No Italo-Turkish War of 1911

[Fearless Leader]

True, it was placating the Albanians, but the Balkan League never seriously believed the Albanians will support them. Serbia and Montenegro gave them some funds and weapons while they were rebelling against the Ottoman Empire but this arrangement was understood to be temporary by all sides. Basically, the Albanians were never going to be allies against the Ottoman Empire, and the ethnic Bulgarian/Greek/Serb citizens would remain reliably supportive. Which is why IMO the Balkan League governments did not feel like they were running out of time, and military-centered reforms are the only kind of reforms that could make them start feeling that way.

I think you're underestimating just how disastrous a fully formed and developed Albanian nationalism would be to the Serbians, Greeks, and Bulgarians. Albanian nationalists were already HEAVILY supported by Austria-Hungary as were efforts to keep Macedonia Ottoman. With Albanian nationalism more widely accepted the Serbs can practically kiss their dreams of taking Shkoder (Scutari) and most of Kosovo goodbye. Same with Greece and "Northern Epirus" (no way that they'll be able to claim the 150k Orthodox Albanians are actually Greeks confused about what language to speak in TTL) As well as Bulgaria with "Western Macedonia" AKA Albanian populated lands allocated to them in the Treaty of San Stefano in 1878.

Finally, I think the revolutionary nature of the 1912 Albanian reforms aren't being understood. This marks the first time that the Ottomans are basically conceding to demands for national (not religious) autonomy within the Empire. There is literally nothing stopping them from doing the same thing to Macedonia or to the Arabs for that matter. Local support isn't really the issue here, it's international support. If the Ottomans are doing everything the Great Powers (Britain, France, Austria in this case) want them to, why would they stand by and allow the Russian backed Balkan league to mess everything up?

 

[LordKalvert]

Well, it's a total delight reading all the posters on here - the perceptions are a great education for me





How stable is the Russian polity? It's difficult to imagine a controlled expansion of suffrage and access to power and policy. If Russia is weakened by internal upheavals? I don't know the realistic chance of this.

Internally Russia is actually pretty strong. The troops that are being called out are doing so in very small detachments, short durations and almost never used there weapons (just 10 times in 1910)

There are strikes but that is hardly indicative of a revolutionary situation-merely workers desiring higher wages. They also have low participation and are of short duration

Turning to the political situation- the Tsar was doing a bang up job of limiting the Duma's powers and franchise to the point that no one cared about it. The institution simply lacked all popular support and was seen as a noble institution. Nicholas will eventually limit it to an advisory role and get away with it. In time, it will probably just disappear

To understand Russia its important to know that while it is an autocracy and the higher levels of government (provincial and municipal) have insanely undemocratic franchises, the country has very ancient liberal institutions at the local level. Namely village government, where most of the people lived and had the real power over the people's lives, was elected in an extremely democratic fashion and the village assemblies allowed every household a vote on major issues. The liberals really have no program to offer the people

As has been said, the powers are capable of almost any combination. The British would love to pursue a pro-France anti-Russian policy but that's not possible. The Russians wouldn't mind a pro-France, pro-Germany anti-Austrian and anti-British policy, but that's not possible either. The Italians desire an anti-Austrian, anti-French policy, pro British policy- but that's not possible either. The Austrians wouldn't mind a pro French, anti-Russian policy but that won't work

Its these competing interests that makes the situation both unstable and stable at the same time. Depending on the issue, the powers could combine in almost anyway- except a Franco-Russian or Austro-German split- this balance is too natural and too obvious to go away

 

[GrayAnderson]

Another generalized thought: It seems unlikely that a major war is avoided beyond 1920 or so, but the question of when one drops is a worthwhile one. If nothing else, delaying a war into 1916 is likely to mean that there has been another election in Britain (possibly putting the Tories in, possibly leaving an even more ramshackle coalition in place than the situation from 1910). It also increasingly raises the possibility of a leadership change in the US (Wilson barely won in 1916 as it was; his position was arguably quite weak, having only won in 1912 due to a massive split in the opposition, and he represents the only time that a candidate who was neither a Republican nor a Bourbon Democrat won between 1856 and 1932* and absent a clear reason to be re-elected he is likely to lose). The one way this doesn't happen is if the GOP splits again...something possible without the specter of war, though definitely not likely.

So as a serious question, would the Tories have been likely to be more pro-German than the Liberals (who had been in power from 1906)? I can see a Tory victory happening it the Liberals and Labour really go at it (this is no small part of what happened after the war, though of course that situation is insanely complicated as the Liberals basically tore themselves apart in the end).

*Andrew Johnson never won an election and Grover Cleveland was a "hard money" Democrat who arguably represented something different than was the party's general position over the years. Wilson stumbled in with <42% of the vote in 1912.

 

[Halagaz]

I think you're underestimating just how disastrous a fully formed and developed Albanian nationalism would be to the Serbians, Greeks, and Bulgarians. Albanian nationalists were already HEAVILY supported by Austria-Hungary as were efforts to keep Macedonia Ottoman. With Albanian nationalism more widely accepted the Serbs can practically kiss their dreams of taking Shkoder (Scutari) and most of Kosovo goodbye. Same with Greece and "Northern Epirus" (no way that they'll be able to claim the 150k Orthodox Albanians are actually Greeks confused about what language to speak in TTL) As well as Bulgaria with "Western Macedonia" AKA Albanian populated lands allocated to them in the Treaty of San Stefano in 1878.

Finally, I think the revolutionary nature of the 1912 Albanian reforms aren't being understood. This marks the first time that the Ottomans are basically conceding to demands for national (not religious) autonomy within the Empire. There is literally nothing stopping them from doing the same thing to Macedonia or to the Arabs for that matter. Local support isn't really the issue here, it's international support. If the Ottomans are doing everything the Great Powers (Britain, France, Austria in this case) want them to, why would they stand by and allow the Russian backed Balkan league to mess everything up?

Could be. But I'd say Albanian nationalism doesn't mean much for the short term if the Balkan states are still able to militarily defeat the Ottoman Empire. And if it turns out they're unable it would again be due to factors mostly or completely unrelated to Albanian autonomy.

Not to mention how the new Albanian vilayet would be massively inflated in size and would have ruled over significant populations of Slavs (Christian and Muslim) and Greeks. That can't be good for its internal stability, which would already be marred by sectarian and regional conflicts within the Albanians themselves.

The Ottomans conceded (limited) national autonomy to Serbs in 1830 and Bulgarians in 1878, so it's not unprecedented.

 

[yourworstnightmare]

One important thing is that no Balkans wars or Italian wars would mean a very different Ottoman Empire, not yet as exposed to it's own weakness as OTL.

 

[trajen777]

Very good thoughts..... Read several good books -- Dreadnought - and his other books -- anyway they discussed in depth the 1895 - 1900 Britain and German Alliance that was being put forward -- many sticking points - mostly Kaiser wanting to get better deal -- and then the Austrian situation (Britain not waning to get pulled into support for Austria in Balkan war)

Anyway -- I think the best situation is that Russia and France form tight alliance -- France needs Russia and Russia needs France financing. Germany needs a better partner then Austria and can go Russia (but they do not want to finance a building power on their border) so need Britain, Britain and Germany offer each other a good balance if Germany minimizes fleet - by 1909 they had given up the fleet race. So with Britain and Germany vs France and Russia prob no WW1 -- if Germany supports Austria then Britain might stay neutral and Germany + Austria + Ottoman ? vs France and Russia --- Fr and Russia loses

 

[Fearless Leader]

Could be. But I'd say Albanian nationalism doesn't mean much for the short term if the Balkan states are still able to militarily defeat the Ottoman Empire. And if it turns out they're unable it would again be due to factors mostly or completely unrelated to Albanian autonomy.

Not to mention how the new Albanian vilayet would be massively inflated in size and would have ruled over significant populations of Slavs (Christian and Muslim) and Greeks. That can't be good for its internal stability, which would already be marred by sectarian and regional conflicts within the Albanians themselves.

We seem to be talking past one another. I'm not arguing that the Balkan League was concerned with the military ramifications of the Ottoman reforms but rather the diplomatic ramifications. As regional powers at best, the Balkan League was utterly dependent on Great Power support or ambivalence. Albanian and Macedonian autonomy presents the Great Powers with more options for diplomatic compromise that don't involve substantial land gains for the Balkan League. As it was, at the conclusion of the First Balkan War in OTL, the Great powers toyed with an independent Macedonia centered on Salonika. Imagine what weight these proposals would get if Macedonia was already an autonomous region?

What I'm trying to argue is that the Balkan League worried that Albanian and Macedonian autonomy would cause them to lose the peace with the Ottomans after having won any conflict. Thus it played a major role in spurring them to launch the first Balkan War when they did, before Albanian autonomy could be established and reforms enacted in Macedonia. These concerns existed independently from the Italo-Turkish war and would likely have lead to a Balkan war sooner rather than later.

The Ottomans conceded (limited) national autonomy to Serbs in 1830 and Bulgarians in 1878, so it's not unprecedented.

Yes, but the Serbs and the Bulgarians were both predominantly Orthodox. The Albanian reforms were the first time the Ottomans granted some kind of national autonomy to Muslims, violating their insistence of the uniformity of the Muslim millet within the empire. In that way it's unprecedented.

 

[GiantMonkeyMan]

Just as a side note, without the war in Libya, the (non-pacifist) reformist wing of the PSI would never have been expelled from the party. People like Bissolati, editor of Avanti! at the time, and Bonomi supported the war and ended up being expelled and going on to form the Partito Socialista Riformista Italiano. As a result, Mussolini would never have been made editor of Avanti! and his crude nationalistic 'socialism' would never have circulated beyond the minor local papers he wrote for.