No Japanese Invasion of China

As the title states, I'm curious to here whether it would be plausible for the Japanese to decide not to invade China before world war 2. What I'd like to know is whether this would be possible for them with the government they had, and also, if they hadn't invaded, whether they may have stood a greater chance of survival as they wouldn't have had such a large military commitment in China and foreign nations wouldn't be as hostile to the Empire. Lastly, without an invasion, could we possibly see an early invasion of French Indochina and the Dutch East Indies instead?: The Japanese Empire could've called it "a war on western imperialism" :D, which may have sat better with the USA than OTL's Chinese war and occupation.
 
There no war with european power or America.the war in China created the need for the resources in south east Asia and there still an angry China going to roll in the 40s or 50s
 
Which invasion of China? 1931 or 1937?

Also, the primary reasons for the Japanese demands in Indochina and invasion of the Dutch East Indies were to interdict the Sino-Vietnamese Railway supplying the Chinese and oil they needed due to the American embargo. Stopping Japanese adventurism in China would require a PoD reducing the megalomania of the officer corps, junior or senior.
 
It all depends on who's leading the country.

With the militarists OTL? Short answer: no. Long answer: nein. Invading China was something that was going to at least attempted, with all the right factors in place: civil war going, weak states, and resource-rich.

If you avoid the militarists taking charge, perhaps Japan might try to go for peaceful and economic expansion instead?
 
My apology, I should have specified, I was referring to the Japanese invasion of China in 1937. The invasion in 1931 was enough of a success, the one in 1937 never struck me as a valuable or intelligent use of resources. Manchuria alone possessed an immense amount of natural resources as I understand. And with the Dutch East Indies, wouldn't their oil be valuable with or without the USA's embargo? Also, let us say that another POD is that Japan, although upset at the backlash, does not withdraw from the League of Nations.
 
dislodging the militarists post the Hara assassination is impossible. By the mid 1920s the dominant ideology of the Mejii Oligarchy was the one espoused by the militarists. Sure people like Hara and other individuals were against expansionism but they were not in the mainstream as demonstrated by the various mass protests held in Japan during the 1920s following the naval treaties and halting of expansionist policies.

The only difference in military was one faction wanted to strike north and the other strike south. Now the average Japanese person I doubt was all that interested in expansionism but by the late 1920s all the stats point to the Japanese economy slowing down. I did a university exam paper in economic history on this subject and it appears that the periods when Japan was expanding at least pattern wise occurred during phases of slowed economic growth. Given such a trajectory by the 1930s I expect Imperial japan to attack somewhere or expand because to fuel the Japanese economy the state needs... manpower, resources, and more land.

Thus even if you sideline the militarists one must also break the Zaibatsus because you can bet that like with what happened in Korea, if the Japanese economy stagnates as was happening prior to the invasion of China, well the left would be getting stronger in the sense that they would receive more attention. With an ailing/stagnant economy the Meiji Oligarchy would face shaky ground.

Now the big difference with the corporates rather than officers in charge would probably be the corps wouldn't be interested in war as much as continuing unfair trade practices and opening up more parts of Asia for trade/building factories and for cheap labor.

As for China well in such a case only two scenarios exist to prevent Japanese invasion.

Either following Yuan's death a stable line of succession occurs or he doesnt become emperor and China unites around a strongman and is able to field at least on paper and in perception highly drilled and modernized army. True Japan would still have an edge but I think Japanese officials would think twice before attacking a fully modernized chinese army backed by unified chinese state without the assistance of another great power.

The other way is for Chiang to die, and have Zhang Zhuolin not be assassinated by japanese officers. The Beiyang's continue doing business dealings with Japan and China remains open to Japanese markets, capital, investments, cheap source of labor and places to build factories and extract resources to run the Japanese economy. Personally I like option 1(Chiang too could replace Yan provided the Northern expedition is much more successful.)

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1937 too late... Chiang already vowed to never negotiate with Japan over Manchuria and its occupation of chinese Territory(rightfully so)meant that conflict with japan became a when not if. Japan simply struck first.

Not to mention the militarists are firmly in pwoer and I believe the strike north faction has by this point been discredited and thus invasion of China to reach southeast Asia and Indochina was definatley on the Japanese states mind. As mentioned above economy too by then was stagnating and something had to be done. You will need a pod at the very least to a ate where Chiang or some reason doesnt hardline his stance agaisnt Japanese imperialism or have a POD where the corporates rather than militaristic hold over power in japan. neither side was good... but at least the corps were more rational..
 
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As the title states, I'm curious to here whether it would be plausible for the Japanese to decide not to invade China before world war 2. What I'd like to know is whether this would be possible for them with the government they had,
There have been quite a few threads on the subject of 'No Militarist Japan"/"No invasion/total war in China", some of which were fairly recent. I suggest you read them if you have time. These are all from this month and last month:
https://www.alternatehistory.com/discussion/showthread.php?t=357804
https://www.alternatehistory.com/discussion/showthread.php?t=355537
https://www.alternatehistory.com/discussion/showthread.php?t=356872
https://www.alternatehistory.com/discussion/showthread.php?t=356995
https://www.alternatehistory.com/discussion/showthread.php?t=357471
https://www.alternatehistory.com/discussion/showthread.php?t=356991

and also, if they hadn't invaded, whether they may have stood a greater chance of survival as they wouldn't have had such a large military commitment in China and foreign nations wouldn't be as hostile to the Empire.
Yes, a Japan that doesn't engage in total war in China, doesn't ally itself with Nazi Germany, and doesn't end up going to war with the strongest powers on Earth has a much better chance of survival. Assuming this Japan is as rational as actor on the international stage as the Japan of 1890-1925 or so, I see no reason the Empire could not survive another few decades. I do think there are likely to be problems concerning decolonization in Korea, however, and it is possible or even likely that the overall standard of living will be lower than in OTL's postwar Japan.
Lastly, without an invasion, could we possibly see an early invasion of French Indochina and the Dutch East Indies instead?: The Japanese Empire could've called it "a war on western imperialism" :D, which may have sat better with the USA than OTL's Chinese war and occupation.
I think it is highly unlikely that a non-Militarist Japan that is at peace with its neighbors will attack the European colonies. After all, in OTL the main motivation behind expanding the war in this way was to seize the resources needed to continue the war in China. That motivation is not present here, naturally. In OTL WWI, the Japanese economy expanded hugely providing goods to the Allies, and making up for civilian goods shortfalls from factories that had been converted to war work elsewhere. No reason they cannot do so again here. That strikes me as the smart play. However, on the outside, i think it might be possible to see something like an Ally-friendly Japan occupying French Indochina "on behalf' of the Allies (that is, with their agreement, however reluctant), in order to prevent it being used as a German/Vichy submarine base, or with some other such excuse.

dislodging the militarists post the Hara assassination is impossible. By the mid 1920s the dominant ideology of the Mejii Oligarchy was the one espoused by the militarists. Sure people like Hara and other individuals were against expansionism but they were not in the mainstream as demonstrated by the various mass protests held in Japan during the 1920s following the naval treaties and halting of expansionist policies.
You keep using the term "Meiji Oligarchy". What do you mean by that? Do you mean the actual genro? By this time period, literally everyone except Saionji is dead. In fact, I would say that much of the 1910's-1930s can be characterized as a struggle to see who will wield power now that they are dead--the Military, the elected government, the Privy Council, the bureaucrats/"New Bureaucrats", or some combination thereof.

I hardly think the protests are proof that the Militarist ideology was the mainstream position, certainly not within the government. If it was an accepted mainstream position, then there would have been no protests, as things like the naval treaties or the policy of non-intervention in China would never have happened. Indeed, the protests happened because the people against these policies, as of the 1920s, were NOT in the mainstream, and not able to influence government policy in the direction they wished, so they had to protest from the outside.
but by the late 1920s all the stats point to the Japanese economy slowing down. I did a university exam paper in economic history on this subject and it appears that the periods when Japan was expanding at least pattern wise occurred during phases of slowed economic growth. Given such a trajectory by the 1930s I expect Imperial japan to attack somewhere or expand because to fuel the Japanese economy the state needs... manpower, resources, and more land.
Yes, the Showa Financial Crisis of 1927, followed by the Great Depression, and then the Hawley-Smoot Tariff, did lead to hard times for many in Japan. Extreme rural poverty had long been a driver of army radicalism, and during this time period real rural incomes declined by half, leading to a further increase in radicalism. Economic turmoil breeds acceptance of radical solutions, the same in Japan as in Italy, Germany, or anywhere else. However, whether the chosen radical solution is military expansion abroad, as in OTL, depends on the domestic political situation in Japan at the time. Incidentally, I am not sure "more manpower' was seen as a pressing concern by Japanese business leaders at the time. The Japanese population was growing by, IIRC, about 500,000 a year, and the widespread sentiment at the time was "we will never find jobs/land for all these men!", not "we need more workers!". :p It was only under total war mobilization that Japan started running into a labor shortage.
 
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You keep using the term "Meiji Oligarchy". What do you mean by that? Do you mean the actual genro? By this time period, literally everyone except Saionji is dead. In fact, I would say that much of the 1910's-1930s can be characterized as a struggle to see who will wield power now that they are dead--the Military, the elected government, the Privy Council, the bureaucrats/"New Bureaucrats", or some combination thereof.

I hardly think the protests are proof that the Militarist ideology was the mainstream position, certainly not within the government. If it was an accepted mainstream position, then there would have been no protests, as things like the naval treaties or the policy of non-intervention in China would never have happened. Indeed, the protests happened because the people against these policies, as of the 1920s, were NOT in the mainstream, and not able to influence government policy in the direction they wished, so they had to protest from the outside.

Yes, the Showa Financial Crisis of 1927, followed by the Great Depression, and then the Hawley-Smoot Tariff, did lead to hard times for many in Japan. Extreme rural poverty had long been a driver of army radicalism, and during this time period real rural incomes declined by half, leading to a further increase in radicalism. Economic turmoil breeds acceptance of radical solutions, the same in Japan as in Italy, Germany, or anywhere else. However, whether the chosen radical solution is military expansion abroad, as in OTL, depends on the domestic political situation in Japan at the time. Incidentally, I am not sure "more manpower' was seen as a pressing concern by Japanese business leaders at the time. The Japanese population was growing by, IIRC, about 500,000 a year, and the widespread sentiment at the time was "we will never find jobs/land for all these men!", not "we need more workers!". :p It was only under total war mobilization that Japan started running into a labor shortage.
1) I should clarify, what I meant by the oligarchs were the companies such as mitubishi and mitsui. It was these companies who controlled and funded both minseito and seiyukai. Thus you could consider the mainstream Japanese parties as mouthpieces for the views held by their respective benefactor. The left and members within both parties though were probably not in leauge with the big companies but at leas party policy among the big 2 was for the most part dictated by the Zaibatsu's needs. Thus in the 1930s with the establishment of iraa signalled the decline o influence held by the corporates adn was now held by the officers. THough to the corporates war or no war as long as they made profits it did not matter in which direction Japan wnt.

2) Nihon Shoku(Think that is how it is called) is what I mean. This was the ideology ascribed to by much of he imperial court including the emperor himself.

3) I dont just mean difficult times for japanese but the resource situations as well. The japanese industrial world was expanding rapidly as were the nations armed forces but for all this buildup one needs resources such s coal, steel, rubber, etc These resources were lacked by Japan but found in the neighboring states. By the 1930s china had refused to continue doing trade with Japan and the Japanese trade in China was crucial for fueling the Japanese economy. Korea by this point was not enough.

The poster wants a pod in 1937 and by then it is impossible for war to be averted. As I mentioned earlier chiang's cutting of ties with Japan and hostile rhetoric which was justified meant war was inevitable. It is akin to nazi-soviet situation though the difference wasnt in ideology but economics and Chiang activity trying to reunify China under the nationalist banner.
 
1) I should clarify, what I meant by the oligarchs were the companies such as mitubishi and mitsui. It was these companies who controlled and funded both minseito and seiyukai. Thus you could consider the mainstream Japanese parties as mouthpieces for the views held by their respective benefactor. The left and members within both parties though were probably not in leauge with the big companies but at leas party policy among the big 2 was for the most part dictated by the Zaibatsu's needs. Thus in the 1930s with the establishment of iraa signalled the decline o influence held by the corporates adn was now held by the officers.
Well, I would agree that Imperial Japan was an oligarchy for pretty much the entirety of the Meiji Period. Already by the Taisho Period, though, you had some real power in the hands of civilian leaders. It is true that the zaibatsu families had tremendous influence--money can do that--but I don't think it is correct to say that they were the oligarchs in Japan at this time, at least not in the sense of being truly in charge. Part of what makes Japan interesting in this time period is the constantly-shifting power blocs, of which the zaibatsu were only one. There were also the Military, the Privy Council, the bureaucracy, and civilian political leaders. The zaibatsu families were sometimes able to flex their political power, as for example when they helped bring an end to the Siberian Expedition and bring the troops home. This was unpopular with the Army, at least, and the Zaibatsu managed to get it done anyway, though it did help that by this time the Expedition had become very unpopular with large segments of the Japanese public. Nevertheless, they were not always able to get their way. Look into the ideology of the so-called "New Bureaucrats", which wielded a lot of power and influence in the 1930s. The ideology called for an upper limit on the total amount of wealth one person or family would be allowed to own, an abolition of privately-held or family businesses above a certain size, and more. This was a power bloc that was literally calling for the abolition of the zaibatsu, and yet these families, despite their wealth, were never able to so much as prevent them from gaining in influence. For another example, look at the tax structure of Imperial Japan throughout the first 30 years of the 20th century. Even before the Militarists took power, Japanese military spending was huge, often taking up 30% of the national budget or more. Of course, such large expenditures necessitated a relatively higher level of taxation, which the zaibatsu families truly loathed. Nonetheless, these families were never able to win this fight, and military spending and taxes remained high. There is no question that these men had great influence, but an oligarchy--or, at least, an oligarchy composed of zaibatsu families--it was not. To sum up, the rich industrialist families had enormous wealth, and that did bring influence, primarily through elected politicians, but also somewhat through friends on the Privy Council. However, they were never in an actual position of control. The best they could do was add their weight to a given side of the scales on each issue.
THough to the corporates war or no war as long as they made profits it did not matter in which direction Japan wnt.
I can't agree with this, sorry. It is not true to say that the Zaibatsu families did not care about Japanese foreign policy. In fact, they cared a great deal, and for most of their existence, they consistently promoted a relatively peaceful policy. However, in the depths of the Great Depression, they made a volte face, and joined forces with the Militarists, who had earlier been their hated enemy. This is an odd situation, and requires some explanation. First, why did the zaibatsu families support a smaller foreign policy in general? The reasons are twofold. The primary reason is what I mentioned above--taxes. Zaibatsu leaders were utterly consistent in their opposition to high taxes, the high military spending that necessitated them. The second reason was diplomatic. As a newly-industrializing nation, Japan occupied a very strange niche in world trade. Her balance of trade with the US, UK, and Germany, for example, was almost perpetually in the red, as Japan tended to sell items of relatively little worth to these nations (except for silk), and import complex machinery, rolling stock, etc in order to build her own industry. In contrast, Japan's trade with East Asia was usually quite profitable, as they exported finished goods, and received raw materials in return. This meant, clearly, that in order to prosper, Japan needed to have good relations with as many nations as possible. Zaibatsu leaders had seen the effect that Chinese boycotts, for example, could have on their business, and they feared such an effect. The Japanese economy could ONLY prosper if she could trade freely with both the West and with East Asia, and if people were willing to buy her goods. This is not to say that the zaibatsu families were avowed pacifists, of course. The concessions in China under the treaty port system were immensely profitable, and I think the majority of these families would support any action, including military, in order to defend them. But would they have, in normal times, have supported an all-out war in order to seize markets and resources abroad? I think the answer is almost certainly not. For one thing, a total war would mean that the zaibatsu looses control of their factories, as they are turned over to military use. It means antagonizing both the West and the countries that Japan attacks. It means that profits willl be squeezed in the name of wartime efficiency. All in all, it is far too risky. In OTL, this is what we find: up until 1930 or so, the zaibatsu families consistently supported a policy of reducing military spending, of defending, but not expanding, Japanese concessions abroad, and of good relations with as many nations as possible.

Point three: why did the Militarists and the zaibatsu hate each other? Of course, part of the answer goes back yet again to military spending and taxes. I have covered that twice already, so I will not force you to read it again. however, the Militarists also hated the zaibatsu for ideological reasons. If you read a lot of what the Militarists themselves wrote, especially in the various coup attempts of the 1930s, a ton of it is actually just hateful rants directed against the rich industrialist class. The rich used their money to pervert government in order to serve their aims (instead of the righteous patriotic aims of endless foreign aggression), and thus were unpatriotic, the rich tried to hold back Japan's military spending, and thus were trying to weaken Japan, the rich had ties to foreign trade and foreign businessmen, and thus were not "truly Japanese". It goes on and on.

So, then, why did the zaibatsu ultimately side with the Militarists after 1930, if they had been sworn enemies before this? It's simple, really: they felt like they had no other choice. Before the HS Tariff, they hated them. But after that passed, many felt like exports were simply not an option. At the very least, the Militarists could bring big (and profitable) military supply contracts. At least the factories would stay open. Further, if Japan was going to make things, it needed raw materials. If it could not pay for them, then perhaps the Militarists could simply seize them. Was that not better than going without? Military action would enrage the Chinese, and make them less likely to buy Japanese goods. But people weren't buying Japanese goods anyway. Maybe if the Militarists could turn China into a captive market, the way India was for the British, then Chinese people would have no choice but to buy from Japan. If that huge market was in Japanese hands, then the zaibatsu would never be such a position again.

Really, the alliance between the zaibatsu leaders and the Militarists is a case of politics making strange bedfellows. It was an alliance of desperation, one that never should have happened. It should be easy enough to butterfly...

2) Nihon Shoku(Think that is how it is called) is what I mean. This was the ideology ascribed to by much of he imperial court including the emperor himself.
Not sure what you mean here, sorry. The only "nihonshoku" that I know of means "Japanese food", and I doubt that is what you mean. Perhaps you mean kokutai?
3) I dont just mean difficult times for japanese but the resource situations as well. The japanese industrial world was expanding rapidly as were the nations armed forces but for all this buildup one needs resources such s coal, steel, rubber, etc These resources were lacked by Japan but found in the neighboring states. By the 1930s china had refused to continue doing trade with Japan and the Japanese trade in China was crucial for fueling the Japanese economy. Korea by this point was not enough.
I believe I answered this part above. Absent the Great Depression and the Hawley-Smoot Tariff, I believe the zaibatsu and the civilian government would have strongly favored simply trading with foreign countries for more resources, rather than taking the all-or-nothing chance of going to war to seize them. It was, in my view, only the rise of the Militarists, coupled with the two economic events outlined above, that lead to a consensus (of sorts) in Japan in favor of military action abroad.
 
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