No Kalinin diversion during Operation Taifun

  • Thread starter Deleted member 1487
  • Start date

Deleted member 1487

And OTL October 12th:

Stahel Oct 12th.jpg
 
Finally a realistic scenario where Moscow could fall to the Germans!

What next though, and how do you stop the Russian counter attack turning Moscow into a Stalingrad?

I guess that will be determined by the state of the Soviet leadership in the wake of the fall of the capital. Is Stalin strong enough to stay in power or will his enemies seize their moment.

Moscow will be such a trophy to hold onto, the Germans may have to reassess their plans to drive south in 1942.
 

Deleted member 1487

Finally a realistic scenario where Moscow could fall to the Germans!

What next though, and how do you stop the Russian counter attack turning Moscow into a Stalingrad?

I guess that will be determined by the state of the Soviet leadership in the wake of the fall of the capital. Is Stalin strong enough to stay in power or will his enemies seize their moment.

Moscow will be such a trophy to hold onto, the Germans may have to reassess their plans to drive south in 1942.
Reverse Stalingrad maybe. Nothing to stop them...eventually. If the Germans take Moscow in October-November the Soviets can't really assemble to counter attack until January at the earliest and the Germans are operating from their captured all weather airfields south of the Moscow river:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vnukovo_International_Airport

The Soviets then would be missing the critical communication and rail center of the nation, along with major parts of their population and defense industry, as well as electrical grid. They could laborously mass East of the city and to the Northwest and Southeast, but it would take a LOT longer without the Moscow rail hub. That leaves the Soviets mostly attacking without air support, with mostly infantry, across swampy terrain in thick snow, and missing their primary means of distributing supplies (Moscow).
http://users.tpg.com.au/adslbam9/Railways1941.png

Stalin losing Moscow would be a huge political blow, especially as Leningrad falls if Moscow is held over the Winter. He may well face military coup. The Soviets won't quit even without Stalin, but they lose a huge means of keeping their war effort coherent then. Holding Moscow in 1942 is a lot easier if they manage to make it through the Winter; look at how well they held Rzhev despite the Soviets having a superior logistics system to attack it. If Moscow is gone then supplying and massing reinforcements to attack it is virtually impossible once the Germans consolidate their hold, especially as Leningrad would fall and that would cut off Northwest and Kalinin Fronts from supply. Once Leningrad goes, so too does Murmansk, at least the rail road to it would be cut. The Finns would have the reserves necessary and they'd take all of Karelia. Once that is gone, so is about 25% of LL, the part that was supplying the armies north of Moscow. Come 1942 then the Soviets are dramatically short of industry and supply compared to OTL, which then shuts down combat against AG-North and probably opens up the Gorky area west of the Volga to attack.

Then Stalingrad probably doesn't happen as a major campaign due to the Soviets lacking a major part of their production, cohesion, and supplies. Losing Voronezh after Moscow would mean its pretty tough to get supplies to Stalingrad due to lack of double track rail lines down south. It also frees up a large part of AG-Center to help out down south (no Rzhev, Soviets lose a lot of civilians in the capital and Leningrad that would have been drafted).
 
Or you know we could just post actual maps from Stahel's book with screen grab. Attached is a map of October 10th dispositions.

Thanks! The google books version had the relevant pages blocked off, which was annoying. Anyways, your disposition map largely confirms what I was saying: we can see that 1st Panzer Division, after fighting through the 247th Rifle Division, had no forces between it and the north of the map, although Kalinin itself is even further north of the map. The October 12th map shows a single rifle division between 1st Panzer and Kalinin (the 5th), but Kalinin itself is unoccupied, although Operation Group Vatutin is too it's immediate north and well placed to both block an attempt to move from Kalinin as well as cut-off any occupier (which is subsequently did). ITTL, it would also be well-placed to roll into the Germans northern flank. Meanwhile, over at Volokolamsk, we can see two cavalry divisions occupying defensive positions. Then in the October 12th map we can see posted shows that these were joined by an additional 3 rifle divisions (the 316th, 136th, and the 8th being transferred over from 5th Army) as well as two tank battalions and something called "Stu B." (some kind of battalion?). More then enough to stop the exhausted 1st Panzer.

Claiming that the 10th of October was the culmination point of the offensive power of AG-Center is ridiculous given how they did in fact advance all the way to the gates of Moscow by December.
Actually, it was October 7-8 that was the culmination point. This only came apparent once the German spearheads came into contact with functioning Soviet formations, at which point their rate-of-advance rapidly collapsed.

eventually. If the Germans take Moscow in October-November the Soviets can't really assemble to counter attack until January at the earliest

By magic, apparently, given that Soviet administration behind the lines was functioning just fine.

and the Germans are operating from their captured all weather airfields south of the Moscow river:
How are they supplying the aircraft from there?

The Soviets then would be missing the critical communication and rail center of the nation,
Not that critical, even ignoring that they would rapidly retake it.

along with major parts of their population and defense industry, as well as electrical grid.
No different then IOTL.

They could laborously mass East of the city and to the Northwest and Southeast, but it would take a LOT longer without the Moscow rail hub. That leaves the Soviets mostly attacking without air support, with mostly infantry, across swampy terrain in thick snow, and missing their primary means of distributing supplies (Moscow).
Meanwhile, the Germans are even more strung out and basically stuck static inside a single salient centered on Moscow, meaning the Soviets can encircle them at their leisure.

look at how well they held Rzhev despite the Soviets having a superior logistics system to attack it.
Which required the Germans to massively fall back on their own supply lines, and even then they might have been encircled had Stalin not dispersed his forces into additional offensives against Leningrad and Ukraine.

especially as Leningrad would fall and that would cut off Northwest and Kalinin Fronts from supply.
How? The Soviets could still supply those through the Yaroslavl rail-line, as they did IOTL in November when the German capture of Kalinin cut the direct Moscow-Leningrad rail line.

Losing Voronezh after Moscow would mean its pretty tough to get supplies to Stalingrad due to lack of double track rail lines down south.
What? Voronezh was irrelevant to the supply of Stalingrad, seeing as how the Germans took it in July. The railroads used to supply Stalingrad were those on the East Bank of the Volga.
 
Last edited:

Deleted member 1487

Thanks! The google books version had the relevant pages blocked off, which was annoying. Anyways, your disposition map largely confirms what I was saying: we can see that 1st Panzer Division, after fighting through the 247th Rifle Division, had no forces between it and the north of the map, although Kalinin itself is even further north of the map. The October 12th map shows a single rifle division between 1st Panzer and Kalinin (the 5th), but Kalinin itself is unoccupied, although Operation Group Vatutin is too it's immediate north and well placed to both block an attempt to move from Kalinin as well as cut-off any occupier (which is subsequently did). Meanwhile, over at Volokolamsk, we can see two cavalry divisions occupying defensive positions. Then in the October 12th map we can see posted shows that these were joined by an additional 3 rifle divisions (the 316th, 136th, and the 8th being transferred over from 5th Army) as well as two tank battalions and something called "Stu B." (some kind of battalion?). More then enough to stop the exhausted 1st Panzer..
Again, not sure why you think 1st Panzer was exhausted, it had been reinforced and was fresh after limited combat in the preceding 10-12 days. It wasn't alone either, it also had the Lehr Brigade and 36th Motorized, while the 14th Motorized pulled up the rear. The rest of 3rd Panzer would follow as they got freed up.

Actually, it was October 7-8 that was the culmination point. This only came apparent once the German spearheads came into contact with functioning Soviet formations, at which point their rate-of-advance rapidly collapsed.
1st Panzer traveled 75km from the 8th to the 14th and was in limited combat until the 11th IIRC. Generally speaking though combat does tend to slow advances down. As the 1st Panzer and its co-corps divisions moved up with it, it would likely hit the Volokolamsk line on the 11th if it avoided Rzhev or the 13th if it did not. Of the divisions in the way apparently only the 316th was fully staffed, but it was a newly raised formation, so was not highly combat capable. The others were older reformed divisions, but weren't up to strength; the tank battalions were also mostly conscripts that weren't fully trained who generally ran away when shot at. The cavalry were survivors that slipped out of Vyazma and were pretty worn down. I was hoping you had an idea what the Stu. B was, but if I had to guess it is some sort of reserve unit.

I think it would likely take about 2 days for the early fighting to breach the line and roll forward against the defenders that were just arriving (18th RD, 316th RD, tank batt.) and were off the line. The cavalry weren't really an obstacle given that they just barely survived Vyazma and the other rifle division was a rebuilt shell. I get the impression based on the deployments on the 12th that the best unit was held furthest back, the 316th, while the rest were speed bumps to disrupt the Germans as the one core unit was deployed.

By the 14th the 18th is contained to the south, the cavalry are scattered, the Soviet tank battalions are wasted, and the 316th is the last cohesive fighting unit on the path confronting 1st Panzer as the 900th and 36th and 14th motorized support/screen the 1st Panzer's flanks. The 36th, probably moves up to flank whatever is checking 1st Panzer frontally, as the 14th screens the 18th RD and the 900th screens the cavalry survivors. After the 316th is beaten what is there left to stop 1st Panzer?

Historically 1st Panzer was not exhausted, it was quite combat effective through October and into December. By December 7th it was the main combat unit at Klin that kept the 3rd Panzer army's flank from collapsing; they were the reason the Klin bulge formed, so they were in fact quite combat effective even at that late date.
 
Again, not sure why you think 1st Panzer was exhausted, it had been reinforced and was fresh after limited combat in the preceding 10-12 days.

It had spent the preceding 10-12 days fighting it's way through two lines of divisions and beyond any hope of resupply while possessing inadequate stocks of spare parts and fuel. All of this is going entail severe exhaustion on the part of a formation. The division was below 70% overall establishment strength even before Typhoon kicked off. Undoubtedly the strain of losses contributed to it's stalling at KAlinin and would ITTL at Volokolamsk.
It wasn't alone either, it also had the Lehr Brigade and 36th Motorized, while the 14th Motorized pulled up the rear. The rest of 3rd Panzer would follow as they got freed up.
Your map for October 12th shows a part of trailing several kilometers behind 1st Panzers rear with the Lehr brigade another several kilometers behind it's rear. The majority of 36th motorized is well to the south, east of the encircled 247th Rifle Division and south of the road to Volokolamsk.

Generally speaking though combat does tend to slow advances down. As the 1st Panzer and its co-corps divisions moved up with it, it would likely hit the Volokolamsk line on the 11th if it avoided Rzhev or the 13th if it did not.
Judging from the map, If it tries to avoid Rzhev it will be moving cross-country which will impose even more drastic operational losses to equipment from both as well as slowing down it's rate of advance to basically nothing, given the mud.

The others were older reformed divisions, but weren't up to strength; the tank battalions were also mostly conscripts that weren't fully trained who generally ran away when shot at. The cavalry were survivors that slipped out of Vyazma and were pretty worn down.
Perhaps you'd like to cite the relevant sentences which show all of this? And perhaps you'd like to demonstrate . Given the state of German forces by the time they reached the Mozhiask line, the Soviet formations in particular don't have to be particularly good... they just have to be there. As an added bonus, they 16th Army had been put under the command of Rokossovsky. He would certainly be the sort of commander who would be able maximize the utility of these forces to take advantage of the conditions. With only a single paved road, not only would it be easy for the Soviets to concentrate their anti-tank assets, with some machine guns and riflemen to keep enemy infantry off of them but it also means the entirety of the panzer division's combat power would basically be the lead tank and the squad of infantry accompanying it. The forces behind the lead tank can't get involved because to maneuver around would mean leaving the road and getting promptly immobilized in the mud. The British XXX Corps faced an identical problem during Market Garden, although what blocked them from leaving the road was trees rather then mud.

EDIT: In fact, looking back over the OP, I cannot find you citing anything which supports claims such as the road to Volokomsk from Rzhev being paved. Indeed, the description by Stahel seems quite the opposite: he describes even major roads as becoming mud choked on page 93.

Historically 1st Panzer was not exhausted, it was quite combat effective through October and into December.
The descriptions of it's experience at Kalinin indicates the opposite. It was barely successful at beating off Soviet counterattacks and was incapable of preventing Soviet forces from penetrating it's tactical lines. At one point, a single KV tank was rampaging through it's rear area and they could do nothing to stop it until the tank ran out of ammo and simply left. This is hardly a description of a "combat effective" formation. It's main saving grace in December was the state of the Soviet forces on the attack. This is consistent pretty much all across the line: Glantz calls both sides in October 1941 "two punch-drunk bozers, staying precariously on their feet but rapidly losing the power to hurt each other."
 
Last edited:

Deleted member 1487

It had spent the preceding 10-12 days fighting it's way through two lines of divisions and beyond any hope of resupply while possessing inadequate stocks of spare parts and fuel. All of this is going entail severe exhaustion on the part of a formation. The division was below 70% overall establishment strength even before Typhoon kicked off. Undoubtedly the strain of losses contributed to it's stalling at KAlinin and would ITTL at Volokolamsk.
Can you demonstrate that they lacked what you claim? I mean 1st Panzer specifically. It didn't face much combat during its push, much less in fact than the other divisions engaged in making and containing Vyazma pocket. At Vyazma they faced stiff resistance to capture it, they did, then advanced against another target, but faced counterattacks and had to stop and hold their ground, which they did successfully.


Your map for October 12th shows a part of trailing several kilometers behind 1st Panzers rear with the Lehr brigade another several kilometers behind it's rear. The majority of 36th motorized is well to the south, east of the encircled 247th Rifle Division and south of the road to Volokolamsk.
Given the conditions of the roads on the way to Kalinin and having to take a detour around resistance to rush to the city, its unlikely to be an issue ITTL advance straight East. The roads on the way to Moscow would be clear and more extensive. I have a Soviet map from 1944 that shows terrain and roads and looking at the route that 1st Panzer and its corps took to Kalinin, which are worse and fewer than from the position of 1st Panzer and the motorized units with it had on the 10th to Volokolamsk.

Going by the October 10th map I have reattached below they can hop on that road and drive straight to Volokolamsk with minor if any inconvenience and get there quicker with less detours and resistance than the route to Kalinin

Judging from the map, If it tries to avoid Rzhev it will be moving cross-country which will impose even more drastic operational losses to equipment from both as well as slowing down it's rate of advance to basically nothing, given the mud.

I have a Soviet map from 1944 I found online (too big to clip and show here) that has roads that are not represented on Stahel's map that would allow them to bypass Rzhev and use the main road to Volokolamsk after a minor, literally probably 5km, detour over open ground.

Perhaps you'd like to cite the relevant sentences which show all of this? And perhaps you'd like to demonstrate . Given the state of German forces by the time they reached the Mozhiask line, the Soviet formations in particular don't have to be particularly good... they just have to be there. As an added bonus, they 16th Army had been put under the command of Rokossovsky. He would certainly be the sort of commander who would be able maximize the utility of these forces to take advantage of the conditions. With only a single paved road, not only would it be easy for the Soviets to concentrate their anti-tank assets, with some machine guns and riflemen to keep enemy infantry off of them but it also means the entirety of the panzer division's combat power would basically be the lead tank and the squad of infantry accompanying it. The forces behind the lead tank can't get involved because to maneuver around would mean leaving the road and getting promptly immobilized in the mud. The British XXX Corps faced an identical problem during Market Garden, although what blocked them from leaving the road was trees rather then mud.
The mud issue in the Volokolamsk area wasn't that much of a problem. Apparently the mud didn't stop the Mozhiask line from being breached on the 18th and rolled back, so won't be a hindrance on the 12th/14th at Volokolamsk.


EDIT: In fact, looking back over the OP, I cannot find you citing anything which supports claims such as the road to Volokomsk from Rzhev being paved. Indeed, the description by Stahel seems quite the opposite: he describes even major roads as becoming mud choked on page 93.
IIRC that was based on info I got from Zetterling's Moscow book about paved roads to Moscow and Forcysk Osprey book. Again the roads didn't stop them from getting to Kalinin, taking it in heavy combat, and hold it until the Soviet counter offensive in December.


The descriptions of it's experience at Kalinin indicates the opposite. It was barely successful at beating off Soviet counterattacks and was incapable of preventing Soviet forces from penetrating it's tactical lines. At one point, a single KV tank was rampaging through it's rear area and they could do nothing to stop it until the tank ran out of ammo and simply left. This is hardly a description of a "combat effective" formation. It's main saving grace in December was the state of the Soviet forces on the attack. This is consistent pretty much all across the line: Glantz calls both sides in October 1941 "two punch-drunk bozers, staying precariously on their feet but rapidly losing the power to hurt each other."
This is a core issue I have with the way you argue this, you misrepresent things to prove your point. The KV tank anecdote was an exceptional experience that was the result of standard issue German AT guns not being able to knock out the heavy tank, which than overran them and ran riot until it could be knocked out, which it was. Nowhere does it say that the tank drove off. In fact it was able to penetrate into Kalinin because 1st Panzer was busy attacking toward Torzhok during that period and had to call off the attack because of the situation in Kalinin and the heavy reinforcements that were coming in against them on all sides, while counterattacks cut the spearhead off from supply.
Despite all of this the Germans held Kalinin despite SNAFUs like that. But again that was a wild exceptional experience, not the norm, and it was dealt with and Kalinin held despite constant counterattacks and later disengaged to advance on Moscow in late October/November. Its remarkable that 1st Panzer was able to take Kalinin after a wild advance and heavy combat to take the city and then advance on Torzhok despite the Soviets bringing in reserves from Moscow and counterattacking them hard with substantial airpower and everything onhand on the ground.

Glantz's statement about punch-drunk boxers was about the situation in December-January, not in October when the Germans were wiping out 1 million Soviet soldiers and then pushing within a few miles of Moscow.

From the map below on the 10th of October the 1st Panzer division was about 50km/30miles from Volokolamsk; their historical route, as you'll see below in maps I'm attaching, took them around Rzhev to the Volokolamsk highway to Moscow and then north, when ITTL they can just use it to head East and be at Volokolamsk by morning/noon on the 12th.

Stahel Oct 10th.jpg
 
Last edited by a moderator:

Deleted member 1487

Here is the clipped map section from the 1944 Soviet map. Hopping over to the Rzhev-Volokolamsk road from their position on October 10th is a minor inconvenience at worst.

road moscow.jpg
 

Deleted member 1487

From Forczyk's Osprey campaign book on Moscow we can see 1st Panzer and its corps did historically skirt Rzhev on the detour I am talking about to advance on Kalinin. I'm suggesting they make that detour and head east instead on a shorter route taking the highway to Moscow, instead of skirting Rzhev and moving back around to take the road to Kalinin from Rzhev (a much more significant and cost detour over open ground, not roads).

Forscyk.jpg
 
It seems to me that if the Germans are actually able to take Moscow ITTL, much would depend on how much the Soviets could apply their scorched earth policy to the city. If they have to leave in a relative hurry, then AGC might be able to capture many useful supplies. If Moscow is wrecked the way it was in 1812, on the other hand, the German logistical situation is going to be very tricky.
 

Deleted member 1487

It seems to me that if the Germans are actually able to take Moscow ITTL, much would depend on how much the Soviets could apply their scorched earth policy to the city. If they have to leave in a relative hurry, then AGC might be able to capture many useful supplies. If Moscow is wrecked the way it was in 1812, on the other hand, the German logistical situation is going to be very tricky.
But so will it be for the Soviets. Even if they retake the city it loses a lot of its value and any civilians left basically die. That means they flee in the millions and largely die on the roads out of the city and jam up infrastructure. Recapturing the city then only has symbolic value, leaving little actual value to taking it, as it would likely be impaired as a rail hub and useless for civilians to live there.
 
But so will it be for the Soviets. Even if they retake the city it loses a lot of its value and any civilians left basically die. That means they flee in the millions and largely die on the roads out of the city and jam up infrastructure. Recapturing the city then only has symbolic value, leaving little actual value to taking it, as it would likely be impaired as a rail hub and useless for civilians to live there.

Agreed, but it seems to me the problems will still be somewhat worse for the Germans than for the Soviets because the former can't use the railways near the city because of the gauge issue whereas the Soviets can. This would remain the case until such time as the gauges could be converted.
 

Deleted member 1487

Agreed, but it seems to me the problems will still be somewhat worse for the Germans than for the Soviets because the former can't use the railways near the city because of the gauge issue whereas the Soviets can. This would remain the case until such time as the gauges could be converted.
The issue is how much rolling stock is captured to enable the Germans to use the unconverted RRs and how quickly the Soviets could act to take it back. Regardless the Soviets are much worse off even if they lose the city temporarily. Consequences to the Germans probably won't be any worse than IOTL and could be substantially less given how much weaker the Soviets will be and the more limited combat the Germans would face in 1941 if they took the city in October.
 
The issue is how much rolling stock is captured to enable the Germans to use the unconverted RRs and how quickly the Soviets could act to take it back. Regardless the Soviets are much worse off even if they lose the city temporarily. Consequences to the Germans probably won't be any worse than IOTL and could be substantially less given how much weaker the Soviets will be and the more limited combat the Germans would face in 1941 if they took the city in October.

So assuming the Germans retain Moscow through the winter, what happens in 1942? Do they go for the Caucasus as OTL, Leningrad, or attack in the center? There could also be some interesting butterflies for other fronts. Perhaps if the Wallies get the impression that the Soviet situation is desperate they'd hold off some of their Pacific operations and try a landing in France in 1943.
 

Deleted member 1487

So assuming the Germans retain Moscow through the winter, what happens in 1942? Do they go for the Caucasus as OTL, Leningrad, or attack in the center? There could also be some interesting butterflies for other fronts. Perhaps if the Wallies get the impression that the Soviet situation is desperate they'd hold off some of their Pacific operations and try a landing in France in 1943.
If they hold it for the winter then Leningrad falls due to inadequate supply:
http://users.tpg.com.au/adslbam9/Railways1941.png

The Murmansk goes due to the freeing up of 200k Finnish troops. Likely the front around Moscow is pretty easy to hold against an Eastern push given the logistics issue the Soviets would be having, meaning going after the oil still is the only option; taking Voronezh would mean severing much of the remaining ability to move Soviet forces around too. With the loss of Moscow comes the loss of much of the ability of the Soviets turn use the industry West of the Volga east of Moscow, so that probably get evacuated, impairing Soviet industry pretty badly. Largely then the front north of Moscow shuts down, Axis supply is improved by the capture of Leningrad and the reduction in use of supplies in that area, while the loss of Murmansk limits Soviet LL. Losing Moscow, Leningrad, and Murmansk within 6 months of each other really means a heavy blow to Soviet industry, especially if/when it provokes the evacuation of Gorky-Yaroslavl. There is probably major efforts to retake the capital, but then its a worse version of Rzhev for the Soviets and better one for the Germans.

Add in Case Blue and the Soviets are in legitimate danger of collapse in 1942 and could well provoke an attempt to invade France in 1943. Interestingly the consensus is that doing that instead of Operation Torch (which would have to be dropped to allow for a 1943 France invasion) would probably fail based on this discussion:
http://ww2aircraft.net/forum/aviati...torch-instead-1943-invasion-france-44275.html

If no Operation Uranus is possible or successful, then the Wallies would have serious resistance in France in 1943 should they try and invade and they might well not win given how much less pressure there is in the East on the Germans and then no wearing down in the Mediterranean in 1942.
 

Deleted member 1487

Okay I got the German situation map from October 11th and it shows 36th motorized division East of 1st Panzer, which was at Subzow, directly east of Rzhev as 1st Panzer was getting ready to move north against Kalinin. That means actually 36th motorized on the 11th of October was actually closer to Volokolamsk than 1st Panzer:
https://files.secureserver.net/2fZMd6lPQROFgu
It would seem they stuck to highways from the 8th on, so they never even had to go off road based on what I'm seeing from the situation maps. So from Subzow they can head East:

11th.jpg
 

Deleted member 1487

Moscow_Sep30_Nov_1941.jpg


Here is the situation on the 14th/15th. Effectively the 1st Panzer, 36th Motorized infantry division, 900th Lehr Brigade, elements of the 6th Panzer, 129th infantry division, and 14th motorized would be in combat past Volokolamsk. Without the northern turn the infantry divisions of the 3rd Panzer army would be probably moved up to hold the flanks as the rest of the army is pushed East instead of north. The northern drive stretched out and dispersed the front in an unnecessary way and they'd have been far more concentrated and the flank more strongly held had they just gone East instead of North.

15.jpg
 
Last edited by a moderator:

Deleted member 1487

I've become aware of a book about this part of Operation Typhoon that might add some to the discussion:
https://www.amazon.com/Defense-Moscow-1941-Northern-Flank-ebook/dp/B00DN5V6UC
It covers the parts of Stahel's book that I referenced in FAR more detail and it seems the Germans poured in a ton of effort that was lost on the Moscow offensive in an attempted to go for a huge third pocket of Northwestern Front or what became Kalinin Front, which was defeated by Soviet resistance and the mud's impact on logistics. From what I can tell from reviews the Germans screwed up BIG TIME by even trying the Kalinin Operation, something von Bock was highly concerned about, but let himself get talked into it. Ultimately it really sucked in a major part of 3rd Panzer Army's resources that should have been sent against Moscow, as the distance traveled by forces sent to Kalinin was the same distance to Moscow from Vyazma. During the Soviet defensive efforts despite how worn down their forces were they managed to really wear down one of Hoth's Panzer Corps to the point it was effectively combat ineffective come the November offensive against Moscow. Had the Germans not gone after Kalinin they would have been spared a ton of wear and tear on their logistics (which would have been significantly less on the better quality highway from Rzhev to Moscow) while the air support assets used to keep the Kalinin forces alive and supplied would have been extremely useful on the road to Volokolamsk/Moscow, but since the Kalinin Operation had priority for air support and supply, it was not available for the Moscow thrust. Stahel mentions all this in passing in his book on Operation Typhoon that was the source for the thread. Robert Forczyk in his Osprey campaign book about Moscow suggests foregoing the Kalinin Operation and using those forces/assets against Moscow may have been the only way to capture the city, while the mud and distance from rail lines would have actually aided the German 9th army defending against the Soviet Kalinin Front on the flank, as the Soviets lacked the ability to effectively offensively power project from Kalinin to Rzhev in the mud in October until the frost cleared up the roads in November. Even then the lack of trucks and supply elements, as well as trains made supporting against the German flanks in a thrust on Moscow impossible, especially given how weak their individual divisions were at the time, a point that is made in the book linked in this post. Also the Soviet 16th army at Volokolamsk lacked the reserve army behind it that 5th army had at Borodino against 4th Panzer Army, so if 3rd Panzer hit it with it's fulls strength there was nothing to keep the line intact like the Soviet reserves behind 5th army did to stiffen it against 4th Panzer army.
 
Top