No Invasion of Sicily during WW2

I've a related question here.

With all this effort and with all these forces already in the Med, how come the Allies didn't go for an Operation Dragoon instead of Overlord?

Even with the various deceptions to throw the Germans off the Allies knew they'd still be attacking into the teeth of a very well prepared enemy who was expecting such an attack in that overall area.

Rather than playing into Germany's hands, why not go for the French Mediterranean coast instead Hitler's "Atlantic Wall?"

Yes, we'd still have to neutralize Sicily and the various other islands as well as destroying the Italian air forces and navy. But by the time we put ashore and Anzio we'd already largely done that. So, why not jump into France where the Axis was least prepared to deal with it?
Logistics logistics logistics.

It just made sense to bring supplies from Britain to Normandy.
 

thorr97

Banned
naraic,

Logistics logistics logistics.

It just made sense to bring supplies from Britain to Normandy.

But we were already supporting the invasion of Italy via those existing logistics trains.

Considering the power and density of the defenses the Germans had established there along the Channel coast, coming ashore on the otherwise undefended French Mediterranean coast would've been far less risky and involved far lower a loss of life.

Cutting Germany out of France in '43 is also an exceptionally attractive and war shortening goal.
 
naraic,

But we were already supporting the invasion of Italy via those existing logistics trains.
Yes and as far as I understand it's an either or. Italy used all the available ports capacity in the med.

Also you won't take Italy out of the war without troops on Italian soil. Despite people here talking down on Italy you would need to allocate a significant air force to keeping Italian air force from interfering.
 

thorr97

Banned
naraic,

Yes and as far as I understand it's an either or. Italy used all the available ports capacity in the med.

Also you won't take Italy out of the war without troops on Italian soil. Despite people here talking down on Italy you would need to allocate a significant air force to keeping Italian air force from interfering.

I can't see the Allies ignoring Italy in its entirety but the prize of retaking France in '43 seems a lot more compelling that spending two years slogging through one Italian peninsular valley after another.

So, we'd go after Sicily, as in OTL, and Sardina while making every effort to look like Italy was the ultimate target.

Then we put ashore anywhere from Nice to Argeles-sur-Mer and drive north for all its worth.

Coming up from behind all those coastal fortifications would force the Germans to bail out of them and thus we'd soon have that Channel coast to bring supplies from England ashore on even we didn't get Calais cleared immediately.

I think that would be worth far more than we gained by grinding away in Italy.
 
Would the Allies have the air bases in range to do all of that? With Normandy it is a short flight across the Channel to the world's largest aircraft carrier. I don't see how the Allies can mass decisive airpower the way they did with Normandy even with carrier support.
 
Would the Allies have the air bases in range to do all of that? With Normandy it is a short flight across the Channel to the world's largest aircraft carrier. I don't see how the Allies can mass decisive airpower the way they did with Normandy even with carrier support.
Corsica would be the large unsinkable carrier in this situation.

But you are going to have to take Corsica, there won't be a big resistance upswing without Italy falling apart.

Of course fortifying Corsica and developing it as an airbase is kind of obvious. Maybe a Jubilee style raid against northern Italy might divert focus away from France though.
 
Corsica would be the large unsinkable carrier in this situation.

But you are going to have to take Corsica, there won't be a big resistance upswing without Italy falling apart.

You not only have to take it, you have to supply it, and develop the infrastructure, and everything else. Great Britain is not only a lot bigger than Corsica it is also a modern industrialized nation that is also a lot closer to North America. There is no comparison between the two.
 
You not only have to take it, you have to supply it, and develop the infrastructure, and everything else. Great Britain is not only a lot bigger than Corsica it is also a modern industrialized nation that is also a lot closer to North America. There is no comparison between the two.
True to build enough runways for the airforce needed you probably need about 5,000 cargo ships.

Add another few thousand to stockpile supplies in theater and you have a massive logistical effort.

By the time you develop Corsica there's probably a good start on a Mediterranean wall as the Atlantic Walls little brother.
 

thorr97

Banned
Zheng He,

Would the Allies have the air bases in range to do all of that? With Normandy it is a short flight across the Channel to the world's largest aircraft carrier. I don't see how the Allies can mass decisive airpower the way they did with Normandy even with carrier support.

From the northern tip of Sardinia it's just 200 miles to Nice. Your stock P-40 has a 240 mile range. For Overlord, a goodly number of the airbases were a considerable distance back from the coast. But the 112 mile distance from Caen to Brighton is illustrative.

Also, as the defenses wouldn't be as developed and intense, so too would the need for close air support be lesser as a result. All of which was demonstrated as practicable in OTL with Operation Dragoon.
 
Even with the various deceptions to throw the Germans off the Allies knew they'd still be attacking into the teeth of a very well prepared enemy who was expecting such an attack in that overall area.
Well, aside from all the logistics and air considerations, and the desire to take the direct route to the knockout blow - if you land in the south of France you are going to have to deal with the local forces, and then head into northern France towards the Ruhr. And in northern France you will eventually find that exact same very well prepared enemy who is expecting such an attack in that overall area, and with you on the end of a long rickety logs chain from US/UK via the med and the length of France.
May as well just jump on them directly, especially if you can apply more force due to the shorter distance.
 

thorr97

Banned
b0ned0me,

Well, the things is, we're talking about 1943 here. The forces for Overlord are still assembling. The forces for Husky however, were already in theater and ready to go. So, instead of sending them all to Italy to waste themselves in the Italian mountains, the Allies could've sent them to the French Mediterranean cost.

"Local forces?" Yeah, that's not much. The Vichy French military might put up a fight for a bit longer than what the Vichy French military did with Operation Torch. But I doubt that'd be too substantial. And the Germans were mighty light on troop deployments in that region.

Yes, logistics would be a stretch. Hence the drive north to the Channel and thus opening a supply route there.
 
b0ned0me,

Well, the things is, we're talking about 1943 here. The forces for Overlord are still assembling. The forces for Husky however, were already in theater and ready to go. So, instead of sending them all to Italy to waste themselves in the Italian mountains, the Allies could've sent them to the French Mediterranean cost.

"Local forces?" Yeah, that's not much. The Vichy French military might put up a fight for a bit longer than what the Vichy French military did with Operation Torch. But I doubt that'd be too substantial. And the Germans were mighty light on troop deployments in that region.

Yes, logistics would be a stretch. Hence the drive north to the Channel and thus opening a supply route there.
And so rather than signing up the Husky forces for a small fight with a weak opponent in difficult terrain, you sign them up for a large fight with a difficult opponent in easy terrain. You press the Germans harder but give the Italians a breather when you might knock them out of the war. Liberate the French faster but turn their whole country into a battlefield. It's all swings and roundabouts and while the OTL choices might not have turned out the best, but they were usually taken for what seemed at the time logical reasons.
 
Zheng He,



From the northern tip of Sardinia it's just 200 miles to Nice. Your stock P-40 has a 240 mile range. For Overlord, a goodly number of the airbases were a considerable distance back from the coast. But the 112 mile distance from Caen to Brighton is illustrative.

Also, as the defenses wouldn't be as developed and intense, so too would the need for close air support be lesser as a result. All of which was demonstrated as practicable in OTL with Operation Dragoon.

It's not just about distance, it's about sustaining the operations. Corsica and Sardinia offer nothing. You have to bring in every bullet, every bomb, every spare part, and every drop of fuel. The British Isles offer a substantial amount of capacity in their own right. Plus if it's 43 the Luftwaffe is a lot stronger than it was in June 44 and Italian and German air units will have the Italian peninsula to operate from.

I'm having trouble seeing this...
 

thorr97

Banned
Zheng He,

If I was proposing something which was never done then the arguments thus far against doing it would have more weight. Thing is, such an invasion was done; Operation Dragoon. That operation faced the same problems as you and b0ned0me have pointed out and yet they were overcome. Also, Dragoon took place while Overlord as consuming all other available resources. Yes, the Germans had reoriented their forces against the Overlord landings and thus weren't deployed so as to counter Dragoon.

However, my contention is that there were even fewer German forces in southern France - and France, in general - in the summer of '43 than there was as of June - or August - of '44. A strike in '43 would be much more unexpected than in August of '44 after the Allies had spent a year crawling up the Italian peninsula and thus putting the entire region on alert for long enough to do more about it. Punching in to France would be easier than that valley after valley slog of the Italian campaign. And driving across the breadth of France to reach the Channel would put the Allies at the doorstep of the Rhine a full year before they got there in OTL.
 
With regard to the south of France in '43, isn't the Rhone valley a rather narrow corridor to advance up, relatively easy to deny/defend if there aren't distractions from other, bigger, invasions elsewhere, and with the additional complication of a rather large river (by Western European standards) running through it.
And if you're not trying to advance along the Rhone Valley, then you have rather a lot of hills/small mountains either side of it...

I seem to remember the Germans, in Dunois' The Sword of Freedom version of a 'France Fights on' timeline, getting seriously bogged down in the Rhone going the other way, and that despite having momentum and having kicked the stuffing out of a lot of French troops during the 'Sickle Cut' up in the North of France going for them....

And if the Western Allies land in the South of France in '43, Hitler can pull troops off the eastern front and stick them in the South of France, as he did with the OTL to contest the Allied invasion/liberation of Italy. He has internal lines of communication, and in '43 a still functional railway network and an airforce which can still contest attempts to interdict his troop movements.

Edit:
I'm not saying that it would be impossible to do; just that it likely wouldn't be a fast track or easy route to Germany.
 
Some catching up to do here...

I've a related question here.

With all this effort and with all these forces already in the Med, how come the Allies didn't go for an Operation Dragoon instead of Overlord? ...

Originally labeled Operation Anvil the invasion of South France was proposed by the COSSAC staff in the late summer of 1943. It was a part of a package of options presented by COSSAC. Those included up dated versions of the ROUNDUP operations (RANKIN I, II, III). The old SLEDGEHAMMER reworked into OVERLORD & NEPTUNE. The purpose of Op ANVIL was to secure the south France super port group of Marsailles/Toulon, draw German reserves south in advance of OVERLORD, & act as a fast conduit to move US and French forces from the Mediterranean to NW Europe.

When COSSAC was folded into SHAEF in December 1943 Eisenhower liked the concept of ANVIL & directed it be scheduled for April 1944. However, Eisenhower also wanted Op NEPTUNE to be as large as possible in order to Gain the maximum effect of Op OVERLORD. This could not be done if a amphibious fleet were retained in the Med until April to execute Op ANVIL on schedule. Eisenhower had both the staffs of SHAEF, 21 Army Group and SACMED struggle with this problem through January and February. It proved impossible to have it both ways. Eisenhower wanted a maximum cross Channel effort first and formost. So Op Anvil was dropped in March 1944. The same moment Anvil was canceled Eisenhower directed a new operation be prepared, with a target date of as soon as sufficient amphib fleet elements could be transfered from the UK to the Med. This reworked Op was named DRAGOON.

The Hyperwar web site outlines all this and refrences original sources. There are also at least two descriptions of Eisenhowers dilemma over ANVIL vs 'large' NEPTUNE in at least two of the bios of Eisenhower.

You not only have to take it, you have to supply it, and develop the infrastructure, and everything else. Great Britain is not only a lot bigger than Corsica it is also a modern industrialized nation that is also a lot closer to North America. There is no comparison between the two.

OTL Corsica was captured secured in November 1943, By mid January 44 there were 1,100+ US and French aircraft permanetly based in Corsica. That 1,100 was split between ten medium bomber groups, a similar number of fighters, and some recon and maritime patrol aircraft. A surge capacity for some 2,000+ additional aircraft was built up on Corsica/Sardinia so extra aircraft could use the islands as a intermediate base on missions northwards. Elsewhere in the Med in early 1944 were 5,000+ operational aircraft of the Allied 15th and other airforces.

Again Hyperwar has some bits on this, tho the histories of the US 15th Air Force & the US AAF can turn up more detail. Ditto for the Brit air force histories.

Well, the things is, we're talking about 1943 here. The forces for Overlord are still assembling. The forces for Husky however, were already in theater and ready to go. So, instead of sending them all to Italy to waste themselves in the Italian mountains, the Allies could've sent them to the French Mediterranean cost.

"Local forces?" Yeah, that's not much. The Vichy French military might put up a fight for a bit longer than what the Vichy French military did with Operation Torch. But I doubt that'd be too substantial. And the Germans were mighty light on troop deployments in that region.

The Vichy French Army was disarmed and disbanded in November/December 1943 after Operation ANTON. By December 43 the Riveria coast was defended by the Italian Army & a very small number of Germans. German reserves in France in Jan 44 look great on paper. They included two panzer corps, but those were being stripped & their strength split between Tunisia and the east front. Those had been replaced by shot up divisions from the east which had just started rebuilding.

Yes, logistics would be a stretch. Hence the drive north to the Channel and thus opening a supply route there.

The Marsailles port group, including Toulon, Niece, Cannes, & other small ports had a nominal peace time capacity of between 20,000 & 30,000 tons daily. Using the lower number thats nominal support for a army group of 22 ground combat divisions plus corps and army overhead and a tactical airforce in support. OTL all the southern ports were secured and opened in the second half of September. By December they were supporting the entire Allied 6th Army group, and building up material from the US to double the French Army from ten to twenty divisions.

And so rather than signing up the Husky forces for a small fight with a weak opponent in difficult terrain, you sign them up for a large fight with a difficult opponent in easy terrain. You press the Germans harder but give the Italians a breather when you might knock them out of the war. Liberate the French faster but turn their whole country into a battlefield. It's all swings and roundabouts and while the OTL choices might not have turned out the best, but they were usually taken for what seemed at the time logical reasons.

Yes those are interesting trade offs. One of the advantages of feeding the French vs the 'liberated' Italians is the French were interested in fighting the Germans. In 19th months the Allied Italian government managed to muster enough soldiers to constitute two infantry divisions & a few brigades for security. The French brought ten ground combat divisions to the fight & in the space of three months rounded up enough manpower for ten new divisions, additional airgroups, a army support force, ect...

The best the Allies could show for providing the shipping to keep the southern Italian population alive were a few thousand infantry & some humanitarian credit. Draw your own conclusions.

...

Also you won't take Italy out of the war without troops on Italian soil. Despite people here talking down on Italy you would need to allocate a significant air force to keeping Italian air force from interfering.

The Italian airforce had been shot out of the sky before the Sicillian campaign started. Aluminum shortages alone halted aircraft production in early 1943. IIRC a total of 800 new aircraft came off the factory floors from January to September 43. For comparison the US built 60,000+, the Germans close to 50,000, & Britain around 40,000 combat aircraft in 1943. When the Allied armies arrived in autum 1943 they found the Italian population on the verge of famine. The food rationing system was breaking down, and the Germans were still only promising grain from the east just as soon as the war there was won. Coal & fuel oil for residential heat were very short, new clothing had become impossible to find. Factories were often shut down for lack of fuel and raw materials. In short the Italian economy was collapsing.

The Germans could not make up the shortfall. The air battles in the Med from January 43 to August had left the Axis hard pressed to muster 2,500 aircraft while the Allied air strength had risen to over double that.
 
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With regard to the south of France in '43, isn't the Rhone valley a rather narrow corridor to advance up, relatively easy to deny/defend if there aren't distractions from other, bigger, invasions elsewhere, and with the additional complication of a rather large river (by Western European standards) running through it.
And if you're not trying to advance along the Rhone Valley, then you have rather a lot of hills/small mountains either side of it...
...

I'm not saying that it would be impossible to do; just that it likely wouldn't be a fast track or easy route to Germany.

OTL it took a single US Army corps a couple weeks to blow through the Rhone valley.

On the game board it is more difficult. As the Allied player I bypass a stiff German defense of the Rhone valley & swing west to secure LaPerigon & Bourdeux, both useful ports on the Atlantic coast. There is a wide rolling plain between the coast and the Central Massif If the German player has not got the message then a further advance north to pick off LaRochelle, Nantes, and St Nazaire. It is correct the German player has enough ground forces to stop all that, but only by leaving the north west coast dangerously weak.
 
If the Allies had invaded Sardinia instead of Sicily,
  • Corsica would fall almost immediately since it as virtually indefensible by the Germans
  • The Germans would have to spread their forces along hundreds of miles of coastline instead of being able to concentrate in one area. By invading Sicily, the Allies limited themselves on invasion sites since the farthest operating area for aircraft was the Naples-Salerno sector.
  • By launching from Sardinia and Corsica, the Allies can land in central or northern Italy and trap all Axis forces south of the invasion site. The Allies could easily land 100 miles north of Rome instead 100 miles south. So even if the Allies land in Anzio, they'd be doing it in the summer or early autumn or '43, instead of January '44.
  • By completely bypassing the Monte Cassino position, Allied bombers would be able to attack targets from southern Germany to possibly the Romanian oil fields much earlier.
 
A further thought:
Not knocking Italy out in 1943 means that the Italian navy, such as it is, remains a headache for Allied ship movements in the Mediterranean, as a 'fleet in being'. If Churchill's concerns OTL concerns and precautions regarding Tirpitz are anything to judge by, it seems to me that the Italian navy will remain a constant thorn-in-the-side of at least British naval operations until at least the Regia Marina does surrender or every last Italian capital ship is bombed or torpedoed sufficiently to put them permanently on the sea-floor. Even without a mainland Italy invasion, I think Churchill would want a lot of submarine and air activity going after Italian ports...
 
A further thought:
Not knocking Italy out in 1943 means that the Italian navy, such as it is, remains a headache for Allied ship movements in the Mediterranean, as a 'fleet in being'. If Churchill's concerns OTL concerns and precautions regarding Tirpitz are anything to judge by, it seems to me that the Italian navy will remain a constant thorn-in-the-side of at least British naval operations until at least the Regia Marina does surrender or every last Italian capital ship is bombed or torpedoed sufficiently to put them permanently on the sea-floor. Even without a mainland Italy invasion, I think Churchill would want a lot of submarine and air activity going after Italian ports...

The Italian fleet, or more specifically the capitol ships, intermediates, and at the end the destroyers & related classes could not be fueled. There was a reason the ships of operation Pedestal were savaged by destroyers, torpedo boats, and submarines but not opposed by the heavy hitters. as 1942 spun out it had become counter productive to refuel the Italian heavy fleet.

... Even without a mainland Italy invasion, I think Churchill would want a lot of submarine and air activity going after Italian ports...

Attacking the Italian fleet with heavy & medium bombers had become a Allied air force sport in the first half of 1943. One of the reasons that after Operation Torch the fleet moved north, to reduce the number of Allied sorties possible against it. Allied airfields on the Sardinia/Corsica group means medium ranged fast bombers like the A20, B25, & B26 can ad their weight to the attack. Warships are quite vulnerable in port & the Italian fleet is not going to last long.
 
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