No major offensive toward Leningrad 1941

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Deleted member 1487

Having read the book, it's quite obvious his analysis is excellent. Your just dismissing the scholarship because it disagrees with your views.
And you agree with it because it supports yours.


Most probably they do. As a case in point: OTL the Germans captured Velikiye-Luki in August. The rail line from Riga to the city was still not completed when the . I'm also curious how the Germans are supposed to extend the line from Velikiye Luki to Rzhev before Operation Typhoon given that Rzhev was not taken until Operation Typhoon.
'When the' what? They hadn't connected the rail lines because that area wasn't the focus when they recaptured it and the Soviets were attacking out of the area until it was recaptured. Kind of hard to move the rail lines up there.
http://www.allworldwars.com/image/130/CommentsOnRussianRailroadsSketch2Lg.jpg
This map of rail construction in the area indicates by mid-July they had extended rail along that line already.

There appears to be a miscommunication regarding the Luki-Rzhev part of the line; until its captured it cannot be converted, but as the Luki part wasn't added to the rail net until August-September and the part beyond it toward Rzhev was destroyed in the heavy fighting in August-October, rather than being taken relatively quickly in July as it was IOTL before being relinquished, ITTL it would be taken with relatively minimal damage in July as per OTL, then the area beyond it as 4th Panzer Group is focused in that area instead of north on the Leningrad axis and then behind it AG-North rail conversion groups would extend the rail net to keep them supplied without interfering with AG-Center.


Actually they'd be facing more. The Soviets could reinforce with forces that OTL were sent to Leningrad. I'm also ignoring your premise of the Germans trying to encircle the 22nd Army, since that requires the Germans to realize it was there before they encounter it (for the record: they did not, just like the rest of the Soviet second strategic echelon).
To a point yes. They still need to defend the Luga and Leningrad from the North. So they replace some of the losses along the main axis, but given the way Stalin tended to behave, he'd order pointless, costly counterattacks to try and draw off German attention, as he did in the region IOTL, and they would be bloody failures as they were IOTL thanks to being in swampy areas that were a defenders paradise, as the Germans found out when they tried to attack east of the city of Luga.

As to 22nd army, they encountered that by early July so knew it was there. 4th Panzer Group wouldn't just act without knowing about it, their mission would be to move on Moscow in in support of AG-Center once the Dvina was breached, as per the altered plan ITTL (no Leningrad thrust). As they discover 22nd army on their flank and that of 3rd PG, nestled into the crease between the AGs, they would maneuver to encircle it from the north, freeing up 3rd PG to use its full power against Smolensk, rather than diverting to fight 22nd army as per OTL and taking Luki, only to give it up and belatedly move on Smolensk after. So 4th PG takes it out with its two corps and then continues to move against the other Soviet armies in the area like the 27th.

By doing so 3rd PG then can close the Smolensk pocket from the North sooner and much more securely inflicting even heavier damage on the Soviets in the process, weakening them for their attacks to break the pocket and in subsequent attacks like the Timoshenko offensives.


Which leaves them with an even more exposed northern flank and not any closer to actually taking Moscow.
18th and 16th armies anchor on the Luga in swampland, which is highly defensible. Its really not that exposed as you can only advance along roads; IOTL it was a mistake to attack in that area with Panzers, as it was infantry country, so the infantry of AG-North sans 4th PG would do just fine and be able to ably hold against the remaining opposition that was left after the disaster during the Baltic defensive operation west of the Dvina for the Soviets. The the onus of attack is on the Soviets and they get slaughtered trying to attack in constricted terrain.

More realistically, they sit around in July-September for lack of the requisite shipping to get the fuel or ammo out for them to operate. Also, if the Germans try to attack in September towards Moscow, a number of said counteroffensives don't happen and the Germans bleed upon tougher Soviet defenses.
They would as per OTL not advance past the Smolensk line taken in July as logistics are moved up and they parry the repeated Soviet counteroffensives, ripping them apart much more easily with a 2nd Panzer group attached to the area north of Yelna and not removing 8th air corps in August-September. So as per OTL the Soviets attack and are slaughtered, while the extra panzer divisions mean they can much more readily defeat through maneuver the Soviet mobile divisions attacking.
The Soviet counteroffensives were over as of early September and everything was pretty quiet between early September and October 1st on the Moscow axis while Kiev played out. No change from OTL as far as Soviet attacks go from July-September. By September 15th, when I'm proposing 3rd and 4th PGs attack with 9th and 4th army (with some help from 16th army/AG-North on the flank), IOTL the Soviets were on the defensive. The Yelna offensive was the last attack of Soviet offensives and that was over by September 8th IIRC.

Crewald, Page 170:

The same rains also imposed delays on Guderian's link up with AGS.
That was in the Gomel area affecting Guderian, not at Smolensk affecting 3rd and 4th PG in their September movements. It was well south of the Smolensk area, almost in North Ukraine, not in East Belarus/West Russia.


So largely what happened OTL. The Germans were converting every rail line they could as rapidly as they could because they needed those rail lines to sustain future operations.
Not every rail line, they picked a few major ones to focus their attention on. ITTL instead of having to extend from Luga to Leningrad in August they can focus on extending from Luki East and other supporting rail lines nearby like Nevel to Luki.

The line was advanced along with all the others. Just because Vilikiye Luki fell does not mean the Germans were not aiming to extend their rail net in the cities direction. The Germans were moving as quickly as they could.
Not really, they were focused on extending from Pskov to Luga and then beyond in July-September. ITTL once they reach the Luga they don't have to continue, they can convert from the Baltics East instead as a priority.

The Germans did have panzer and air support in July-August. What they didn't have were the supplies or frontage to effectively use them. Nothing changes here.
In July to early August yes (8th air corps left on August 3rd), but not the whole month and into September. The diverted 8th air corps in early-August to Leningrad and even more from 2nd air corps in early September to support Guderian. 3rd Panzer Group was diverted in late August IIRC to support AG-North. ITTL from July on they also have 4th PG to support the northern flank of AG-Center, which didn't have much armor support IOTL, which is why Velikiye Luki was abandoned in late July IOTL. In fact based on the operations that Stalin ordered in that area as described in Glantz's "barbarossa derailed" on the fighting around Smolensk in July-September having two PGs operating together on the offensive they could really pincer and wipe out major Soviet offensive formations during the July-August period. 3rd PG was ordered in late July to support AG-North, which didn't end up happening until August. Glantz makes the point that AG-Center by August was deprived of most armor and air support as it was mostly concentrated on the flanks (Guderian on the south, Hoth supporting AG-North along with Richthofen's 8th air corps).

Yes, and? All your doing is proving that it was easier to convert through the Baltics then it was in Russia proper.
Which is why its easier to convert from the Baltics to Velikiye Luki and beyond than from Pskov-Leningrad, as it was much closer and not using a major rail line of supply to AG-North, so wouldn't be majorly impact operations of the 18th and 16th armies defending the flank, while ensuring an unavailable LOS to 4th PG on the central axis ITTL.


The Germans focused as many resources as they could on moving east. The entire point of Barbarossa was to move east as rapidly as they could. You can try and say the Germans could do it all you want, but we know from history that they could not, the underlying reasons they could not, and that you have done nothing to address said reasons.
Not really, they focused a ton moving on Leningrad, which is how AG-North was able to extend the rail lines through the Baltics to Leningrad IOTL and sustain major operations to encircle the city. Instead ITTL those resources go into an unresourced set of rail lines that were not used IOTL because they were held by the Soviets until August and then were competing for resources with the Leningrad advance, so weren't ever put into operation. Without an advance beyond the Luga the resources are available to open those lines and a new source of supplies for AG-Center and the advance on Moscow, which takes significant burden off the Smolensk line and doesn't force them to try and supply armies via the Vyazma-Rzhev branch line, which was much lower capacity than the Luki-Rzhev line, ensuring in fact that the attacking armies have a far better source of supply ITTL than IOTL.
 
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Don Quijote

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How realistic is a strike on Moscow from the south? Communications from Kiev to Moscow were reasonably good as far as I know, and an attack like this would in fact leave the Soviets with a very long and exposed front if they tried to hold out in the centre (assuming German forces are sent to the Baltic States, but don't make a direct attack towards Leningrad). Stalin expected Kiev to be strong enough to hold out alone, at least for a while (the Germans took around 600,000 prisoners in the area). So as long as large numbers of Soviet troops don't head south to relieve the city Army Group South may have the ability to push north while the bulk of Soviet forces are occupied in the north, centre, and far south expecting an attack towards the Crimea and Caucasus.
 

Deleted member 1487

How realistic is a strike on Moscow from the south? Communications from Kiev to Moscow were reasonably good as far as I know, and an attack like this would in fact leave the Soviets with a very long and exposed front if they tried to hold out in the centre (assuming German forces are sent to the Baltic States, but don't make a direct attack towards Leningrad). Stalin expected Kiev to be strong enough to hold out alone, at least for a while (the Germans took around 600,000 prisoners in the area). So as long as large numbers of Soviet troops don't head south to relieve the city Army Group South may have the ability to push north while the bulk of Soviet forces are occupied in the north, centre, and far south expecting an attack towards the Crimea and Caucasus.
Not at all. The Kiev-Dniepr line couldn't be taken from the front and getting Guderian in place to take it from the rear took time, by which time it was too late to move up after from Ukraine before the end of the year. Remember 2nd Panzer lagged well behind the rest of AG-Center in getting at Moscow, while its logistics was the worst of all of the Panzer Groups.

Without a move toward Kiev as per OTL then the Soviet forces in the Ukraine are a threat to the flank of Guderian and von Weichs, so they have to leave forces to screen in case of a Soviet attack.

https://files.secureserver.net/2fZMd6lPQROFgu
Here you can get all the German situation maps for every day of Barbarossa. Check August 23rd 1941 to get the situation on AG-Center's Southern Flank at the start of the Kiev operation.

http://www.armchairgeneral.com/rkkaww2/maps/1941SW/Kiev/MC3_Kiev_July31_Sept26_41.jpg
Look at the start positions of 2nd Panzer and 2nd army; 2nd army was pretty much stuck screening Ukraine, while 2nd Panzer Group was doing that AND up against the Bryansk Front. 2nd army and 2nd Panzer had the 5th, 21st, and 40th armies on their flank; 2nd army would have to stay to guard the flank, probably requiring part of 2nd Panzer Group too. That would mean only about 67-75% of 2nd Panzer Group could even attack and would have to fight through Bryansk front on its own (13th, 3rd,and 50th armies: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bryansk_Front).
Likely without taking care of Ukraine first Guderian is pretty much stuck as a flank guard.

MC2_Kiev_Sept_1_10_41.jpg
 
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So in your estimation the improvement in supply which results from having the Velikiye Luki rail line is enough to allow AGC to take Moscow?
 

Deleted member 1487

So in your estimation the improvement in supply which results from having the Velikiye Luki rail line is enough to allow AGC to take Moscow?
In combination with the following: more damage along the central axis to the Soviets during July, as the 4th PG operating against the 22nd and 27th Soviet armies would free up Hoth's 3rd PG to concentrate on Smolensk instead of diverting critical strength to take VL (or at least cutting off the Soviet 67th corps as an alternative), which would cause fewer Soviets to escape from the pocket. By not advancing to Leningrad more strength can be focused on the central axis, especially in the critical August period during the Soviet counter offensives, which with the 3rd and 4th PGs plus the 8th air corps on the scene would really wear down the Soviets far more than the infantry left to do so IOTL in August all by themselves, the Germans can focus their logistic conversion/construction units on the VL-Rzhev rail line that was not open IOTL and then means 9th army and 3rd PG can be supplied independent of the Smolensk rail line, taking a burden off that line and off the 9th army and 3rd PG who can have their own dedicated rail line. For the Soviets on the Leningrad axis they will be forced by Stalin to attack and try and divert German resources in that area, but will be attacking in swamps and probably slaughtered en masse in the process, as it was very good defender terrain with attaackers being funneled along roads.

Likely given the combination of better supply (also a function of less being needed for AG-North, so some can be sent on that rail net to AG-Center units) and greater strength on the central axis from July on the Soviets in on the Central front opposite AG-Center would be much more torn up in July-September and the Germans, without the push in August-September against Leningrad, would have the resources to launch Vyazma (not Bryansk, but that's not necessary to take Moscow) in mid-September when the weather was better around Smolensk and they could potentially take the city if they don't divert along the Kalinin axis as per OTL. Given that Moscow is the target and Leningrad is not an option in TTL there is less need to cut supply via the Kalinin rail line, so we could say that won't happen ITTL. Then with weeks of better weather from mid-September on the Germans have roughly a month of good weather to take Moscow with 4th and 9th armies and 3rd and 4th PGs (2nd army and 2nd PG are off at Kiev and can show up in October to handle Bryansk Front).

For example 8th air corps spent August-September dropping over 3 million kilos of explosives on forces defending Leningrad; ITTL they can do that against Soviet counteroffensive forces defending Moscow.

By attacking early then the Siberians and the October-November reinforcements won't be available to block the roads to Moscow, nor will the defenses be as complete as they were in mid-October.

Its not a guarantee that Moscow will be taken, but its a far better chance than IOTL.
 
And you agree with it because it supports yours.

And until you post a study of German logistics equal in it's thoroughness and scope of study arguing the opposite, it's the most authoritative examination we have.

'When the' what?
That was supposed to say "when operation Typhoon began", a full month and a half after the area was fully secured.

They hadn't connected the rail lines because that area wasn't the focus
And it wasn't the focus because it was a small, inadequately sized railline. The Germans prioritized all of the major raillines capable of carrying operationally significant supplies. The Riga-Luki line was not one of them.

Then November hits and the German rail net collapses anyways as their locomotive boilers explode from the extreme cold.

This map of rail construction in the area indicates by mid-July they had extended rail along that line already.
Uh, no. That map only shows the rail line being connected up to Pustoshka, which is notably further west then Veliye Luki.

but as the Luki part wasn't added to the rail net until August-September
Actually, it wasn't even connected then. By the time Typhoon started in October, the nearest . Furthermore, the route is totally inadequate for the supply of forces you are claiming.

and the part beyond it toward Rzhev was destroyed in the heavy fighting in August-October,
The part beyond it toward Rzhev was never actually converted, since there was too little time between the start of Typhoon and the beginning of the mud period to do so.

To a point yes. They still need to defend the Luga and Leningrad from the North.
Obviously, they just need significantly less forces to do so.

So they replace some of the losses along the main axis, but given the way Stalin tended to behave, he'd order pointless, costly counterattacks to try and draw off German attention, as he did in the region IOTL
Not really. With the Germans showing no sign of moving from the Luga, Stalin will thank his lucky stars that the Germans. The OTL counteroffensives in the Leningrad region were prompted by the Germans pushing over the Luga and towards on the city, without that the counterattacks won't happen and the forces are diverted elsewhere.

As to 22nd army, they encountered that by early July so knew it was there.
By which point it was too late to pull off an encirclement.

18th and 16th armies anchor on the Luga in swampland, which is highly defensible.
Not the part of the front I'm talking about. Look much further east, in the long stretch between Lake Ilmen and Kalinin.

They would as per OTL not advance past the Smolensk line taken in July as logistics are moved up and they parry the repeated Soviet counteroffensives, ripping them apart much more easily with a 2nd Panzer group attached to the area north of Yelna and not removing 8th air corps in August-September.
Taking the losses they did OTL while inflicting the same losses as per ITTL, since they have no capacity to adequately supply 2nd panzer and 8th air corps while the rail line is moved up. Those forces will sit mostly static for lack of fuel, as the Germans cannot get enough fuel to them without compromising the shipments of ammunition needed to prevent the Soviet counter-offensives from destroying (as per Crewald 168, although even then German army stocks of ammunition were consistently fell from mid-July to mid-August).

That was in the Gomel area affecting Guderian, not at Smolensk affecting 3rd and 4th PG in their September movements. It was well south of the Smolensk area, almost in North Ukraine, not in East Belarus/West Russia.
Nope, Crewald explicitly states that "further to the north, the situation was not dissimilar" and a page later continues to state "After being interrupted by the floods, stockbuilding for Army Group Center was resumed on 21 September and by the end of the month was more or less complete."

Of course, he then qualifies the "more or less complete" by noting: "shortages included motor oil (the bottleneck of the entire transportation system), vehicles, engines, spare parts for tanks (which, on Hitler's orders, were not being manufactured at all) and tyres, which only arrived at the rate of one a month for every sixteen vehicles. Fuel was so short that the shortage threatened to bring the operation to a halt in November. This was partly due to its non-availability at home, and partly to the impossibility of supplying six armies (including three armored one) with some seventy divisions between them, at a distance of 400 miles from their bases."

The addition of extra panzer groups only makes this worse. Even OTL, the transfer of Hoepner's 4th Panzergruppe from AGS to AGC caused massive conniptions. It was supposed to be integrated into AGC's logistics as 2nd and 3rd were. How did this work? It didn't. The rail capacity was woefully inadequate and there simply weren't enough trains getting through. Throwing a fourth panzergruppe in there? Either it sits around doing nothing or you can kiss the Vyazma-Bryansk encirclement goodbye.

Not every raillline, they picked a few major ones to focus their attention on.
Which were the only major raillines which could support the necessary forces, yes.

How realistic is a strike on Moscow from the south?

Not very. The Soviets blew the bridges over the southern D'niepr which rendered the Germans unable to get railheads over the river until Spring, 1942. Army Group South almost collapsed itself trying to get to Rostov.
 
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Deleted member 1487

AGN-1-31July-300x256.jpg


Going by the above you could have 18t army move up into Estonia as per OTL, 16th army move to Pskov to Dno and stop to guard the flank from Leningrad, while 4th Panzer Group instead of moving north to the Luga would go right to VL and envelope the Soviet 22nd army and break though the 27th army, largely overrunning it in the process, and head east to guard the flank of AG-Center.

That keeps AG-North logistics much easier to deal with. 18th army would rely on the Estonian ports, Estonia transports, and their rail system, while 16th army would only go half the distance of OTL to Pskov and Dno to the river to the east, meaning rail conversion largely stays within Latvia for them and IOTL that depth of conversion (to Pskov) was already reached in early/mid-July. 16th army had much less supply demands than 4th PG and 18th army altogether deep onto the outskirts of Leningrad. So when 4th PG heads east it takes the rail assets of the entire army group with it and most of the allotted rail conversion capacity, rail supply trains, and Grosstransportraum trucks with it. As that is largely overkill for just 4th PG it can probably share some with 9th army and 3rd PG once the Smolensk line is hit.

Take the map below:

eastern-front-ww2-barbarossa-june-september-1941_e.jpg
 
The relevant lines continue to be of too low capacity to get sufficient quantity of supplies to support even 3 panzer groups, much less 4, and three armies. There is ultimately only one line in Army Group Center that offers remotely enough capacity to keep it even partially in supply: the Litovsk-Minsk-Orsha-Smolensk line. The Germans expanded this line as fast as was physically possible given the quality of their rail conversion equipment and logistical personnel.

The idea of Germany taking Moscow in 1941 continues to be fantasy.
 

Deleted member 1487

The relevant lines continue to be of too low capacity to get sufficient quantity of supplies to support even 3 panzer groups, much less 4, and three armies. There is ultimately only one line in Army Group Center that offers remotely enough capacity to keep it even partially in supply: the Litovsk-Minsk-Orsha-Smolensk line. The Germans expanded this line as fast as was physically possible given the quality of their rail conversion equipment and logistical personnel.

The idea of Germany taking Moscow in 1941 continues to be fantasy.
The Riga-VL line was enough to handle that of the 4th PG if backed up by the rail conversion forces of AG-North from mid-July on, with some retained for conversion for the immobilized 16th army around Pskov-Dno and the 18th army advancing up into Estonia and being supplied via Estonian ports and connected rail. 4th PG could then take the bulk of the supplies coming in via rail and Riga to the Baltic states as it pushed East, while when the reorganization for Vyazma happens the 9th army could be supplied via the capture VL-Rzhev line instead of via Smolensk. Given then that the GTR truck capacity could be shifted away from AG-North to AG-Center and 4th PG that means a large increase in their ability to operate along the Moscow axis. 18th and 16th armies would have a lot less demand ITTL for supplies, being much closer to supply sources and not very deep in the USSR (18th army pretty much being able to be supplied exclusively by coastal shipping until ice hits in October-November), and not in offensive action beyond August (july for 16th army).

Plus inland waterways from Riga were pretty important to Axis supply IOTL, though in winter that would be a problem, but not until November-December.

latvia.gif


balticstates.jpg
 
The Riga-VL line was enough to handle that of the 4th PG if backed up by the rail conversion forces of AG-North from mid-July on, with some retained for conversion for the immobilized 16th army around Pskov-Dno and the 18th army advancing up into Estonia and being supplied via Estonian ports and connected rail.

Except this is blatantly not true. 4th Panzer was not supplied by the Riga-VL line, it was supplied by the Riga-Pskov line, which was a high-capacity, double tracked line on much more solid rail bedding (just like the Minsk-Smolensk railway) as opposed to the Riga-VL line which was a low-capacity single track on a rail bedding that was so weak that, after conversion, it was repeatedly washed away by the summer rains. Just like OKH, you look at rail lines, nod your head, and go "okay, there's a rail line so we can supply an advance." Then such niggling details as the fact that the line does not have the adequate capacity once converted to German gauge sneaks up and bogs down your operation, leaving you behind schedule, .

Not to mention this plan is all predicated on something the OKH simply never planned for: the Soviets being capable of resistance beyond mid-July. Without that consideration, OKH will not change their plans and once committed cannot change their plans: the movement of rail repair corps and forward supply bases requires immense amounts of planning ahead of time and trying to adjust on the fly would lead to utter chaos.

4th PG could then take the bulk of the supplies coming in via rail and Riga to the Baltic states as it pushed East,
They quickly run out of supplies and bog down due to operating beyond a rail line that lacks the capacity to support them.

while when the reorganization for Vyazma happens the 9th army could be supplied via the capture VL-Rzhev line instead of via Smolensk.
Rzhev did not fall until Vyazma-Bryansk, meaning it would be too late in the year for the rail net to be extended from. And in any case, the capacity for VL-Rzhev line is much lower then that of the Smolensk-Rzhev line, which while a single-track is built on a more solid bedding and hence had a higher capacity.

Given then that the GTR truck capacity could be shifted away from AG-North to AG-Center and 4th PG that means a large increase in their ability to operate along the Moscow axis.
Where they would spend all their time sitting around to ship since the rail lines did not have the capacity to supply that many additional trucks with the required amounts of fuel and spare parts to keep them moving.
 

Deleted member 1487

Except this is blatantly not true. 4th Panzer was not supplied by the Riga-VL line, it was supplied by the Riga-Pskov line, which was a high-capacity, double tracked line on much more solid rail bedding (just like the Minsk-Smolensk railway) as opposed to the Riga-VL line which was a low-capacity single track on a rail bedding that was so weak that, after conversion, it was repeatedly washed away by the summer rains. Just like OKH, you look at rail lines, nod your head, and go "okay, there's a rail line so we can supply an advance." Then such niggling details as the fact that the line does not have the adequate capacity once converted to German gauge sneaks up and bogs down your operation, leaving you behind schedule, .
The Soviet rail map I have shows the lines leading to Pskov to be all single track, just like the Riga-VL line. In fact almost all of the rail lines in the Baltic states are shown as single track.
What's your source on the bolded?
Considering the distance from Riga to the Luga was further than from Riga to VL, it would be easier to supply them than where the 4th PG was historically in mid-July, even if the rail lines weren't theoretically as good from Riga-Luga.

Not to mention this plan is all predicated on something the OKH simply never planned for: the Soviets being capable of resistance beyond mid-July. Without that consideration, OKH will not change their plans and once committed cannot change their plans: the movement of rail repair corps and forward supply bases requires immense amounts of planning ahead of time and trying to adjust on the fly would lead to utter chaos.
We're supposing they opt not to try and go after Leningrad from day 1, Moscow is priority ITTL during planning.

They quickly run out of supplies and bog down due to operating beyond a rail line that lacks the capacity to support them.
They could have kept going according to van Creveld if the 18th and 16th armies were immobilized, but von Leeb wasn't willing to try that. But as I said the distance from where they were in mid-July was further than where I am proposing around VL and beyond up to the halt line north and south of Smolensk. Plus they have less swamps to deal with that halted them on/near the Luga IOTL, roads no one else was using, plus rail lines unused by other armies; plus if 16th army stops around Pskov-Dno and 18th army is using ports in Estonia to draw supply from, then the rail lines to AG-North are not nearly as burdened and are much closer to supply sources than they were IOTL.

Rzhev did not fall until Vyazma-Bryansk, meaning it would be too late in the year for the rail net to be extended from. And in any case, the capacity for VL-Rzhev line is much lower then that of the Smolensk-Rzhev line, which while a single-track is built on a more solid bedding and hence had a higher capacity.
I'm not saying Rzhev falls sooner than IOTL, but the area between VL-Rzhev is captured much sooner and converted/strengthened to support an advance east instead of north as per OTL. The Smolensk Rzhev line in November-December was only getting 2 trains per day for 9th army, 3rd Panzer Group, and later 4th Panzer group. Do you have a source for the claim that the rail line between Rzhev-Smolensk was what you claim?


Where they would spend all their time sitting around to ship since the rail lines did not have the capacity to supply that many additional trucks with the required amounts of fuel and spare parts to keep them moving.
Given that IOTL the trucks were running from near Narew to about Riga by mid-July, they would actually be going a shorter distance from the Dvina to VL by mid-July over better roads, while 16th army isn't using up nearly as much GRT by sitting still once they get to Pskov-Dno. They'd be connected from the Dvina to Pskov by rail by mid-July as per OTL, while 18th army is drawing supply from Estonian ports in July as per OTL. Meanwhile 4th PG is getting most of GRT and being closer to the Dvina rail head come early July.
 
The Soviet rail map I have shows the lines leading to Pskov to be all single track, just like the Riga-VL line. In fact almost all of the rail lines in the Baltic states are shown as single track.

Is that the map you posted? Because those don't distinguish at all between tracks. Although double checking it turns out that it was the Riga-Tallinn-Narva line that was double tracked, not the Riga-Pskov line.

What's your source on the bolded?
An offline map labelled "Major Soviet Rail Lines - 1941" which, according to the blud, shows only high capacity rail lines both double and single-tracked (and unlike your earlier maps, it distinguishes between the two). If it doesn't appear on the map, it's considered too low capacity to be operationally significant.

And the only part of the Riga-VL line which appears on that map is the Riga-Dunaburg section. The Dunaburg-VL part does not appear at all.

Considering the distance from Riga to the Luga was further than from Riga to VL,
Distance from Riga to Luga: ~393 kilometers
Distance from Riga to VL: ~398 kilometers.

We're supposing they opt not to try and go after Leningrad from day 1, Moscow is priority ITTL during planning.
Again: the Germans did not expect the Red Army to last past mid-July. There is no reason to not just grab everything at once if the enemy has already been defeated in the first three weeks of the campaign. And the Germans made the assumption that they would defeat the Red Army in three weeks because, ultimately, they recognized it was impossible to achieve their objectives otherwise. Thus the conniption they had when August rolled around and the Soviets still had armies in the field, fighting, and inflicting heavy casualties.

They could have kept going according to van Creveld if the 18th and 16th armies were immobilized, but von Leeb wasn't willing to try that.
And for good reason: without the 18th and 16th armies, the panzergroups would have rapidly run out of supplies short of their objective, bogged down in terrain for which they were unsuited for, and be encircled by the Soviets.

Plus they have less swamps to deal with that halted them on/near the Luga IOTL,
This is horrendously false. Looking at a terrain map of the region, I'm seeing no less then three major regions of swampy terrain between Riga and Velikie Luki, as well as a number of lakes and a series of rivers.

I'm not saying Rzhev falls sooner than IOTL, but the area between VL-Rzhev is captured much sooner and converted/strengthened to support an advance east instead of north as per OTL.
Based on wishful thinking, largely. The terrain between VL and Rzhev is even more difficult, bordering on impassible for armored forces in the face of any degree of Soviet resistance (and there will be Soviet resistance). Your assertion of the road network around Velikiye Luki being better does not stand up to scrutiny either: as befitting a much less important part of the Soviet Union then the Leningrad or Moscow regions, the Velikiye Luki region road network was much sparser. We're talking practically nothing but goat tracks that cease to exist the moment it rains for more then an hour.

The Smolensk Rzhev line in November-December was only getting 2 trains per day for 9th army, 3rd Panzer Group, and later 4th Panzer group.
And that was unavoidable regardless of what rail line the Germans converted. German rail supply was guaranteed to implode regardless of what rail lines they converted, first from the autumn rains in October washing out many of the tracks and then from the freezing temperatures causing German engine boilers to explode. It's unavoidable and a major part of why, with hindsight, we can say the Germans had no business attempting the advance on Moscow.

And really that is the best option for the Germans after Kiev: forego Typhoon or trying to take the Donbass and simply dig-in for the winter. Yes, it would leave the Soviets with more military and industrial assets, meaning a tougher Red Army come summer 1942, but at least it would preserve more of the German army. And sure, it won't win the Germans the war but then that was never really in the cards anyways, OKW/OKHs delusions aside.

Do you have a source for the claim that the rail line between Rzhev-Smolensk was what you claim?
The map I mentioned above. The Vyazma-Rzhev line appears, single tracked but there. That means it has enough capacity to be noticeable.

Given that IOTL the trucks were running from near Narew to about Riga by mid-July,
While the panzer groups were way beyond that and stuck static, unable to move for lack of fuel. PzG 4s exposed left flank will also likely be struck and severed by forces from the Leningrad Front striking into the region between the panzer spearheads and the infantry lagging behind. The resulting losses of trucks will be extreme.
 
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I can't seem to find a legend key to translate...

I fail to see how your map would show rail lines being washed out by rains after the Germans captured them

There isn't any map that shows that. It's just something that happened. Crewald notes it in Supplying War. Other things that happened were trains colliding with each other since the German rail scheduling was a mess, trains being hijacked by neighboring armies and/or army groups, and even entire trains up and vanishing without a trace. Exacerbating this was the fact that logistical command was not centralized: you had one person in charge of trucks (including those used by rail repair and maintenance crews) and another person in charge of trains and not only did neither have authority over the other, but it was unclear whether the head of OKH (the guy who was in charge of the invasion) had authority over them and this problem was never settled.

On the whole, German macrologistics were just shit and this was a key determinant in their failure to take any objective, other then Eastern Ukraine. On the more local, tactical level they were able to improvise some, but there are limits to what this can achieve and the Germans hit those limits. Trying to have on Army Group North zig instead of zag isn't going to change that.
 

Deleted member 1487

There isn't any map that shows that. It's just something that happened. Crewald notes it in Supplying War.
Where does it say the VL line was washed out repeatedly? I've looked over the Barbarossa section repeatedly yet no mention of that. Guderian's supply line was washed out in mid-September during his Ukraine push and there is some general mention of wet weather impacting AG-Center supply stockpiling, but nothing about the VL line.
 
Where does it say the VL line was washed out repeatedly? I've looked over the Barbarossa section repeatedly yet no mention of that. Guderian's supply line was washed out in mid-September during his Ukraine push and there is some general mention of wet weather impacting AG-Center supply stockpiling, but nothing about the VL line.

It tended to happen to rail lines in general. That it likely happened to VL at least a few times naturally follows. Particularly given the relative wetness of the region...
 

Deleted member 1487

It tended to happen to rail lines in general. That it likely happened to VL at least a few times naturally follows. Particularly given the relative wetness of the region...
This is a serious problem you tend to have in these discussions; you assert something, then are asked to provide proof and then it comes out that you are taking a general and undefined sentence in a text and applying it to a specific case without proof, just like when you mentioned an event that happened in the 1990s in Serbia as proof of WW2 Maskirovka effectiveness. So there is no actual evidence that the washing out of AG-North or the VL line specifically happened.
 
This is a serious problem you tend to have in these discussions; you assert something, then are asked to provide proof and then it comes out that you are taking a general and undefined sentence in a text and applying it to a specific case without proof,

Given that general sentences are called such because they apply to all (or at least, most) cases...

just like when you mentioned an event that happened in the 1990s in Serbia as proof of WW2 Maskirovka effectiveness.
Given that it was right out of the Soviet WW2 maskirovka textbook with only minor modifications for some of the technological differences of the time...

So there is no actual evidence that the washing out of AG-North or the VL line specifically happened.
Nothing direct. But then it was never an important nor did it have the capacity to be so, so it isn't something that is really going to be glaringly recorded. But it's far harder to believe that the VL line is going to somehow be magically different from every other rail line on the Eastern Front.
 

Deleted member 1487

Nothing direct. But then it was never an important nor did it have the capacity to be so, so it isn't something that is really going to be glaringly noticed. But it's far harder to believe that the VL line is going to somehow be magically different from every other major rail line on the Eastern Front.
Nothing in the passage indicated that every major line suffered from that problem, just some in the area of AG-Center and Guderians area around Gomel in marshland.
 
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