No January Uprising

WI: Aleksander Wielopolski led better policy and somehow managed to stop polish revolt in 1863. What would happen? I think history would be seriously affected.
Congress Poland would keep some degree of autonomy, it's rather obvious, but not really important compared to other changes:
-Russia wouldn't sell Alaska (suppression of uprising was costly for Russia, Tsar needed money to balance budget, ITTL he doesn't need)
_without uprising there is no rapprochement between Russia and Prussia like in OTL (no Anvelsleben convention)-it was caused by fear of polish irredentism-common danger for both countries. That's mean-Russia wouldn't allow Prussians to unite Germany! Such strengthening of the western neighbor wasn't in Russia's interest. OTL they agreed because liquidation of polish danger was more important at the moment. So Germany propably wouldn't grow beyond North German Confederation borders.
 
No one interested?:(

Some other thoughts:would it be ww1 with weaker Germany? I'm sure not with OTL alliances system-in the case of global war UK would rather side with Germany ITTL, but it may happen that european order without Second Reich is stable enough to avoid Great War (France and Russia strong enough to balance Germany and Austria-Hungary). Or I am wrong and Germany can unite even despite russian hostility? (Or would they at least risk something like 1870 action without clear situation on eastern border?)
 
Well, yeah - buttefflies will be pretty significant. Not only would it affect Russia, but also early 20th century, WW1, Bolshevik Revolution etc.
 
Alaska would still be sold--it was nothing but a money pit for the Russians, and the Americans would go for it if it were offered.

I hardly think Russia has much say in German unification--it doesn't affect them much to see Bavaria joined to Prussia, and a strong Prussia means a weak Austria means more of the Ottoman Balkans going into St. Petersburg's orbit.

The most significant effects of this (barring butterflies) will be within Poland itself. Jozef Pilsudski, for example, might be a different person as his father will be different for not having fought in the uprising.

The cultural effects of no uprising could go either way--Polish nationalism might be stronger and more violent, to the point where Pilsudski's OTL attempt to get Japanese arms for a Polish uprising would not be seriously opposed, or it might be less uprising-oriented and more along the lines of Dmowski's own collaborate-with-Russia idea.
 
I hardly think Russia has much say in German unification--it doesn't affect them much to see Bavaria joined to Prussia, and a strong Prussia means a weak Austria means more of the Ottoman Balkans going into St. Petersburg's orbit.
Bismarck was rather wary of how Russia would react and made sure to ask for Russian neutrality in Prussia's wars.
 
Bismarck was rather wary of how Russia would react and made sure to ask for Russian neutrality in Prussia's wars.

He was a very cautious politician who liked to be sure the things he planned wouldn't run into unforeseen trouble. In this context, it is also good to remember that until around 1880, the German government planned from a perceived position of weakness. The bombast of the Wilhelmine era can easily blind us to the fact that to Bismarck, the other great powers were nightmare of certain military annihilation. If the Czar had objected to German unification, it would not have happened in the OTL fashion. The question is, of course, whether he would have, since it meant no immediate threat and greatly reduced Austria's standing.

It is unlikely that this would be enough to preempt German unification entirely. The sentiment in Germany was too strongly in favour. but it would have prevented the Bismarckian Empire from coming into being, and its peculiar construction was responsible for many of the key problems of the coming 50 years. The question is, what happens instead? I'm just not sure enough of the constellations this early. With Russia and Prussia opposed, they might seek to make their own Polish subjects happiest and rile those on the other side, giving "Organic Work" a chance at spectacular success. That would require neither Russification nor Ansiedlungsgesetz (I doubt Prussia would feel either strong or national enough to stoop to the level Wilhelmine Germany did, anyway).

Would Russian opposition to a stronger Prussia be enough to prevent the war of 1866? There was no conflict that could not have been resolved, the war was about who would run the rest of Germany in future, a pure rank battle. If that, both Prussia and Austria would stay in the game. As a result, "Germany" could not become a military entity. If we still have an Ausgleich in some form (I assume we will have to), then it woulsd be possible to integrate the Austrian half of Austria-Hungary economically into an ever closer Zollverein. In the end, there may be other institutions designed to homogenise aspects of life. Alt-Germany may get its own version of Schengen and a Nationalitätenpolitik in the Austrian mould.

Of course, if this defused the issue to an extent and forced the Prussians and Austrians to come to a settlement of their respective claims in Germany, Russia will have screwed the pooch big time. This would be a defensive bloc with no inbuilt opposition by France, but major difficulties with Russia. And I don't think industrialisation in the German Bund will be appreciably slower than in the Reich - more likely accelerated, given the lesser preponderance of Eastelbian agriculturalists in high politics. You'd see things like the Rheinausbau and Mittellandkanal much earlier.

That leaves us with the questions: are the Prussians and Austrians smart enough not to screw this up (I doubt it) and WWND?
 
Bismarck was rather wary of how Russia would react and made sure to ask for Russian neutrality in Prussia's wars.
Bismarck had just to offer support about the Straits to get it anyway. But it would be a harder bargain.
 
The obvious winner ITTL is... Denmark. Without January Uprising and Anvelsleben convention Russia would uphold the role of guarantor of Danish borders - which means no 2nd Schleswig War, and possibly better Russo-French relations. In the end there may be different Austro-Prussian War in which after Austrians getting the upper hand... they got mobbed by French AND Russians.
 
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