Once you reached 10% casualties the planning guide had you in the realm of Destruction Fires. In the artillery we seldom planned for those & executed them less. I did have 6-7 months of infantry training in the schoolhouse and 20+ months experience in a rifle company. My take away lesson was the infantry leaders saw 'suppressive' fires as a momentary effort on the way to organizing more effective fires and maneuver. Their object was once the enemy location was identified to swamp them with fire power. The assault or maneuver was accomplished in relatively small increments, and the high volume weapons did not remain static. Those were aggressively maneuvered along with the squad maneuver groups.

A few other notes: When the company fire power was heavied up in the 1980s the M16A3 rifles were limited to 3 round bursts. I met very few people who had a problem with that. There was the occasional John Wayne who thought hosing a entire 30 round mag in a minute was a good idea, but in short we went back to the sort of volume of fire we had from the Garands or M14. The 33 MMG/SAW we had in the company sufficed for the full auto fire. A second thing was that 27 M203 grenade launchers were added to the company, further reducing dependance on assault rifle fire.
 


Definitely worthwhile data. frequency of MP-44 was 6944 guns over 28 units or an average of 248 per unit for spring 1944 time period. "The German Infantry Handbook 1939-1945" reports the late 1944 figures [1st Oct "only 110,000 were on hand"]. If we go from the above average we get 443 units could be sustained with ~ 250 guns each. Mind you by this standard SMG should still be maybe 564 per unit.

Seems the MP-38/40 development and production was squarely in the way of any early assault rifle development. I can't see them developing assault rifle instead of MG-34.
 
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If the prewar prototype of the assault rifle of 4000 RM ; can be seen as development cost- then a war time production could be something like 400 RM each. Using the learning curve ,the per unit price could be 1/2 or 200 RM based on million unit production.

http://www.csgnetwork.com/learncurvecalc.html


If the MP-40 is replaced by the Vollmer m35 -production could allow about 300,000 units built in 1941-43 OR about 100,000 per year compared to 200,000 MP-40 built every year historically.

If the GW-41/43 are also factored in That should amount to 160,000 units @ ~ 100 RM should allow roughly 80,000 Vollmer m35 increasing the annual production to about 120,000 per year. It appears inventory numbers are about 1/2 of the increased production.

IE
1941 + 120K /2= 60K inventory
1942 60k+120k/2= 90k inventory
1943 90k + 120k/2= 105k inventory

The STG MP-44 takes over with 420,000 built

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vollmer_M35

https://panzerworld.com/stg-44
inventory numbers are 4-5000 in winter 1943.
STG-44 inventory figures in 1944 rise from 14k in JAN to 68K in AUG . After this the inventory sky rocketed from 100k to 160k by the end of the year and 230k by FEB 1945.
 
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If the prewar prototype of the assault rifle of 4000 RM ; can be seen as development cost- then a war time production could be something like 400 RM each. Using the learning curve ,the per unit price could be 1/2 or 200 RM based on million unit production.
Hand built M1921 Thompson at $200 to simplified M1 at $70 for mass production
 

Deleted member 1487

More often than you might think. This is a function of terrain. Its really important on the Belgian Plain vs the woods of the Ardennes or Argonne.
Probably not given all the historical data from, WW1, WW2, and Korea that lead to the creation of the first assault rifles and later M16. US OR reports from Korea had LMGs mostly engaging at no more than 400-500m at the company level despite the mountainous terrain and relatively long fields of vision.
https://ia800301.us.archive.org/16/items/KoreanWarAfterAction/Commentary on Infantry and Weapons, Korea, 1950-51.pdf

This report only has chart for the M1, but this shows that even in daylight offensive fighting 80% of engagement ranges are 300m or below:
http://lmharchive.ca/wp-content/upl...antry-Weapons-and-Equipment-in-Korea-1952.pdf

In the Pacific the US Marines started with a infantry company of high fire power rifles. 16 BAR & 120+ Garands, & a handful of SMG. After a year of combat experience the SAW strength was boosted to 18 per company, the number of Garands in the squad/platoon boosted, AND MMG were added to the company at the demand of the commanders from company through battalion. By early 1944 the rifle fire power in Garands and SAW were boosted again (27 BAR per rifle company) and the number of MMG were tripled by TE in the company. Further the battalion/regiment commanders increased the MMG and HMG within the company by pushing the battalion weapons, and the AA weapons down to the company commanders. It was not unusual to have eight or ten MG under direct control of the company commander, & those used as aggressively forward as the skill of the crews and squad leaders allowed. Further the infantry leaders also demanded the LMG versions of the Browning MG. These could be better maneuvered with the assault elements (squads) & add weight of fire to the three automatic rifles already present in the 1944/45 squad.
Sounds like they had a lot more firepower than the US Army company did.


Definitely worthwhile data. frequency of MP-44 was 6944 guns over 28 units or an average of 248 per unit for spring 1944 time period. "The German Infantry Handbook 1939-1945" reports the late 1944 figures [1st Oct "only 110,000 were on hand"]. If we go from the above average we get 443 units could be sustained with ~ 250 guns each. Mind you by this standard SMG should still be maybe 564 per unit.

Seems the MP-38/40 development and production was squarely in the way of any early assault rifle development. I can't see them developing assault rifle instead of MG-34.
Why in an ATL where the German army decides to prioritize the adoption of a 'machine carbine', which replaces the MP38/40? The MP had nothing to do with the decision to not adopt the Vollmer, if anything the MP was to help make up for not adopting it.
 

Deleted member 1487

If the prewar prototype of the assault rifle of 4000 RM ; can be seen as development cost- then a war time production could be something like 400 RM each. Using the learning curve ,the per unit price could be 1/2 or 200 RM based on million unit production.

http://www.csgnetwork.com/learncurvecalc.html


If the MP-40 is replaced by the Vollmer m35 -production could allow about 300,000 units built in 1941-43 OR about 100,000 per year compared to 200,000 MP-40 built every year historically.

If the GW-41/43 are also factored in That should amount to 160,000 units @ ~ 100 RM should allow roughly 80,000 Vollmer m35 increasing the annual production to about 120,000 per year. It appears inventory numbers are about 1/2 of the increased production.

IE
1941 + 120K /2= 60K inventory
1942 60k+120k/2= 90k inventory
1943 90k + 120k/2= 105k inventory

The STG MP-44 takes over with 420,000 built

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vollmer_M35

https://panzerworld.com/stg-44
inventory numbers are 4-5000 in winter 1943.
STG-44 inventory figures in 1944 rise from 14k in JAN to 68K in AUG . After this the inventory sky rocketed from 100k to 160k by the end of the year and 230k by FEB 1945.
The MG34 cost less than 200 RM, there is no way in hell that a weapon half the weight and complexity of the MG34 would cost that much. It would cost no more than the M1 Garand given that it had a very similar operating system, just with select fire ability. At most it would be 1.5x the cost of an STG and possibly more than the K98k.
Also your numbers calculations are off because you're not factoring in the K98ks not being built ITTL nor the relative lack of the MG34/42s, nor the savings from locking in the MG13 as the LMG of WW2, for which production was already existing, while the heavy pattern version is for the MMG/HMG role.
 
Why in an ATL where the German army decides to prioritize the adoption of a 'machine carbine', which replaces the MP38/40? The MP had nothing to do with the decision to not adopt the Vollmer, if anything the MP was to help make up for not adopting it.


Exactly !!! So calculating MP-40 production to Vollmer should give us an idea of the scale of production possible.

I assume Vollmer M-35 can ALSO fill every role MP-40 can ?

If you have annual figures for K98 rifle then the increase in the 'scale of production' can be estimated.

BTW increased cost is because the original article claimed too expensive @ 4000 RM. Do you have figures for production models?
 
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Deleted member 1487

Exactly !!! So calculating MP-40 production to Vollmer should give us an idea of the scale of production possible.

I assume Vollmer M-35 can ALSO fill every role MP-40 can ?

If you have annual figures for K98 rifle then the increase in the 'scale of production' can be estimated.

BTW increased cost is because the original article claimed too expensive @ 4000 RM. Do you have figures for production models?
Since it wasn't accepted into production, no there are none available.

Assault rifles have largely supplanted SMGs in military doctrine since WW2, so yeah I'd imagine they'd nearly entirely replace SMGs, as the STG44 was supposed to do.

Best I can find about K98k production, it has all rifles lumped into 1 category:
https://ww2-weapons.com/german-arms-production/
Basically about 1.3 million rifles per year until 1943, then 1.9 million, then 2.2 million in 1944. Probably 8.5 million or so produced from 1940-45.
 
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Since it wasn't accepted into production, no there are none available.

Assault rifles have largely supplanted SMGs in military doctrine since WW2, so yeah I'd imagine they'd nearly entirely replace SMGs, as the STG44 was supposed to do.

Best I can find about K98k production, it has all rifles lumped into 1 category:
https://ww2-weapons.com/german-arms-production/
Basically about 1.3 million rifles per year until 1943, then 1.9 million, then 2.2 million in 1944. Probably 8.5 million or so produced from 1940-45.


Good information! I read 12 million rifles some where but that must include the prewar numbers?
 
Probably not given all the historical data from, WW1, WW2, and Korea that lead to the creation of the first assault rifles and later M16. US OR reports from Korea had LMGs mostly engaging at no more than 400-500m at the company level despite the mountainous terrain and relatively long fields of vision.
https://ia800301.us.archive.org/16/items/KoreanWarAfterAction/Commentary on Infantry and Weapons, Korea, 1950-51.pdf

This report only has chart for the M1, but this shows that even in daylight offensive fighting 80% of engagement ranges are 300m or below:
http://lmharchive.ca/wp-content/upl...antry-Weapons-and-Equipment-in-Korea-1952.pdf

Thats correct as far as they go. What I take away from those is the capability of that weapons mix limited the company/battalions weapons area of influence. Second, looking at the numbers its argument for increasing the number of LMG. Your MG are influencing the battlefield at a average range of 400-500 meters, the Garands only out to 300. Later the use of full volume or automatic fires from the M16 reduced the rifle squads influence to under 300 meters. When we returned training for other battlefields in the 1970s a effective squad range of 250 meters was ok for a assault but inadequate. It was also clear that even with a bipod the M16 and M14 were not worth much as a platoon or squad automatic weapon. They were too light for sustained fire & like the BAR magazine capacity reduces volume significantly.

Sounds like they had a lot more firepower than the US Army company did.

A lot more than the Army infantry company, they went through the war with nine BAR & two MMG in the company. A couple more MMG could be typically seconded from the battalion MG group. The Armored Infatry Company had a lot more MG, roughly ten - twelve or one per vehicle in the company.

In WWII the Marines doctrine/equipment mix was driven more from the bottom up, vs the top down dominance imposed by Army Ground Forces. In part this was because of the large number of 1942 veterans rotated to support units back in the US, in part because of the much higher portion of combat veterans among the USMC officers prewar, & in part because the colonels at battalio, regiment, and the division/corps staff were given more responsibility or flexibility in arming the rifle battalions.
 
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