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Recently I managed to acquire David Stahel's book on Operation Typhoon:
http://www.amazon.com/Operation-Typhoon-Hitlers-Moscow-October/dp/1107501954

In it there are some interesting maps that show the progress of the attempt to take Moscow and confirm some of the issues mentioned by many other historians about the failure of the operation, namely the dispersal of effort along several axes of advance. I did another thread about this a while back and no knowing as much as I do know about the battle I accepted the explanation that the roads were too jammed up by armored forces to they needed to disperse. The maps in Stahel's book (apparently taken from David Glantz's books) show that was definitely not the case, in fact there was inexplicable diversion that kept the attack from concentrating and overloading defenses until it was too late.

The worst of this was the Kalinin attack between October 9th-14th:


During the Vyazma pocket there was a loose Panzer Corps from the 3rd Panzer Group that was not part of the pocket enclosure and it ran straight to Kalinin after the front was ruptured and captured it the day the Vyazma pocket battle officially ended on the 14th (though mopping up still continued for a few days). This force just ended up getting bogged down in attritional fighting around the city with infantry forces and ended up advancing away from Moscow until November.

What if it had not gone to Kalinin and instead advanced on Moscow from the 9th of October onward? The Soviet 16th army wasn't fully concentrated until the 15th/16th on the road to Moscow at Volokolamsk (it didn't fall until October 27th IOTL), having only 2 Soviet depleted rifle divisions and a couple armored battalions in place by the 12th, which was when the Panzer corps could have contacted them (the distance from their position on October 9th is a bit less to the Soviet 16th army than to their OTL position on the road to Kalinin on October 12th). Effectively the Soviet forces in place wouldn't be able to face a Panzer corps and hold their ground, because defenses weren't set up, there were no reserves in place, and the units in place were survivors of the defeat at Vyazma (i.e. not really combat effective). So by the 14th the front could have been blown wide open the the same distance that they traveled IOTL to Kalinin by October 14th would put them through the historical Soviet defenses that held until the 27th. Supply-wise the distance is no greater than the distance they traveled IOTL, so that's not an issue, in fact the roads to Moscow were better than the ones from Rzhev to Kalinin. An advance would turn the flank of the historical defense at Mozhaisk:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Moscow#Mozhaisk_defense_line_.2813_.E2.80.93_30_October.29
When, on 10 October 1941, the Germans arrived within sight of the Mozhaisk line west of Moscow, they encountered another defensive barrier manned by new Soviet forces. That same day, Georgy Zhukov was recalled from Leningrad to take charge of Moscow's defense, with Colonel General Ivan Konev as his deputy.[33] On 12 October, he ordered the concentration of all available forces on a strengthened Mozhaisk line, a move supported by Vasilevsky.[34]

By 13 October 1941, the Wehrmacht had reached the Mozhaisk defense line, a hastily constructed double set of fortifications protecting Moscow's western approaches that extended from Kalinin towards Volokolamsk and Kaluga. Despite recent reinforcements, only around 90,000 Soviet soldiers manned this line–far too few to stem the German advance.[37][38] Given the limited resources available, Zhukov decided to concentrate his forces at four critical points: the 16th Army under Lieutenant General Rokossovsky guarded Volokolamsk, Mozhaisk was defended by 5th Army under Major General Govorov, the 43rd Army of Major General Golubev defended Maloyaroslavets, and the 49th Army under Lieutenant General Zakharkin protected Kaluga.[39] The entire Soviet Western Front—nearly destroyed after its encirclement near Vyazma—was being recreated almost from scratch.[40]


On 13 October 1941 (15 October, according to other sources), the Wehrmacht resumed its offensive. At first, the Germans attempted to bypass Soviet defenses by pushing northeast towards the weakly protected city of Kalinin and south towards Kaluga and Tula, capturing all except Tula by 14 October. Encouraged by these initial successes, the Germans launched a frontal assault against the fortified line, taking Mozhaisk and Maloyaroslavets on 18 October, Naro-Fominsk on 21 October, and Volokolamsk on 27 October after intense fighting. Because of the increasing danger of flanking attacks, Zhukov was forced to fall back,[23] withdrawing his forces east of the Nara River.[43]
That pretty much rips open the last Soviet defensive line in the area and leaves no reserve to stop them. Travel on the road wasn't impeded by weather, so they could pretty much blow through as fast as they could. Now one Panzer corps of 2 divisions is not going to take Moscow, but the issue isn't combat power per se, rather the psychological impact of Soviet defenses effectively collapsing IOTL caused a breakdown in order in the capital that ended when the Germans were delayed and defenses stabilized by the 18th, enabling a series of orderly fighting withdrawals that ended up stopping the Germans by December:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Moscow#The_Battles_of_Vyazma_and_Bryansk
On 15 October, Stalin ordered the evacuation of the Communist Party, the General Staff and various civil government offices from Moscow to Kuibyshev (now Samara), leaving only a limited number of officials behind. The evacuation caused panic among Muscovites. On 16–17 October, much of the civilian population tried to flee, mobbing the available trains and jamming the roads from the city. Despite all this, Stalin publicly remained in the Soviet capital, somewhat calming the fear and pandemonium.[23]
Russian article on Moscow Panic:
https://translate.googleusercontent...%D0%B0&usg=ALkJrhgn_RT_3yUjQNH1E-7TZiri9iFonQ

Not having the stabilization by the 15th, rather instead the defenses on the highway to Moscow breaking down and a mad dash toward the city, would/could the city then remain in chaos, defenses not rally at all, and the end result is that reserves cannot move up and stop the Germans? If German troops are able to move into the city does it fall? Does Stalin evacuate? Can a counteroffensive be mounted to take it back and effect a major offensive success like IOTL? If a counterattack cannot be mounted until January or later after the city falls, can it be retaken at all?

So what happens from this then?
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