1) I should clarify, what I meant by the oligarchs were the companies such as mitubishi and mitsui. It was these companies who controlled and funded both minseito and seiyukai. Thus you could consider the mainstream Japanese parties as mouthpieces for the views held by their respective benefactor. The left and members within both parties though were probably not in leauge with the big companies but at leas party policy among the big 2 was for the most part dictated by the Zaibatsu's needs. Thus in the 1930s with the establishment of iraa signalled the decline o influence held by the corporates adn was now held by the officers.
Well, I would agree that Imperial Japan was an oligarchy for pretty much the entirety of the Meiji Period. Already by the Taisho Period, though, you had some real power in the hands of civilian leaders. It is true that the zaibatsu families had tremendous influence--money can do that--but I don't think it is correct to say that they were the oligarchs in Japan at this time, at least not in the sense of being truly in charge. Part of what makes Japan interesting in this time period is the constantly-shifting power blocs, of which the zaibatsu were only one. There were also the Military, the Privy Council, the bureaucracy, and civilian political leaders. The zaibatsu families were sometimes able to flex their political power, as for example when they helped bring an end to the Siberian Expedition and bring the troops home. This was unpopular with the Army, at least, and the Zaibatsu managed to get it done anyway, though it did help that by this time the Expedition had become very unpopular with large segments of the Japanese public. Nevertheless, they were not always able to get their way. Look into the ideology of the so-called "New Bureaucrats", which wielded a lot of power and influence in the 1930s. The ideology called for an upper limit on the total amount of wealth one person or family would be allowed to own, an abolition of privately-held or family businesses above a certain size, and more. This was a power bloc that was literally calling for the abolition of the zaibatsu, and yet these families, despite their wealth, were never able to so much as prevent them from gaining in influence. For another example, look at the tax structure of Imperial Japan throughout the first 30 years of the 20th century. Even before the Militarists took power, Japanese military spending was huge, often taking up 30% of the national budget or more. Of course, such large expenditures necessitated a relatively higher level of taxation, which the zaibatsu families truly loathed. Nonetheless, these families were never able to win this fight, and military spending and taxes remained high. There is no question that these men had great influence, but an oligarchy--or, at least, an oligarchy composed of zaibatsu families--it was not. To sum up, the rich industrialist families had enormous wealth, and that did bring influence, primarily through elected politicians, but also somewhat through friends on the Privy Council. However, they were never in an actual position of control. The best they could do was add their weight to a given side of the scales on each issue.
THough to the corporates war or no war as long as they made profits it did not matter in which direction Japan wnt.
I can't agree with this, sorry. It is not true to say that the Zaibatsu families did not care about Japanese foreign policy. In fact, they cared a great deal, and for most of their existence, they consistently promoted a relatively peaceful policy. However, in the depths of the Great Depression, they made a volte face, and joined forces with the Militarists, who had earlier been their hated enemy. This is an odd situation, and requires some explanation. First, why did the zaibatsu families support a smaller foreign policy in general? The reasons are twofold. The primary reason is what I mentioned above--taxes. Zaibatsu leaders were utterly consistent in their opposition to high taxes, the high military spending that necessitated them. The second reason was diplomatic. As a newly-industrializing nation, Japan occupied a very strange niche in world trade. Her balance of trade with the US, UK, and Germany, for example, was almost perpetually in the red, as Japan tended to sell items of relatively little worth to these nations (except for silk), and import complex machinery, rolling stock, etc in order to build her own industry. In contrast, Japan's trade with East Asia was usually quite profitable, as they exported finished goods, and received raw materials in return. This meant, clearly, that in order to prosper, Japan needed to have good relations with as many nations as possible. Zaibatsu leaders had seen the effect that Chinese boycotts, for example, could have on their business, and they feared such an effect. The Japanese economy could ONLY prosper if she could trade freely with both the West and with East Asia, and if people were willing to buy her goods. This is not to say that the zaibatsu families were avowed pacifists, of course. The concessions in China under the treaty port system were immensely profitable, and I think the majority of these families would support any action, including military, in order to defend them. But would they have, in normal times, have supported an all-out war in order to seize markets and resources abroad? I think the answer is almost certainly not. For one thing, a total war would mean that the zaibatsu looses control of their factories, as they are turned over to military use. It means antagonizing both the West and the countries that Japan attacks. It means that profits willl be squeezed in the name of wartime efficiency. All in all, it is far too risky. In OTL, this is what we find: up until 1930 or so, the zaibatsu families consistently supported a policy of reducing military spending, of defending, but not expanding, Japanese concessions abroad, and of good relations with as many nations as possible.
Point three: why did the Militarists and the zaibatsu hate each other? Of course, part of the answer goes back yet again to military spending and taxes. I have covered that twice already, so I will not force you to read it again. however, the Militarists also hated the zaibatsu for ideological reasons. If you read a lot of what the Militarists themselves wrote, especially in the various coup attempts of the 1930s, a ton of it is actually just hateful rants directed against the rich industrialist class. The rich used their money to pervert government in order to serve their aims (instead of the righteous patriotic aims of endless foreign aggression), and thus were unpatriotic, the rich tried to hold back Japan's military spending, and thus were trying to weaken Japan, the rich had ties to foreign trade and foreign businessmen, and thus were not "truly Japanese". It goes on and on.
So, then, why did the zaibatsu ultimately side with the Militarists after 1930, if they had been sworn enemies before this? It's simple, really: they felt like they had no other choice. Before the HS Tariff, they hated them. But after that passed, many felt like exports were simply not an option. At the very least, the Militarists could bring big (and profitable) military supply contracts. At least the factories would stay open. Further, if Japan was going to make things, it needed raw materials. If it could not pay for them, then perhaps the Militarists could simply seize them. Was that not better than going without? Military action would enrage the Chinese, and make them less likely to buy Japanese goods. But people weren't buying Japanese goods anyway. Maybe if the Militarists could turn China into a captive market, the way India was for the British, then Chinese people would have no choice but to buy from Japan. If that huge market was in Japanese hands, then the zaibatsu would never be such a position again.
Really, the alliance between the zaibatsu leaders and the Militarists is a case of politics making strange bedfellows. It was an alliance of desperation, one that never should have happened. It should be easy enough to butterfly...
2) Nihon Shoku(Think that is how it is called) is what I mean. This was the ideology ascribed to by much of he imperial court including the emperor himself.
Not sure what you mean here, sorry. The only "nihonshoku" that I know of means "Japanese food", and I doubt that is what you mean. Perhaps you mean
kokutai?
3) I dont just mean difficult times for japanese but the resource situations as well. The japanese industrial world was expanding rapidly as were the nations armed forces but for all this buildup one needs resources such s coal, steel, rubber, etc These resources were lacked by Japan but found in the neighboring states. By the 1930s china had refused to continue doing trade with Japan and the Japanese trade in China was crucial for fueling the Japanese economy. Korea by this point was not enough.
I believe I answered this part above. Absent the Great Depression and the Hawley-Smoot Tariff, I believe the zaibatsu and the civilian government would have strongly favored simply trading with foreign countries for more resources, rather than taking the all-or-nothing chance of going to war to seize them. It was, in my view, only the rise of the Militarists, coupled with the two economic events outlined above, that lead to a consensus (of sorts) in Japan in favor of military action abroad.