No MARKET: How far can the British advance in Holland without using airborne troops ?

How far does XXX Corps advance by November 1944 in Holland?


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What if the British launched only a ground offensive instead of the combined airborne/ground Operation Market-Garden in September 1944? How far would XXX Corps advance on it's own without airborne troops landing ahead and seizing most of the bridges?

In this scenario the British launch only the ground offensive on September 17. They have the same troops that were committed to GARDEN. How far can the British advance by November 1944 when OTL the 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions were pulled off the line?
 
By this point shouldn't the emphasis really have been on securing supply lines through Antwerp?. Doing that sooner lays the foundation for a much broader attack later in the year.
 
How about another variable: Use the transport fleet to carry supplies for frontline troops instead.
 
What if the British launched only a ground offensive instead of the combined airborne/ground Operation Market-Garden in September 1944? How far would XXX Corps advance on it's own without airborne troops landing ahead and seizing most of the bridges?

In this scenario the British launch only the ground offensive on September 17. They have the same troops that were committed to GARDEN. How far can the British advance by November 1944 when OTL the 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions were pulled off the line?

Much the same as OTL, certainly up to the Maas, and perhaps the Waal but no further.

It will be hard grinding battle, as much of the OTL for the post Market Garden battles in the Netherlands, with a fight over each waterline. See for example the flanking Corps in Market Garden - night assault crossings by infantry to create a small bridgehead, with a 24 hour delay to get a Class 40 bridge in place and tanks across in support. Rinse and Repeat.

The other question is what you will do with XVIII Airborne Corps in the meantime, if they weren't used in Market Garden; there were plans for them to be used in support of 12th Army Group to break the frontline and cross the Rhine. Given how the campaign developed OTL, these are unlikely to be successful.
 
By this point shouldn't the emphasis really have been on securing supply lines through Antwerp?. Doing that sooner lays the foundation for a much broader attack later in the year.

How about another variable: Use the transport fleet to carry supplies for frontline troops instead.

Both good points.
In this scenario however Monty still does the wrong thing and pushes into Holland rather than concentrating on Antwerp.
 
Both good points.
In this scenario however Monty still does the wrong thing and pushes into Holland rather than concentrating on Antwerp.

Pushing into Holland is still needed, at least up to the Maas, to prevent Antwerp being threatened by a counterattack, or artillery fire.
 
I don't see how there can be that much difference. The various airborne forces were tasked with taking certain bridges and holding them for a specified period. This they all did. It was the speed of advance of the land forces that set the actual results on the ground. This demonstrates that, whilst not perfect, the airborne plans were realistic enough to achieve all their principal aims whilst the ground advance made unreasonable assumptions for an advance over an incredibly narrow front in the face of a determined, skilled and reasonably armed opposition.

This does not mean that I have a cunning plan to get the ground forces through Arnhem before the bridge is lost. But if they could then door to the North German Plain is open. But then, ceteris paribus, major wars are won by logistics. If the door was open could the thrust be continued without Antwerp?
 
A better question might be, what if Horrocks secured both Antwerp and the Scheldt approaches, thus opening the port up almost immediately (bar some minesweeping)? That would result in a massive injection of supplies to 2nd Army and those parts of 1st Canadian with them and would potentially change everything.
 

Deleted member 1487

What would the Germans do with the troops freed up from not having to fight the Allied airborne? That might well delay the ground push. Over 40k airborne troops were used, which tied down substantial German troops during the operation.
 
Brother Wiking,
Don't worry, because Germans would have found plenty of tasks for under-employed soldiers: digging defensive works, laying mines, etc.
Hah!
Hah!
German defenders were short-handed after the summer of 1944. German defenders were exhausted and severely depleted by mid-August. The only reason the Allied advance "paused" in early September was depleted Canadian infantry regiments and over-stretched supply lines.
If German troops occupying Arnhem had not been forced to fight British para-troopers, they would have been able to complete their rest and recuperation cycle and provided an even more stubborn defence in late 1944.
 

Deleted member 1487

Brother Wiking,
Don't worry, because Germans would have found plenty of tasks for under-employed soldiers: digging defensive works, laying mines, etc.
Hah!
Hah!
German defenders were short-handed after the summer of 1944. German defenders were exhausted and severely depleted by mid-August. The only reason the Allied advance "paused" in early September was depleted Canadian infantry regiments and over-stretched supply lines.
If German troops occupying Arnhem had not been forced to fight British para-troopers, they would have been able to complete their rest and recuperation cycle and provided an even more stubborn defence in late 1944.
Given that they were so stretched IOTL due frontal and airborne attacks, they'd be less stretched and able to concentrate against a frontal assault without the 40k airborne troops to deal with behind their lines. Additionally XXX Corps will be no less depleted, the Wallied supply lines no less attenuated, and even if they used their airborne infantry as normal infantry divisions for frontal attacks, the German can still concentrate all their units on the line, rather than behind it; airborne units deployed behind enemy lines also have the benefit of disrupting enemy communications and spreading confusion until the situation is clarified; ITTL without that there wouldn't be confusion and dispersal of defensive forces, rather they could send them to the front and hold the line as a concentrated defensive force. With the Allied force thus contained the Germans would still have their rest cycle and have a better defensive line in the Netherlands than they did historically after the battle. Even the tired and depleted SS Panzer Corps would have been very helpful stopping the Allies from penetrating as far as they did historically.
 
A better question might be, what if Horrocks secured both Antwerp and the Scheldt approaches, thus opening the port up almost immediately (bar some minesweeping)? That would result in a massive injection of supplies to 2nd Army and those parts of 1st Canadian with them and would potentially change everything.

Up to a point...

Opening the Scheldt means taking Breskens on the south bank, and Walcheren Island on the north bank. Walcheren is the problem as it an Atlantic Wall fortress and an Island. It can't be taken by air - FAAA said no; it can't be taken immediately by sea as there are no naval taskforces available - they are tied up at le Havre; it can't be taken quickly by land as the land approaches are a causeway 1km+ long IIRC covered by anti-tank guns and artillery. After clearing the land defences completely minesweeping took another 3 weeks.

21st Army Group didn't need Antwerp for supplies, as they were moving the logistics base from Normandy to the Channel ports - Dieppe is open and Calais and Boulogne will follow shortly.
 
Nice try Aber,
But by early September 1944, WALLYS were struggling to move enough supplies across the Normandy Beaches.
Yes, WALLYS did capture several other French ports, but they were either too small, or too badly damaged to move sufficient tonnages of cargo.
Antwerp was significant because the Belgian "White Brigades" prevented Germans from demolishing port facilities making it the first significant port captured intact.
Belgian (White Brigade) dock workers suffered major casualties disarming explosives, scouting German defences, etc.

WALLYS missed an opportunity when they assigned the "trivial" task of clearing the coast to an exhausted Canadian Army while Montgomery and Patton competed for glory.
The underlying problem was that there were simply not enough beans and bullets - crossing Normandy beaches - to support either advance.
 
Nice try Aber,
But by early September 1944, WALLYS were struggling to move enough supplies across the Normandy Beaches.
Yes, WALLYS did capture several other French ports, but they were either too small, or too badly damaged to move sufficient tonnages of cargo.
Antwerp was significant because the Belgian "White Brigades" prevented Germans from demolishing port facilities making it the first significant port captured intact.
Belgian (White Brigade) dock workers suffered major casualties disarming explosives, scouting German defences, etc.

WALLYS missed an opportunity when they assigned the "trivial" task of clearing the coast to an exhausted Canadian Army while Montgomery and Patton competed for glory.
The underlying problem was that there were simply not enough beans and bullets - crossing Normandy beaches - to support either advance.

Would you like me to pull out some detail from Admin History of 21st Army Group, or Montgomery's signals to Brooke setting out his logistic plans?

There were some issues ( leading to the grounding of a Corps on the Seine), but Antwerp was not important for supplying the British. It was far more important for the US but because of V2 attacks it was not used for personnel or ammunition.
 
According to a Brit in World at War the Allies had, a week or so before Market Garden, "100 km worth of petrol...and 100 km within 24 hours reach. THey should have in my opinion taken the chance...The only thing between us and the Rhine was one division of very old men which we called "stomach divisions" because they were all my age and had things wrong with their tummies. They have been guarding the coast a month, they never fired a shot in anger, and they would have been delighted to go to our prisoner of war camps." He said this was enough petrol to cut all the Germans off and surround the rhur from behind the Rhine. (see 10:19
).

The delay allowed the Germans to move in reserves which made Market Garden a disaster.

So, perhaps the theory is, the war could have been almost won in 1944, or more likely, over by the end of the winter with the rhur cut off.
 
Some rembering with advantage there; German resistance actually stiffened as early as September 5th IIRC - when 11th Armoured tried to cross a canal to the north of Antwerp they got thrown back.
 
Given that they were so stretched IOTL due frontal and airborne attacks, they'd be less stretched and able to concentrate against a frontal assault without the 40k airborne troops to deal with behind their lines. Additionally XXX Corps will be no less depleted, the Wallied supply lines no less attenuated, and even if they used their airborne infantry as normal infantry divisions for frontal attacks, the German can still concentrate all their units on the line, rather than behind it; airborne units deployed behind enemy lines also have the benefit of disrupting enemy communications and spreading confusion until the situation is clarified; ITTL without that there wouldn't be confusion and dispersal of defensive forces, rather they could send them to the front and hold the line as a concentrated defensive force. With the Allied force thus contained the Germans would still have their rest cycle and have a better defensive line in the Netherlands than they did historically after the battle. Even the tired and depleted SS Panzer Corps would have been very helpful stopping the Allies from penetrating as far as they did historically.

I think all those SS men in the Arnhem area would head south. The Germans could make a stand at the Maas River. Blow up or severely damage the Grave bridge. The Germans could easily destroy the smaller bridges in what would be the OTL 101st Airborne sector around Eindhoven in a scorched earth/delaying action. While the British make yet another river crossing and build a bridge the Germans dig in at Nijmegen.
When XXX Corps gets to Nijmegen they are stuck in house to house fighting. Meanwhile the SS blow up the Nijmegen Bridge and probably flood the "island" between Arnhem and Nijmegen. XXX Corps spends the rest of winter planning to push across the Waal.
 
A far smarter use of Market forces would've been to clear the Scheldt Estuary, to get Antwerp in use sooner. Maybe instead of early November as in OTL, the Allies can get the port fully open by the close of September. Patton would thus be able to keep up his offensive, and take the Rhineland before the weather closes the front down for Winter. Come Spring, maybe the Western Allies meet the Soviets in Prague, Vienna, and near Berlin instead of what happened historically.
 

Minty_Fresh

Banned
A ground offensive could sweep aside opposition in the immediate region, but by the time they got to Nijmigen, the bridge might have already been blown. Of course, that might not be such a huge issue if the Germans do not move the resting SS Panzer Divisions down to Nijmigen, but if they do, and there is reason to think they would, there would not have been much of a chance to get across the river in any haste. A flanking movement might be necessary, perhaps moving downriver with some reserves if possible.

A good part of this is that there would not be attacks on the highway from either side in the case of a broad advance north, thereby not delaying the advance. I still think however that a limited operation would have been far more successful and far less costly.

A better question however might be why go north at all. The Scheldt needs to be clear, Antwerp needs to be fully open, and Patton needs fuel to pursue a beaten enemy that hardened while he was bogged down at Metz.
 

hipper

Banned
A ground offensive could sweep aside opposition in the immediate region, but by the time they got to Nijmigen, the bridge might have already been blown. Of course, that might not be such a huge issue if the Germans do not move the resting SS Panzer Divisions down to Nijmigen, but if they do, and there is reason to think they would, there would not have been much of a chance to get across the river in any haste. A flanking movement might be necessary, perhaps moving downriver with some reserves if possible.

A good part of this is that there would not be attacks on the highway from either side in the case of a broad advance north, thereby not delaying the advance. I still think however that a limited operation would have been far more successful and far less costly.

A better question however might be why go north at all. The Scheldt needs to be clear, Antwerp needs to be fully open, and Patton needs fuel to pursue a beaten enemy that hardened while he was bogged down at Metz.


The Best solution would have been to attack germant with Bradley through the Aachen gap. Using the Fitst airborne army and supplies from the channel ports.

Of course you would have to ground Montgomery and Patton one put them in minor flank guarding roles

Eisenhower however would not do such a thing so no attempt was made.

Cheers Hipper
 
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