Deleted member 1487
And you agree with it because it supports yours.Having read the book, it's quite obvious his analysis is excellent. Your just dismissing the scholarship because it disagrees with your views.
'When the' what? They hadn't connected the rail lines because that area wasn't the focus when they recaptured it and the Soviets were attacking out of the area until it was recaptured. Kind of hard to move the rail lines up there.Most probably they do. As a case in point: OTL the Germans captured Velikiye-Luki in August. The rail line from Riga to the city was still not completed when the . I'm also curious how the Germans are supposed to extend the line from Velikiye Luki to Rzhev before Operation Typhoon given that Rzhev was not taken until Operation Typhoon.
http://www.allworldwars.com/image/130/CommentsOnRussianRailroadsSketch2Lg.jpg
This map of rail construction in the area indicates by mid-July they had extended rail along that line already.
There appears to be a miscommunication regarding the Luki-Rzhev part of the line; until its captured it cannot be converted, but as the Luki part wasn't added to the rail net until August-September and the part beyond it toward Rzhev was destroyed in the heavy fighting in August-October, rather than being taken relatively quickly in July as it was IOTL before being relinquished, ITTL it would be taken with relatively minimal damage in July as per OTL, then the area beyond it as 4th Panzer Group is focused in that area instead of north on the Leningrad axis and then behind it AG-North rail conversion groups would extend the rail net to keep them supplied without interfering with AG-Center.
To a point yes. They still need to defend the Luga and Leningrad from the North. So they replace some of the losses along the main axis, but given the way Stalin tended to behave, he'd order pointless, costly counterattacks to try and draw off German attention, as he did in the region IOTL, and they would be bloody failures as they were IOTL thanks to being in swampy areas that were a defenders paradise, as the Germans found out when they tried to attack east of the city of Luga.Actually they'd be facing more. The Soviets could reinforce with forces that OTL were sent to Leningrad. I'm also ignoring your premise of the Germans trying to encircle the 22nd Army, since that requires the Germans to realize it was there before they encounter it (for the record: they did not, just like the rest of the Soviet second strategic echelon).
As to 22nd army, they encountered that by early July so knew it was there. 4th Panzer Group wouldn't just act without knowing about it, their mission would be to move on Moscow in in support of AG-Center once the Dvina was breached, as per the altered plan ITTL (no Leningrad thrust). As they discover 22nd army on their flank and that of 3rd PG, nestled into the crease between the AGs, they would maneuver to encircle it from the north, freeing up 3rd PG to use its full power against Smolensk, rather than diverting to fight 22nd army as per OTL and taking Luki, only to give it up and belatedly move on Smolensk after. So 4th PG takes it out with its two corps and then continues to move against the other Soviet armies in the area like the 27th.
By doing so 3rd PG then can close the Smolensk pocket from the North sooner and much more securely inflicting even heavier damage on the Soviets in the process, weakening them for their attacks to break the pocket and in subsequent attacks like the Timoshenko offensives.
18th and 16th armies anchor on the Luga in swampland, which is highly defensible. Its really not that exposed as you can only advance along roads; IOTL it was a mistake to attack in that area with Panzers, as it was infantry country, so the infantry of AG-North sans 4th PG would do just fine and be able to ably hold against the remaining opposition that was left after the disaster during the Baltic defensive operation west of the Dvina for the Soviets. The the onus of attack is on the Soviets and they get slaughtered trying to attack in constricted terrain.Which leaves them with an even more exposed northern flank and not any closer to actually taking Moscow.
They would as per OTL not advance past the Smolensk line taken in July as logistics are moved up and they parry the repeated Soviet counteroffensives, ripping them apart much more easily with a 2nd Panzer group attached to the area north of Yelna and not removing 8th air corps in August-September. So as per OTL the Soviets attack and are slaughtered, while the extra panzer divisions mean they can much more readily defeat through maneuver the Soviet mobile divisions attacking.More realistically, they sit around in July-September for lack of the requisite shipping to get the fuel or ammo out for them to operate. Also, if the Germans try to attack in September towards Moscow, a number of said counteroffensives don't happen and the Germans bleed upon tougher Soviet defenses.
The Soviet counteroffensives were over as of early September and everything was pretty quiet between early September and October 1st on the Moscow axis while Kiev played out. No change from OTL as far as Soviet attacks go from July-September. By September 15th, when I'm proposing 3rd and 4th PGs attack with 9th and 4th army (with some help from 16th army/AG-North on the flank), IOTL the Soviets were on the defensive. The Yelna offensive was the last attack of Soviet offensives and that was over by September 8th IIRC.
That was in the Gomel area affecting Guderian, not at Smolensk affecting 3rd and 4th PG in their September movements. It was well south of the Smolensk area, almost in North Ukraine, not in East Belarus/West Russia.Crewald, Page 170:
The same rains also imposed delays on Guderian's link up with AGS.
Not every rail line, they picked a few major ones to focus their attention on. ITTL instead of having to extend from Luga to Leningrad in August they can focus on extending from Luki East and other supporting rail lines nearby like Nevel to Luki.So largely what happened OTL. The Germans were converting every rail line they could as rapidly as they could because they needed those rail lines to sustain future operations.
Not really, they were focused on extending from Pskov to Luga and then beyond in July-September. ITTL once they reach the Luga they don't have to continue, they can convert from the Baltics East instead as a priority.The line was advanced along with all the others. Just because Vilikiye Luki fell does not mean the Germans were not aiming to extend their rail net in the cities direction. The Germans were moving as quickly as they could.
In July to early August yes (8th air corps left on August 3rd), but not the whole month and into September. The diverted 8th air corps in early-August to Leningrad and even more from 2nd air corps in early September to support Guderian. 3rd Panzer Group was diverted in late August IIRC to support AG-North. ITTL from July on they also have 4th PG to support the northern flank of AG-Center, which didn't have much armor support IOTL, which is why Velikiye Luki was abandoned in late July IOTL. In fact based on the operations that Stalin ordered in that area as described in Glantz's "barbarossa derailed" on the fighting around Smolensk in July-September having two PGs operating together on the offensive they could really pincer and wipe out major Soviet offensive formations during the July-August period. 3rd PG was ordered in late July to support AG-North, which didn't end up happening until August. Glantz makes the point that AG-Center by August was deprived of most armor and air support as it was mostly concentrated on the flanks (Guderian on the south, Hoth supporting AG-North along with Richthofen's 8th air corps).The Germans did have panzer and air support in July-August. What they didn't have were the supplies or frontage to effectively use them. Nothing changes here.
Which is why its easier to convert from the Baltics to Velikiye Luki and beyond than from Pskov-Leningrad, as it was much closer and not using a major rail line of supply to AG-North, so wouldn't be majorly impact operations of the 18th and 16th armies defending the flank, while ensuring an unavailable LOS to 4th PG on the central axis ITTL.Yes, and? All your doing is proving that it was easier to convert through the Baltics then it was in Russia proper.
Not really, they focused a ton moving on Leningrad, which is how AG-North was able to extend the rail lines through the Baltics to Leningrad IOTL and sustain major operations to encircle the city. Instead ITTL those resources go into an unresourced set of rail lines that were not used IOTL because they were held by the Soviets until August and then were competing for resources with the Leningrad advance, so weren't ever put into operation. Without an advance beyond the Luga the resources are available to open those lines and a new source of supplies for AG-Center and the advance on Moscow, which takes significant burden off the Smolensk line and doesn't force them to try and supply armies via the Vyazma-Rzhev branch line, which was much lower capacity than the Luki-Rzhev line, ensuring in fact that the attacking armies have a far better source of supply ITTL than IOTL.The Germans focused as many resources as they could on moving east. The entire point of Barbarossa was to move east as rapidly as they could. You can try and say the Germans could do it all you want, but we know from history that they could not, the underlying reasons they could not, and that you have done nothing to address said reasons.
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