Reverse Stalingrad maybe. Nothing to stop them...eventually. If the Germans take Moscow in October-November the Soviets can't really assemble to counter attack until January at the earliest and the Germans are operating from their captured all weather airfields south of the Moscow river:Finally a realistic scenario where Moscow could fall to the Germans!
What next though, and how do you stop the Russian counter attack turning Moscow into a Stalingrad?
I guess that will be determined by the state of the Soviet leadership in the wake of the fall of the capital. Is Stalin strong enough to stay in power or will his enemies seize their moment.
Moscow will be such a trophy to hold onto, the Germans may have to reassess their plans to drive south in 1942.
Or you know we could just post actual maps from Stahel's book with screen grab. Attached is a map of October 10th dispositions.
Actually, it was October 7-8 that was the culmination point. This only came apparent once the German spearheads came into contact with functioning Soviet formations, at which point their rate-of-advance rapidly collapsed.Claiming that the 10th of October was the culmination point of the offensive power of AG-Center is ridiculous given how they did in fact advance all the way to the gates of Moscow by December.
eventually. If the Germans take Moscow in October-November the Soviets can't really assemble to counter attack until January at the earliest
How are they supplying the aircraft from there?and the Germans are operating from their captured all weather airfields south of the Moscow river:
Not that critical, even ignoring that they would rapidly retake it.The Soviets then would be missing the critical communication and rail center of the nation,
No different then IOTL.along with major parts of their population and defense industry, as well as electrical grid.
Meanwhile, the Germans are even more strung out and basically stuck static inside a single salient centered on Moscow, meaning the Soviets can encircle them at their leisure.They could laborously mass East of the city and to the Northwest and Southeast, but it would take a LOT longer without the Moscow rail hub. That leaves the Soviets mostly attacking without air support, with mostly infantry, across swampy terrain in thick snow, and missing their primary means of distributing supplies (Moscow).
Which required the Germans to massively fall back on their own supply lines, and even then they might have been encircled had Stalin not dispersed his forces into additional offensives against Leningrad and Ukraine.look at how well they held Rzhev despite the Soviets having a superior logistics system to attack it.
How? The Soviets could still supply those through the Yaroslavl rail-line, as they did IOTL in November when the German capture of Kalinin cut the direct Moscow-Leningrad rail line.especially as Leningrad would fall and that would cut off Northwest and Kalinin Fronts from supply.
What? Voronezh was irrelevant to the supply of Stalingrad, seeing as how the Germans took it in July. The railroads used to supply Stalingrad were those on the East Bank of the Volga.Losing Voronezh after Moscow would mean its pretty tough to get supplies to Stalingrad due to lack of double track rail lines down south.
Again, not sure why you think 1st Panzer was exhausted, it had been reinforced and was fresh after limited combat in the preceding 10-12 days. It wasn't alone either, it also had the Lehr Brigade and 36th Motorized, while the 14th Motorized pulled up the rear. The rest of 3rd Panzer would follow as they got freed up.Thanks! The google books version had the relevant pages blocked off, which was annoying. Anyways, your disposition map largely confirms what I was saying: we can see that 1st Panzer Division, after fighting through the 247th Rifle Division, had no forces between it and the north of the map, although Kalinin itself is even further north of the map. The October 12th map shows a single rifle division between 1st Panzer and Kalinin (the 5th), but Kalinin itself is unoccupied, although Operation Group Vatutin is too it's immediate north and well placed to both block an attempt to move from Kalinin as well as cut-off any occupier (which is subsequently did). Meanwhile, over at Volokolamsk, we can see two cavalry divisions occupying defensive positions. Then in the October 12th map we can see posted shows that these were joined by an additional 3 rifle divisions (the 316th, 136th, and the 8th being transferred over from 5th Army) as well as two tank battalions and something called "Stu B." (some kind of battalion?). More then enough to stop the exhausted 1st Panzer..
1st Panzer traveled 75km from the 8th to the 14th and was in limited combat until the 11th IIRC. Generally speaking though combat does tend to slow advances down. As the 1st Panzer and its co-corps divisions moved up with it, it would likely hit the Volokolamsk line on the 11th if it avoided Rzhev or the 13th if it did not. Of the divisions in the way apparently only the 316th was fully staffed, but it was a newly raised formation, so was not highly combat capable. The others were older reformed divisions, but weren't up to strength; the tank battalions were also mostly conscripts that weren't fully trained who generally ran away when shot at. The cavalry were survivors that slipped out of Vyazma and were pretty worn down. I was hoping you had an idea what the Stu. B was, but if I had to guess it is some sort of reserve unit.Actually, it was October 7-8 that was the culmination point. This only came apparent once the German spearheads came into contact with functioning Soviet formations, at which point their rate-of-advance rapidly collapsed.
Again, not sure why you think 1st Panzer was exhausted, it had been reinforced and was fresh after limited combat in the preceding 10-12 days.
Your map for October 12th shows a part of trailing several kilometers behind 1st Panzers rear with the Lehr brigade another several kilometers behind it's rear. The majority of 36th motorized is well to the south, east of the encircled 247th Rifle Division and south of the road to Volokolamsk.It wasn't alone either, it also had the Lehr Brigade and 36th Motorized, while the 14th Motorized pulled up the rear. The rest of 3rd Panzer would follow as they got freed up.
Judging from the map, If it tries to avoid Rzhev it will be moving cross-country which will impose even more drastic operational losses to equipment from both as well as slowing down it's rate of advance to basically nothing, given the mud.Generally speaking though combat does tend to slow advances down. As the 1st Panzer and its co-corps divisions moved up with it, it would likely hit the Volokolamsk line on the 11th if it avoided Rzhev or the 13th if it did not.
Perhaps you'd like to cite the relevant sentences which show all of this? And perhaps you'd like to demonstrate . Given the state of German forces by the time they reached the Mozhiask line, the Soviet formations in particular don't have to be particularly good... they just have to be there. As an added bonus, they 16th Army had been put under the command of Rokossovsky. He would certainly be the sort of commander who would be able maximize the utility of these forces to take advantage of the conditions. With only a single paved road, not only would it be easy for the Soviets to concentrate their anti-tank assets, with some machine guns and riflemen to keep enemy infantry off of them but it also means the entirety of the panzer division's combat power would basically be the lead tank and the squad of infantry accompanying it. The forces behind the lead tank can't get involved because to maneuver around would mean leaving the road and getting promptly immobilized in the mud. The British XXX Corps faced an identical problem during Market Garden, although what blocked them from leaving the road was trees rather then mud.The others were older reformed divisions, but weren't up to strength; the tank battalions were also mostly conscripts that weren't fully trained who generally ran away when shot at. The cavalry were survivors that slipped out of Vyazma and were pretty worn down.
The descriptions of it's experience at Kalinin indicates the opposite. It was barely successful at beating off Soviet counterattacks and was incapable of preventing Soviet forces from penetrating it's tactical lines. At one point, a single KV tank was rampaging through it's rear area and they could do nothing to stop it until the tank ran out of ammo and simply left. This is hardly a description of a "combat effective" formation. It's main saving grace in December was the state of the Soviet forces on the attack. This is consistent pretty much all across the line: Glantz calls both sides in October 1941 "two punch-drunk bozers, staying precariously on their feet but rapidly losing the power to hurt each other."Historically 1st Panzer was not exhausted, it was quite combat effective through October and into December.
Can you demonstrate that they lacked what you claim? I mean 1st Panzer specifically. It didn't face much combat during its push, much less in fact than the other divisions engaged in making and containing Vyazma pocket. At Vyazma they faced stiff resistance to capture it, they did, then advanced against another target, but faced counterattacks and had to stop and hold their ground, which they did successfully.It had spent the preceding 10-12 days fighting it's way through two lines of divisions and beyond any hope of resupply while possessing inadequate stocks of spare parts and fuel. All of this is going entail severe exhaustion on the part of a formation. The division was below 70% overall establishment strength even before Typhoon kicked off. Undoubtedly the strain of losses contributed to it's stalling at KAlinin and would ITTL at Volokolamsk.
Given the conditions of the roads on the way to Kalinin and having to take a detour around resistance to rush to the city, its unlikely to be an issue ITTL advance straight East. The roads on the way to Moscow would be clear and more extensive. I have a Soviet map from 1944 that shows terrain and roads and looking at the route that 1st Panzer and its corps took to Kalinin, which are worse and fewer than from the position of 1st Panzer and the motorized units with it had on the 10th to Volokolamsk.Your map for October 12th shows a part of trailing several kilometers behind 1st Panzers rear with the Lehr brigade another several kilometers behind it's rear. The majority of 36th motorized is well to the south, east of the encircled 247th Rifle Division and south of the road to Volokolamsk.
Judging from the map, If it tries to avoid Rzhev it will be moving cross-country which will impose even more drastic operational losses to equipment from both as well as slowing down it's rate of advance to basically nothing, given the mud.
The mud issue in the Volokolamsk area wasn't that much of a problem. Apparently the mud didn't stop the Mozhiask line from being breached on the 18th and rolled back, so won't be a hindrance on the 12th/14th at Volokolamsk.Perhaps you'd like to cite the relevant sentences which show all of this? And perhaps you'd like to demonstrate . Given the state of German forces by the time they reached the Mozhiask line, the Soviet formations in particular don't have to be particularly good... they just have to be there. As an added bonus, they 16th Army had been put under the command of Rokossovsky. He would certainly be the sort of commander who would be able maximize the utility of these forces to take advantage of the conditions. With only a single paved road, not only would it be easy for the Soviets to concentrate their anti-tank assets, with some machine guns and riflemen to keep enemy infantry off of them but it also means the entirety of the panzer division's combat power would basically be the lead tank and the squad of infantry accompanying it. The forces behind the lead tank can't get involved because to maneuver around would mean leaving the road and getting promptly immobilized in the mud. The British XXX Corps faced an identical problem during Market Garden, although what blocked them from leaving the road was trees rather then mud.
IIRC that was based on info I got from Zetterling's Moscow book about paved roads to Moscow and Forcysk Osprey book. Again the roads didn't stop them from getting to Kalinin, taking it in heavy combat, and hold it until the Soviet counter offensive in December.EDIT: In fact, looking back over the OP, I cannot find you citing anything which supports claims such as the road to Volokomsk from Rzhev being paved. Indeed, the description by Stahel seems quite the opposite: he describes even major roads as becoming mud choked on page 93.
This is a core issue I have with the way you argue this, you misrepresent things to prove your point. The KV tank anecdote was an exceptional experience that was the result of standard issue German AT guns not being able to knock out the heavy tank, which than overran them and ran riot until it could be knocked out, which it was. Nowhere does it say that the tank drove off. In fact it was able to penetrate into Kalinin because 1st Panzer was busy attacking toward Torzhok during that period and had to call off the attack because of the situation in Kalinin and the heavy reinforcements that were coming in against them on all sides, while counterattacks cut the spearhead off from supply.The descriptions of it's experience at Kalinin indicates the opposite. It was barely successful at beating off Soviet counterattacks and was incapable of preventing Soviet forces from penetrating it's tactical lines. At one point, a single KV tank was rampaging through it's rear area and they could do nothing to stop it until the tank ran out of ammo and simply left. This is hardly a description of a "combat effective" formation. It's main saving grace in December was the state of the Soviet forces on the attack. This is consistent pretty much all across the line: Glantz calls both sides in October 1941 "two punch-drunk bozers, staying precariously on their feet but rapidly losing the power to hurt each other."
But so will it be for the Soviets. Even if they retake the city it loses a lot of its value and any civilians left basically die. That means they flee in the millions and largely die on the roads out of the city and jam up infrastructure. Recapturing the city then only has symbolic value, leaving little actual value to taking it, as it would likely be impaired as a rail hub and useless for civilians to live there.It seems to me that if the Germans are actually able to take Moscow ITTL, much would depend on how much the Soviets could apply their scorched earth policy to the city. If they have to leave in a relative hurry, then AGC might be able to capture many useful supplies. If Moscow is wrecked the way it was in 1812, on the other hand, the German logistical situation is going to be very tricky.
But so will it be for the Soviets. Even if they retake the city it loses a lot of its value and any civilians left basically die. That means they flee in the millions and largely die on the roads out of the city and jam up infrastructure. Recapturing the city then only has symbolic value, leaving little actual value to taking it, as it would likely be impaired as a rail hub and useless for civilians to live there.
The issue is how much rolling stock is captured to enable the Germans to use the unconverted RRs and how quickly the Soviets could act to take it back. Regardless the Soviets are much worse off even if they lose the city temporarily. Consequences to the Germans probably won't be any worse than IOTL and could be substantially less given how much weaker the Soviets will be and the more limited combat the Germans would face in 1941 if they took the city in October.Agreed, but it seems to me the problems will still be somewhat worse for the Germans than for the Soviets because the former can't use the railways near the city because of the gauge issue whereas the Soviets can. This would remain the case until such time as the gauges could be converted.
The issue is how much rolling stock is captured to enable the Germans to use the unconverted RRs and how quickly the Soviets could act to take it back. Regardless the Soviets are much worse off even if they lose the city temporarily. Consequences to the Germans probably won't be any worse than IOTL and could be substantially less given how much weaker the Soviets will be and the more limited combat the Germans would face in 1941 if they took the city in October.
If they hold it for the winter then Leningrad falls due to inadequate supply:So assuming the Germans retain Moscow through the winter, what happens in 1942? Do they go for the Caucasus as OTL, Leningrad, or attack in the center? There could also be some interesting butterflies for other fronts. Perhaps if the Wallies get the impression that the Soviet situation is desperate they'd hold off some of their Pacific operations and try a landing in France in 1943.