Some catching up to do here...
I've a related question here.
With all this effort and with all these forces already in the Med, how come the Allies didn't go for an Operation Dragoon instead of Overlord? ...
Originally labeled Operation Anvil the invasion of South France was proposed by the COSSAC staff in the late summer of 1943. It was a part of a package of options presented by COSSAC. Those included up dated versions of the ROUNDUP operations (RANKIN I, II, III). The old SLEDGEHAMMER reworked into OVERLORD & NEPTUNE. The purpose of Op ANVIL was to secure the south France super port group of Marsailles/Toulon, draw German reserves south in advance of OVERLORD, & act as a fast conduit to move US and French forces from the Mediterranean to NW Europe.
When COSSAC was folded into SHAEF in December 1943 Eisenhower liked the concept of ANVIL & directed it be scheduled for April 1944. However, Eisenhower also wanted Op NEPTUNE to be as large as possible in order to Gain the maximum effect of Op OVERLORD. This could not be done if a amphibious fleet were retained in the Med until April to execute Op ANVIL on schedule. Eisenhower had both the staffs of SHAEF, 21 Army Group and SACMED struggle with this problem through January and February. It proved impossible to have it both ways. Eisenhower wanted a maximum cross Channel effort first and formost. So Op Anvil was dropped in March 1944. The same moment Anvil was canceled Eisenhower directed a new operation be prepared, with a target date of as soon as sufficient amphib fleet elements could be transfered from the UK to the Med. This reworked Op was named DRAGOON.
The Hyperwar web site outlines all this and refrences original sources. There are also at least two descriptions of Eisenhowers dilemma over ANVIL vs 'large' NEPTUNE in at least two of the bios of Eisenhower.
You not only have to take it, you have to supply it, and develop the infrastructure, and everything else. Great Britain is not only a lot bigger than Corsica it is also a modern industrialized nation that is also a lot closer to North America. There is no comparison between the two.
OTL Corsica was captured secured in November 1943, By mid January 44 there were 1,100+ US and French aircraft permanetly based in Corsica. That 1,100 was split between ten medium bomber groups, a similar number of fighters, and some recon and maritime patrol aircraft. A surge capacity for some 2,000+ additional aircraft was built up on Corsica/Sardinia so extra aircraft could use the islands as a intermediate base on missions northwards. Elsewhere in the Med in early 1944 were 5,000+ operational aircraft of the Allied 15th and other airforces.
Again Hyperwar has some bits on this, tho the histories of the US 15th Air Force & the US AAF can turn up more detail. Ditto for the Brit air force histories.
Well, the things is, we're talking about 1943 here. The forces for Overlord are still assembling. The forces for Husky however, were already in theater and ready to go. So, instead of sending them all to Italy to waste themselves in the Italian mountains, the Allies could've sent them to the French Mediterranean cost.
"Local forces?" Yeah, that's not much. The Vichy French military might put up a fight for a bit longer than what the Vichy French military did with Operation Torch. But I doubt that'd be too substantial. And the Germans were mighty light on troop deployments in that region.
The Vichy French Army was disarmed and disbanded in November/December 1943 after Operation ANTON. By December 43 the Riveria coast was defended by the Italian Army & a very small number of Germans. German reserves in France in Jan 44 look great on paper. They included two panzer corps, but those were being stripped & their strength split between Tunisia and the east front. Those had been replaced by shot up divisions from the east which had just started rebuilding.
Yes, logistics would be a stretch. Hence the drive north to the Channel and thus opening a supply route there.
The Marsailles port group, including Toulon, Niece, Cannes, & other small ports had a nominal peace time capacity of between 20,000 & 30,000 tons daily. Using the lower number thats nominal support for a army group of 22 ground combat divisions plus corps and army overhead and a tactical airforce in support. OTL all the southern ports were secured and opened in the second half of September. By December they were supporting the entire Allied 6th Army group, and building up material from the US to double the French Army from ten to twenty divisions.
And so rather than signing up the Husky forces for a small fight with a weak opponent in difficult terrain, you sign them up for a large fight with a difficult opponent in easy terrain. You press the Germans harder but give the Italians a breather when you might knock them out of the war. Liberate the French faster but turn their whole country into a battlefield. It's all swings and roundabouts and while the OTL choices might not have turned out the best, but they were usually taken for what seemed at the time logical reasons.
Yes those are interesting trade offs. One of the advantages of feeding the French vs the 'liberated' Italians is the French were interested in fighting the Germans. In 19th months the Allied Italian government managed to muster enough soldiers to constitute two infantry divisions & a few brigades for security. The French brought ten ground combat divisions to the fight & in the space of three months rounded up enough manpower for ten new divisions, additional airgroups, a army support force, ect...
The best the Allies could show for providing the shipping to keep the southern Italian population alive were a few thousand infantry & some humanitarian credit. Draw your own conclusions.
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Also you won't take Italy out of the war without troops on Italian soil. Despite people here talking down on Italy you would need to allocate a significant air force to keeping Italian air force from interfering.
The Italian airforce had been shot out of the sky before the Sicillian campaign started. Aluminum shortages alone halted aircraft production in early 1943. IIRC a total of 800 new aircraft came off the factory floors from January to September 43. For comparison the US built 60,000+, the Germans close to 50,000, & Britain around 40,000 combat aircraft in 1943. When the Allied armies arrived in autum 1943 they found the Italian population on the verge of famine. The food rationing system was breaking down, and the Germans were still only promising grain from the east just as soon as the war there was won. Coal & fuel oil for residential heat were very short, new clothing had become impossible to find. Factories were often shut down for lack of fuel and raw materials. In short the Italian economy was collapsing.
The Germans could not make up the shortfall. The air battles in the Med from January 43 to August had left the Axis hard pressed to muster 2,500 aircraft while the Allied air strength had risen to over double that.