No major offensive toward Leningrad 1941

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Deleted member 1487

What if something like the Marcks plan was adopted for Barbarossa, which meant the focus was on Moscow and Kiev, with Leningrad a secondary mission, effectively meaning the advance with AG-North would be aimed at support AG-Center rather than racing after Leningrad. So once the Stalin line was breached instead of the 4th Panzer group racing north it instead focuses on supporting AG-Center by moving against the Soviet 22nd army on its flanks and takes Velikiye Luki permanently, rather than the OTL result of 3rd Panzer group diverting a corps north to take it, letting 22nd army escape, then abandoning it and in the process weakening the drive on Smolensk while the Soviets retook the city and formed a problematic flank threat for months.

ITTL then 18th army still pushes up into Estonia on its own, 16th army still moves on Leningrad, but 4th Panzer group then operates on the northern flank of AG-Center in July-September, while there then is no northern diversion of 3rd Panzer group north along with VIII air corps to try and take/cut off Leningrad. So likely 18th and 16th army are stopped well short of Leningrad and don't put it under siege, but the Finns still attack from the North and reach their historical lines north of the city and in the rest of Karelia.

What impact would that have on Barbarossa, specifically the rest of the months of July-September 1941?
 

Don Quijote

Banned
I've always thought that since Napoleon managed to get to Moscow, the Germans could have too. Unfortunately for them they'll have the same problem as the French - main goal achieved, capital taken, heavy casualties to the enemy but the enemy is still undefeated and capable of a counterattack.

Of course the main difference is Russia's leadership. Will the Soviet government survive the loss of Moscow? Even if it doesn't, Germany has a lot of territory and population to subdue, to the north, south and east.
 
How would the supply situation work? I belive quite a lot of the support in the north was by boat would there be
 

Deleted member 1487

I've always thought that since Napoleon managed to get to Moscow, the Germans could have too. Unfortunately for them they'll have the same problem as the French - main goal achieved, capital taken, heavy casualties to the enemy but the enemy is still undefeated and capable of a counterattack.
About 130 years later Moscow was vastly different than in 1812. It was the rail hub of the nation, as well as the land line communication system, plus alone was equal to about 10% of national industry and sat on major iron and coal deposits. Its loss with those things isn't necessarily fatal, but it is a very heavy blow. The real issue comes down to it falling if Stalin opts to stay as per OTL. In that case he dies and the USSR falls into political chaos; he had so thoroughly decimated any potential for a rival to emerge that there was no one ready to replace him in 1941. He build up a team over the course of the war and into the post war that was able to take over from him in 1953, but that didn't exist in 1941 and his loss would be worse than Hitler being assassinated in terms of ability to actually run the war effort. Plus there would be mass flight east of civilians desperate to get out, which would jam up the rail lines and disrupt the ability to get any counterattack going for a while and create a massive humanitarian disaster in winter.

So taking the capital is actually pretty damaging to the USSR beyond just the material factors, its the morale loss and loss of Stalin, which had the ability to paralyze the USSR's ability to function, especially in wartime.

Of course the main difference is Russia's leadership. Will the Soviet government survive the loss of Moscow? Even if it doesn't, Germany has a lot of territory and population to subdue, to the north, south and east.
That is a very valid question. Stalin opted out of evacuating IOTL, choosing to stand or die, so he'd likely be killed if the city fell or at very least lost to the USSR. That effectively paralyzes the government because of how badly he purged any potential replacement in the system. The military didn't need him to function, but much of the rest of the system did and there is very likely to be a power struggle between the army and NKVD for power, as Beria was paranoid that if he didn't take power he'd be purged (as he ended up being IOTL after Stalin's death). If the Soviet government falls into infighting as a result of the loss of Moscow and Stalin then subduing the population is just a matter of time and not necessary in 1941. Based on some memoirs I've been reading about the fighting in 1941 around Moscow the Soviets were getting really panicked about losing the city and were shooting anyone that might remotely have been defeatist and thus the regime was generating a lot of bitterness among the civilians that were being press-ganged into service and horribly abused (same with people forced into the army and sacrificed en masse to soak up German bullets).


How would the supply situation work? I belive quite a lot of the support in the north was by boat would there be
Most was by rail actually, especially around Leningrad. Not having to supply Panzers by rail, especially that deep, would leave spare capacity to set to the northern flank of AG-Center. Also if they take Velikiye Luki relatively intact and keep it thanks to 4th Panzer Group encircling 22nd army from the north and destroying it months sooner than IOTL, then that would open up a rail line that was heavily destroyed IOTL and not active during October 1941. Instead that could be used by 4th Panzer Group and if anything actually improve the rail situation significantly over OTL.
 

Don Quijote

Banned
If the Germans take Moscow and appear to be secure there, would the Japanese, as part of the Anti-Comintern Pact, try to take Vladivostok and North Sakhalin?

Back to the OP, if the Germans take Moscow, which is much further east than Leningrad, there is the potential for a much bigger encirclement of Leningrad, one which would cut off all supply routes from the east. How much of the Baltic States has fallen by September 1941 in this TL?
 

Deleted member 1487

If the Germans take Moscow and appear to be secure there, would the Japanese, as part of the Anti-Comintern Pact, try to take Vladivostok and North Sakhalin?
If they thought they could take it on the cheap. They'd probably need confirmation that the Soviets were infighting.

Back to the OP, if the Germans take Moscow, which is much further east than Leningrad, there is the potential for a much bigger encirclement of Leningrad, one which would cut off all supply routes from the east. How much of the Baltic States has fallen by September 1941 in this TL?
If Moscow fell the only supply for Leningrad would be two single track rail lines from the East and Murmansk. The Baltic states fall as per OTL, so by September they are totally occupied. Logistically moving anywhere east of Moscow in 1941 is out of the question, likely Leningrad withers on the vine until Spring 1942 and an offensive from the Baltic area, plus from Kalinin take the city.

Of course the issue is whether Moscow could actually be taken even with 4th Panzer group diverted to the center earlier and VIII air corps never leaving. They could theoretically do more damage to forces on the Moscow axis in July-September and attack before Guderian is done with Kiev, just doing the Vyazma pincer and screening Bryansk if they attack 2-3 weeks earlier than IOTL.
 
The real issue comes down to it falling if Stalin opts to stay as per OTL.

There is a huge difference between staying in the capital while the rest of the government has been moved, but the enemy hasn't yet reached it; and staying in the capital even if the enemy surrounds the city or takes it.

Stalin has plenty of time to evacuate before his life comes into any danger.

The chances of him dying or being taken is almost zero.
 

Deleted member 1487

There is a huge difference between staying in the capital while the rest of the government has been moved, but the enemy hasn't yet reached it; and staying in the capital even if the enemy surrounds the city or takes it.

Stalin has plenty of time to evacuate before his life comes into any danger.

The chances of him dying or being taken is almost zero.
He made a pretty strong statement that he was staying no matter what, I think he got that an evacuation would undermine the defense and legitimacy of the government too much. Also in the early part of Typhoon the Germans were going for a straight move into the city, not an encirclement. Despite having talked about it they only really did the flanking moves once it was clear the center was too well defended to breach, which IOTL only became clear in mid/late October.

If they opt for an early run at Moscow in mid-September due to a more successful defense while Guderian was still involved in the Kiev battle, they wouldn't be able to the Kalinin diversion and try and do a pincer on the city, likely they would just run straight up the middle while screening the flanks once they had pulled Vyazma off, but this time its too early for the fresh Siberians to show up and block the major highways and before the mud began.
 

jahenders

Banned
I've always felt that the Germans would have increased their chances of success significantly if they had focused on only 1 or 2 objectives vs 3. Leningrad, though certainly significant, would be the logical one to eliminate.

I think it could have worked. Assuming they took Moscow, it'd be far different from when Napoleon did. In 1941, Moscow as a huge city, had substantial industry, and was a huge rail and communications hub. Stalin and the government could fall back, as well as some industry moving, but the Germans holding it would have a huge impact on all Soviet movement.

What if something like the Marcks plan was adopted for Barbarossa, which meant the focus was on Moscow and Kiev, with Leningrad a secondary mission, effectively meaning the advance with AG-North would be aimed at support AG-Center rather than racing after Leningrad. So once the Stalin line was breached instead of the 4th Panzer group racing north it instead focuses on supporting AG-Center by moving against the Soviet 22nd army on its flanks and takes Velikiye Luki permanently, rather than the OTL result of 3rd Panzer group diverting a corps north to take it, letting 22nd army escape, then abandoning it and in the process weakening the drive on Smolensk while the Soviets retook the city and formed a problematic flank threat for months.

ITTL then 18th army still pushes up into Estonia on its own, 16th army still moves on Leningrad, but 4th Panzer group then operates on the northern flank of AG-Center in July-September, while there then is no northern diversion of 3rd Panzer group north along with VIII air corps to try and take/cut off Leningrad. So likely 18th and 16th army are stopped well short of Leningrad and don't put it under siege, but the Finns still attack from the North and reach their historical lines north of the city and in the rest of Karelia.

What impact would that have on Barbarossa, specifically the rest of the months of July-September 1941?
 

Deleted member 1487

Looking back at a Stalin bio I have it would seem that there was considerable indecision on his part; IOTL eventually he decisively came down on the side of staying, but if the Germans had advanced earlier and there were no mid-October reserves on hand Zhukov could have easily said Moscow could not have been held and Stalin could have left. I think that would mean the city would fall for sure without him making a stand and it would severely hurt the credibility of the government and morale of the nation if the city was lost. The army might well not have continued to fight nearly as hard and the other issues I mentioned for the Soviet war effort would have happened.

BTW earlier someone mentioned that Moscow was the capital when Napoleon captured it in the 1812 invasion; it was not, that was St. Petersburg, which had taken that title in the early 1700s.

I've always felt that the Germans would have increased their chances of success significantly if they had focused on only 1 or 2 objectives vs 3. Leningrad, though certainly significant, would be the logical one to eliminate.

I think it could have worked. Assuming they took Moscow, it'd be far different from when Napoleon did. In 1941, Moscow as a huge city, had substantial industry, and was a huge rail and communications hub. Stalin and the government could fall back, as well as some industry moving, but the Germans holding it would have a huge impact on all Soviet movement.
Not to mention morale. It would also be the focus of effort to retake, but be an hard target to retake from the East, especially once the Germans take the all weather airfields.
 
I've always felt that the Germans would have increased their chances of success significantly if they had focused on only 1 or 2 objectives vs 3. Leningrad, though certainly significant, would be the logical one to eliminate.

Crewald deals with this myth quite decisively in his book on logistics, saying:

The difficulties experienced in building up a base for the attack on Moscow also rule out another suggestion that is sometimes made, namely that Hitler, instead of dissipating his forces in simultaneous offensives along three divergent axes, ought to have concentrated them for a single attack against Moscow. he logistics situation ruled out such a solution, however, for the few roads and railroads available would not have allowed such a force to be supplied. Even as it was, the concentration of seventy divisions for the attack early in October gave rise to very great difficulties, especially with the railways and the supply of fuel.
Put bluntly: forcing more forces on the Moscow axis sooner or faster = not possible. People on this board have trouble accepting that the Germans were incredibly fortunate at the start of the invasion as it was. Given the already amazing scale and scope of German battlefield success during Barbarossa, alternate scenarios where Germany takes Moscow in 1941 or does even more damage to the Red Army aren't particularly realistic and enter the realm of fantasy.

What likely happens is that Army Group North badly lags behind the other two, allowing many more Soviet forces to escape from the Baltic and leaving a large exposed northern flank for Army Group Center. AGC and AGS largely proceeds as historical.
 

Deleted member 1487

Crewald deals with this myth quite decisively in his book on logistics, saying:

Put bluntly: forcing more forces on the Moscow axis sooner or faster = not possible. People on this board have trouble accepting that the Germans were incredibly fortunate at the start of the invasion as it was. Given the already amazing scale and scope of German battlefield success during Barbarossa, alternate scenarios where Germany takes Moscow in 1941 or does even more damage to the Red Army aren't particularly realistic and enter the realm of fantasy.

What likely happens is that Army Group North badly lags behind the other two, allowing many more Soviet forces to escape from the Baltic and leaving a large exposed northern flank for Army Group Center. AGC and AGS largely proceeds as historical.

A single claim by Creweld isn't the end of the discussion when talking about a what if like this. Also based on the last discussion on the topic attack Moscow in September with a smaller force would mean less logistic requirements and the diversion of resources from AG-North to the central push, especially with Velikiye Luki captured intact with its rail line to Rzhev operational, which it was not IOTL during Typhoon. Also the Germans made a lot of mistakes during Barbarossa, but were fortunate that few of them meant immediate disaster.

Shipping to Riga and then by rail to Luki and beyond could have been available if there weren't resources spent on converting rail lines all the way to Leningrad and they stopped short of the city:
CommentsOnRussianRailroadsMap1.jpg
 

Deleted member 1487

Capturing the Luki line intact and being able to convert it instead of moving beyond the Luga river would open up considerable spare rail capacity; IOTL the diversion to Leningrad prevented Luki from being retained when taken originally in mid-July, and then forced its recapture later, August IIRC, after the line between it and Rzhev have been badly destroyed, meaning it was not operational as a rail line ever for the Germans, as it was overrun by the Soviets in the January 1942 offensive before repairs could be effected. Having that in operation instead of spending rail conversion/construction on advancing passed the Luga river would open up a lot more spare rail capacity straight from Riga without eating into 18th or 16th army's supply trains from East Prussia and would be done by September. That would be a critical increase that would allow a mid-September advance provided Guderian's component of Typhoon was not launched, just the Vyazma part.

A map showing the Luki-Rzhev rail line out of service:
CommentsOnRussianRailroadsSketch5Lg.jpg
 
Not that they're definitive, but has anyone who has computer simulations of the Eastern Front tried any of these alternate approaches? If so, what happened?
 
A single claim by Creweld isn't the end of the discussion when talking about a what if like this.

It pretty much is. Seeing as Crewald actually sat down and did a detailed analysis of the German logistical services, the supply networks, and quatermaster records. The chapter is filled with citations from such first-hand records. Did you do all of that?

attack Moscow in September with a smaller force would mean less logistic requirements
And is also easier for the Soviet forces to stop. A smaller combat force is not going to succeed where a larger one failed. It won't even achieve as much. Especially with the September rains and lagging logistics getting in the way. Not to mention that with Leningrad under less of a threat, the Soviets can throw more troops into battle along the Moscow axis.

and the diversion of resources from AG-North to the central push, especially with Velikiye Luki captured intact with its rail line to Rzhev operational,
Just capturing Velikiye Luki does not permit the Germans to using the rail line there. They then have to spend considerable time and resources converting the rail net all the way there. Given the rates at which this proceeded elsewhere, this means the German railhead in the Velikiye Luki direction would be... pretty much where it was OTL (about 50 kilometers short of the city).

Also the Germans made a lot of mistakes during Barbarossa, but were fortunate that few of them meant immediate disaster.
Their mistakes largely lay before the operation, in adopting an unrealistic plan and setting unrealistic goals that were impossible to do. These were fatal to the entire operation. You try and obsess over tactics and operational changes, flagrantly ignoring that the basic planning process and strategy was fatally flawed and this is what determined how Barbarossa turned out.

Shipping to Riga and then by rail to Luki and beyond could have been available if there weren't resources spent on converting rail lines all the way to Leningrad and they stopped short of the city.
The Germans actually had a rather easier time converting the rails through the Baltic states, since those rail lines had originally been in the standard gauge rather then the Russian. Once they moved into Russian territory, though, the rate of rail conversion dropped drastically and this would be no different. Throwing extra resources doesn't help since the Germans were already moving as rapidly as they could.
 
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Not that they're definitive, but has anyone who has computer simulations of the Eastern Front tried any of these alternate approaches? If so, what happened?

Well, I've tried. But I'm always stymied by various issues with either gameplay or the AI. War in the East, for example, is overly generous with it's logistics (any given rail line can handle unlimited amounts of supply shipping where as in reality there are only so many supply trains you can send down a given rail line) and has a Soviet AI that is programmed to retreat it's military forces behind the D'niepr rather then try and fight on the frontier, so trying to replicate the situation of Barbarossa beyond the first 4 days is nigh impossible.

Setting up a scenario from scratch would probably give a more realistic overview, but the editors on these things are so unintuitive and time consuming to work with that I don't have the patience to do it for the sake of an internet debate.
 

Deleted member 1487

It pretty much is. Seeing as Crewald actually sat down and did a detailed analysis of the German logistical services, the supply networks, and quatermaster records. The chapter is filled with citations from such first-hand records. Did you do all of that?
We have no idea how good his analysis of that data was nor how well he really did what ifs based on this specific POD and the result of capturing and using the Velikiye Luki-Rzhev rail line, not open IOTL and probably not figured into his claim.


And is also easier for the Soviet forces to stop. A smaller combat force is not going to succeed where a larger one failed. It won't even achieve as much. Especially with the September rains and lagging logistics getting in the way.
They'd be facing less Soviet troops and with fewer troops they can't/won't do the Kalinin diversion to advance on Moscow after Vyazma with flank screening forces. But prior to this by not diverting to Leningrad 3rd and 4th Panzer, plus 8th air corps can spend July-September ripping apart the Soviet counteroffensive far more cost effectively around Smolensk, meaning the Soviets would be weaker than IOTL, while the Germans don't take the full 100k losses between July-August defending without Panzer/air support. So relatively they suffer fewer losses than IOTL, inflict more, specially with killing the 22nd army in July instead of August, and then are more able to supply what they do have with more rail lines against fewer Soviet defenders. Can you provide a source to September mud being a problem around Smolensk? That started in October.


Just capturing Velikiye Luki does not permit the Germans to using the rail line there. They then have to spend considerable time and resources converting the rail net all the way there. Given the rates at which this proceeded elsewhere, this means the German railhead in the Velikiye Luki direction would be... pretty much where it was OTL (about 50 kilometers short of the city).
I know, that's why I said instead of advancing conversion beyond the Luga the 18th/16th armies stop on the Luga river and instead convert the rail from the Baltic states to Velikiye Luki and beyond as they capture more of the line. That line was not advanced quickly because after it was initially captured in early/mid-July it was abandoned and fell into Soviet hands against until August and not converted until about then. Then conversion didn't go beyond that city; had it been captured and retained in July it would have been converted in that month and then advanced in the July-September battles to hold the line while logistics are moved up from Minsk (and in this case from the Baltic states to the Luga and Velikiye Luki) and 3rd and 4th Panzer Groups stay with AG-Center and spend July-September ripping up the Soviet forces south of the Luga along the Moscow axis before going on the offensive once logistics move up. That way both 4th and 3rd Panzer groups don't have to be supplied from Smolensk, they can draw supply from a captured and converted Velikiye Luki (same with 9th army).


The Germans actually had a rather easier time converting the rails through the Baltic states, since those rail lines had originally been in the standard gauge rather then the Russian. Once they moved into Russian territory, though, the rate of rail conversion dropped drastically and this would be no different. Throwing extra resources doesn't help since the Germans were already moving as rapidly as they could.
Actually no, not all of the Baltics were originally standard gauge. Remember they were Russian gauge before 1915 when the Germans captured part of them. After only parts of them were converted; IIRC Estonia kept the Russian system entirely. In the Baltics too they had much more local volunteers with rail engineer experience willing to volunteer and help. Also the distance between the border of the Baltic state and Velikiye Luki is much short than between Pskov and Luga, not to mention Leningrad.

By focusing resources on moving east instead of north to Leningrad they'd be focusing conversion on something they didn't work on IOTL, not to speed up something they were already working on. By not advancing the lines to the north passed the Luga that can then use those resources to convert/repair lines from Riga to Velikiye Luki and beyond to Rzhev (instead of having to convert the lines from Smolensk to Rzhev as per OTL).
 

Deleted member 1487

Well, I've tried. But I'm always stymied by various issues with either gameplay or the AI. War in the East, for example, is overly generous with it's logistics (any given rail line can handle unlimited amounts of supply shipping where as in reality there are only so many supply trains you can send down a given rail line) and has a Soviet AI that is programmed to retreat it's military forces behind the D'niepr rather then try and fight on the frontier, so trying to replicate the situation of Barbarossa beyond the first 4 days is nigh impossible.

Setting up a scenario from scratch would probably give a more realistic overview, but the editors on these things are so unintuitive and time consuming to work with that I don't have the patience to do it for the sake of an internet debate.

I mean if you aren't going to waste your time creating mods for minor internet disagreements how can you claim to be a true war gamer?
 
We have no idea how good his analysis of that data was

Having read the book, it's quite obvious his analysis is excellent. Your just dismissing the scholarship because it disagrees with your views.

nor how well he really did what ifs based on this specific POD and the result of capturing and using the Velikiye Luki-Rzhev rail line, not open IOTL and probably not figured into his claim.
Most probably they do. As a case in point: OTL the Germans captured Velikiye-Luki in August. The rail line from Riga to the city was still not completed when the . I'm also curious how the Germans are supposed to extend the line from Velikiye Luki to Rzhev before Operation Typhoon given that Rzhev was not taken until Operation Typhoon.

They'd be facing less Soviet troops and with fewer troops
Actually they'd be facing more. The Soviets could reinforce with forces that OTL were sent to Leningrad. I'm also ignoring your premise of the Germans trying to encircle the 22nd Army, since that requires the Germans to realize it was there before they encounter it (for the record: they did not, just like the rest of the Soviet second strategic echelon).

they can't/won't do the Kalinin diversion to advance on Moscow after Vyazma with flank screening forces.
Which leaves them with an even more exposed northern flank and not any closer to actually taking Moscow.

But prior to this by not diverting to Leningrad 3rd and 4th Panzer, plus 8th air corps can spend July-September ripping apart the Soviet counteroffensive
More realistically, they sit around in July-September for lack of the requisite shipping to get the fuel or ammo out for them to operate. Also, if the Germans try to attack in September towards Moscow, a number of said counteroffensives don't happen and the Germans bleed upon tougher Soviet defenses.

Can you provide a source to September mud being a problem around Smolensk?
Crewald, Page 170:

The capacity of this line [Gomel-Gorodnya] was initially small. It had just started showing signs of improvement when, on 12 September, floods blocked the roads from the railhead to the corps and forced its operation to be suspended.
The same rains also imposed delays on Guderian's link up with AGS.

I know, that's why I said instead of advancing conversion beyond the Luga the 18th/16th armies stop on the Luga river and instead convert the rail from the Baltic states to Velikiye Luki and beyond as they capture more of the line.
So largely what happened OTL. The Germans were converting every rail line they could as rapidly as they could because they needed those rail lines to sustain future operations.

That line was not advanced quickly because after it was initially captured in early/mid-July it was abandoned and fell into Soviet hands against until August and not converted until about then.
The line was advanced along with all the others. Just because Vilikiye Luki fell does not mean the Germans were not aiming to extend their rail net in the cities direction. The Germans were moving as quickly as they could.

while the Germans don't take the full 100k losses between July-August defending without Panzer/air support.
The Germans did have panzer and air support in July-August. What they didn't have were the supplies or frontage to effectively use them. Nothing changes here.

Actually no, not all of the Baltics were originally standard gauge. Remember they were Russian gauge before 1915 when the Germans captured part of them. After only parts of them were converted; IIRC Estonia kept the Russian system entirely. In the Baltics too they had much more local volunteers with rail engineer experience willing to volunteer and help.
Yes, and? All your doing is proving that it was easier to convert through the Baltics then it was in Russia proper.

By focusing resources on moving east instead of north to Leningrad they'd be focusing conversion on something they didn't work on IOTL, not to speed up something they were already working on. By not advancing the lines to the north passed the Luga that can then use those resources to convert/repair lines from Riga to Velikiye Luki and beyond to Rzhev (instead of having to convert the lines from Smolensk to Rzhev as per OTL).
The Germans focused as many resources as they could on moving east. The entire point of Barbarossa was to move east as rapidly as they could. You can try and say the Germans could do it all you want, but we know from history that they could not, the underlying reasons they could not, and that you have done nothing to address said reasons.
 
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