No Maginot line

The orginal plan the Germans had was to go straight into the Maginot Line, this was changed in the last minute. I think the Germans were just lucky rather then doctrine.

whaaat ? nope. The original pre-Manstein plan, the schlieffen 2.0, was going to central Belgium - Gembloux Namur, playing in the hand of the French and BEF.
That the exact reason why sickle cut worked so well.
In Gembloux - MIDDLE of Belgium - the wallies believed they were resisting the main german push - 9 panzers when they had actually stopped only 2 - the 7 others were heading to the Ardennes, SOUTH of Belgium, to screw them magnificently.

There was no plan to attack frontally the Maginot line in Alsace or elsewhere - in that sense the line played its "deterrent" role nicely. Germany knew they had to go through Belgium, or stall on the Maginot line (option 3 being... Switzerland!)

AFAIK IMHO of course.

the wallies entered Belgium from the french frontier in the middle of that country, north of the point were the Ardennes are replaced by flatlands.
Well, the Germans just said "screw the Ardennes" and crossed them, entering southern Belgium near Luxembourg (well they actually rolled over that unfortunate country)
 
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formion

Banned
An aspect of the Maginot Line that was not touched in the thread, is its function as a major public investment: In the middle of the financial crisis tens of thousands of jobs were provided in north-eastern France, revitalizing whole sectors of the french industry -concrete, steel, artillery, rails, electrical equipment. It was the only public investment that was near-unanimously supported from the whole spectrum of the political system. I think that in absence of the fortifications, there wouldn't be any kind of mechanized army. The French officers had to choose between funds for fortifications or no funds at all. De Gaulle's professional army would be ASB in the confines of the Third Republic.

Even in the very unlikely senario that funds were allocated for the procurement of tanks and other modern equipment, then there would have been a significant danger for what French commanders called ‘instant obsolescence’. In other words, the Army would face problems similar to that of AdA with their re armament plans I and II in 1934 and 1936.

What perplexes me regarding the extend of the Line, is that it ended in La Ferte. Of course, expansion to the sea faces geopolitical and geological problems as it has been discused multiple times in the forum. However, until at least 1936, Gamelin and the rest of the Staff were expecting to dash forward to the "protective glacis" of the Albert Canal-Liege-Meuse line. In such case, it would have made far more sense to expand the line until the Meuse, perhaps building a major fort in Sedan as the anchor of the whole line. Perhaps even have the Mezieres as the La Ferte equivalent. Gamelin, expected that fortifications to the sea would cost 10-15 billion francs, while the costs of the line until 1937 were 6-7 billions. To build 30km more wouldn't have made much of a difference in budget and it would secure the front up to the river.

I wonder whether the Manstein Plan could have worked with Sedan a fortress with 135mm guns in cupolas. The Germans would have to attack in much narrower front in order to bypass Sedan - at least 20km away from the fortress. I guess that it would have been too great a risk to force crossings in ever more restricted terrain.
 
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An aspect of the Maginot Line that was not touched in the thread, is its function as a major public investment: In the middle of the financial crisis tens of thousands of jobs were provided in north-eastern France, revitalizing whole sectors of the french industry -concrete, steel, artillery, rails, electrical equipment. It was the only public investment that was near-unanimously suppoerted from all the spectrum of the political system. I think that in absence of the fortifications, there wouldn't be any kind of mechanized army. The French officers had to choose between funds for fortifications or no funds at all. De Gaulle's professional army would be ASB in the confines of the Third Republic.

The political obstacles to a standing army waive away a force for preemptive intervention. One has to radically change both French & international politics to return to the conditions that allowed the 1923 Ruhr occupation in the first place. It is possible to build a larger mobile force for France with the reserve system with some larger changes in general.

Even in the very unlikely senario that funds were allocated for the procurement of tanks and other modern equipment, then there would have been a significant danger for what French commanders called ‘instant obsolescence’. In other words, the Army would face problems similar to that of AdA with their re armament plans I and II in 1934 and 1936.

There large funds allocated to modern equipment and a lot of it was purchased. Six armored divisions and five mechanized cavalry brigades. Nine motorized infantry divisions. 40% of all French artillery had motor/mechanized transport. The German army was still near 80 % horse drawn artillery.

The problem of obsolescence can be overstated. Hardly a quarter of the German tanks used could be considered 'modern'. Even the MkIII & MkIV models were based on designs that reached back to the early 1930s. To use another example the Isralis in 1967 deployed large numbers of antediluvian Shermans & Centurions, vs sleek modern looking T54s & T62. Who won those battles?

What perplexes me regarding the extend of the Line, is that it ended in La Ferte. Of course, expansion to the sea faces geopolitical and geological problems as it has been discused multiple times in the forum. However, until at least 1936, Gamelin and the rest of the Staff were expecting to dash forward to the "protective glacis" of the Albert Canal-Liege-Meuse line. In such case, it would have made far more sense to expand the line until the Meuse, perhaps building a major fort in Sedan as the anchor of the whole line. Perhaps even have the Mezieres as the La Ferte equivalent. Gamelin, expected that fortifications to the sea would cost 10-15 billion francs, while the costs of the line until 1937 were 6-7 billions. To build 30km more wouldn't have made much of a difference in budget and it would secure the front up to the river.

I wonder whether the Manstein Plan could have worked with Sedan a fortress with 135mm guns in cupolas. The Germans would have to attack in much narrower front in order to bypass Sedan - at least 20km away from the fortress. I guess that it would have been too great a risk to force crossings in ever more restricted terrain.
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I've wondered that myself. I suspect when originally budgeted & laid out on the map it was still expected the Belgians would be fortifying their frontier, and deploying a strong defense in the Ardennes. That would have made Overages west from Longwy to Givet redundant. But the Belgians only installed light defense works south of Liege to the French border and deployed a single corps of two light divisions there.

As it was one of Kliests three armored corps attacked and cross at Sedan. The other two crossing north of Givet & at Dinant. So, a fortress group at Sedan does not completely stuff the Ardennes route. Tho it does crowd it a bit. Also there was flexibility in the German plan. When the French 101st Fortress division slowed the crossing at Montherme the Corps commander was able to redirect the 8th PzD & make a entirely new crossing a bit north near Givet. A close look at my fathers US Army issued Michilien road map may indicate if the roads would support Guderians corps 20+ kilometers west of Sedan. The convergence of the road net there had some importance.
 
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There was no plan to attack frontally the Maginot line in Alsace or elsewhere - in that sense the line played its "deterrent" role nicely. Germany knew they had to go through Belgium, or stall on the Maginot line (option 3 being... Switzerland!)

Strictly speaking there was a plan or plans for this. Those were pretty much left to the staff of Army Group C & Halder put little attention to them. The problems were clear, even without extensive exercises. Still AG C planned and practiced. Since there were never any armored corps assigned to AG C their planning was largely at the tactical level with only theoretical attention to a large mobile breakthrough. The destruction of the smaller supporting fort at LaFerte was the war time execution of a part of the planning done by AG C.
 

formion

Banned
There large funds allocated to modern equipment and a lot of it was purchased. Six armored divisions and five mechanized cavalry brigades. Nine motorized infantry divisions. 40% of all French artillery had motor/mechanized transport. The German army was still near 80 % horse drawn artillery.

I completely agree to the above.

I'd like to clarify that I meant purchases before 1936. Pz II was a 1934 design and it was obsolent in 1940, same as R-35, H-35. But for armored units to be formed in eg. 1933, the designs would have been ever earlier, probably late 20s. It would have been even more difficult and expensive to replace >1000 extra tanks in the 1936-1940 period.

To use another example the Isralis in 1967 deployed large numbers of antediluvian Shermans & Centurions, vs sleek modern looking T54s & T62. Who won those battles?

Training and doctrine are more important than materiel, I agree! However, the political issues you described above, would affect even the budget for training. The 1933 & 1934 division and corps level manoeuvres were cancelled. The political climate of the era would affect even training, not just equipment purchases...

I've wondered that myself. I suspect when originally budgeted & laid out on the map it was still expected the Belgians would be fortifying their frontier, and deploying a strong defense in the Ardennes. That would have made Overages west from Longwy to Givet redundant. But the Belgians only installed light defense works south of Liege to the French border and deployed a single corps of two light divisions there.

Quite interesting!

the following map is from the book "Belgium's Dilemma, The formations of Belgian defence policy 1932-1940."

At least until 1934, the Ardennais Chasseurs were supposed to make a fighting retreat and occupy the Meuse line between Givet and Dinant. Even before 1936 there no plans to fortify that portion of the river. The main Belgian Army would focus around Liege and the Dutch border (5 active, 3 reserve, 1 cavalry division just to face the flank in the Dutch border). So, they expected the French to cover most of the rest of the line. In that light, it makes even more sense for Sedan to become a fortress, since they would expect to send field formations north to Namur and the Meuse that won't have protection by modern fortifications.

upload_2019-3-8_15-1-37.png


A close look at my fathers US Army issued Michilien road map may indicate if the roads would support Guderians corps 20+ kilometers west of Sedan. The convergence of the road net there had some importance

Please let us know when you check it ! Thanks in advance!


Edit: I strongly recommend also the book "French Foreign and Defence Policy, 1918-1940: The Decline and Fall of a Great Power", a Routledge publication. Great book on the topic of policy making in that era.
 
I do not know about easily. Admitably the US had a major supply line but it delayed the Allies for about 6 months and costed the American personnel was close to 140,000 casualties.

By WW I standards, that was very fast and very cheap. Also, one notes winter weather, the BATTLE OF THE BULGE, Hurtgen Forest and a few other mobile operations ongoing. Also sections of the line were breached as early as December near Aachen and that one of the reasons the Allies did not march into Germany during December was their supply situation was actually dire due to an operational error in September called Market Garden. This little setback plus a Mulberry disaster and a logistics disaster (not enough trucks) and the Germans not being cleared of the Channel ports, causing a road limited supply circuit of about 900 kilometers or more round trip from the Normandy beach heads to the fronts, severely limited ground operations until the transport desert in France was repaired and enough dumps could be built up forward enough to resume complete full scale operations in MARCH.

Wiki only gives a snapshot and often a very inaccurate one of ground truth. Example of Ground Truth; 140,000 US casualties, half of those were psychological or environmental (20,000 PTSD + 50,000 exposure to cold.) Tough as in I mean TOUGH winter. The Germans suffered far worse and they were on defense in shelters.
 
At least until 1934, the Ardennais Chasseurs were supposed to make a fighting retreat and occupy the Meuse line between Givet and Dinant. Even before 1936 there no plans to fortify that portion of the river. The main Belgian Army would focus around Liege and the Dutch border (5 active, 3 reserve, 1 cavalry division just to face the flank in the Dutch border). So, they expected the French to cover most of the rest of the line. In that light, it makes even more sense for Sedan to become a fortress, since they would expect to send field formations north to Namur and the Meuse that won't have protection by modern fortifications.

Makes sense.

On the French side, four options were studied, the last three involving war on Belgium territory
- option 1 screw Belgium, fight the Germans on the frontier
- option 2 enter Belgium up to Escaut river, fight the Germans there
- option 3 enter Belgium deeper, up to river Dyle
- option 4 "hey, once at Dyle, we are not that far from the Netherlands... how about pushing to Breda ?" this way, we defend a second democracy, The Netherlands plus Belgium

guess what option was picked up in March 1940 ? the Breda one,except it took one more army, a very mobile one, to rush to Breda, bury there, and awaits the Germans.
Of course it was General Giraud army, the 7th army, that was send there... and moved out of Reims, where it was the strategic reserve to crush a possible german breakthrough the flatlands - Gembloux, Namur. Or through the Ardennes - no, I'm just kidding (bangs my head against a wall).

What is completely nut/ insane, in retrospect, is that the (fatal) slide from option 1 to option 4 happened between October 1939 and March 1940 ! Because politically, it become impossible for France to gave up the Netherlands... another reason, in retrospect, to hang Gamelin by his testicles, for utter siliness...

General Giraud has been badly treated by history because he lost the Free French to De Gaulle (and also because Giraud, really, was a little dumb).
But Giraud made one hell of WWII.
On May 10 - 11 he rushed from Northern France to Breda, across the entire northern Belgium, with its 7th army which was acclaimed by people.
Only 6 days later having rushed back to northern France in the wake of Sedan, he was stupidly taken prisonier while trying to catch pace with a German army that simply moved too fast.
18 months later he evaded like a true badass from Colditz where he was held prisonier, told Vichy France to go fuck themselves, entered La Resistance, was exfiltrated to Free French territory. And then there was the entire political struggle with De Gaulle (and Roosevelt, his ally).
All this, with a bad limp inherited from a bad horse fall during the interwar.
The fate of General Henri Giraud in WWII is really a mirror of what France endured during the war.
 
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18 months later he evaded like a true badass from Colditz where he was held prisonier, and then there was the entire political struggle with De Gaulle (and Roosevelt, his ally).

Roosevelt was de Gaulle's ally? Roosevelt hated de Gaulle's guts. He despised de Gaulle for not toadying. Whatever other criticisms one can make of de Gaulle (And I do not criticize him for his attitude.) he always stood up to Roosevelt's various schemes for France with which he disagreed, for the "honor" of France.
 
Roosevelt was de Gaulle's ally? Roosevelt hated de Gaulle's guts. He despised de Gaulle for not toadying. Whatever other criticisms one can make of de Gaulle (And I do not criticize him for his attitude.) he always stood up to Roosevelt's various schemes for France with which he disagreed, for the "honor" of France.

D'OOH !!!

neine, my sentence went down the toilet. you are right indeed, Giraud was Roosevelt prefered option, waaaaaaaaaaaay more than De Gaulle (the two hated each others)

When De Gaulle learned he has not been invited to Yalta, he famously said "I WILL BURY THOSE THREE" and surely he did. Roosevelt (1945) Staline (1953) Churchill (1965) De Gaulle (1970)
 
By WW I standards, that was very fast and very cheap.


Not according to this
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_battles_with_most_United_States_military_fatalities

Less but roughly comparable

Also, one notes winter weather, the BATTLE OF THE BULGE, Hurtgen Forest and a few other mobile operations ongoing.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Hürtgen_Forest

The Hurtgen Forest was in the Siegfried Line.


Also sections of the line were breached as early as December near Aachen and that one of the reasons the Allies did not march into Germany during December was their supply situation was actually dire due to an operational error in September called Market Garden. This little setback plus a Mulberry disaster and a logistics disaster (not enough trucks) and the Germans not being cleared of the Channel ports, causing a road limited supply circuit of about 900 kilometers or more round trip from the Normandy beach heads to the fronts, severely limited ground operations until the transport desert in France was repaired and enough dumps could be built up forward enough to resume complete full scale operations in MARCH.

I said that


Wiki only gives a snapshot and often a very inaccurate one of ground truth. Example of Ground Truth; 140,000 US casualties, half of those were psychological or environmental (20,000 PTSD + 50,000 exposure to cold.) .

This is true of almost all ww2 battles that psychological and environmental factors were the main cause of causalities.
 
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